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The proliferation in recent decades of “stewardship model” approaches for developing a 
theology of creation, which places human beings at the center of the cosmos as caretakers 
or managers of the divine oikos, is the result of an intentional effort to correct overtly 
problematic “dominion model” approaches that have contributed both to reifying a sense 
of human sovereignty and the resulting environmental degradation. However, the first 
part of this dissertation argues that the stewardship model of creation actually operates 
under many of the same problematic presuppositions as the dominion model, and 
therefore does not offer a correction but rather a tacit re-inscription of the very same 
pitfalls. After close consideration and analysis of the stewardship model, this dissertation 
identifies scriptural, theological, and philosophical sources to support the adoption of a 
“kinship” or “community of creation” model. Drawing on postcolonial theorists and 
theologians as key critical and constructive interlocutors, this project then proposes the 
concept of “planetarity” as a framework for conceiving of the relationship between 
human and other-than-human creation, as well as the relationship between the whole of 
creation and the Creator, in a new way. This theoretical framework invites a theological 
supplément, which, this dissertation argues, is found best in the writings of the medieval 
Franciscan tradition. Several distinctive characteristics of the Franciscan theological 
 iv 
tradition offer key constructive contributions. Among these themes are the foundational 
sense of the interrelatedness, mutuality, and intended harmony of creation within the 
early spiritual texts and later Franciscan theological and philosophical writings; John 
Duns Scotus’s distinctive principle of individuation; the alternative appropriation of Peter 
John Olivi’s category of usus pauper for use in navigating the tension between creation’s 
intrinsic and instrumental value; and the application of a Franciscan understanding of the 
virtue of pietas as a proposal for environmental praxis. The result is what can be called a 
postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation imagined in terms of planetarity as 
reconceived in a theological key. It is a constructive and non-anthropocentric response to 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Problematic of Anthropocentric Theologies of Creation 
 
“But ask the animals, and they will teach you; 
 the birds of the air, and they will tell you; 
ask the plants of the earth, and they will teach you; 
 and the fish of the sea will declare to you. 
Who among all these does not know 
 that the hand of the LORD has done this? 
In his hand is the life of every living thing 
 and the breath of every human being” (Job 12:7-10) 
 
 In her essay, “Losing and Finding Creation in the Christian Tradition,” published 
a decade and a half before Ask The Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love,1 the title of 
which comes from a passage in Job selected as the opening epigraph, Elizabeth Johnson 
offers a brief survey of how the Christian tradition had suffered collective amnesia 
concerning humanity and its relationship to the rest of creation.2  What she surmises is 
that once there was a time when our Christian understanding of the created order was not 
so reduced to the extreme anthropocentrism of the dominion model of creation witnessed 
during Europe’s Industrial Revolution.  Furthermore, Johnson believes that there were 
times, particularly early in Christian history, when nonhuman creation (or what I will call 
in this dissertation “other-than-human creation”)3 was a valid starting point or subject for 
theological reflection.  Over time, however, the human eclipsed what she calls the 
                                                
 1 Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014). 
 2 See Elizabeth A. Johnson, “Losing and Finding Creation in the Christian Tradition,” in 
Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, eds. Dieter T. Hessel and 
Rosemary Radford Ruether (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1-21. 
 3 While admittedly more cumbersome than the expression “nonhuman,” I have elected to use the 
qualifier “other-than-human” in an effort to avoid a simple binary relationship that establishes humanity on 
one side and all aspects of creation outside the human species in another.  Although it is imperfect, it is my 
belief that in using the expression “other-than-human creatures” one gestures toward and, therefore, 
acknowledges the panoply of diverse creatures in existence, among which humanity is also counted. 
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“natural world” and our increasing anthropocentric outlook effectively delegitimized any 
robust theological reflection on creation as having value apart from its 
instrumentalization or utilization by human beings.  
 Though, for many reasons including that essay’s intended scope, Johnson does 
not offer a full accounting of this shift in theologies of creation, marked as they have 
been in retrospect according to models delineated as “dominion,” “stewardship,” and 
“kinship” or “community of creation.”  But her recognition that the theological tradition 
has much to offer that has been “forgotten,” overlooked, or even silenced outright follows 
naturally from her earlier work in feminist theological reflection on the problem of God 
and aligned very well with my own interest in the relationship between historical 
theological scholarship, particularly as it pertains to the medieval Franciscan tradition, as 
a source for constructive systematic theology.   
 For some time now, I have been struck by the ostensible lack of creative 
ressourcement in many theological projects responding to the environmental crises of our 
age.  In terms of immediate responses, most theological efforts of this sort have taken 
shape within the fields of moral theology or theological ethics.  Relying largely on the 
presupposition that the stewardship model of creation is the best Christian approach, 
moral theologians and ethicists have sought to establish norms and principles that can be 
applied to individual and corporate practices without ever critically engaging the 
operative model of stewardship.  Undoubtedly, this has been a welcomed improvement in 
addressing pressing concerns.  However, my interest has been motivated in part by a 
desire to interrogate the more foundational theological aspects of creation rather than 
simply engaging an uncritically received paradigm as a starting point for considering 
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ethical applications.  As will be seen in the chapters that follow, the stewardship model of 
creation contains inherent theological weaknesses, which emerge with increasingly 
clarity under critical examination from a systematic theological perspective.  I believe 
there can be another, better way to proceed.   
 Among the principles that have governed my interests in this regard stands a 
conviction about the necessity for dialogue between the fields of theology and the natural 
sciences.  While this dissertation does not go into great detail about the new and 
emerging scientific insights that could help inform ongoing theological reflection about 
creation, I do take seriously the need for such cross-disciplinary engagement and always 
keep this expectation at the fore of my theological, scriptural, and philosophical 
scholarship in this project.  Any contemporary theology of creation must be able to 
withstand basic scientific critique that is expected in our advanced scientific age.  I 
believe that there are insights and sources within Christianity for such a project.   From 
this conviction comes my interest in reexamining the Christian tradition for resources ad 
intra that have been overlooked or minimized over the centuries and yet hold potential as 
fundamental sources for a renewed theology of creation.  As will be demonstrated in this 
dissertation, many of these sources have been marginalized while a few Christian 
standard bearers have received disproportionate attention, thereby reaching a hegemonic 
status within the tradition.  For example, unlike Thomas Aquinas and the iterations of 
Thomism that have followed, the Franciscan contributions to Christian theology are not 
as widely known or utilized.  As someone whose areas of specialization includes the 
Franciscan theological and philosophical tradition, I have been especially interested in 
highlighting some of the ways these thinkers offer alternative approaches to theological 
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reflection on creation.  Furthermore, with an interest in the insights of postcolonial 
theory, I have come to recognize an allied sensibility between some key Franciscan 
resources and the work of postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak which when 
engaged together offers a potential path toward constructing a contemporary, non-
anthropocentric theology of creation.   
 What follows is the result of just such a project of drawing on underappreciated or 
overlooked theological resources in the medieval Franciscan tradition for engagement in 
a constructive theology of creation.  With the assistance of postcolonial theorists as key 
critical and constructive interlocutors, I propose that theologians move away from not 
only the dominion model of creation but also the stewardship model of creation and 
toward “imagining planetarity.”  This concept of “planetarity,” which will be examined in 
detail later in chapter five, offers contemporary theologians a critical framework for 
conceiving of the relationship between human and other-than-human creation, as well as 
the relationship between the whole of creation and the creator, in a new way.  This new 
way is my effort to “find” or remember creation as Johnson suggests in her essay.  In 
finding creation, we return to the opening quote from Job, which offers us but one 
illustration of a scriptural resource that lends theological support for what the natural 
sciences have increasingly confirmed; namely, that our anthropocentric worldview has 
skewed our understanding of our place within the community of creation and continually 
obfuscated the agency and subjectivity of other-than-human creatures.  In something of 
an anticipatory mode, this epigraph from a divine discourse in Job echoes a key 
conviction of my postcolonial Franciscan project.  Rather than overlooking and denying 
the inherent relationship and interdependence of humanity within the order of creation, 
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thereby bolstering a mistaken sense of human sovereignty as the adjudicators of 
creaturely alterity, we should turn to our creational kin to “ask” them—or, as Gayatri 
Spivak might suggest, “hear” them—and come to recognize further the rich potential that 
Christian reflection on creation presents to contemporary theology. 
 
A. Identifying the Problem 
 It is almost a cliché at this point to state that our world faces unprecedented 
ecological challenges today that require creativity, innovation and, as I will argue in this 
dissertation, a critical retrieval of often-overlooked theological resources from the 
Christian tradition to aid us in responding to the environmental “signs of the times” 
according to the Gospel.4  We have entered an epoch variously described as the 
“anthropocene,” a term first invoked by the scientist and Nobel Prize laureate Paul 
Crutzen to identify the era in which human influence has become ubiquitous throughout 
all the Earth’s systems.5  During this historical period, global climate change, the effects 
of pollution, the eradication of biomes, the extinction of species, among other continuing 
environmental travesties, have challenged theologians to reconsider both Christianity’s 
                                                
 4 Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes, no. 4 (127).  Any references to the documents of the Second 
Vatican Council are taken from The Documents of Vatican II: With Notes and Index (Strathfield: St. Paul’s 
Publications, 2009) and are cited by page number parenthetically following document paragraph 
references. 
 5 See Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, “The Anthropocene,” Global Change Newsletter 41 
(2000): 17-18; Paul Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature 415, no. 6867 (2002): 23-24; and Jan 
Zalasiewicz, Paul Crutzen, et al., “The New World of the Anthropocene,” Environmental Science & 
Technology 44 (2010): 2228-2231.  Several theologians and ethicists have readily appropriated this term in 
recent years.  For a sampling, see Iain Wallace, “Space, Place, and the Gospel: Theological Exploration in 
the Anthropocene Era,” in After Modernity? Secularity, Globalization and the Re-Enchantment of the 
World, ed. James K. A. Smith (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2008), 123-141; Willis Jenkins, “Religion 
and Ecology: A Review Essay on the Field,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 77 (2009): 187-
197; and Willis Jenkins, The Future of Ethics: Sustainability, Social Justice, and Religious Creativity 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013). 
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complicity in perpetuating these ecological problems and uncover its promise in aiding a 
response to them.6   
 This call to examine the tradition has led scholars to return to scripture as well as 
to the patristic and medieval schools to argue for the widespread rejection of the 
dominion model of creation and embrace of the stewardship approach.  Theological 
reflection on creation from the perspective of stewardship has resulted in an 
understanding of other-than-human creation as the divine oikos or the “household of 
God” within which the drama of salvation history concerning human beings unfolds, 
concretizing a theological position of anthropomonism, which means that God is 
ultimately concerned only with human creatures as it concerns salvation.  While the 
stewardship model is undoubtedly a vast improvement over the dominion model of 
creation, suggesting in turn that human beings are called to be “gardeners,” “caretakers,” 
or “stewards” of the divine oikos rather than sovereign monarchs with mandates to 
dominate other-than-human creatures, I believe that the stewardship model of creation is 
a tacit iteration of the overtly problematic dominion model.  As will be made evident in 
the following chapters, advocating stewardship with regard to the relational tie between 
humanity and the rest of creation requires a certain type of theocentric worldview that 
mirrors the ostensible bestowal of the natural world to humanity in the dominion model.  
The stewardship model of creation occludes the intrinsic relationship shared among the 
whole of creation, under which aegis I believe Christian anthropological considerations 
must first be situated (although the reverse is more typically the case).  Theologies of 
                                                
 6 The classic essay indicting Christianity is Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis,” Science 155 (1967): 1203-1207.  Some balanced responses to this essay include: Willis Jenkins, 
“After Lynn White: Religious Ethics and Environmental Problems,” Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (2009): 
283-309; and H. Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985). 
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creation that rely on stewardship as the operative discursive and conceptual frame 
inadvertently subordinate the other-than-human economy to a place of alterity and 
inherent utility, while concurrently elevating humanity to a location over and against the 
remainder of the community of creation.  Put succinctly, the first part of this dissertation 
argues that the stewardship model of creation actually operates under many of the same 
problematic presuppositions as the dominion model, and therefore does not ultimately 
offer correction but rather a tacit re-inscription of the very same pitfalls that have been 
identified as contributing to the environmental crises of our age.   
 
B. The Proposed Response 
 What is at issue here is the problematic of anthropocentric theologies of creation.  
This dissertation looks closely at the origins and development of the stewardship model 
of creation, offers a substantive theological and philosophical critique of it, and identifies 
an alternative course of theological reflection on creation in the form of a kinship or 
community of creation approach.  Despite increasing calls for such a theology of kinship 
as seen in the work of Johnson, Denis Edwards, and others, few have offered a concrete 
articulation of what, precisely, this might look like.  The constructive aim of this 
dissertation then, beyond the historical and analytical engagement with the stewardship 
approach, is to provide a preliminary vision of a non-anthropocentric theology of 
creation.   
 The process of developing a constructive theology of creation in this manner 
begins with identifying the resources within the Christian tradition that supports such an 
effort.  In highlighting the ways in which the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 8 
provide evidential material for understanding creation and humanity according to this 
community of creation context, this constructive project begins on a foundation formed 
by the normative source for Christian theological reflection.  Furthermore, in identifying 
the ways the Christian theological tradition has maintained valid and orthodox 
alternatives to both the dominion and the stewardship models of creation, this project 
benefits from the resources and nascent precedent found within the writings of major 
theologians across Christian history.  Starting in this way contributes to safeguarding the 
validity and integrity of a constructive project of this sort.   
 Relying on the insightful work of postcolonial theorists, this project draws on 
critical hermeneutics typically engaged within human society as a means to examine 
more deeply the inadequacies of hitherto received theological models for conceiving of 
creation and humanity’s place within it.  As is explained in greater detail in chapter five, 
there are many reasons why postcolonial theory presents itself as a promising operative 
hermeneutic, including several allied concerns about agency, alterity, and method.  
Furthermore, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s neologism “planetarity” offers theologians an 
especially fecund concept ideally situated for theological development and application.   
 While postcolonial theory as deployed in a critical and constructive mode offers 
theologians much in terms of the project of articulating a contemporary Christian 
theology of creation, it nevertheless remains insufficient or provisional on its own, 
thereby inviting a theological supplément to flesh out what would otherwise remain 
simply a theoretical framework.  This dissertation asserts that the Franciscan theological 
tradition, particularly as it is expressed in the work of Francis of Assisi, Bonaventure, 
John Duns Scotus, and Peter of John Olivi, provides a distinctively helpful set of 
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resources that align well with the critical spirit and positive results of postcolonial theory.  
With the figure of Francis serving as a unifying thread among otherwise seemingly 
disparate thinkers, the respective contributions of these major medieval Franciscans can 
be brought together under the heading of the postcolonial concept of “planetarity” to 
form the constitutive components of what we might call a preliminary “Franciscan 
theology of creation.”  In sum, the result of this project guides us toward a postcolonial 
Franciscan theology of creation that offers the Christian tradition an alternative paradigm 
for reflecting on creation and humanity’s place within it.  In addition to the doctrinal 
contributions such an effort provides, several ethical implications naturally arise that 
make this project valuable as a foundation for a renewal of environmental ethics.  
 
C. Overview of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into six chapters with a constructive conclusion.  In 
chapter one I provide a survey of the history and development of the so-called “dominion 
model” of creation.  This hermeneutical approach to scriptural interpretation and the 
theological tradition has been identified by a number of theorists, historians, and 
theologians as an influential factor in the human quest for domination of the other-than-
human world as well as a justification for intra-human subjugation and colonization.7  
This uncritical emphasis on human distinctiveness and sovereignty now has been largely 
rejected, and its manifold iterations over the centuries have been recently characterized as 
                                                
 7 The classic example of this is still Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” 
Science 155 (10 March 1967): 1203-1207, though others have followed suit and will be examined in this 
section of the chapter. 
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“misunderstandings or perversions” of the Christian tradition.8  This approach to 
conceiving of the whole of creation and humanity’s location within, yet above and over 
it, expresses the most overtly anthropocentric conceptualization of the human/non-human 
and the God/creation relationships. 
 In recent decades a consensus appears to have formed among theologians that the 
“dominion model” of creation is no longer tenable.9  In its place, the Christian theological 
community has advocated for what is commonly referred to as a “stewardship model” of 
creation that situates humanity within the divine oikos as “gardener,” “caretaker,” or 
“steward” of the rest of the created order.10  In so doing, the construction of a human 
vocation as steward of creation has flourished in contemporary attempts to present a 
sustainable and just vision of a Christian theology of creation.  Whereas the first section 
of this chapter is dedicated to reviewing the dominion model of creation, the second, 
third, and fourth sections of this chapter introduce the stewardship approach, 
                                                
 8 See Steven Bouma-Prediger, For the Beauty of the Earth: A Christian Vision for Creation Care 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 68-69. 
 9 The literature on this subject is far too extensive to represent adequately in this proposal. For a 
sampling, see, H. Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985); H. Paul Santmire, “Healing the Protestant Mind: Beyond the 
Theology of Human Dominion,” in After Nature’s Revolt: Eco-Justice and Theology, ed. Dieter Hessel 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 57-78; Richard Clifford, “Genesis 1-3: Permission to Exploit Nature?” 
Bible Today 26 (1988): 133-137; and Frederick Ferré, Hellfire and Lightning Rods: Liberating Science, 
Technology, and Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 154, among others. 
 10 Among the numerous and varied resources on this theme, some examples include: Theodore 
Hiebert, “The Human Vocation: Origins and Transformations in Christian Traditions,” in Christianity and 
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, eds. Dieter Hessel and Rosemary Radford Reuther 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 135-154; David Rhoads, “Stewardship of Creation,” 
Currents in Theology and Mission 36 (2009): 335-340; Jay Richards, ed., Environmental Stewardship in 
the Juedo-Christian Tradition: Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant Wisdom on the Environment (Grand 
Rapids: The Acton Institute, 2007); Douglas Hall, “Stewardship as Key to a Theology of Nature,” in 
Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, ed. R. J. Berry (New York: T & T Clark, 2006), 129-
144; Calvin DeWitt, “Stewardship: Responding Dynamically to the Consequences of Human Action in the 
World,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, 145-158; and David Toolan, At Home in the 
Cosmos (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001). For a helpful sociological overview of some of these iterations in 
the United States context, see Laurel Kearns, “Saving the Creation: Christian Environmentalism in the 
United States,” Sociology of Religion 57 (1996): 55-70. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 11 
characteristics of this model, and two short illustrations of how it is manifested in both 
Protestant and Catholic contexts. 
 The second chapter is focused on critiquing the stewardship model of creation.  
Despite the improvement over the dominion model, the various iterations of the 
stewardship model of creation have come under scrutiny in recent years. The general 
concern focuses on a belief that the stewardship model of creation is no more than a 
subtle version of the problematic dominion model.  The first section of this chapter draws 
especially from the work of Elizabeth Johnson, Clare Palmer, and Val Plumwood.  These 
theologians and philosophers develop substantive critiques that center on the often-
occluded hierarchical dualism that arises from presuppositions that ground stewardship 
approaches to creation and environmental ethics.  The question of alterity (which will 
also be explored further in chapter five through a postcolonial optic) and the unveiling of 
the stewardship model’s inextricable anthropocentrism also emerge in the work of these 
scholars, which additionally bolsters a critique of stewardship’s tenability.  The second 
section of this chapter takes the work of theologian Celia Deane-Drummond as its 
starting point. Deane-Drummond has drawn attention to the fact that the managerial 
quality of the stewardship model raises serious questions about its validity as a 
contemporary creational paradigm.  Deane-Drummond writes that, “stewardship has 
connotations of management and, arguably, implicit exploitative attitudes that principles 
of stewardship when used in an ecological context are aiming to correct.”11  While a 
stewardship model of creation might avoid the trap of making the created order as 
explicitly anthropocentric as the dominion approach, it also skirts the issue of humanity’s 
direct relationship with the rest of creation and instead resituates other-than-human 
                                                
 11 Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona: St. Mary’s Press, 2008), 84. 
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aspects of creation in an instrumental relationship to humanity.  The third section of this 
chapter presents a critique of the stewardship model in terms of its eschatological 
inadequacy. Drawing on Scripture as well as ancient and contemporary theologians, this 
section of chapter two seeks to return to a vision of the God-world relationship that 
presupposes God’s inherent relationship with all of creation independently and not 
simply according to that which is mediated through the human person. The fourth section 
of this chapter looks at contemporary critiques of philosophical anthropology that has 
been used to support the advancement of a stewardship model of creation.  The work of 
twentieth-century continental philosophers and pioneering philosophers of biology have 
troubled the apodictic presuppositions of phenomenology, particularly those found in the 
work of Martin Heidegger, whose influence on contemporary theology of creation is 
significant.  
 In chapter three attention shifts away from the critique of the received models of 
creation to the constructive resources found within the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures 
that ground a theology of kinship and provide a foundation for a robust community of 
creation paradigm.  This chapter is organized into five subsections, each of which focuses 
in on either a particular text (e.g., Genesis and Job) or a collection of related texts (e.g., 
the Prophets and the New Testament).  Genesis is a natural starting point for an 
exploration of the scriptural sources given its predominance as a starting point for 
theological reflection on creation.  Drawing on the best of biblical scholarship and 
exegesis, this section offers a renewed reading of Genesis text with an appreciation for 
the complex and, at times, ambiguous meaning of key terms and ideas.  What results is an 
illustration of how the texts of Genesis 1-2, in particular, lend support to a community of 
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creation paradigm.  The Book of Job provides perhaps the most in-depth consideration of 
a theology of creation rooted in kinship.  The second section of chapter three offers a 
close reading of key passages in Job that reveal a strong biblical grounding for a 
community of creation paradigm.  In the third section, we examine passages from the 
Wisdom Literature and the Psalms, each of which contain notable instances of support for 
the community of creation over against a stewardship or dominion perspective.  
Additionally, selections from the Hebrew Prophets provide textual evidence for a move 
toward a renewal of the Christian tradition’s theological reflection on creation.  Finally, 
the last section of this chapter explores both the Gospel accounts and the New Testament 
Letters that present significant resources for a kinship model or community of creation 
paradigm. 
 As with chapter three, chapter four continues the effort to provide substantive 
resources from within the Christian tradition for constructing a theology of creation 
rooted in a theology of kinship.  Whereas chapter three focused on particular books of the 
Bible, this chapter is organized around four central theological themes under the headings 
of which a survey of ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers is presented.  The first 
theme is the intended mutuality and interrelationship of all creation.  Here we see the rich 
patristic witness in the work of Irenaeus of Lyons, Basil of Caesarea, and Augustine; the 
unexpected resources of Thomas Aquinas; and the contemporary work of Rosemary 
Radford Reuther, Elizabeth Johnson, Jürgen Moltmann, and Denis Edwards come 
together in support of creation’s a prior interrelationship and the divine intention for 
creational mutuality revealed in the tradition.  The second theme is what I call the 
“cosmic chorus,” which is perhaps best championed by Francis of Assisi in his 
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articulation of all creation’s prayerful relationship to the Creator as we will see later in 
chapter six.  In the meantime, we return to the writings of Basil and Augustine, consider 
the mystical insights of John of the Cross, and examine the modern contributions of 
Thomas Merton and Thomas Berry on this theme, which point toward the inherent 
relationship all creation has with the Creator independent of human mediation.  The third 
theme is an invitation to reconsider the classical anthropocentric reading of the doctrine 
of Imago Dei.  Exploration of this theme includes a reexamination of the limited Genesis 
accounts that form the scriptural impetus for the doctrine and an exploration of the 
contemporary work of theologians who take seriously what the natural and social 
sciences have told us about human and other-than-human creatures.  Categories typically 
reserved as distinctive for the human person have been put into question by ethologists 
and other scientists in recent years, which, combined with the theological resources in 
scripture and tradition, offers an opportunity for a more-capacious understanding of how 
creation bears the image and likeness of God.  This is a theme that will also appear later 
in chapter six as found in the work of medieval Franciscan theologians.  Finally, the 
fourth theme is the relationship between God and creation.  Starting with an affirmation 
of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, this section examines the contemporary contributions 
of Brian Robinette, Rowan Williams, and Kathyrn Tanner on the immanence of God in 
creation and the restoring of the relationship between protology and eschatology within 
the Christian tradition.  This theme highlights God as the singular source of creaturely 
alterity, a principle that will be fleshed out in the conclusion. 
 Chapter five inaugurates a critical move in the effort to develop a constructive 
theology of creation that takes the sources presented in the previous chapter seriously, 
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while concurrently advancing the conversation with the aid of contemporary critical 
theory.  This chapter contains four parts.  The first section of this chapter provides an 
overview to the field of postcolonial theory.  It surveys, in brief, the foundational work of 
thinkers including Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, while 
also tracing the poststructuralist foundations from which postcolonial theory originally 
emerged.  The second section of this chapter offers and introduction to and background 
for Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, including a brief biography, a highlighting of key 
themes in her work, and an overview of the development of her neologism “planetarity.”  
The third section traces the recent engagement with postcolonial theory by Christian 
theologians. Scholars from diverse subfields including systematic theology, theological 
ethics, and scripture studies have all been attracted to the potential postcolonial theory 
offers for critical engagement with both the tradition and contemporary experience.  
Among those considered in this section are Catherine Keller, Mayra Rivera, Susan 
Abraham, Dhawn Martin, Stephen Moore, and R. S. Sugirtharajah, among others.  
Though Spivak does not present her admittedly tentative vision of planetarity in overtly 
religious terms, some theologians have identified the latent potential for conceiving of 
planetarity in a theological register.  The primary aim of this section is to develop the 
theological valence of planetarity as such. 
 In chapter six we turn to the Franciscan tradition in order to provide the 
postcolonial theory with a theological supplément.  This chapter is organized into six 
parts.  The first section of this chapter returns to the origins of the Franciscan movement 
and the vernacular theology of Francis of Assisi.12   The second section offers what I am 
                                                
 12 On the subject of “vernacular theology,” see Bernard McGinn, “Meister Eckhart and the 
Beguines in the Context of Vernacular Theology,” in Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics: Hadewijch 
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calling a “methodological interlude” to address the challenges and opportunities found 
when engaging the Franciscan tradition and the sources therein.  Section three of this 
chapter draws on the thought of several Franciscan theologians and philosophers to 
examine the interdependent relationship shared among the whole community of creation, 
as well as the mutuality and harmony of order in creation.  The fourth section is centered 
on the unique contributions Scotus’s work presents for a contemporary theology of 
creation. Under examination is Scotus’s distinctive principle of individuation (commonly 
referred to as haecceitas). This philosophical approach to addressing the question of the 
relationship between particulars and universals challenges a utilitarian or purely 
instrumental view of both the human and other-than-human dimensions of creation. The 
Scotist concept of haecceitas invites further reflection on creation’s source of alterity, de-
centering the human person as the adjudicator of otherness and subjectivity, and 
recognizes God as the source of all creation, thereby recognizing that each aspect of the 
created order has inherent dignity and value.  The fifth section of this chapter takes as its 
focus the perennial question of how to negotiate the tension between the instrumental and 
intrinsic value of creation.  The argument advanced in this section is that Olivi’s proposal 
for interpreting the commitment to evangelical poverty in terms of “poor use” (usus 
pauper) offers a constructive heuristic for those seeking to discern how to approach 
various aspects of the created order.  Finally, the last section of this chapter returns 
primarily to the work of Bonaventure and his understanding of the virtue of pietas, which 
                                                                                                                                            
of Brabant, Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Marguerite Porete, ed. Bernard McGinn (New York: 
Continuum, 1994), 4-14; Bernard McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New 
Mysticism — 1200-1350 (New York: Crossroads, 1998); and Dominic Monti, “Francis as Vernacular 
Theologian: A Link to the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition?” in The Franciscan Intellectual Tradition: 
Washington Theological Union Symposium Papers 2001, ed. Elise Saggau (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan 
Institute Publications, 2002), 21-42. 
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he often predicated of Francis of Assisi.  According to its classical origin and preliminary 
usage, pietas is understood as that characteristic of one in right relationship with one’s 
family, nation, and deity.  It denotes the familial duty owed to another and the exhibition 
of this virtue reflects full commitment to and completion of this duty.  Whereas Olivi’s 
usus pauper hermeneutic suggests ways in which we might discern utilizing those 
necessary aspects of the created order according to their respective instrumental value, 
Bonaventure’s understanding of pietas offers us a novel way to consider how we care for 
our fellow creational kin, arising from recognition of the intrinsic value of all creation 
and an affirmation of our participation in the singular community of creation. 
 This dissertation concludes with a short constructive chapter that seeks to present 
what imagining a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation looks like.  This chapter is 
organized into four parts.  The first section presents the hermeneutical frame of 
theological imagination for the constructive project of developing a non-anthropocentric 
theology of creation.  The second section is the most constructive aspect of this chapter 
and it is organized into three subsections according to which the notion of planetarity as 
introduced by postcolonial theory and the theological supplément of the Franciscan 
tradition are engaged.  These subsections include the headings of particularity and 
alterity, interrelatedness and community, and subjugated epistemologies and creation as 
subaltern.  The third section briefly presents some ethical implications of a postcolonial 
Franciscan theology of creation, a project that is intentionally bracketed for further 
development at another time.  The last section of this chapter provides a short conclusion. 
 This project is my contribution toward responding to the challenges of our 
anthropocene era.  By critically examining our theological tradition, identifying fecund 
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resources for constructive engagement, and proposing postcolonial Franciscan theology 
of creation by means of imagining planetarity, I hope to fulfill our Vatican II mandate to 
read the environmental “signs of the times” in light of the Gospel and the Christian 
theological tradition.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Tracing The Development of the Stewardship Model of Creation 
 
 The emergence of the so-called “stewardship model” of creation within the 
Christian tradition is the result of several converging factors.  Though some scholars have 
long interpreted the Genesis creation narratives in ways closely resembling more modern 
iterations of a stewardship approach,13 its current iteration in manifold form emerged 
largely in response to the increase in environmental degradation witnessed during the 
postindustrial age.14  The most often-cited study ascribing culpability to Christianity for 
encouraging, or at least bolstering, negative human activity in nature is Lynn White, Jr.’s 
now-classic 1968 article, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis.”15  White’s 
argument is that the Christian doctrine of creation, which he claims has interpreted 
Genesis 1:28’s call for humanity to “have dominion” over the other-than-human aspects 
of creation as a divine mandate for environmental despotism,16 bears significant 
responsibility for what he calls “environmental deterioration” in the West.  White’s 
article served as a clarion call for theologians and biblical scholars to respond to the 
challenge of his historical interpretation.  As a result, many theologians accepted White’s 
premise, recognizing that – regardless of the actual degree to which Christianity as such 
was responsible – much of the Christian theological tradition had been operating under 
                                                
 13 For more, see James Barr, “The Ecological Controversy and the Old Testament,” Bulletin of the 
John Rylands Library 55 (1972): 9-32. 
 14 This argument is found in manifold locations and argued by various scholars. For one example, 
see Calvin DeWitt, “Stewardship: Responding Dynamically to the Consequences of Human Action in the 
World,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives – Past and Present, ed. R. J. Berry (London: 
T & T Clark, 2006), 145-158. 
 15 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155 (1968): 1203-1207. 
 16 The verse reads: “God blessed them, and God said to them, ‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the 
earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every 
living thing that moves on the earth” (NRSV). 
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certain presumptions that could be identified as contributing to the contemporary 
environmental problematic.  Efforts to reconceive the doctrine of creation followed, aided 
by renewed interpretations of Scripture that took seriously the historical-critical method.  
The result was the rise of a stewardship model of creation in its myriad iterations.17  
 This chapter is an historical examination of the stewardship model of creation’s 
development.  First, I will review the sources for and contexts of the dominion model of 
creation.  Second, I will trace the emergence of the stewardship model of creation as a 
response to what became increasingly recognized as the problematic and inadequate 
dominion approach.  Third, I will briefly present a working typology of the stewardship 
model based on four key characteristics, which offers a helpful framework given the 
stewardship model’s concurrent proliferation and variation in contemporary theological 
reflections on creation.  Finally, drawing upon this typological frame, I will offer two 
contemporary iterations of the stewardship model of creation as illustrations and 
examples. 
                                                
 17 Among the numerous and varied resources on this theme, some examples include: Theodore 
Hiebert, “The Human Vocation: Origins and Transformations in Christian Traditions,” in Christianity and 
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, ed. Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford 
Ruether (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 135-154; David Rhoads, “Stewardship of Creation,” 
Currents in Theology and Mission 36 (2009): 335-340; Jay Richards, ed., Environmental Stewardship in 
the Judeo-Christian Tradition: Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant Wisdom on the Environment (Grand 
Rapids: The Acton Institute, 2007); Douglas John Hall, “Stewardship as Key to a Theology of Nature,” in 
Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, 129-144; Calvin DeWitt, “Stewardship: Responding 
Dynamically to the Consequences of Human Action in the World,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical 
Perspectives, 145-158; David Toolan, At Home in the Cosmos (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2001); Ken 
Gnanakan, God’s World: A Theology of the Environment (London: SPCK, 1999); Calvin DeWitt, et al., 
Caring for Creation: Responsible Stewardship of God’s Handiwork (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
1998); Drew Christiansen and Walter Grazer, And God Saw That It Was Good: Catholic Theology and the 
Environment (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1996); Fred Van Dyke et al., Redeeming 
Creation: The Biblical Basis for Environmental Stewardship (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 1996); 
Loren Wilkinson, ed., Earthkeeping in the Nineties: Stewardship of Creation (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 1991); Douglas John Hall, The Steward: A Biblical Symbol Come of Age (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 1990); and Sean McDonagh, To Care for the Earth (Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Company, 
1986).  For a helpful sociological overview of some of these iterations in the United States context, see 
Laurel Kearns, “Saving the Creation: Christian Environmentalism in the United States,” Sociology of 
Religion 57 (1996): 55-70. 
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A. Reviewing the Dominion Model of Creation 
 What we today recognize as the dominion model of creation appears on the 
theological scene after centuries of development and shifting contexts.  Contributing to 
this model is a history of biblical interpretation and changing cultural influences that 
finds its origins in pre-modern Hellenistic philosophy, leading to an early and 
foundational anthropocentric view of human dominion “understood as a static fact.”18  At 
the center of this development is a tradition of interpreting the Priestly creation narrative 
found in Genesis 1.  Consideration of what is meant by the Hebrew terms rādâ (“have 
dominion”) in Genesis 1:26 and kābaš (“subdue”) in Genesis 1:28 has shaped the 
operative ecological-anthropological hermeneutic in ways now recognized by many as 
problematic.  Yet, despite the modern presumption of dominion-model ubiquity prior to 
the widespread adoption of the stewardship model, the history of interpretation reflects a 
more complex emergence of biblical interpretation and theological reflection that 
established an ecological worldview in which humanity stands over against the rest of 
creation.  For the sake of simplicity and brevity, I have organized the following review of 
the dominion model’s emergence according to four generally defined epochs: the pre-
modern Hellenistic influence, Italian humanism during the Renaissance, the development 
of modern natural sciences and philosophy, and the industrial and technological ages. 
 
1. Pre-Modern Hellenistic Influence 
                                                
 18 Richard Bauckham, “Modern Domination of Nature: Historical Origins and Biblical Critique,” 
in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives – Past and Present, ed. R. J. Berry (London: T & T 
Clark, 2006), 32-33. 
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 The Hellenistic influence on Christian interpretations of Genesis 1, both in terms 
of the Platonic and Aristotelian strains, have had a profound and lasting effect on the 
biblical interpretation and theological imagination over the centuries.  In addition to its 
having shaped interpretations of Genesis 1:26 and 1:28, specifically, the Hellenistic 
philosophical milieu is in part responsible for what David Clough has described as 
“human separatist” readings of the Imago Dei passage in Genesis 1:27.19  The whole of 
Genesis 1:26-28 offers a pericope that lends itself to anthropocentric interpretation when 
read through the lens of Greek philosophical anthropology.  J. Richard Middleton has 
argued compellingly that exegetes and theologians who have not taken the broader intra-
biblical context seriously in the case of Genesis 1:26-28 “turn to extrabiblical, usually 
philosophical, sources to interpret the image and end up reading contemporaneous 
conceptions of being human back into the Genesis text.”20  Similarly, Hendrikus Berkhof 
has even suggested that, “by studying how systematic theologies have poured meaning 
into Gen. 1:26 one could write a piece of Europe’s cultural history.”21   
 In approaching the question of meaning around rādâ (“have dominion”), selem 
(“image”), and kābaš (“subdue”) in Genesis 1:26-28, “Most patristic, medieval, and 
modern interpreters typically asked not an exegetical, but a speculative question: in what 
way are humans like God and unlike animals?”22  With little concern for the textual or 
contextual evidence found in the Hebrew Bible, exegetes and theologians turned to 
philosophical anthropology for answers.   
                                                
 19 See David Clough, “All God’s Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human and Nonhuman 
Animals,” in Reading Genesis After Darwin, eds. Stephen C. Barton and David Wilkinson (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 145-161. 
 20 J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: 
Brazos Press, 2005), 17. 
 21 Hendrikus Berkhof, Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith, trans. Sierd 
Woodstra (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1979), 179. 
 22 Middleton, The Liberating Image, 18-19. 
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 Emblematic of this anthropological outlook is Aristotle’s distinguishing 
characterization of the human person as the animal rationabile.23  This Aristotelian 
demarcation between human and other-than-human creatures represents an often-cited 
truism concerning the distinguishing quality of the human person as that which stands 
apart from the irrational matter found in the rest of creation.  While the Aristotelian 
anthropological axiom generally summarizes the view of humanity’s unique status during 
this time period and earlier, it is the First-Century Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria 
(ca. 25 BCE – ca. 50 CE) who is credited with having the most significant impact on the 
Christian history of interpreting Genesis as it pertains to humanity’s relationship within 
creation.   
 Reflecting a combination of sources including Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and late 
Middle Platonism, Philo’s writings can best be described as an attempt at synthesizing 
Greek philosophy with the Hebrew Scriptures.24  Richard Bauckham asserts that, “all the 
ingredients of the Christian reading of Genesis in Aristotelian and Stoic terms are to be 
found already in the first-century Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, who did so 
much to interpret Jewish monotheistic faith in Hellenistic philosophical terms and from 
whom some of the early Fathers learned how to do the same for their Christian faith.”25  
                                                
 23 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.13, trans. F. H. Peters (New York: Barnes and Noble 
Books, 2004), 21-24. Here Aristotle distinguishes between the “two parts” of the soul, the irrational and 
rational, that latter being that which primarily distinguishes human beings from other animals. 
 24 See Gregory E. Sterling, “‘The Jewish Philosophy’: Reading Moses via Hellenistic Philosophy 
according to Philo,” in Reading Philo: A Handbook to Philo of Alexandria, ed. Torrey Seland (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2014), 129-155. 
 25 Richard Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures: Green Exegesis and Theology (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2011), 20. 
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Among the most influential of Philo’s works in this regard are his treatises De 
Animalibus and De opificio mundi.26 
 In his De Animalibus, Philo argues in dialogue with his nephew Alexander about 
whether or not various other-than-human animals exhibit signs of rational behavior.  
Alexander’s presentation, which occupies nearly three quarters of the text, includes 
illustrations from the animal kingdom such as witnessed in the behaviors of spiders, bees, 
monkeys, elephants, falcons, among others.  The last part of the dialogue, in which we 
hear Philo’s response, is, as Clough describes so well, “a brisk judgment that all of these 
[animal behaviors] are done naturally by the creatures, rather than by foresight: while 
their actions look similar to those of human beings, they are without thought, and the 
complexity of their actions is attributable to the way they are designed, rather than to 
their own rationality.”27  In his commentary on De Animalibus, Abraham Terian argues 
that, “the work as a whole is basically anthropological” and that Philo’s use of other-
than-human animals in the dialogue was only to defend the Aristotelian notion that it is 
reason that distinguishes humans from the rest of creation.28 
 In his De opificio mundi, Philo specifically focuses on the book of Genesis with 
an eye toward identifying the qualitative difference between humans and other-than-
human creatures.  Rather than any corporeal justification for a distinction (something that 
both the creation narrative in Genesis 2 and the advent of modern natural sciences would 
trouble), Philo turns to the noumenal, stating that the distinctive – and superior – quality 
                                                
 26 See Abraham Terian, Philonis Alexandrini de Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an 
Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) and “On The Creation,” in 
The Works of Philo, ed. Charles D. Yonge (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2013), 3-24. 
 27 Clough, “All God’s Creatures,” 146. 
 28 Terian, Philonis Alexandrini de Animalibus, 112. 
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of humanity is identified “in respect to the mind, the sovereign element of the soul.”29  
Later in De opificio mundi, Philo goes into greater detail about why human beings are 
superior to the rest of creation according to four general reasons, all of which relate to 
Philo’s understanding that God created humans chronologically last.  Clough summarizes 
Philo’s arguments well: 
 
First, just as the giver of a banquet ensures that everything is prepared 
before the guests arrive, so God wanted human beings to experience a 
‘banquet and sacred display’ of all the things intended for their use and 
enjoyment.  Second, human beings were created last so it might be 
instructive to future generations that God provided abundantly for their 
ancestors.  Third, God wanted to unite earth and heaven by making heaven 
first and human beings last, since human beings are a ‘miniature heaven.’  
Finally, human beings had to arrive last so that, in appearing suddenly 
before the other animals, the other animals might be amazed, do homage 
to their master, and be tamed.30 
 
As Middleton and others have noted, Philo and many of those who will come after him 
do not concern themselves with the biblical text itself, but rather read the philosophical 
anthropology of their Aristotelian, Stoic, and Platonic tradition into Genesis.31  This 
eisegetical form of interpretation concretized an absolute demarcation between humanity 
and the rest of creation, which was characterized in terms of rationality. 
 In the immediately ensuing centuries the early Christian theologians and 
philosophers, including Origen, Lactantius, and Nemesius, among others, adopted “this 
                                                
 29 Philo, “On The Creation” no. 23, in The Works of Philo, 10. Also, Philo states: “And let no one 
think that he is able to judge of this likeness [i.e., imago Dei] from the characters of the body: for neither is 
God a being with the form of a man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is 
spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind: for the mind which exists 
in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its 
primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which carries it about and bears its image within 
it” (10-11). 
 30 Clough, “All God’s Creatures,” 146-147. 
 31 For more, see Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in 
Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967). 
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highly anthropocentric view of the world [derived] not from the biblical tradition but 
from Aristotle and the Stoics.”32  Even in later centuries theologians ranging from 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to John Calvin and Karl Barth would presuppose that the 
verses contained in Genesis 1:26-28 unequivocally parallel the otherwise axiomatic 
Aristotelian presupposition that human beings, and human beings alone, are “rational 
animals.”  Rationality becomes the demarcating feature that justifies human superiority 
and, consequently, sovereignty.  The sovereignty of humans is analogous to the rule of 
God and understood in terms of a divine bestowal of the non-human created order as the 
oikos and abundant resource to human beings.  As Philo’s first reason for human 
superiority rooted in the perceived chronological order of creation makes clear above, all 
things were created for the “use and enjoyment” of human beings.  Some even argued 
that God had created those creatures that appeared to be useless to humanity, including 
non-living aspects of creation, for some ancillary human use such as for tropology, 
pedagogy, or aesthetic pleasure.33 
 This interpretation of the Genesis text becomes the longstanding thread that 
undergirds the Western Patristic and Medieval theological outlook.  Though human 
domination in terms of exploitation of all other-than-human creation is not present in its 
more modern instantiation, which has been traced as a contributing cause of the current 
                                                
 32 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 21. A telling example of an early Christian theologian 
adopting the perspective found in Philo and other Hellenistic thinkers of the time is Didymus the Blind 
who, in commenting on Genesis 1:28, wrote: “God has made [the gift of dominion to humanity] in order 
that land for growing and land for mining, rich in numerous, diverse materials, be under the rule of the 
human being.  Actually, the human being receives bronze, iron, silver, gold, and many other metals from 
the ground; it is also rendered to him so that he can feed and clothe himself.  So great is the dominion the 
human being has received over the land that he transforms it technologically – when he changes it into 
glass, pottery, and other similar things.  This is in effect what it means for the human being to rule the 
whole earth.” [Cited in Jeremy Cohen, ‘Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It’: The Ancient 
and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 227]. 
 33 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 21. 
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environmental crises, the absolute and qualitative distinction of the human person in 
contrast to the rest of creation is the seed for what will germinate in the European 
Renaissance era and blossom most fully in post-Enlightenment philosophy.34  In the 
intervening time, notably during the Middle Ages, allegorical interpretation of scripture 
led to a rendering of dominion as the mandate for human persons to engage more actively 
with the natural world for the purposes not of exploitation, but “knowledge of things” 
according to which humans were then able to bring other-than-human creation under their 
control.  Peter Harrison highlights the enduring influence of the Hellenistic philosophical 
outlook when he writes: 
 
The rediscovery of ancient Greek knowledge during the course of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries thus inspired a more direct engagement 
with the empirical world, adding a new dimension, the idea of dominion 
over nature. Yet we still do not encounter an explicit ideology of material 
exploitation of the world. Rather, the new emphasis is on the intellectual 
mastery of the knowledge of living things.35 
 
The absence of an explicit exploitative attitude toward the natural world found in the 
medieval anthropocentric view, which focused on rational distinctiveness of humanity, 
will not last far beyond the fifteenth century apart from marginal exceptions.36  As 
Bauckham succinctly summarizes for us, “the dominant theological tradition before the 
modern period did articulate a strongly anthropocentric view of the human dominion, 
largely as a result of imposing on the biblical texts understandings of the human 
                                                
 34 See Peter Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the Exploitation 
of Nature,” Journal of Religion 79 (1999): 90-96; and Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 24. 
 35 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 93. 
 36 Here one might think of some of the Franciscan and Eastern Christian views of creation, the 
former will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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relationship to nature were of Greek, rather than biblical, origin.”37  The next section will 
explore how the significant shifts in theological reflection on the human person in 
relationship to creation unfolded after the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
 
2. Italian Humanism During the Renaissance 
 Richard Bauckham has argued that the modern notion of dominion as a biblical 
mandate for human sovereignty vis-à-vis the rest of creation gains significant momentum 
in the writing of Italian humanists during the Renaissance.  “The Renaissance humanists 
were preoccupied with the theme of the supreme dignity of humanity, which they not 
infrequently expounded as exegesis of Genesis 1:26.”38  Whereas the earlier readings of 
Genesis 1, shaped as they were by Greek philosophical anthropology, held that the earth 
existed precisely for human use, the reading of Genesis 1 that emerged in the writing of 
the Renaissance humanists took a more decisive turn toward an anthropocentricity that 
explicitly elevated human beings over and above the rest of the created order.39  
Bauckham summarizes the shift in Renaissance outlook well: 
 
A striking feature of the Renaissance humanist idea of humanity is that the 
vertical relationship of humanity to nature (human beings as rulers over 
the rest of creation) is emphasized to the virtual exclusion of the horizontal 
relationship of humanity to nature (human beings as creatures who share 
with other creatures a common creaturely relationship to the Creator). 
Humanity’s place within creation is abolished in favor of humanity’s 
exaltation above creation.40 
 
                                                
 37 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 28. 
 38 Bauckham, “Modern Domination of Nature,” 33. 
 39 A helpful study of this intellectual and cultural shift is Charles Trinkhaus, In Our Image and 
Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). 
 40 Bauckham, “Modern Domination of Nature,” 34. 
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This Renaissance amplification of the earlier tradition of Hellenistic readings of the 
Genesis creation narratives begins to bear out in practical ways.  Whereas in the Patristic 
and medieval periods the interpretation of Genesis suggested humans had a form of 
“moral and intellectual dominion” with regard to the rest of creation, by the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, Genesis 1:26-28 “is now read by most commentators as having to do 
with the exercise of control not in the mind, but in the natural world.”41  Peter Harrison, 
among others, attributes this development to a shift in style of biblical interpretation.42  
Harrison writes: 
 
The literal approach to texts that, from the sixteenth century onward, 
becomes a hallmark of modern hermeneutics, meant that natural objects 
were no longer to be treated as symbols.  The fundamental presupposition 
of allegorical interpretation was that natural objects could function, like 
words, as signs…now the injunction to exercise dominion over birds and 
beasts was taken quite literally to refer to the actual exercise of power over 
things of nature, its sense no longer being distributed across allegorical, 
anagogical, or tropological readings. The beasts of Genesis did not 
represent impulses of the mind, which needed to be bridled by reason, nor 
was the desired control of living things to be achieved merely through 
systematically ordering them in the mind.  Adam had once literally been 
lord of all the creatures, and this was the kind of dominion sought by his 
seventeenth-century imitators.  With the turn away from the allegorical 
interpretation, the things of nature lost their referential functions, and the 
dominion over nature spoken of in the book of Genesis took on an 
unprecedented literal significance.43 
 
What began to emerge in Renaissance-era writing on Genesis and humanity’s role in 
God’s plan for creation was a reification of the unique and superior quality of the human 
                                                
 41 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 96. 
 42 For example, see John Black, The Dominion of Man: The Search for Ecological Responsibility 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1970), 32-43. 
 43 Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 97-98. Also, see Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and 
the Rise of Natural Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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person over the rest of creation in a way that reflects an inherent right to sovereign rule.44   
There is a magnification of the human person such that humanity begins to be considered 
“god-like.”  Bauckham explains that this increasingly dominant way of thinking led to a 
“rejection of the idea that humanity occupies a given, fixed place within the created 
order.”  Instead, “Human beings are understood as uniquely free to make of themselves 
what they will and to transcend all limits.  In effect, humanity becomes a kind of god in 
relation to the world.  Human creatureliness is forgotten in the intoxication with human 
godlikeness. The Renaissance humanist vision of humanity is of a creative and sovereign 
god over the world.”45 
 Several Renaissance authors return to the classical foundations of Hellenism in 
affirming their reading of humanity’s uniqueness, which then serves as the starting point 
for this extreme rendering of human sovereignty.  Charles Trinkaus offers us examples of 
Italian Renaissance humanist writers who represent the development of a new way of 
thinking about the human person; these include Giannozzo Manetti and Marsilio Ficino.46  
These authors oftentimes apply to the human person attributes and descriptors 
traditionally reserved for God as Creator, which signals an increasing anthropocentrism.  
As Bauckham explains, this shift goes back to these authors’ interpretation of Genesis 
                                                
 44 Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, 192. 
 45 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 44. 
 46 Giannozzo Manetti (1396-1459) was an Italian diplomat and someone who read biblical 
Hebrew. His interest in the translation of scripture is best seen in his Apologeticus in which he argues the 
need for a new translation of the Bible and encourages the study of biblical languages.  See his forthcoming 
work in translation, A Translator’s Defense, trans. Mark Young and ed. Myron McShane (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2015).  Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) was an Italian Catholic Priest and an 
influential humanist philosopher.  Known for translating the works of Plato into Latin, Ficino was a prolific 
writer.  For more, see Michael Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His 
Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2002). 
 Recent scholarship has suggested a variety of “Renaissance strands,” which highlights the 
diversity of thought and influence in this time period. For more on alternative Renaissance perspectives, see 
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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1:26-28, particularly the meaning of Imago Dei.  “The image of God in human nature is 
understood not simply as the rational or moral capacity that distinguishes humans from 
other creatures, as the dominant theological tradition had [previously] understood it, but 
as likeness to God in the divine activity of creating and mastering the world.”47 
 Manetti represents a line of thinking that emphasizes the human capacity for 
creative activity and technological development.  In his tellingly titled treatise De 
dignitate et excellentia hominis, Manetti observed that: 
 
After that first, new and rude creation of the world [by God], everything 
seems to have been discovered, constructed and completed by us out of 
some singular and outstanding acuteness of the human mind…the world 
and all its beauties seems to have been first invented and established by 
Almighty God for the use of man, and afterwards gratefully received by 
man and rendered much more beautiful, much more ornate, and far more 
refined.48 
 
One can begin to see the slippage in the anthropological presuppositions of the author.  It 
begins with a received anthropocentrism that saw humanity as clearly distinct from both 
God and other-than-human creation toward the novel quasi-divine status of humanity 
completing and perfecting the otherwise preliminary divine act of creation.  This is made 
more overt in the writing of Ficino, who writes that, “Man at last imitates all the works of 
divine nature and perfects, corrects, and modifies the works of lower nature.”49 
 Ficino elevates humanity to such a place above the rest of creation that human 
beings become like terrestrial demiurges.  He goes so far as to say that, “Universal 
providence is proper to God who is the universal cause.  Therefore man who universally 
provides for things living is a certain god.  He is the god without doubt of the animals 
                                                
 47 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 44. 
 48 Cited in Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, 247. 
 49 Cited in Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, 482. 
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since he uses all of them, rules them, and teaches some of them.  He is established also as 
god of the elements since he inhabits and cultivates them all.”50  Interestingly, Ficino also 
anticipates some later philosophical developments of the modern period in observing, 
albeit it in a seemingly uncritical way, that human beings “will not be satisfied with the 
empire of this world, if, having conquered this one, he learns there remains another world 
which he has not yet subjugated.”51  What is articulated here is a kind of pre-Nietzschean 
conceptualization of the human “will to power.”  This capacity for human manipulation 
of the other-than-human world is understood as evidence of the divine-like sovereignty 
Ficino and others of the Renaissance era read into Genesis, particularly in their 
interpretation of the Imago Dei.   
 Without overstating the matter, it is evident that a conceptual shift in Western 
literature during the Renaissance, especially among Italian humanist writers, marks the 
emergence of a new form of anthropocentric reflection on creation.  Rather than 
understanding humanity’s distinctiveness simply in terms of rationality and morality, the 
Renaissance authors advanced a vision of the human person as divine in relation to the 
rest of creation.  This earthen divinity was understood in terms of humanity’s apparently 
limitless capacity for creativity, technology, and manipulation of the natural world.  The 
notion that other-than-human creation was given not just for the sustenance of humanity, 
but for humanity’s complete and discretionary usage of it now saturated the theological 
and philosophical context.  The next section explores what might be described as the 
pinnacle of the dominion model’s emergence in the origins of empirical and natural 
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 51 Cited in Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, 491. 
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science, the key contributions of Francis Bacon in the establishment of modern science, 
and the role of René Descartes’s modern philosophy. 
 
3. The Development of Modern Natural Sciences and Philosophy 
 Though best known for his contribution to establishing what has come to be 
called the modern scientific method, scholars also assert that Francis Bacon has played a 
key role in the development of the dominion model of creation.52  Bauckham argues that 
it was, in fact, not his work in terms of methodology that reflects Bacon’s main 
contribution to modern science.  Rather, this more significant contribution “lay rather in 
his vision of organized scientific research with a utopian goal to be realized through 
scientific innovation and progress.”53  Bacon’s insight was dependent on the renewal of 
anthropocentrism characteristic of the Renaissance humanists and the classical 
Hellenistic vision of human distinctiveness before that.  With an appreciation for what the 
Italian humanists describe as the homo faber characteristics of humanity’s god-like 
creativity, Bacon believed that scientific discovery and human manipulation of the 
natural world were means to carrying out a divinely mandated call for humanity to 
subdue the earth.  Bauckham explains:  
 
Central to Bacon’s vision of scientific progress was his understanding of 
the goal of science as the implementation of the God-given human 
                                                
 52 Given the limitations of length and scope, I have elected to offer a brief examination of the 
contributions of two major figures from this era – one in the sciences (Bacon) and one in philosophy 
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dominion over nature, which Bacon himself presented as the meaning of 
Genesis 1:28.  Taking entirely for granted the traditional view that the rest 
of creation exists for the sake of humanity, Bacon understands the human 
dominion as humanity’s right and power to use nature for human benefit.54 
 
While most consider Bacon’s scientific methodology through the lens of modern notions 
of objectivity, in truth it was Bacon’s own interpretation of Genesis that governed his 
approach to the natural world and intellectual inquiry.  He believed that because of The 
Fall human persons had lost not only their state of innocence, but also true “dominion 
over creation.”  Bacon insisted that there were two means by which these losses could be 
repaired: innocence through religion and dominion through science.55  Bauckham says as 
much in asserting that, “[Bacon] effectively drew a firm distinction between the 
restoration of human innocence, which was the province of religion, and the restoration 
of human dominion, which would be accomplished by science and technology.”56   
 Bacon believed that scientific inquiry was a means of human dominion, seeking 
to restore true sovereignty to the human person that was bestowed by the Creator and 
subsequently lost by sin.  In several locations, Bacon expresses this vision by affirming 
humanity’s efforts “to extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the 
universe,” which he also stated was “a work truly divine.”57  The pervasiveness of 
anthropocentricism is immediately recognizable when one considers Bacon’s primary 
motive is centered on human progress and development.  Bauckham argues that this is 
the first time we witness the modern notion that scientific advancement and technological 
                                                
 54 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 48. 
 55 See Francis Bacon, “Novum Organon,” in The Works of Francis Bacon, eds. James Spedding, 
Robert Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 15 volumes (London: Longman, 1857-1858), 4:247-248.  The 
entire fifteen-volume collection is now available online: 
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 56 Bauckham, Living With Other Creatures, 49.  Also, see Harrison, “Subduing the Earth,” 98. 
 57 Bacon, “Valerius Terminus” and “Novum Organon,” in The Works of Francis Bacon, 3:223 and 
4:114, respectively. 
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progress is unassailable when used to “liberate humanity from all the ills of the human 
condition,” which dates back to The Fall according to Bacon’s paradigm.58  Bacon 
recognizes no intrinsic or non-utilitarian value in other-than-human creation, but rather 
sees nature as something to be “conquered.”59   
 Though Bacon’s anthropocentrism is evocative of his intellectual predecessors in 
both the ancient and Renaissance eras, there is at least one distinguishing characteristic in 
his thought worth noting.  While Bacon appropriates rationality as the key distinction 
leading to human superiority over the rest of creation, he does not go so far as to claim 
that human beings are divine or like gods, not even in an analogous sense as did his 
Italian humanist predecessors.  Rather, he criticizes this notion of human deification, 
claiming that such hubris actually interferes with the more authentic quest of the human 
person to learn from the natural world, master its laws, and control it through divinely 
imparted dominion.  Bacon insisted that those who claimed humans were like gods on 
earth misunderstood the role that the intellect and knowledge play in the effort to restore 
human innocence and dominion.60  Recognizing the pervasive “Judeo-Christian” view 
Bacon espoused, John Passmore has nevertheless summarized what he understands to be 
the neo-Pelagianism of Bacon’s worldview.  Passmore maintains that Bacon held that, 
“What sin had shattered, science could in large part repair: man could become not only 
the titular but the actual lord of nature.  This was by no means the orthodox Christian 
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teaching; it amounted to saying that man, as distinct from God, could bring the world into 
the ideal state which Isaiah had prophesied.”61 
 The case of Bacon’s writing and influence is representative of a liminal moment 
in the history of philosophy, theology, and science.  Though his starting point was 
admittedly religious, drawing on an interpretation of Genesis undoubtedly informed by 
the anthropocentric tradition that preceded him, Bacon’s own conclusions inaugurated a 
move toward incredulity concerning the relationship of religion or ethics to what would 
become known as modern science.62  In his own writings, the twofold need humanity has 
for a return to prelapsarian innocence and dominion over creation reflects an emerging 
bifurcation of religion and science.  In this sense, a desacrilization begins to shape inquiry 
into the utility, purpose, and potential of all other-than-human creation for humanity 
alone.  Only human beings have to be considered in terms of ethics or morality, the rest 
of creation is there for our taking and use.  In fact, this form of appropriating and 
manipulating the rest of the created order is, according to Bacon, the only means we have 
in progressing toward what God had intended for us from the beginning.  With Bacon the 
dominion model of creation understood as domination becomes a divinely mandated 
pursuit and seen as the authentic human vocation. 
 Alongside the development of modern natural sciences is the emergence of so-
called modern philosophy.  A key figure from this era in terms of contributing to the 
dominion model of creation is René Descartes.63  Like Bacon before him, Descartes was 
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influenced by the ancient and Renaissance paradigms that established an ever-increasing 
divide between the human and the rest of creation.  Passmore explains that, “These 
attitudes, certainly, are all to be found in Descartes who carries them, indeed, to an 
extreme point.  On his view every finite existence except the human mind – identified by 
Descartes with consciousness – is a mere machine, which men, in virtue of that fact, can 
manipulate without scruples.  Animals not only cannot reason but cannot even feel.”64  
This is a reference to Descartes’s famous modern ontological distinction between res 
extensa and res cogitans, “extended (or mechanistic) things” and “thinking things.”  The 
latter refer to human persons, while the former include all other-than-human aspects of 
creation.65  It is near the end of Part Five of his Discourse on Method (1637) that 
Descartes reinscribes an anthropocentric hermeneutical bias in his metaphysics.  The 
presupposition of rationality as pertaining solely to the human in his philosophical 
outlook comes through strongly: 
 
And we should not confuse words with the natural movements that attest 
to the passions and can be imitated by machines as well as by animals.  
Nor should we think, as did some of the ancients, that beasts speak, 
although we do not understand their language; for if that were true, since 
they have many organs corresponding to our own, they could make 
themselves as well understood by us as they are by their fellow creatures.  
It is also a very remarkable phenomenon that, although there are many 
animals that show more skill than we do in some of their actions, we 
nevertheless see that they show none at all in many other actions.  
Consequently, the fact that they do something better than we do does not 
prove that they have any intelligence; for were that the case, they would 
have more of it than any of us and would excel us in everything.  But 
rather it proves that they have no intelligence at all, and that it is nature 
that acts in them, according to the disposition of their organs – just as we 
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 65 See René Descartes, Discourse on Method, in Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. 
Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000). 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 38 
see that a clock composed exclusively of wheels and springs can count the 
hours and measure time more accurately than we can with all our 
carefulness.66 
 
The recognition in hindsight of his naïveté concerning other-than-human animal 
communication notwithstanding, Descartes’s perspective again reflects the development 
and reification of the dominion model of creation, which elevates the human person over 
against the rest of creation.  After this telling and presumptive anthropocentric conclusion 
to Part Five of Discourse on Method, Descartes directs his attention to the ways in which 
these and his earlier philosophical reflections inform our understanding of the human 
person in the world. 
 
For these notions made me see that it is possible to arrive at knowledge 
that would be very useful in life and that, in place of that speculative 
philosophy taught in schools, it is possible to find a practical philosophy 
by means of which, knowing the force and actions of fire, water, air, the 
stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us, just as 
distinctly as we know the various skills of our craftsmen, we might be 
able, in the same way, to use them for all the purposes for which they are 
appropriate, and thus render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors 
of nature.67 
 
Unlike Bacon and the Italian humanists who believed that God made all of other-than-
human creation explicitly for humanity, Descartes actually argues that there is “an 
infinity of things” that existed or do exist and that serve no apparent use for the human 
person.68  Therefore, human “mastery and possession” of the rest of creation is not as 
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straightforward as it was in the divinely mandated vision of Bacon or as it appeared 
through the self-serving anthropocentric lens of the Italian humanists.   
 In a counterintuitive way, Descartes’s philosophical arguments appear to endow 
the human person with a mandate for colonization of creation.  Whereas for Bacon the 
shift was toward a human-initiated return to a prelapsarian state of human dominion over 
creation according to a redemptive effort aligned with God’s providence, Descartes’s 
shift is away from some return to an ideal or edenic past and toward a progressive future 
of human control and mastery.  Though Descartes recognizes the real possibility that the 
whole universe was not simply created for human enjoyment or use, he nevertheless 
affirms that, because of human distinctiveness, rationality, and free will, we are called to 
dominate, master, and possess the other-than-human world.   
 Descartes’s progressive philosophical anthropology and mechanical philosophy of 
nature leads to the industrial revolution.  Passmore explains: “Descartes’s philosophy, 
rather than Bacon’s, is the charter of the Industrial Revolution.  When in 1848 the radical 
American economist, H. C. Carey, told his readers that ‘the earth is a great machine, 
given to man to be fashioned to his purpose,’ it is Descartes that he is unwittingly 
echoing, under the impression that it is [the meaning behind] Genesis.”69   
 Though no single person can be credited exclusively with inaugurating the advent 
of the Industrial and subsequent Technological Ages, the representative figures of Francis 
Bacon and René Descartes provide us with examples of the intellectual shift from the 
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perspective encapsulated in the writings of the Italian humanists toward a more 
aggressive, colonizing force of human dominion over the rest of creation.  As Peter 
Harrison has noted, the European-Enlightenment milieu was rife with post-Baconian and 
Cartesian impulses that led to an identification of this anthropocentric reading of the 
biblical imperative to “have dominion” with the newly emergent theories of “property 
ownership and colonization” such as is found in the writings of John Locke.70  In addition 
to providing justification for what has been called the Industrial Age, such interpretations 
of the natural world and humanity’s right or even duty to master it also had an influence 
in the so-called “New World” of North America, providing a supposed religious and 
philosophical justification for slavery, colonization, and the American principle of 
“Manifest Destiny.”71  What resulted was an extremely anthropocentric reading and 
invocation of biblical passages.  Harrison summarizes well the effects of this 
development: “Stripped of their allegorical and moral connotations, these passages were 
taken to refer unambiguously to the physical world and its living occupants.  Whatever 
the ecological practices of medieval society had been, at no time in the West prior to this 
do we encounter so explicit an ideology of the subordination of nature.”72  What resulted 
from this axial moment in the history of humanity’s reflection of its relationship to the 
rest of creation was the emergence of both the pinnacle of anthropocentrism and the nadir 
of ecological care. 
 
4. The Industrial and Technological Ages 
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 It does not take much imagination to see how the intellectual, philosophical, and 
religious worldviews tied to the rise of the dominion model of creation could lead human 
beings in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to think they had a divinely 
bestowed license to mine, deforest, over-fish, and pollute at unprecedented rates.  When 
invocation of the supposed mandate to dominate nature found in Genesis was absent, it 
was the remainder product of presupposed human distinctiveness and superiority received 
from the ancient, renaissance, and early modern thinkers that informed the dramatic shifts 
in humanity’s perception of itself in relation to other-than-human creation.73  Larry 
Rasmussen offers an insightful overview of the effects of this cumulative way of 
interpreting Genesis and viewing humanity vis-à-vis other-than-human creation, which 
resulted in the Industrial Age. 
 
Commerce and culture in agricultural societies and before the industrial 
revolution were regulated almost entirely by natural energy flows, chiefly 
solar energy as captured by food, wood, and wind.  The industrial 
revolution, by contrast, came about through the use of stored energy 
(fossil fuels).  As Paul Hawken notes, this permitted a huge transition.  
Commerce and culture could shift from necessarily working with natural 
forces to overcoming them for human ends.  Production processes and 
people could both be separated from intrinsic ties to the land.  An artificial 
or artifactual world could be created, with few constraints from the very 
nature on which it depended utterly.  It buried that nature in the artifacts 
themselves or in the processes of their production, distribution, and 
consumption.  The economy of nature will no doubt have the last word in 
all this.  But for the time being industrial ecology had found the way, 
through stored energy and processes of industrialization, commerce, and 
trade, to massively reconfigure nature for the sake of and as human 
society.  Industrialization found a way to live, at least for a season, against 
the grain of (the rest of) nature.74 
 
                                                
 73 For a thorough overview of this point, see Clive Ponting, A New Green History of the World: 
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 74 Larry Rasmussen, Earth Community, Earth Ethics (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 58-59 
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What is distinctive about the Industrial Age when compared to previous periods of 
increasing anthropocentric approaches to creation is the identification of dominance over 
creation with commerce and capital as measures of progress.  Rasmussen goes on to note 
that, “from a human point of view abstracted from the rest of nature, industrialization 
looked like genuine progress.  After all, ‘industriousness’ modified and controlled 
environments in ways that met the needs of more and more people.”75   
 The seeds of a progressive view of human dominion as witnessed in the work of 
Descartes (in contrast to Bacon’s desire to “return” to a prelapsarian state) germinated in 
the Industrial Age and were nurtured by the misreading of Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
of natural selection to suggest a “survival of the fittest.”76  According to this 
misinterpretation and inappropriate application of Darwin’s research, “Man, it was 
alleged, not only had to struggle against nature in order to survive, but demonstrated his 
moral superiority by his success in doing so.”77  This way of thinking also was supported 
by the burgeoning field of psychoanalysis, which sought to understand the human person 
in ever-clearer ways.  For example, Sigmund Freud, in his text Civilization and Its 
Discontents, argues for a vision of the human ideal in terms of connection with the rest of 
the human community such that, united, humanity might overcome the natural world with 
the tools of science.78  Science, industry, psychology, and other fields of human 
                                                
 75 Rasmussen, Earth Community, Earth Ethics, 59. 
 76 Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, 23. 
 77 Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, 23. 
 78 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. 
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development in this time supported humanity’s belief that it had a right to deal with 
other-than-human creation in any way women or men choose.79 
 Commenting on the contemporary effects of this way of viewing humanity and 
the rest of creation, Norman Wirzba has asserted that, “For the most part, our 
assumptions about reality, its ontological status, reflect modern scientific, economic, and 
technological views that place humanity and its interests over and against the natural 
world.  Nature, rather than being the realm of God’s creative work and plan, the object of 
God’s good pleasure, is the foil for human technique and desire.”80  Within this context 
the mastery and control over nature advanced by Bacon and Descartes, as well as the 
god-like status of humanity found in the Italian humanist writers, have become realized in 
novel yet destructive ways.  Without due regard or consideration for the rest of creation, 
human beings have pillaged natural resources and polluted the planet in such a way that 
thousands of species have been made extinct and the ill effects of our industrial hunger 
and commercial appetite are on the verge of irrevocability, if they have not yet reached 
that stage.   
 The rise of industry in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked a 
decisive amplification of human dissociation with the so-called “natural world.”81  This is 
reflected in what Wirzba calls the eclipse of the agrarian life, according to which human 
beings were previously engaged with the earth and other-than-human creation in 
necessary ways.  Now, this first-hand association with the source and even means of 
production has been lost to all but a few.  The mechanistic power of factories and new 
                                                
 79 Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, 23. 
 80 Norman Wirzba, The Paradise of God: Renewing Religion in an Ecological Age (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 62. 
 81 For a history of human impact on the rest of creation, see Ian G. Simmons, Changing the Face 
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forms of transportation, the marvels of new forms of communication and exchange, all 
contribute to a further isolation of the human person, what Marxists and other social 
critics will call the prevalence of “alienation.”  Wirzba sees this alienation and our 
increasing reliance on new technology and media as deeply problematic.  “The danger 
with our reliance on these media is that we are reduced to the role of spectator.  As 
spectators our knowledge of reality, and thus our ability to engage it practically or 
honestly, is impaired because a sustained, direct encounter with reality is compromised.  
We lose the deep, complex, multifaceted character of the world because we see only 
surfaces that have been packaged and filtered for us by others.”82  While our treatment of 
the rest of creation reached a new level of domination and colonization during the 
Industrial Age, our sense of human uniqueness and disassociation with both other 
humans and other-than-human creatures has reached a new level of precariousness in our 
current Technological Age.   
 While there is much more that could be said about the impact of developments in 
industry and technology, suffice it to say that during the last few centuries we have, as 
Elizabeth Johnson keenly describes, forgotten or “lost” creation.83  The conditions for 
imagining humanity as divinely endowed with a mandate for dominion over the rest of 
creation in terms of subjugation, domination, abuse, and colonization only increased over 
time.  The misreading of Genesis 1:26-28, which lead to this way of thinking, dates back 
to the pre-modern Hellenistic influences of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic 
philosophical traditions’ influence on early Jewish and Christian theologians and 
exegetes.  This nascent anthropocentrism was magnified centuries later during the 
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Renaissance when humanist writers elevated the human person to a status of quasi-
divinity and sovereignty.  With the advent of modern natural science and philosophy, the 
disconnection of humanity from the rest of creation reached a turning point that was 
complemented by the separation of religion from science.  What was praised in the 
Renaissance and Modern periods as humanity’s ingenuity and creative potential came to 
be realized in destructive ways during the Industrial Age and was carried over into our 
contemporary Technological Age.  It is no wonder, then, that the anthropocentric reading 
of scripture that informs so much of the modern Christian imaginary still bears the marks 
of a dominion model of creation. 
 
B. Introducing Stewardship: Beyond the Dominion Approach 
 Theological reflection on creation as divine oikos or the “household of God” 
within which the drama of salvation history unfolds has, in recent years, yielded an 
improvement over the unfortunately long-standing view of human mastery over the rest 
of creation found in the received dominion model.84  Though this is not an entirely novel 
idea given the traces of minority perspectives on creation that leaned toward stewardship 
in centuries past,85 today theologians and scripture scholars have become especially 
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attentive to what Elizabeth Johnson has described as the “amnesia about the cosmic 
world” within the history of Christian theological reflection and biblical interpretation.86  
Others, including Steven Bouma-Prediger and Wendell Berry, have argued for the need 
to render a clearer and more precise distinction between “authentic Christian faith” and 
“misunderstandings or perversions” of the tradition by Christians themselves concerning 
the relationship between humanity and the rest of the created order.87    
 In light of this call for a return to the scriptural sources, a desire to overcome the 
theological amnesia concerning creation, and the need to more adequately delineate 
authentic from distorted Christian doctrine, a renewed sense for and critical awareness of 
the inherent dangers of the dominion model of creation have led scholars to reevaluate 
the foundations of contemporary Christian ktiseology in at least three distinctive yet 
interrelated ways: by returning to scripture, by reexamining the history of Christian 
theology, and by considering the pressing pragmatic needs of a world experiencing an 
array of ecological crises.  According to these re-evaluative efforts, the construction of 
the human vocation as steward has flourished in contemporary attempts to present a 
sustainable and just vision of a Christian theology of creation.  Likewise, the renewed 
examination of the tradition over the last five decades, following Lynn White’s now-
famous 1967 critique, has led to a near universal rejection of the earlier dominion 
paradigm, resulting in its having largely fallen out of favor among theologians.88   
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1. Returning to Scripture, Discerning the Human Vocation in Genesis 
 The first of these reevaluations has been focused on the Hebrew Scriptures 
generally and the Book of Genesis specifically.89  Consideration of what is actually meant 
by the terms rādâ (“have dominion”) in Genesis 1:26 and kābaš (“subdue”) in Genesis 
1:28 serve as the primary foci of such renewed scriptural study.90  As we saw in the last 
section, scholars see the connection between the interpretation of these commands and 
the identification of human uniqueness as Imago Dei in the first creation narrative, 
shaped as they have been by Hellenistic philosophy and other historical influences, as the 
foundation for what will become the prevailing dominion model of creation through the 
centuries.91  However, with renewed attention to the meaning of scripture, both intra-
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biblically and in terms of the broader context of the ancient world, exegetes and 
theologians began to reconsider this largely uncritically received presupposition of 
human sovereignty and mastery over the rest of creation.92 
 Among such shifts in approaching scripture was an increased interest in reading 
Genesis 2 alongside or, at times, in place of the Genesis 1 creation narrative.  Whereas 
the latter, attributed to the so-called “Priestly source” (P), had at times been interpreted as 
supporting a distinctive quality within humanity in terms of the Imago Dei (which was 
used to justify human superiority over the rest of creation), the account in Genesis 2, 
attributed to the so-called “Yahwist source” (J), offered an alternative narrative.  Claus 
Westermann has suggested that the image of the human person that emerges from this 
alternative account in Genesis 2 (especially 2:15) in terms of stewardship is tied to the 
origin of the human vocation to work.   
 
It is important however that God puts man in the garden in order to till it 
and keep it…Every human work can in some way or another share in this 
‘tilling and keeping.’  The narrator wanted to give a basic direction to 
man’s activity and in this way to state that it is the Creator’s intention and 
ordinance that his creature should undertake all such work.  It should be 
noted that man’s work must be understood in this context in a functional, 
not in a static sense.  Genesis 2 is not establishing fixed classes or states in 
which the work has to be performed, as for example the state of the 
peasant, the teaching profession, the military profession. Work must be 
understood functionally: God has put man into a garden; the garden and 
the land there need to be worked; the land is entrusted to man, who is both 
capable and industrious.  When other types of work are demanded by a 
change in the environment, the commission is in nowise altered.  Tilling 
and conserving are suitably adapted.93 
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Westermann’s interpretation suggests that the primary vocation of the human person, 
from the moment of creation, has been as a “gardener” of God’s land.  Though this 
identity is originally formed in a literal sense, with human beings entrusted to till the 
earth and care for the rest of creation, quickly this notion of “gardener” becomes 
metonymnic, representing all forms of human industry and labor.94   
 In an effort to understand better the human person’s place within and relationship 
to the rest of creation in the wake of rampant environmental degradation and the 
pervasiveness of the dominion model of creation, theologians returned to this primordial 
notion of gardener or caretaker.  Rather than the sovereign lords depicted in the dominion 
model, according to this interpretation of Genesis 2, “human beings are pictured as 
oikonomoi, trustees of the oikos and tillers and keepers of earth as our patch of 
creation…We are shomrei ‘adamâ – guardians of earth.”95  Larry Rasmussen explains 
that in the original Hebrew, “The charge ‘to till and keep’ of Gen 2:15 (NRSV) is literally 
‘to serve and preserve’ (l’ovdah ul’shomrah).  To serve means, literally, to cultivate.  The 
connection to stewards (shomrei) as guardians, custodians, and preservers of earth is 
plain.”96   
 In an effort to identify a common link between the Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 
narrative accounts of creation that supports this renewed sense of stewardship or 
caretaking as human vocation, some scholars have posited a comparison between Genesis 
1:28 and Genesis 2:15.  For instance, Terence Fretheim explains:  
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God places the man in the garden – resuming v. 8 – to work/serve (‘ābad) 
the ground and care for it (šāmar) in fulfillment of the command to subdue 
the earth (‘ereș and ‘ădāmâ are often interchangeable).  Given the use of 
‘ābad in v. 5, this role involves not only simple maintenance or 
preservation, but a part of the creative process itself. The role given the 
human in v. 15 may be compared to the dominion/servant role in 1:28.97 
 
The hermeneutical shift that occasioned the renewed emphasis on the Yahwist creation 
narrative and contributed to the emergence of the stewardship model of creation as an 
operative paradigm also led to a re-reading of the Priestly creation narrative.  This led 
scholars to pursue with greater attention what the “true meaning” of humanity’s having 
been given “dominion” (rādâ) in Genesis 1:26 and told to “subdue” (kābaš) the earth 
looks like for contemporary women and men.  Accordingly, Calvin DeWitt argues that, 
“The biblical imperative, then, is for stewardship on behalf of God’s creation no matter 
what its condition.  Christian environmental stewardship is not crisis management but a 
way of life.  God’s call to serve and keep the garden is our calling no matter whether it is 
our vegetable garden or the whole of creation.”98  This turn toward stewardship as a 
human vocational imperative arises not only from the reevaluation of the Hebrew 
Scriptures (as well as the New Testament), but also from a reconsideration of how 
theologians have considered creation throughout Christian history. 
 
2. Reconsidering Creation in Christian History 
 The second of these reevaluations has been directed toward what may be 
uncovered about the historical and theological foundations for traditional 
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conceptualizations of a Christian theology of creation.99  This, for example, is the starting 
point for Paul Santmire’s study of the “postbilical theological tradition” of theological 
reflection on creation.100  As we saw in the last major section of this chapter, one 
interesting result of this return to the historical and theological sources associated with 
the emergence of dominion models of creation is the realization that it wasn’t until 
around the seventeenth century that theologians and scriptural exegetes understood rādâ 
in a “literal sense and consider[ed] it to be a directive concerning the natural world.”101  
Previously, the concept of dominion had been understood analogously in largely “moral 
and symbolic ways” with regard to the human relationship between the “terrestrial and 
heavenly inherent in every human being.”102  Nevertheless, it is clear that over the course 
of several centuries the majority tradition adopted an approach to understanding the 
Christian theology of creation as having to do with a sense of human sovereignty over 
against the rest of the created order.   
 Closer examination of the tradition of biblical interpretation and theological 
reflection over the centuries led to reconsideration of the best conceptual framework for 
understanding the human person’s relationship to the rest of creation.  This has not been a 
project limited by Christian denominationalism.103  In fact, some sense of renewal in 
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understanding creation within Christian history and doctrine can be found in the work of 
Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theologians during the last several decades of the 
twentieth century.  Given the necessary limits of this dissertation’s scope, in general, and 
this section of the chapter, in particular, I offer only one example from each of these three 
admittedly broad traditions with the intention of merely illustrating what Dieter Hessell 
and Rosemary Radford Ruether have called an “Ecological Reformation” in each 
respective branch of Christianity.104   
 From within the Catholic tradition Elizabeth Johnson speaks of the shifting 
perspectives of the Christian faith community.  “On the brink of the third millennium, a 
new consciousness of the earth is taking hold among persons around the globe, an 
understanding shaped by a unique dialectic: new knowledge of the earth’s intricate 
workings discovered and popularized by contemporary science, in tension with the 
realization of how human predation is currently spoiling the natural world.”105  For 
Johnson, this collective awakening to the ways in which humankind has caused havoc in 
creation, no doubt spurred on by the environmental crises experienced around the planet, 
has challenged theologians and ethicists to return to the roots of the Christian tradition in 
order to reexamine the sources for an authentic theology of creation.  When such an effort 
is pursued, what results, argues Johnson, is a realization that “for the last five hundred 
years the religious value of the earth has not been a subject of theology, preaching, or 
religious education.”106  Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, have effectively “lost” 
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or “forgotten” creation.  We have already seen how the history of biblical interpretation 
and theological reflection that led to the prevalence of the dominion model of creation 
reached a critical summit around this same time period.  It was the nexus of the 
Renaissance humanist writings, the emergence of nascent natural sciences, and the 
beginning of modern philosophy that contributed to what Johnson describes as the 
tradition’s theological amnesia concerning creation.   
 Voices such as Johnson’s have drawn attention to the distortive aspects of 
Christian history that contributed to the dominion model’s overshadowing a more 
biblically and theologically robust sense of our inherent relationship to other-than-human 
creation.  In response, Catholic theologians and ethicists have embraced various forms of 
the stewardship model in a corrective effort to overcome what theologian David Clough 
has referred to as the “human separatist approach” to creation.107  Though Johnson herself 
will ultimately conclude that the stewardship approach is not sufficient, her insistence on 
returning to the historical sources of theology’s negligence with regard to creation has led 
many others toward stewardship, including the United States Catholic Bishops.108 
 From within the Orthodox Christian tradition John Zizioulas decries the 
ecological crises that face the human community.  He goes so far as to say that, “It is, 
indeed, difficult to find any aspect of what we call ‘evil’ or ‘sin’ that would bear such an 
all-embracing and devastating power as the ecological evil.”109  Like Johnson and others, 
Zizioulas has come to an awareness of Christianity’s complicity in the now centuries-old 
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process of environmental degradation catalyzed by humanity’s hubris in terms of its own 
place conceived as over and above the rest of creation.  In turn, he believes that we need 
to return to the roots of Christian theology in order to uncover a more authentic 
understanding of humanity’s place within God’s creation.   
 Perhaps surprisingly to some, Zizioulas argues against turning to theological 
ethics, holding that such a secondary order of reflection is ultimately ineffective without a 
more foundational theological renewal.  Instead, he points to liturgy as the principle 
starting point.  Zizioulas argues that it is by examining the key and often overlooked 
dimensions of ancient Christian liturgies (especially the sanctification of matter and time; 
the Anaphora or “lifting up” of the gifts of bread and wine to our Creator God; and the 
opening prayers of thanksgiving for God’s creation) that we recognize humanity’s place 
as “Priest of Creation.”  Zizioulas explains that Christ is “the embodiment of the 
anakephalaiosis of all creation and, therefore is the Man par excellence and the Savior of 
the whole world.”110  He continues: 
 
On the basis of this belief we form a community which in a symbolic way 
takes from this creation certain elements – bread and wine – which we 
offer to God with the solemn declaration “Thine own do we offer Thee,” 
thus recognizing that creation does not belong to us, but to God, who is its 
only “owner.”  By so doing we believe that creation is brought into 
relation with God and not only is it treated with the reference which befits 
what belongs to God, but it is also liberated form its natural limitations 
and transformed into a bearer of life.  We believe that in doing this “in 
Christ,” we act as priests of creation.111 
 
In the case of Zizioulas’s Orthodox ressourcement of ancient liturgy as starting point for 
reflection on creation, what emerges is not the human person as sovereign over the other-
                                                
 110 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” 289. 
 111 Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,”289. 
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than-human aspects of creation, but rather an anthropology that situates the human person 
as cosmic priest, standing in a place of offering and reconciliation between the Creator 
and all of creation.  According to Zizioulas, humanity’s truest identity, revealed in Christ, 
is as the Eucharistic steward of God’s creation, which has been entrusted to human 
beings for safekeeping and to be offered in return back to the Creator.  When human 
persons do not perform this duty, serving as the intercessor between the Creator and 
creation, we slip into the dominion model of creation that is a destructive distorting of our 
place in the world.   
 From within the Mainline Protestant tradition H. Paul Santmire writes about the 
need for what he calls a “healing of the protestant mind.”112  Santmire contends that the 
so-called “protestant problematic” concerning theological views of creation can be traced 
back to a “the-anthropological concentration in the thought of Luther and Calvin,” which 
reaches something of a pinnacle or full development in the contemporary work of Karl 
Barth.113  Santmire challenges the uncritically inherited theological foundations of many 
Protestant theological approaches to humanity’s place in creation heretofore, pointing to 
what he sees as the admixture of Kantian philosophical strains with Lutheran and Calvin 
theological anthropocentrism, which has resulted in a nearly exclusive emphasis on the 
dominion model of creation.  He suggests: “Given the familiar Protestant proclivity to 
allow the idea of dominion to be interpreted and enacted as domination, it may be best to 
call a moratorium on the use of that conceptuality altogether.”114  In response to this 
                                                
 112 Santmire, “Healing the Protestant Mind,” 57 and passim. 
 113 Santmire, “Healing the Protestant Mind,” 61-65.  Also, see H. Paul Santmire, “Martin Luther, 
The Word of God, and Nature: Reformation Hermeneutics in Context,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: 
Biblical, Historical, and Theological Perspectives, eds. David G. Horrell et al. (New York: T & T Clark, 
2010), 166-180; and H. Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of 
Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985). 
 114 Santmire, “Healing the Protestant Mind,” 75. 
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proposal, Santmire gestures toward a stewardship paradigm according to which the 
human person is understood as homo cooperans (in contrast to homo faber).  He prefers 
homo cooperans to the term “stewardship” given the financial connotations the latter 
term evokes within many churches.  Rather than viewing the other-than-human aspects of 
creation as raw material ripe for human development, Santmire emphasizes the place of 
responsibility in humankind’s vocation.  “The only divinely mandated way for the human 
creature to develop the resources of nature, when that is the moral choice of the moment, 
is within the context of a relationship of cooperation.”115  This sense of cooperation is an 
effort to move beyond the Barthian relational binary of human ad extra relationships: that 
of the I-Thou (human and human) and that of the I-It (human and everything else).116  To 
speak of humanity in terms of homo cooperans is to consider what Santmire proposes to 
be an I-Ens relationship, a tertiary relational paradigm that recognizes the theocentricity 
of creation rather than the despotic and appropriative model of dominion.  All creatures 
(Ens) belong to God alone, humanity has certain unique responsibilities relating to and 
caring for other-than-human creation, but humanity does not “own” the Ens. 
 The work of these three scholars in encouraging a return to the sources within 
Christianity’s manifold library is but an admittedly simple sampling of those who have 
called for reevaluation of the dominion model of creation in recent decades.117  In 
addition to the return to scripture, especially Genesis, and the historical reconsideration of 
                                                
 115 Santmire, “Healing the Protestant Mind,” 77.  Santmire draws on the work of Douglas John 
Hall to develop this view.  See Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986). 
 116 Relatedly, see Geoff Thompson, “‘Remaining Loyal to the Earth’: Humanity, God’s Other 
Creatures, and the Bible in Karl Barth,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical, and Theological 
Perspectives, 181-195. 
 117 For additional perspectives, see the essays located in “Part II: Insights from the History of 
Interpretation,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Perspectives, 121-239. 
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the tradition, another reevaluation has been underway spurred on by the pragmatic 
concerns related to environmental degradation and to which we now turn. 
 
3. Pragmatic Imperatives 
 The third reevaluation, concern for ethical action rooted in critical reflection, has 
led to one of the distinctive characteristics of this shift in creational hermeneutics; 
namely, its largely pragmatic focus.  Whereas the dominion model developed in order to 
offer human beings justification for sovereign action and subjugation of other-than-
human aspects of creation, the stewardship model offers a strategic exhortation to engage 
in care for creation.118  Willis Jenkins, whose own work is deeply concerned with the 
pragmatic dimensions of environmental ethics, summarizes the “strategy of stewardship” 
well as he explains: 
 
The strategy of Christian stewardship frames environmental issues around 
faithful response to God’s invitation and command.  By appropriating the 
biblical trope of stewardship, this strategy organizes concern for 
environmental problems around obligatory service to the Creator.  To 
specify the character of this earthkeeping trust, the strategy looks to 
biblical accounts of how God invites humans into relationship.  
Stewardship thus situates the specific call to care for the earth within a 
general divine call to faithful relationship.119 
 
This model, with its strategic impetus, has become nearly universally accepted within 
many Christian theological communities and is now the default position.120   
                                                
 118 For example, see Anna Peterson, “Talking the Walk: A Practice-Based Environmental Ethic as 
Grounds for Hope,” in Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the Earth, eds. Laurel Kearns and 
Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 45-62. 
 119 Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 77. 
 120 Christopher Southgate, “Stewardship and its Competitors: A Spectrum of Relationships 
between Humans and the Non-Human Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, 
185.  The stewardship model has been appropriated by numerous religious communities; for a survey, see 
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 This default position of stewardship has been appropriated and expressed in a 
variety of formats in recent years.  Given the increase in environmental degradation and 
its perilous effects on communities of humans and other-than-human creatures around the 
world, disparate voices have joined together under the banner of exhorting human 
stewardship of creation.  From religious leaders the likes of Pope Benedict XVI and Pope 
Francis to secular organizations such as the Sierra Club, stewardship has been recognized 
as a model for pragmatic engagement in the face of ecological crises that transcends the 
“definite moral foundations” of particular religious or non-religious institutions.121  
Among contemporary theologians who have begun their theological and ethical 
reflections on stewardship with a pragmatic impetus, one of the most prominent is the 
German Lutheran theologian Jürgen Moltmann.122 
 Moltmann’s interest in reconsidering the Christian theological image of creation, 
humanity’s place within it, and its relationship as a whole to the Creator was most 
explicitly expressed in his 1984-1985 Gifford Lectures at the University of St. 
Andrews.123  The lectures were subsequently published as the monograph, God in 
                                                                                                                                            
Environmental Stewardship in the Judeo-Christian Tradition: Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant Wisdom on 
the Environment (Grand Rapids: The Acton Institute, 2007).  For an in-depth study on the relationship 
between environmental stewardship and evangelical churches, see Katharine Wilkinson, Between God and 
Green: How Evangelicals are Cultivating a Middle Ground on Climate Change (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
 121 This notion that an environmental ethics “can begin from concrete problems, uncertain 
traditions, and [even] incompetent communities” (20) is overarching theme of Willis Jenkins’s latest 
monograph, The Future of Ethics: Sustainability, Social Justice, and Religious Creativity (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).  Concerning the papal and Sierra Club positions on stewardship, 
see Pope Benedict XVI, The Environment, ed. Jacquelyn Lindsey (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor 
Press, 2012); and Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 79-80. 
 122 For the sake of brevity, I offer one example.  Though, there are many others that could likewise 
be considered here.   
 123 To date, the most comprehensive study of Moltmann’s theology of creation is Celia Deane-
Drummond, Ecology in Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997).  For 
additional insight into his theology, see Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making 
(Basingstoke, UK: Marshall Pickering Publishing, 1987) and Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and 
the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001). 
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Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God,124 where one can see the 
inaugural development of what had been previously inchoate in his pneumatological, 
Christological, and eschatological works.125  Jeremy Law suggests that Moltmann’s 
theology has always been both a “situated theology” and an “ecological theology.”126  
Inspired as he was at the time by Christian dialogue with and appropriation of certain 
Marxist theoretical insights, Moltmann’s work was “situated” between the doctrinal 
canon of Christian faith and the historical realities of the present world.  Among those 
concerns facing believers and unbelievers alike in the modern world was the ever-
increasing awareness of environmental degradation, which thereby pressed Moltmann’s 
historically conscious theological reflection from the center of doctrinal elucidation to the 
edges of pragmatic reality.  At a time marked by the emergence of new political theology 
(e.g., Moltmann, Johannes Baptist Metz, etc.) and Latin-American Liberation Theology 
(e.g., Gustavo Gutiérrez, Jon Sobrino, Leonardo Boff, etc.), Moltmann’s openness to the 
“signs of the time” led to an increasing interest in the environment.  Law writes: 
“Ecological attention has remained a prominent feature of Moltmann’s thinking ever 
since.”127 
 Moltmann opens his God In Creation identifying his starting point as distinctive 
from the dominion model of creation, which implied that, “the human being – since he 
                                                
 124 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). [Original: Jürgen Moltmann, Gott in der Schöpfung: 
Ökologische Schöpfungslehre (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1985)].  For Moltmann’s works, English 
translations have been used in citations unless otherwise noted. 
 125 For example, see Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, trans. James W. Leitch (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1993). [Original: Jürgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 5th ed. (Munich: Christian 
Kaiser Verlag, 1965)]; and Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation 
and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993). [Original: Jürgen Moltmann, Der gekreuzigte Gott, 2nd ed. (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 
1973)]. 
 126 Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics, 223. 
 127 Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 223. 
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was God’s image on earth – had to see himself as the subject of cognition and will, and 
was bound to confront his world as its ruler.”128  In an effort to move beyond the 
recognizably problematic dominion model, Moltmann explains that he will not begin 
with uncritically received theological presuppositions.  Instead, he writes: 
 
Here we shall take a different approach, and shall pursue the model of 
identity and relevance.  The identity of the Christian belief in creation has 
become questionable in today’s ecological crisis and must therefore be 
given a new definition in that context; while the relevance of belief in 
creation must prove itself in ideas about the present ecological crisis and 
in suggested ways of escape from that crisis.129 
 
Moltmann acknowledges the veracity, at least in part, of historical claims identifying the 
complicity of Christianity in humanity’s abuse of the environment.  In this way the 
ecological crisis we face today implicates human persons and challenges the previously 
held Christian convictions that appear to have lent some credence to the destructive 
behaviors now associated with the dominion model of creation.  Furthermore, not only do 
our present environmental circumstances challenge tenets of Christian belief, but the faith 
upon which rely must also provide us with resources for ecological remedy and repair.130  
In other words, for Moltmann, the starting point of any contemporary theology of 
creation must be a pragmatic one, which moves beyond the theoretical reflection on 
orthodoxy toward the practical development of orthopraxis.131 
 Although Moltmann frequently exhorts human beings to recall the Yahwist 
Creation account in which we are reminded of our inherent relationship with the rest of 
                                                
 128 Moltmann, God in Creation, 1. 
 129 Moltmann, God in Creation, 22. Emphasis original. 
 130 Moltmann, God in Creation, 34: “Now they [theology and science] have become companions 
in tribulation, under the pressure of the ecological crisis and the search for the new direction which both 
must work for, if human beings and nature are to survive at all on this earth.” 
 131 See Moltmann, God in Creation, 25 and passim.  
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the created order and from which Moltmann insists that we appreciate better our inherent 
identity as imago mundi (bearing the “image of the world”), he nevertheless advocates an 
explicit stewardship model of creation by emphasizing the human responsibility for the 
rest of creation rooted in our distinctive status as imago Dei.   
 
Not even the angels are said to be in the image of God.  But the 
designation is not identical with the natural differences between human 
beings and animals, and is in no way intended to interpret these 
differences.  It affects the whole human being, both in his community with 
other created things and in his difference from them.  As God’s image, 
human beings are God’s proxy in his creation, and represent him.  As 
God’s image, human beings are for God himself a counterpart, in whom 
he desires to see himself as if in a mirror.  As God’s image, finally, human 
beings are created for the Sabbath, to reflect and praise the glory of God 
which enters into creation, and takes up its dwelling there.132 
 
As Celia Deane-Drummond asserts, Moltmann “argues strongly against any suggestion 
that this [imago Dei] is a divine mandate for human domination over the creation,” but 
rather “it gives human beings responsibility to be the ‘authors of the further history of the 
earth.’”133   
 It is Moltmann’s concern about the practical effects of environmental degradation 
that leads to his explicit endorsement and development of the stewardship model of 
creation.  Human beings have failed to live up to their true vocation as those creatures 
made as the imago Dei, which has certain caretaking and protecting responsibilities for 
the other-than-human aspects of creation.  By advocating for the dominion model of 
creation in terms of domination and subjugation of the rest of creation, with which we 
also share in common our creation as imago mundi (though not the imago Dei, which 
Moltmann reserves only for human beings), we have abandoned in sin our divinely 
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mandated duty to be good stewards of the earth.  It is only in recognizing the true 
meaning of imago Dei, which centers on our place as servants and priests of God’s 
creation, that we can begin to respond to the challenges that have arisen from the current 
ecological crisis and return with renewed vision to the Christian tradition in an effort to 
work toward ecological restoration. 
 The pragmatic imperatives that serve as the starting point for a contemporary 
stewardship model of creation are found not only within the scholarly work of academic 
theologians such as Moltmann, but they are also found in the grounding rhetoric of many 
denominational efforts to inform and exhort Christians to care for the environment.134  
 
C. Characteristics of the Stewardship Model 
 Although renewed biblical scholarship, historical reevaluation, and pragmatic 
imperatives have provided key impetuses for the reconsideration of the dominion model 
of creation’s hegemony within the Christian tradition, the resulting stewardship model of 
creation has emerged in manifold form.  The lack of a singular paradigm often makes 
difficult the identification of those stewardship approaches not explicitly titled as such.  
For that reason, this section of the chapter is intended to provide a preliminary set of 
descriptive characteristics or criteria for identifying stewardship approaches.  This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive typology, others may rightly identify additional 
characteristics.  Rather, this section is a presentation of selected thematic loci commonly 
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found among the various iterations of the stewardship model.  Among these overlapping 
dimensions that form a preliminary set of criteria are: (a) a theocentric vision of the 
cosmos; (b) an understanding of other-than-human creation as God’s oikos (“household”) 
for humanity; (c) a “human separatist” interpretation of imago Dei; and (d) a 
deontological sense of the human vocation arising from divine mandate. 
 
1. Theocentric Vision of the Cosmos 
 In an effort to move away from the overtly anthropocentric worldview of the 
dominion model of creation, advocates of the stewardship model have advanced a 
“theocentric” vision of the cosmos.  This theocentrism is intended to displace the human-
as-ruler motif that pervades the dominion model.  Rather than establishing creation for 
human sovereign use, God freely creates for the sake of God and, precisely as Creator, 
everything brought into existence belongs to God.  In this way, God is variously 
imagined as a king, a wealthy landowner, a rich man, among other analogues.135  As 
Clare Palmer has suggested,  
 
This perception of stewardship portrays God as a rich man who has 
handed his riches over to humanity to use to its greatest advantage.  Thus 
humanity is a kind of investor – intended to use the resources to the 
master’s and its own best advantage, to make them grow.  The master is 
thus no longer actively involved with his possessions, although there will 
be a reckoning when the steward has to account for the way in which he 
has used the finances entrusted to him.136 
 
                                                
 135 It is important to note that the gender-exclusive language here is not accidental.  In most 
descriptions of stewardship, the theocentric imagery most often used is reflective of masculine monarchical 
conceptualizations of rule.  
 136 Clare Palmer, “Stewardship: A Case Study in Environmental Ethics,” in Environmental 
Stewardship: Critical Perspectives – Past and Present, 67-68. 
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The result of the economic vision of a theocentric cosmos is an emphasis on divine 
ownership and humanity’s viceroy or managerial status.137 
 This divine ownership of the cosmos is often associated with or attributed to two 
counterintuitively complementary lines of inquiry.  The first centers on cosmogony and 
the origin of creation.  This scientifically oriented view interprets the natural world as 
inexplicable in itself, therefore requiring a source or origin.  Human beings did not will 
themselves into being, nor can the human person account for the origin or existence of 
the rest of the expansive universe.  This leads to a number of possible interpretations, but 
one that supports the stewardship model of creation posits an other-than-human Creator.  
Douglas John Hall, focusing on the anthropological dimension of this question of origin, 
asserts that, “we receive our being from God, the source and ground of all that is.  God, 
who creates ex nihilo; God, who continually re-creates (creatio continua); God, without 
whose grace we and the whole creation, as Calvin insisted, would slip away into oblivion: 
God and God alone is the ‘whence’ of our being.”138 
 The second line of inquiry centers on an alternative interpretation of Scripture, 
which has been a deliberate effort to avoid the perceived misinterpretation previously 
inherited in the dominion model.  In most cases, this reconsideration of Scripture focuses 
on the Genesis creation narratives.  Proponents of the stewardship model of creation often 
emphasize the explicit theocentrism of the Priestly account in Genesis 1.  For example, 
Bruce R. Reichenbach and V. Elving Anderson argue that this narrative is inherently 
                                                
 137 It is no accident that our contemporary words “economy” and “ecology” find their origins in 
the same Greek root.  For more on the economic parallels and influences on the stewardship model of 
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monarchical and more about God as “owner” and “lord” than about human 
exceptionalism. 
 
The creation account is thus the narrative of the establishment of a great 
kingdom by no less than the king of the earth.  It is neither historiography 
nor a scientific account, though nonetheless significant and informative.  It 
is a theological assertion about the origin and true ownership of whatever 
is.  Since everything was created by God, it is his, from light and darkness 
to humankind.  All fits into his dominion and purposes, and he sees that it 
is good.139 
 
Similarly, this sense of divine kingship is found elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, including 
within the Psalms and prophets.  For instance, “Psalm 29 sees God enthroned over all 
creation, powerful of voice to have nature do his biding.  In Psalm 95 the Lord is hailed 
as king above all gods.  All nature, from the depths of the earth and the sea to the tops of 
the mountains, is his.”140   
 Advocates of the stewardship model also draw on the New Testament to support 
theocentrism.  The steward is among the most common characters in Jesus’s parables and 
in each instance God is depicted as the sovereign lord who has bestowed temporary 
responsibility for some property or sum of money to a trusted steward for care and 
investment.141  While responsibility is placed squarely on the shoulders of the steward, 
the ownership always remains with the monarch or owner.  In this way the household 
(oikos) is portrayed as always belonging to God. 
                                                
 139 Bruce R. Reichenbach and V. Elving Anderson, On Behalf of God: A Christian Ethic for 
Biology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1995), 48.  Also, see Bruce Reichenbach, “Genesis 
1 as a Theological-Political Narrative of Kingdom Establishment,” Bulletin for Biblical Research 13 
(2003): 47-69. 
 140 Reichenbach and Anderson, On Behalf of God, 46.  The authors also offer reflections on other 
Hebrew Bible passages that can be interpreted to support this monarchical theocentrism, including Psalms 
96, 97, 103, 145, and 148; 1 Chronicles 29:11; Jeremiah 31:25; and Job 28:26. 
 141 On the image of steward in scripture and history, see Douglas John Hall, The Steward: A 
Biblical Symbol Come of Age (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1990).   
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 Even those theologians who have with good reason critiqued images of God as 
sovereign monarch have maintained a vision of creation rooted in the presupposition of 
theocentrism.  For instance, in responding to several contemporary eco-feminist critiques 
about patriarchal theological discourse contained in many reflections on creation,142 
Rowan Williams asserts that in considering an authentically Christian theology of 
creation one does not need to maintain an image of God as monarchical or as the 
exerciser of sovereign power.  Williams explains: 
 
Creation in the classical sense does not therefore involve some uncritical 
idea of God’s ‘monarchy.’  The absolute freedom ascribed to God in 
creation means that God cannot make a reality that then needs to be 
actively governed, subdued, bent to the divine purpose away from its 
natural course.  If God creates freely, God does not need the power of a 
sovereign; what is, is from God.  God’s sovereign purpose is what the 
world is becoming.143 
 
Though the context here is focused on the contentious imagery associated with God’s 
creation ex nihilo and interpretations of power arising from that doctrine, Williams’s 
position nonetheless shines a light on an alternative approach to theocentrism.  In 
addition to conceiving of God as the owner or sovereign lord in accord with human 
imaginaries, one may also recognize God as the source upon whom all of creation is 
dependent.  In contrast with the overtly anthropocentric schemata of the dominion model 
that places the human person at the center of the cosmos, a reaffirmation of the doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo necessarily shifts our perspective toward a model where God is 
centered as free Creator and ongoing source for creatio continua.   
                                                
 142 In particular, see Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist 
Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) and Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological 
Nuclear Age (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1987). 
 143 Rowan Williams, “On Being Creatures,” in On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2000), 69. 
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2. Other-than-human Creation as God’s Oikos for Humanity 
 As already implied in the assertion of a theocentric vision of the cosmos, the 
stewardship model of creation presupposes that other-than-human creation in general, 
and the earth in particular, is God’s “household” (oikos) for humanity.  Though this 
characteristic bears some resemblance to the dominion conceptualization of other-than-
human creation as that which exists purely for human consumption, there is a distinctive 
nuance present in the stewardship approach.  According to the stewardship model of 
creation, this oikos belongs to God (not humanity) and is the location within which the 
drama of salvation history plays out for humanity.  Rather than serve as some sort of 
cosmic warehouse from which human beings can take provisions at their choosing, 
creation is more akin to a rented home that requires care, maintenance, and responsible 
inhabitation.  One might also imagine with Calvin DeWitt that creation, precisely as 
oikos, relates simultaneously to broader senses of household and to human beings whose 
relationship to these households is best understood in terms of stewardship (oikonomia).  
DeWitt writes: “The relationship between human economies and the economy of God’s 
wider creation is circumscribed by the word stewardship…Our human household, then, is 
part of the larger household of life, which in turn is part of the household of all God’s 
creation.  Our human relationship within and among these households is described by 
oikonomia, or stewardship.”144 
 Some contemporary advocates of the stewardship model have particularly 
emphasized the “ecological” rather than the “environmental” concern that stands at the 
heart of humanity’s relationship to creation.  As Joshtrom Kureethadam has argued, to 
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talk in terms of “the environment” has led to two problematic results.  Kureethadam 
explains that the first effect has been a distancing of human beings from this so-called 
“environment,” which is conceived in popular discourse as “out there” or separates from 
the immediate human experience.  The second effect is that such distance between “the 
environment” and us has allowed for the cooption of the term by our neoliberal economy, 
which has led capitalists to market products that are sold in the “green economy” of 
products intended to be “environmentally friendly,” all the while skirting the necessary 
imperative “to alter radically the present course of economic development or undergo 
drastic personal and community lifestyle changes.”145  As a theological and ethical 
countermove, Kureethadam suggests that we wholeheartedly embrace the language of 
“ecology,” which is the discursive effect of his proposed paradigm shift toward 
embracing creation as our collective home (oikos).  Kureethadam writes: 
 
To see things in this perspective we will need to rediscover Earth as home 
more than as the mere environment that surrounds us.  Only when we see 
and love Earth as our home, our common home, our only home, and see 
ourselves as Earthlings, children of Earth, imago mundi – literally formed 
from the dust of the earth – will we begin to understand the gravity of the 
contemporary ecological crisis…Earth is not only our common home but 
our only home, the home that engendered us and sustains us.  Earth is not 
merely an environment that we can swap for another one by migrating 
somewhere else when our home planet becomes degraded beyond 
redemption, as it is sometimes presented in popular science fiction and in 
techno-savvy media.  Only when we learn to see the earth as our only 
home will we be willing to act to save it.  For in saving our common 
home, we will be saving ourselves.146 
 
In addition to Kureethadam’s conviction that the ecological crises of our time are the 
result of irresponsible stewardship and the lack of recognition that creation is our home, 
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like DeWitt he also sees creation as God’s home too.  “Another root cause of the 
contemporary ecological crisis is our failure to recognize God’s in-dwelling presence in 
creation, a presence that renders it God’s own home.”147  Anne Clifford has similarly 
noted the importance of affirming God’s immanent presence in creation, calling 
Christians to take seriously “that oikos is not only the household of life, but also the 
household of God.  As the household of God, oikos has an inherent sacrality, even a 
sacramentality.”148 
 Whether emphasis is placed on creation as the household of both the divine and 
humanity or humanity alone, iterations of the stewardship model of creation affirm the 
importance of viewing other-than-human creation as both the oikos for humanity and 
belonging to God. 
 
3. ‘Human Separatist’ Interpretation of Imago Dei 
 In order to assert that human beings are called to be caretakers of the rest of 
creation, the stewardship approach necessitates the identification of a distinctive 
dimension of the human person that sets one apart from everything else God has brought 
into existence.  Some manifestations of the stewardship model are explicit in naming the 
imago Dei as the scripturally rooted source for this distinguishing characteristic, while 
other iterations affirm the sui generis status of humanity more tacitly.  Yet, when the 
doctrine of the imago Dei is invoked within the stewardship model it bears a notably 
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anthropocentric quality,149 an interpretation that David Clough has termed the “human 
separatist” approach.150 
 As we have already seen in the first part of this chapter, the doctrine of imago Dei 
has been associated with rationality as far back as at least the writings of Philo of 
Alexandria.  This is one of three key features most often associated with the doctrine of 
imago Dei and its exclusive attribution to human beings.  In addition to the emphasis on 
rationality, advocates of the stewardship model of creation have alternatively suggested 
that relationality or moral reasoning are what constitute the positive features of 
humanity’s unique status as imago Dei.  Those who posit the former suggest that it is our 
human capacity for experiencing ourselves and relating to others as subjects in loving 
relationship that distinguishes us from the rest of creation and aligns us more proximately 
with the Creator.151  Those who posit the latter argue that it is the fact that we human 
beings can discern what is right and wrong, what actions or intentions are good or ill that 
clearly distinguishes us from other-than-human creation.152   
 Whether presented in an explicit way or tacitly affirmed in a less obvious way, 
various iterations of the stewardship model frequently emphasize human uniqueness 
within creation justified in terms of reading the doctrine of imago Dei according to 
rational faculties, relational capacity, or the ability to engage in moral reasoning.  Murray 
Rae offers an insightful summary that ties together this sense of human separatism found 
in the stewardship model and the unique responsibility that human beings interpret 
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themselves as having as those beings that stand over and above the rest of creation.  He 
explains, “humanity is called upon to exercise a unique responsibility in the creation’s 
relatedness to the Creator.  It is human beings who are created in God’s image and human 
beings who are called by God to exercise dominion over all the creatures of the earth.  It 
is through humanity too that the relation of love between Creator and creature may come 
to expression, for it is the human being whom God addresses in the garden and who is 
expected to be the responsive voice of the Creation to the loving call of God.”153  Put 
more bluntly, Bruce Reichenbach and V. Elving Anderson write, “The doctrine of imago 
Dei places both unique position (privilege) and unique responsibilities on human beings.  
Only humans are made in God’s image, and hence there is a prima facie case for human 
preference.”154   
 The unique position of human beings within the cosmos as understood from the 
human vantage point is already well understood.  This sense of superiority, what 
developed into the attitude of “human separatism” from the rest of creation, served as the 
ground not only of the stewardship model of creation but the earlier dominion model as 
well.  Yet, it is the content of these “unique responsibilities” arising from human beings 
exclusively created imago Dei that we still need to examine and will do so in the 
following section. 
 
4. Deontological Sense of the Human Vocation 
 Another key characteristic of the stewardship model of creation emerges as a 
principle closely related to the earlier explored interpretation of imago Dei; namely, that 
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among the unique responsibilities assigned by the Creator to humanity is a duty to care 
for other-than-human creation.  This has been variously expressed as a call to be 
ecological “gardeners,” “caretakers,” “managers,” or even “landlords,” but the image 
most commonly invoked provides the model with its name, “stewards.”155 
 The duty to care for the rest of creation is not elective or optional but is instead 
constitutive of what it means to be called human.  Human beings are called to function as 
representatives of God on earth by caring for other-than-human creation as good 
stewards.  This sense of the human vocation is something with which God has entrusted 
human beings and it is often directly associated with the interpretation of the doctrine of 
imago Dei examined above.  Joshtrom Kureethadam explains: 
 
In being “co-carers” of God’s creation, humans are to imitate and reflect 
God’s own tender and loving way of caring for the physical world.  
Reflecting God in caring for creation is fundamental to what we are.  It is 
our clear job description, stated in the Bible.  It is in this role that humans 
reveal their specific identity of being created in the image of God (imago 
Dei).  Fashioned in the image and likeness of God, the human being is 
expected to tend creation with the same care and compassion of God.156 
 
In a sense, this understanding of the purpose of human activity in the world naturally 
follows from the three characteristics previously examined.  First, that creation is not the 
private and personal domain of human beings to be exploited or dominated but rather is 
that which always already belongs to God, subordinates the human person to a place in 
the cosmic “middle” as mediator between Creator and creation.  Second, the Earth in 
particular and other-than-human creation in general serves as the home (oikos) of God, 
which has been placed on loan to the human family.  “In a wider sense, the garden 
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entrusted to humanity is the oikos of the planet Earth, a veritable garden in the vast 
cosmic expanses, which was gradually prepared for life to flourish.  It is the care of this 
common home, lovingly prepared by God as an abode for humanity and the rest of 
creation, with which humanity is entrusted.”157  Third, given the unique status of the 
human person among the rest of creation, frequently characterized in terms of the imago 
Dei, human beings are notably distinct from and, to some degree, situated above the rest 
of the created order.  Finally, these factors come together and result in a sense of 
deontological or obligatory responsibility for creation that human beings have received as 
a mandate from the Creator.  It is God the Creator who “owns” creation, has deliberately 
housed human beings within this creation, and has placed human beings in an overseer 
role with regard to the cosmic property on loan to them, therefore human beings have an 
intrinsic responsibility to care for this environment (oikos) that is their terrestrial home. 
 Additionally, advocates of this model see this responsibility arising from the 
vocation of stewardship to be yet another unique attribute of the human person as imago 
Dei.  Unlike human beings, God’s other creatures are not accountable to God for the 
prudent and loving care of creation.158  One can see how the common characteristics of 
the stewardship model overlap among each in the descriptive discourse of this approach’s 
proponents: “To be declared accountable by the Creator implies, furthermore, that God 
has given humanity what it needs for actually being accountable.  We need rationality for 
the planning, imagining, and knowing necessary to exercise dominion, love, and 
justice.”159  The vocation to be God’s stewards on earth necessarily elevates the human 
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person to a privileged place while implicitly denying to other creatures those traits 
required for being cooperators with the Creator.  
 Furthermore, refusal to embrace the call to be God’s stewards of creation is 
understood as a form of sin, for it breaks relationship with God, with the rest of creation, 
and within the human person because it alienates the individual from his or her true 
human identity as one called to be a benevolent caretaker of God’s oikos.160  Several 
theologians have tied sin to what Kureethadam has called “irresponsible stewardship.”161  
Among those who have spoken about the sinfulness of disregarding the responsibilities of 
proper stewardship is John Zizioulas, who has written that, “The protection of the natural 
environment is a fundamental religious obligation demanded from humankind by God 
himself. This means that the Church will have to revise radically her concept of sin, 
which traditionally has been limited to the social and anthropological level, and start 
speaking of sin against nature as a matter of primary religious significance.”162  
Expressed positively, human beings fulfill their divine calling by serving as caretakers of 
creation, while expressed negatively, human beings that shirk their responsibility to be 
good stewards of creation are committing a form of sin.  
 These four characteristics are far from exhaustive and various iterations of the 
stewardship model of creation will reflect these and other features in distinctive ways.  
They are presented here to provide a preliminary heuristic frame to help orient us in our 
consideration of various contemporary theologies of creation.  In the next and final 
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section of this chapter, I will offer two examples of contemporary iterations of the 
stewardship model of creation, which will illustrate how these characteristics are 
manifested in practice. 
 
D. Contemporary Iterations of Stewardship 
 This section is dedicated to providing representative illustrations of contemporary 
approaches to the stewardship model of creation.  Though not exhaustive, it is my hope 
that pointing to these two examples may offer a concrete presentation of what has been 
discussed in general terms so far.  The first figure considered here is Douglas John Hall, 
an emeritus professor of theology at McGill University, who has spent a significant 
portion of his renowned career reflecting on the relationship between the metaphor of 
“the steward” and the central convictions of the Christian faith, including care for 
creation.  A United Church of Canada minister, Hall provides us with one Protestant 
approach to the stewardship model.  Hall presents his vision of creation and humanity’s 
place within it most expressly in his books The Steward: A Biblical Symbol Come of Age 
(1982) and Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (1986). The second figure 
considered here is Pope Francis, whose 2015 encyclical Laudato Si’ (“On Care for Our 
Common Home”) provides us with an authoritative Roman Catholic position on the 
stewardship model of creation.  Drawing on the four characteristics of the stewardship 
model of creation enumerated in the previous section, I will show how these features 
appear within and shape these respective iterations of the stewardship model of creation.  
 
1. Douglas John Hall: Steward as Key Symbol of Christianity 
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 Douglas John Hall begins his exploration of the theme “the steward” with a 
scriptural survey of the development from the historical category of “the steward” in the 
Hebrew Bible to the more metaphorical conceptualization of “the steward” in the New 
Testament.163  His interest in this image arises from his concern about the planetary 
effects of human pollution and other forms of impact that have led to rampant 
environmental degradation.  His pragmatic starting point, one concerned ultimately with 
the goal of shifting theological praxis, echoes that of his German contemporary Jürgen 
Moltmann.164  Hall argues that, “The only adequate response to the great physical and 
spiritual problems of our historical moment is for the human inhabitants of the planet to 
acquire, somehow, a new way of imagining themselves.”165  His proposal in response is 
to develop a restored understanding of the biblical metaphor of “the steward.”   
 Hall expresses a strong theocentric vision of the cosmos, stating succinctly that, 
“ownership, mastery, ultimacy of authority, and sovereignty are attributable to God 
alone.”166  He continues: “As soon as God is pictured as the owner and sovereign of 
everything in relation to which human beings can be at most stewards, institutions such 
as the holding of property, the hierarchic distribution of authority, the technocratic 
mastery of the natural world, and the like are thrown into a critical perspective.”167  Not 
only does the shift from an overtly anthropocentric view of the cosmos to a theocentric 
one shift our understanding of human identity, but it also shifts our sense of praxis.  In 
response to the problematic dominion model of creation, Hall also emphasizes a form of 
theocentrism that he believes corrects the errors of an overly anthropocentric worldview 
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by situating a second focus alongside humanity, namely what he calls “geocentrism.”  He 
writes: “A faith that is theocentric is at the same time anthropocentric and geocentric.  
These are not to be regarded as alternative foci for the believing community but as 
interdependent spheres of faith’s concentration.  For it would be impossible for a faith 
that concentrates on God to avoid what this God is concentrating on.”168  Hall sees the 
identity of authentic humanity as expressed in resembling the way God cares for the 
whole cosmos.  “We image God as we are incorporated through grace and faith into the 
preservational dominion of God in the world.  Or, to state the same thing in other words, 
we mirror the sovereignty of the divine love in our stewardship of the earth.”169  The 
model for humanity is found in a God whose identity is tied up with not only the divine 
act of creatio ex nihilo but also with the ongoing, loving, and intentional creatio 
continua.  We are called to care for creation as stewards because God preserves creation 
as Creator. 
 According to Hall, our collective hubris led to the elevation of a dominion model 
of creation and blinded humanity to the truth that other-than-human creation was not 
simply ours for the taking, but something that God lovingly sustains as the true “lord” of 
the cosmos.  “Only when human pride has been chastened by the knowledge of our 
distortion of our own creaturely status is it possible for us to have some share in God’s 
own joy in the creation.”170  This human pride or hubris is also what clouds our ability to 
recognize the true theocentric nature of creation.  As indicated earlier, a key dimension of 
the theocentric vision of the cosmos as a characteristic of the stewardship model is the 
recognition that we are not the source of our own existence.  Hall explains: 
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If we wake up each morning for a certain number of years to find that, yes, 
we still exist, it is not because we have within ourselves the wherewithal 
for our own perpetuation.  We are not self-generating or self-sufficient.  
We are recipients at every level of our being – physical, psychic, spiritual, 
emotional, and so forth…we receive our being from God, the source and 
ground of all that is.  God, who creates ex nihilo; God, who continually re-
creates (creatio continua); God, without whose grace we and the whole 
creation, as Calvin insisted, would slip away into oblivion (a sentiment 
that late twentieth-century humanity, perched on the edge of nuclear 
holocaust, can perhaps once again appreciate): God and God alone is the 
“whence” of our being.171 
 
Hall later reiterates this point, expressing that, “We know, if we are honest, that we 
receive our being, that it comes, prodigiously, from beyond our own inherent capacity for 
living – for ‘going on,’ whether physically or psychically. Faith names this ‘beyond’ 
God.”172  Contrary to the inherited dominion-model sense of human self-importance, a 
true understanding of who we are necessitates a re-centering of God within our theology 
of creation. 
 Concerning the notion that other-than-human creation is God’s oikos for 
humanity, Hall’s presentation of this characteristic is subtler than the other dimensions 
typically present in the stewardship approach.  Nevertheless, Hall writes: “We are all ‘in 
the same boat.’ And it is God’s boat, God’s ark.”173  As we will see in clearer relief in the 
next section, the focus of Hall’s constructive project of reviving the scriptural metaphor 
of the steward is centered on the human person actively expressing the imago Dei.  Given 
the centrality of humanity in his theology, the rest of creation often falls to the 
background.  Yet, there are implicit presuppositions about how other-than-human 
creation serves as God’s oikos for humanity.  One way this appears is in the affirmation 
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of humanity’s responsibility to be “trustees” of the earth rather than outright “owners,” a 
position reserved for the Creator alone.174  For Hall, this sense of God’s ownership of 
creation (in opposition the human-oriented desire for possession) both flows from his call 
for a renewed theocentric vision of creation and guides us toward a recognition of the 
universal right all people have to the resources of this planet.  God has entrusted this 
world to all people, not just a select few.  Christians are called to see in their true identity 
as stewards the particular call to care for this collective home and source of universal life.  
Hall writes: “The Christian community, to be true to its own roots, will increasingly have 
to be found on the side of those who argue that the basic resources of the earth belong 
neither to individuals, nor corporations, nor nations, but are global treasures, given 
perpetually by a gracious God for the use of all the families of the earth – including those 
not yet born.”175 
 Although the presupposition of other-than-human creation as God’s oikos is 
presented in an indirect and subtle manner in Hall’s theological consideration of creation, 
his reflection on the meaning of the human person and what is distinctive about humanity 
is clearly foregrounded.  At the heart of his whole project of retrieving the metaphor of 
stewardship stands the reinterpretation of the doctrine of imago Dei.  It must be stated 
from the outset that Hall offers a considerably nuanced view of humanity and its 
relationship to other-than-human creation.  However, as one might have already intuited, 
his deliberate and pervasive focus on humanity as such conveys an important dimension 
of his unacknowledged “human separatism.”  In a chapter titled “Stewardship as Key to a 
Theology of Nature,” Hall considers three possible expressions of the relationship 
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between humanity and other-than-human creation, ultimately rejecting the first two and 
encouraging the third as a welcome middle between two extremes.   
 The first approach to understanding the human person is most closely associated 
with the dominion model of creation.  Hall refers to this as a “humanity above nature” 
perspective.176  Like many other scholars, Hall traces this misguided way of viewing the 
human person as the historical result of modern science and philosophy.  This way of 
viewing the human person situates humanity in such a place as to have complete 
sovereignty over other-than-human creation.  Hall rejects this notion of the human 
person.  Hall calls the second approach to understanding the human person the “humanity 
in nature” perspective.177  If the “humanity above nature” perspective is viewed as an 
ontological pole on one end of a spectrum, the “humanity in nature” perspective occupies 
the place at the opposite end.  Hall explains: “The second theoretical and historical 
possibility for conceiving of the relation between human beings and the natural world is 
to think of Homo Sapiens as one of the myriad of creatures.  One species among others, 
mortal as they, dependent as they, having no more to offer than they, and no more right to 
life either – this is humanity in nature.”178  Hall views this approach as an overly 
romantic perspective, which, due to the blurring of distinction between human beings and 
other-than-human creatures, seems untenable and beneath the true dignity of humanity.  
Neither of these extremes satisfies Hall’s desire for theologically sound and scripturally 
rooted understanding of the human person.  In response, Hall proposes what he considers 
to be a sustainable middle position. 
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 The third approach to understanding the human person is labeled “humanity with 
nature.”179  Hall believes that the use of the preposition “with” allows for theologians to 
express humanity’s solidarity with other-than-human creation while also maintaining a 
clear distinction from the natural order.  He explains: “Here humanity is neither superior 
to the rest of creation (above) nor simply identical with it (in), but the human creature 
exists alongside the others, in solidarity with them, yet also distinct.”180  At first glance, 
this approach seems to offer a positive solution to the previously irreconcilable divide 
between absolute distinction and creational solidarity.  However, a closer examination of 
Hall’s proposed approach begins to reveal the “human separatist” threads present in his 
argument.  In explaining how he understands the human person’s place within creation he 
emphasizes human distinctiveness. 
 
We are different, then, from the beasts of the field and the birds of the air.  
Let us not be naïve and imagine that we can just melt into nature.  We 
have a reflective side that the other creatures do not have.  It is harder for 
us to die than it is for them.  We have always to choose, or to be victims of 
our lack of choice.  But the purpose of all this is that we should “have 
dominion”: that is, that we should be servants, keepers, and priests in 
relation to others.  That we should represent them before their Maker, and 
represent to them their Maker’s tender care.  We are the place where 
creation becomes reflective about itself, the point at which it speaks, even 
sings! Homo sapiens? Perhaps. But more importantly, Homo loquens, the 
speaking creatures.  But we do not speak for ourselves only (using the 
phrase in both its literal and its figurative sense).  When we are true to our 
own essence, to the ontology of communion and community, we speak for 
all our fellow creatures, for the totality.181 
 
The emphasis that Hall places on the distinctiveness of the human person unveils some of 
the operative presuppositions that are otherwise overlooked.  For example, in addition to 
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the naming of reason as a key distinguishing feature of humanity in terms of choice Hall 
also focuses on the verbalization and communication of humans as distinctive and yet 
essential for all creation.  Human beings serve as the intermediary “representing” God to 
creation and vice versa.182  It appears here that the rest of creation is incapable of relating 
to its Creator without the human person.  Although Hall admits that human beings share 
“creatureliness” with the other-than-human creation, he presents this truth as the 
condition of the possibility for human representation of the whole creation.183  Despite 
the attempts to strike a balance between absolute otherness and complete solidarity, in the 
end Hall falls on the side of human separateness as the necessary foundation for 
understanding our fullest identity as God’s stewards of creation.  According to this view, 
we bear certain characteristics – including the classic examples of rationality, 
relationality, moral decision-making, and speech – that set us apart from rest of creation, 
even though we are physically composed of the same material and even share an 
overwhelming number of traits with other creatures. 
 Finally, Hall’s iteration of the stewardship model also carries the key 
characteristic of a deontological sense of human vocation.  In fact, for Hall the whole 
identity of the human person is actually encapsulated in the symbol of “the steward.”  As 
Christopher Vena describes this feature of Hall’s thought well, “Being a steward is not 
simply compatible with Christian life, it is the Christian life.”184  For Hall the distinctive 
character of humanity’s imago Dei is best expressed in terms of stewardship.  Not only is 
there a deontological imperative present within the Christian call to be stewards, but Hall 
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goes so far as to say that there is an ontological dimension to human being that is only 
authentically expressed in this re-appropriation of the imago Dei in terms of stewardship.  
To illustrate the universality of this human identity lived out fully in response to God’s 
call, Hall suggests that we reconceive of the imago Dei and the metaphor of “steward” as 
verbs rather than as nouns.  In other words, “imagining God” is what it means to bear the 
imago Dei, while “stewarding creation” is what it looks like to actualize the imago Dei in 
this world.185  Hall explains that, “If our being is as such a being-with, then the good that 
we are obliged to pursue is not something externally imposed but the making good of our 
own essence, being who we are.”186  There is a sense of duty and mission that arises from 
this understanding of an ontology of stewardship, it is not an extrinsic “call” as much as 
an internal and a priori sense of duty.  As with his pragmatic starting point identified 
earlier, Hall sees the end of our actualizing the imago Dei as stewards to be praxiological 
and resulting in concrete action.  Hall calls for a sense of conversion from the false 
identity of human personhood found in the dominion model, which is characterized by 
“pride and sloth,” to the true identity of the steward lived out in “missionary zeal” in care 
for the rest of creation.187   
 
2. Pope Francis: Stewardship of our ‘Common Home’ 
 With the possible exception of Pope Paul VI’s encyclical letter Humane Vitae 
(1968), there has been likely no more-anticipated papal teaching in modern history than 
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Pope Francis’s 2015 encyclical letter Laudato Si (“On Care for Our Common Home”).188  
Whereas other modern pontiffs have formally reflected on the relationship between 
humanity and the rest of creation, especially in the teachings of John Paul II and Benedict 
XVI, Francis’s contribution in Laudato Si is the most explicit treatment of a Christian 
theology of creation to date from a pope.  Though the document was both loved and 
loathed even before its official publication because of the Pope’s direct and unapologetic 
admonition of human beings, and particularly those in the global north, for their 
complicity in causing environmental degradation, much of the foundational theology that 
undergirds Francis’s text can be traced back to the now well-established stewardship 
model of creation.  Though hailed for its novelty in terms of direct papal teaching on 
creation, we shall see that Francis’s operative theology is anything but new in terms of 
the stewardship model.  While a detailed treatment of Laudato Si would be of interest, the 
present focus is solely to highlight the ways in which the encyclical offers us another 
example of a contemporary iteration of the stewardship model of creation.  Following the 
examination of Douglas John Hall’s approach to stewardship, this section will examine 
how the four key characteristics previously outlined are manifested in Francis’s 
authoritative teaching. 
 From the outset of Laudato Si, Pope Francis presupposes a theocentric vision of 
the cosmos, calling women and men – of all backgrounds and faith traditions – to return 
God to the rightful place as source, sustainer, and goal of all creation.  With an allusion to 
the work of the Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin, Francis writes that, “The ultimate destiny of 
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the universe is in the fullness of God, which has already been attained by the risen Christ, 
the measure of the maturity of all things.”189  The problem, Francis explains, is that 
human beings have put themselves in God’s place by adopting a distorted dominion 
model of creation, which has no place in Christianity.190  Francis directly addresses the 
need to de-center the human person within the collective cosmic framework, explaining 
that: 
 
A spirituality which forgets God as all-powerful and Creator is not 
acceptable.  That is how we end up worshipping earthly powers, or 
ourselves usurping the place of God, even to the point of claiming an 
unlimited right to trample his creation underfoot.  The best way to put men 
and women in their place, putting an end to their claim to absolute 
dominion over the earth, is once again to put forward the figure of a 
Father, who creates and who alone owns the world.  Otherwise, human 
beings will always try to impose their own laws and interests on reality.191 
 
Although Francis plays down the language of “ruler” or “sovereign” in his various calls 
throughout Laudato Si for a re-centering of God the Creator in our vision of the cosmos, 
he nevertheless conforms to the stewardship-model trope of God as owner of the universe 
with a notably patriarchal sensibility.  While human beings are surely not the lords and 
masters of the universe, God still remains the pater familias of creation. 
 One of the most recognizable characteristics of the stewardship model of creation 
present in Laudato Si is the understanding that other-than-human creation, and the earth 
in particular, is best understood as God’s oikos for humanity.  So central is this aspect of 
the stewardship model to Francis’s vision that it appears in the formal title of the 
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encyclical: “On Care For Our Common Home.”192  Instances of this dimension of 
stewardship are too numerous in the text to explore here in full, though it may be helpful 
to highlight a few examples.  Again affirming a theocentric vision of the cosmos while 
also offering a repudiation of the dominion model, Francis writes: “We are not God.  The 
earth was here before us and it has been given to us.  This allows us to respond to the 
charge that Judaeo-Christian thinking, on the basis of the Genesis account which grants 
man ‘dominion’ over the earth (cf. Gen 1:28), has encouraged the unbridled exploitation 
of nature by putting man as domineering and destructive by nature.  This is not a correct 
interpretation of the Bible as understood by the Church.”193  Francis later cites John Paul 
II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus (1991) in which we have a direct affirmation of this 
stewardship characteristic: “God gave the earth to the whole human race for the 
sustenance of all its members.”194  The ownership of this oikos belongs to God, yet it has 
been entrusted to humankind for the purpose of a domicile and sustenance.  What has 
been entrusted to humanity in terms of other-than-human creation is not reserved only for 
living, but is also given by God to future generations.  Francis calls for “intergenerational 
solidarity” in this regard, focusing on the need to care for the earth and other-than-human 
creation for the sake of those yet to be born.195  In concluding Laudato Si, Francis offers 
an eschatological vision of the connection between our “common home” in this life and 
our future, heavenly home, suggesting that we must care for this oikos while also 
affirming its source and purpose.  “In the meantime, we come together to take charge of 
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this home which has been entrusted to us, knowing that all the good which exists here 
will be taken up into the heavenly feast.”196 
 Like Douglas John Hall, Pope Francis offers a generally nuanced, if sometimes 
contradictory, presentation of “human separatism.”  On the one hand, Francis continually 
shines light on our common connection and interdependence on the rest of creation.  
Such is the case when he writes: “Human beings too are creatures of this world, enjoying 
a right to life and happiness, and endowed with unique dignity.”197  Francis frequently 
goes out of his way to emphasize our relatedness to the rest of creation.  However, on the 
other hand, Francis doggedly defends the uniqueness and particular dignity of the human 
person in contrast to the rest of creation.  It is in these moments that we see the 
stewardship model characteristic of “human separatism” surface in Laudato Si.  For 
instance, in a subsection dedicated to “The Mystery of the Universe,” Francis writes: 
 
Human beings, even if we postulate a process of evolution, also possess a 
uniqueness which cannot be fully explained by the evolution of other open 
systems.  Each of us has his or her own personal identity and is capable of 
entering into dialogue with others and with God himself.  Our capacity to 
reason, to develop arguments, to be inventive, to interpret reality and to 
create art, along with other not yet discovered capacities, are signs of a 
uniqueness which transcends the spheres of physics and biology.  The 
sheer novelty involved in the emergence of personal being within a 
material universe presupposes a direct action of God and a particular call 
to life and to relationship on the part of a “Thou” who addresses himself to 
another “thou.”  The biblical accounts of creation invite us to see each 
human being as a subject who can never be reduced to the status of an 
object.198 
 
Francis relies on the typical loci frequently invoked to defend “human separatist” 
approaches to understanding the human person, which is most easily seen in his 
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preference for emphasizing the distinctiveness of the human person over admitted 
commonalities or kinship.  These loci include subjectivity, rationality, creativity, artistry, 
imagination and interpretation, among others.  Implicit in the discussion of humanity’s 
unique relationship with God is an affirmation of the human person as inherently 
religious, which remains another category used to explain the “human separatist” 
characteristic of the stewardship model.  It is true that Francis oscillates between a focus 
on the interrelatedness of all material creation including humanity and the distinctiveness 
of the human person.  However, he often offers qualification to the former vision of 
humanity within creation in order to affirm the latter vision of the distinctiveness of the 
human person arising from humanity’s singular status as imago Dei.199   
 Finally, the whole tenor of Laudato Si reflects a deontological sense of the human 
vocation as steward of creation.  Drawing on John Paul II’s own reiteration of the duty of 
all Christians to care for creation, Francis expands the demographic of this vocational 
characteristic to all people: “If the simple fact of being human moves people to care for 
the environment of which they are a part, Christians in their turn ‘realize that their 
responsibility within creation, and their duty towards nature and the Creator, are an 
essential part of their faith.’  It is good for humanity and the world at large when we 
believers better recognize the ecological commitments which stem from our 
convictions.”200  These convictions about which Francis speaks are grounded in what he 
calls the correct interpretation of scripture, which he suggests means that God has 
intended human beings to be gardeners and stewards of creation from the beginning. 
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The biblical texts are to be read in their context, with an appropriate 
hermeneutic, recognizing that they tell us to “till and keep” the garden of 
the world (cf. Gen 2:15).  “Tilling” refers to cultivating, plowing or 
working, while “keeping” means caring, protecting, overseeing and 
preserving.  This implies a relationship of mutual responsibility between 
human beings and nature.  Each community can take from the bounty of 
the earth whatever it needs for subsistence, but it also has the duty to 
protect the earth and to ensure its fruitfulness for coming 
generations…This responsibility for God’s earth means that human 
beings, endowed with intelligence, must respect the laws of nature and the 
delicate equilibria existing between the creatures of this world.201 
 
As with his pontifical predecessors, Francis’s key concern is for shifts in human praxis 
arising from a sense of our divine vocation and in response to the increasing effects of 
environmental degradation, which continues to have a disproportionately negative affect 
on the poorest inhabitants of the world.  Throughout Laudato Si we read about “our 
human responsibility for nature.”202  This responsibility, alternatively described in terms 
of the gardening metaphors named earlier, is also explicitly tied to the notion of 
“responsible stewardship.”203  Francis connects this vocation to be “responsible stewards” 
to the challenge of “ecological conversion,” which means that all women and men must 
evaluate and reconsider their practices, behaviors, and worldviews in light of the duty to 
care for all creation.204  In a way that evokes the best of Francis’s “human separatism,” he 
nears the close of Laudato Si with a hopeful call to action that calls all human beings to 
embrace our collective vocation as stewards: “Human beings, while capable of the worst, 
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are also capable of rising above themselves, choosing again what is good, and making a 
new start, despite their mental and social conditioning.  We are able to take an honest 
look at ourselves, to acknowledge our deep dissatisfaction, and to embark on new paths 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Critiquing the Stewardship Model of Creation 
 
 Having examined the developmental history of the stewardship model of creation 
in the last chapter, the present chapter responds with a detailed analysis and critique of 
this approach.  Despite their acknowledged improvement over the dominion model, 
various iterations of the stewardship model of creation have nevertheless come under 
scrutiny in recent years.  The overarching concern centers on a belief that the stewardship 
model of creation is no more than a subtle version of the problematic dominion model.  
The condition for advocating “stewardship” with regard to the relational tie between 
humanity and the rest of creation depends on a particular theocentric worldview that 
mirrors the bestowal of the natural world to humanity in the dominion model.206  In so 
doing, the whole of other-than-human creation becomes subordinated to human beings.  
Such a move reduces the other-than-human economy to a place of alterity and inherent 
utility, while concurrently elevating humanity to a location over against the rest of 
creation.  
 While a fully comprehensive evaluation of every iteration of the stewardship 
model exceeds the limits of this current project, the following chapter is presented as an 
overview of key problems found in the stewardship model organized under four 
headings: (a) hierarchical dualism and the problem of alterity; (b) the managerial or 
caretaker qualities of stewardship; (c) problematic eschatological implications; and (d) 
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the anthropocentric phenomenology that undergirds much of modern theological 
reflection on creation. 
 
A. Hierarchical Dualism and the Problem of Alterity in the Stewardship Model 
 Identifying the now-classic conceptualizations for considering humanity’s 
relationship to the rest of the created order, Elizabeth Johnson delineates three 
approaches found among the multifarious Christian theological and exegetical traditions: 
the absolute kingship (“dominion”) model, the stewardship model, and the kinship 
model.207  Johnson notes well that what she calls the “kingship” model is based on 
“hierarchical dualism that sees humanity separated from the earth and placed in a position 
of absolute dominion over all other creatures who are made for us.”208  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, it does not take much imagination to see how the ecological 
degradation of recent centuries and decades could be spurred on by, if not directly tied to, 
an operative (if only in some implicit form) dominion model of creation.  Sovereignty as 
appropriated by humanity within the oikos of other-than-human creation is exercised such 
that, by an ostensibly divine decree read into Genesis 1:26-28, human persons are not 
accountable to another for their use of the rest of the created order.  This is easy enough 
to recognize.  What is less overt, however, is the way in which the stewardship model is 
not much different from the dominion or “kingship” model in principle.  Johnson 
explains: 
 
The stewardship model keeps the structure of hierarchical dualism but 
calls for human beings to be responsible caretakers or guardians of the 
earth and all its creatures.  Having neither fur nor feathers, human beings 
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need to use the earth creatively for shelter, food, and the basics of survival, 
developing culture as the medium through which these achievements are 
passed on.  But in so doing, they know that they must care for the earth, 
even in terms of their own self-interest.  In this model humanity is still at 
the top of the pyramid of being but has a duty to protect and serve what 
seems weaker and more vulnerable.209 
 
While a prima facie reading of the stewardship model appears to present a departure from 
the absolutizing anthropocentrism of the dominion model, Johnson and others rightly 
note that the grounding principle and guiding ethos of the stewardship paradigm is not 
much different from that of dominion.  Humanity remains above, over, and against the 
rest of the created order, if now only as a “benevolent caretaker” or “steward” in contrast 
to the less-subtle “lord of the land.”210   
 The pervasiveness of this hierarchical dualism present even in the stewardship 
model of creation is the result of a confluence of several deep-seated philosophical and 
theological influences appropriated over the course of millennia.  Like the slow 
concretization of the dominion model, which arose in part due to philosophical answers 
presented in response to scriptural and theological questions, the foundational 
presuppositions that undergird the stewardship model became sedimented over time and 
can be traced back to many of characteristics found at the roots of the dominion model.  
 Feminist theologians including Johnson and Rosemary Radford Reuther, in 
addition to others, have noted the correlative reality present in the Christian theological 
tradition’s treatment of both women and other-than-human creation.  Reuther notes that, 
“The correlation of femaleness with lower nature against higher order changes 
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dramatically as we move from Babylonian to Hebrew to Greek thought.”211  Though the 
license for domination and subjugation of creation presumed in the dominion model 
overlaps more clearly with explicit forms of misogyny, the hierarchical ladder of being 
and nature still present in the stewardship model has also contributed to the maintenance 
of systems of subordination.  It should be noted that not all iterations of a hierarchical 
structure for ontological or even societal ordering are inherently problematic or 
oppressive to the same degree.  However, as the theologians consulted here have 
observed, the oppressive reality of patriarchal systems of hierarchy inherently result in 
subordinationism, which has led to recognizing the need for another paradigm in thinking 
about humanity and the rest of creation.  In calling for a renewed theological approach to 
creation, Reuther states: 
 
This theology must question the hierarchy of human over nonhuman 
nature as a relationship of ontological and moral value.  It must challenge 
the right of the human to treat the nonhuman as private property and 
material wealth to be exploited.  It must unmask the structures of social 
domination, male over female, owner over worker that mediate this 
domination of nonhuman nature.  Finally, it must question the model of 
hierarchy that starts with nonmaterial spirit (God) as the source of the 
chain of being and continues down to nonspiritual “matter” as the bottom 
of the chain of being and the most inferior, valueless, and dominated point 
in the chain of command.212 
 
At the core of the stewardship model of creation stands the axiomatic belief that 
humanity is not coequal with the rest of the created order, either because of an 
ontological difference or by virtue of a divine mandate to “care for” or “steward” other-
than-human creation.  As Johnson succinctly puts it, the stewardship model “misses the 
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crucial aspect of human dependence upon that which we steward,” thereby eschewing the 
significance of our interrelational and interdependent existence as part of the same 
created order.213 
 Among the most pernicious sources for the maintenance of the human person as 
existing apart from the rest of creation in terms of the steward charged to mediate 
between the divine and the material, is the longstanding western preoccupation with 
dualism.214  Johnson notes that, “Hellenistic dualism, patriarchal androcentrism, 
Cartesian dualism: in themselves these are philosophical systems.  But when their 
patterns of thought were brought to bear on theology, they led to religious reflection that 
by and large devalued the earth as a decaying present reality over against heaven, an 
eternal spiritual reality.”215  Furthermore, this dualism “elevated human beings as a 
whole, blessed with rational souls, over Earth’s other living creatures which were allied 
with matter, and thus of lesser worth.”216 
 Not only does this dualistic way of thinking presuppose an a priori divide 
between humanity and the rest of creation, but also this way of seeing the world 
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reinforces other forms of insidious subjugation.  Just as humanity as such is tasked with 
“care” of the created order from a position outside that same order, so too one can 
recognize similarly paternalistic treatments of women by men who understand 
themselves as “responsible” for the care and protection of that which and those who are 
beneath them according to this hierarchical framework.  As feminist scholars have 
acknowledged for decades, women have been associated with “nature” in a way that is 
both demeaning and subordinating according to a hierarchical dualistic framework.  
Conversely, this association of “nature” (vs. “spirit” or “reason”) with the feminine has 
led to ecological exploitation and degradation. Johnson explains: “The ruling man’s 
hierarchy over women and slaves extends also to nature, most often symbolized as 
female.  She is meant for his service while he, in his nobility, has a duty and right to tame 
and control her.”217  This correlative relationship exists because, as Reuther explains, “the 
dominant white Western male rationality has been based on linear, dichotomized thought 
patterns that divide reality into dualisms: one is good and the other bad, one superior and 
the other inferior, one should dominate and the other should be eliminated or 
suppressed.”218  And it is this “dominant white Western male rationality” that 
nevertheless pervades the stewardship model of creation. 
 The environmental ethicist Clare Palmer believes that even the terminology of 
“steward” and “stewardship” is so latent with problematic history and implications, 
especially in the term’s use in financial contexts, that it is an untenable solution to the 
problem of the dominion model’s heretofore hegemony.219  Furthermore, she critiques the 
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stewardship model by drawing on the practical, if at times latent, similarities between 
dominion and stewardship.  “Stewardship allows humanity to continue with exploitative 
attitudes toward the natural world, often with the justification that God has given this 
authority; it certainly softens existing attitudes of domination and triumphalism towards 
the rest of the natural world, by adding an element of responsibility.  However, it fails to 
change the fundamental human centeredness of the original premise.”220  Palmer’s point, 
echoing the theological perspectives of Johnson and Reuther, is that the grounding 
principle or premise is essentially the same for these two approaches.  Human persons 
predicate a dualism of adjudicative alterity to the rest of the created order such that 
“nature” is seen as something entirely “other.”  Alluding to the correlative dimensions of 
intra-human subjugation, Palmer also argues that, “the political message encoded in 
stewardship is one of power and oppression; of server and the served.”221  
 Developing this observation about the themes of “power and oppression” encoded 
in the stewardship model, Palmer explains that such an approach bears “a strong sense of 
humanity’s separation from the rest of the natural world.”222  Palmer notes that many of 
the characteristics that proponents of the dominion model attributed as exclusive to 
humanity have been similarly carried over into descriptions of and discussions about 
stewardship.  Despite the present dominance of homo sapiens on Earth, Palmer argues 
that we should not mistake the use of these characteristics (e.g., intelligence, language, 
etc.) for a sign of absolute distinction of humanity from the rest of creation. 
 
It would be foolish to claim that humans are not the dominant species at 
present existing on this planet.  However, this is not evidence that 
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humanity has been in some theological or even philosophical sense ‘set 
apart’ as manager or governor, God’s representative on earth.  Humans 
have evolved with unique characteristics, as have all species, and this 
difference has enabled them to move to a position of control.  But if, for 
instance, there was abrupt climatic change, humanity could easily become 
extinct, while other species, better equipped for such an event, could gain 
the ascendency.  In the light of evolution, the idea of human metaphysical 
‘set-apartness’ becomes impossible to justify.  However, the concept of 
stewardship continues to support this set-apartness.223 
 
This sense of “human set-apartness” (Palmer) or “human separatism” (David Clough) 
present within the framework of the stewardship model illustrates the twofold 
problematic of the hierarchical dualism discussed earlier and the problem of alterity as it 
relates to the human perception of humanity’s relationship with the rest of creation.   
 The problem of alterity emerges when the self-established status of the human 
being – and especially the white male human being – over the rest of creation establishes 
a form of what we might call environmental colonialism.224  The right to determine who 
or what “counts” or how proximate, if at all, certain aspects of the created order are to the 
human-normative center of creation is appropriated exclusively by homo sapiens.  
Theologically, this has sometimes been justified by a selective reading of the Genesis 2 
account of “the man” naming the other creatures, which has been interpreted as the 
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empowerment of humanity (represented again in this case as male) to determine the 
legitimate status of other-than-human creatures vis-à-vis the human.  Furthermore, this 
reading of Genesis 2 has found further evidence for such adjudicative powers in the 
inadequacy of other-than-human creatures as a suitable partner for the primeval man.  
The scripture scholar Claus Westermann has acknowledged the deeply anthropocentric 
perspective according to which the creation of animals is portrayed in the Yahwistic 
narrative of Genesis 2, which “regards the animals from the point of view of their 
meaning for man, or what they could mean for man in the context of modern behavioral 
science.”  He continues: 
 
In Genesis 1 the creation of the animals is in the context of the creation of 
the World; in Genesis 2 it is in the context of the creation of man.  The 
creation of the animals is related to man in that man, after God has formed 
the animals and led them to him, must himself decide whether they are 
that help which is proper to him.  One can discern here a quite striking 
humanistic quality in the understanding of human relationship: God does 
not simply determine the sort of companion man will have; there is true 
community only where man accepts the companion in a free decision; man 
himself must say whether the partner is the right one or not.225 
 
Central to the traditional reading of this text is the explicit anthropocentrism that 
undergirds the exclusive adjudicative power of humanity in establishing the value and 
relationship of all other-than-human creation as depicted by the Yahwist redactors.   
 The stewardship model of creation presupposes this role of humanity (and, in 
particular, white male humanity) as the adjudicator of alterity.  As Palmer observes, 
“stewardship actually means a form of mastery, in that we decide when the rest of the 
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natural world should be used, and for what.”226  The distance that the status of “humanity 
as steward” creates between homo sapiens and other-than-human creation reinforces the 
notion of an ontological or moral distinction that necessarily subordinates other-than-
human creation to an elevated humanity, which stands over against the rest of creation in 
judgment of otherness even if only to “care” for these lesser creatures.  While these 
critiques may appear at first to vilify both the good intentions behind and the pragmatic 
benefits of the stewardship model of creation, the overarching concern here is a call for 
critical evaluation of the theological models and discourse used to talk about creation.  As 
we will see at the end of this section, even dominion and stewardship’s most public 
critique, Lynn White, Jr., acknowledges the beneficial status of stewardship provided it is 
understood as a liminal paradigm or place-holding concept on the way toward a more 
robust constructive theology of creation.  For this reason, concerns with stewardship still 
need to be addressed, including such concerns as dualism and the problems surrounding 
the subjectivity of other-than-human creatures.227 
 At the core of this problematic dimension of the stewardship model is a crisis of 
epistemology, of not recognizing that the anthropocentric (and, concomitantly, 
androcentric) vision of humanity’s relationship to the rest of creation is not in fact an 
adequate reflection of reality.  The ecofeminist theologian Ivone Gebara has also 
identified this problem in observing that, “Androcentric knowing also leads to 
anthropocentric knowing, in which only human actions and reactions are taken 
seriously.”228  The late environmental philosopher Val Plumwood sees in this 
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epistemological tendency an iteration of the “colonizing conceptual structure.”  She notes 
that we have long been aware of the hierarchical and epistemological presuppositions that 
shape the logic of colonization among different peoples, part of which included the 
plundering and damaging of the land on which the colonized had lived.  Yet, she claims: 
“What we are less accustomed to acknowledging is the idea that the concept of 
colonization can be applied directly to non-human nature itself, and that the relationship 
between humans, or certain groups of them, and the more-than-human world might be 
aptly characterized as one of colonization.”229  Plumwood’s analysis suggests that one of 
the reasons the hierarchical dualism and the problem of alterity in the stewardship model 
has not been adequately critiqued until now is because the “colonizing conceptual 
structure” itself “can disguise centric relationships in a way that leaves the colonizer (and 
sometimes even the colonized) blind to their oppressive character.”230   
 The anthropocentrism of our ecological epistemology often preempts critical 
engagement with the operative presuppositions shaping our creational imagination.  
Plumwood notes that this way of thinking “tends to see the human sphere as beyond or 
outside the sphere of ‘nature,’ construes ethics as confined to the human (allowing the 
non-human sphere to be treated instrumentally), treats non-human difference as 
inferiority, and understands both non-human agency and value in hegemonic terms that 
deny and subordinate them to a hyperbolized human agency.”231 
 According to Plumwood, the problems of hierarchical dualism and alterity come 
together in a postcolonial reading of humanity’s history of ecological imagination.  The 
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“othering” of other-than-human creation both arises from and reinforces the hierarchical 
categories of distinction human beings have used to distance themselves from the rest of 
creation.  Plumwood notes:  
 
The construction of non-humans as ‘Others’ involves both distorted ways 
of seeing sameness, continuity or commonality with the colonized ‘Other,’ 
and distorted ways of seeing their difference or independence.  The usual 
distortions of continuity or sameness construct the ethical field in terms of 
moral dualism, involving a major boundary or gulf between the ‘One’ and 
the ‘Other’ that cannot be bridged or crossed.232 
 
Plumwood suggests that the process of this “othering” tied to hierarchical dualism 
consists of two primary characteristics that function to reinforce “centric and reductionist 
modes of conceiving nature as Other.”233   
 The first characteristic is what Plumwood calls “radical exclusion” or, 
alternatively, “hyper-separation.”  This is a characteristic that is deployed to establish a 
dominant identity by defining it against or in opposition to a subordinated identity 
according to the Other’s actual or perceived inadequacies.  For instance, one of the ways 
proponents of the stewardship model argue for its validity is according to a deontological 
sense of responsibility arising from humanity’s distinctive rational gifts.  In other words, 
human beings alone are divinely called to “care for creation” because the Creator has 
endowed them – and only them – with a rational faculty, which is a characteristic that has 
not been gifted to other-than-human creatures.  Human identity in this case is defined by 
a characteristic that is absent in the Other.  Plumwood explains that, “From an 
anthropocentric standpoint, nature is a hyper-separate lower order, lacking any real 
continuity with the human.  This approach stresses heavily those features [e.g., 
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“rationality”] that make humans different from nature and animals, rather than those we 
share with them.  Anthropocentric culture often endorses a view of the human as outside, 
and apart from, a plastic, passive and ‘dead’ nature, which lacks agency and meaning.”234 
 The second characteristic is the general categorization of the Other in a 
homogenizing or stereotypical way, which erases individuality, uniqueness, and moral 
agency.  This is a form of unequally applied essentialism that celebrates the particular 
dignity and value of individual human beings, but identifies the Other as “essentially 
simple and knowable,” interchangeable and replaceable.235  Plumwood sees this feature 
also tied to an exclusive sense of rationality and humanity's claim of the right to 
adjudicate alterity. 
 
An anthropocentric culture rarely sees nature and animals as individual 
centers of striving or needs, doing their best in their conditions of life.  
Instead, nature is conceived in terms of interchangeable and replaceable 
units (as “resources”), rather than as infinitely diverse and always in 
excess of knowledge and classification.  Anthropocentric culture 
conceives nature and animals as all alike in their lack of consciousness, 
which is assumed to be exclusive to the human.  Once nature and animals 
are viewed as machines or automata, minds are closed to the range and 
diversity of their mind-like qualities.236 
 
From a theological perspective, these two characteristics – radical exclusion and 
homogenization – serve to bolster a conception of humanity’s place in the universe and 
according to God’s plan that, albeit benevolently aims to care for or protect the Other, 
nevertheless perpetuates an anthropocentric vision of creation.  As a result, human beings 
elevate themselves over and against other-than-human creation, while concurrently 
appropriating the right to determine “otherness.”   
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B. The Managerial or Caretaker Qualities of the Stewardship Model 
 One of the common defenses of a stewardship model of creation has been the 
suggestion that this paradigmatic shift away from dominion reflects a move away from an 
anthropocentric view of creation toward a more theocentric perspective.237  The claim can 
be summarized in the following way.  According to the various iterations of a dominion 
model of creation, humanity is given the rest of the created order to subdue and over 
which to rule.  The central actor in this terrestrial drama is the human person, who stands 
over the rest of creation as sovereign lord.  In contradistinction to the dominion model, 
advocates of the stewardship model claim that humanity is de-centered according to this 
alternative paradigm and God becomes the primary actor.  It is God’s creation, God’s 
house, the divine oikos, which is “given on loan” to humanity for safekeeping and care.  
Therefore, creation does not belong to humanity, but is entrusted to human persons.238 
 To some degree this move is accurately described by stewardship proponents and 
effectively exercised in certain theological reflections on creation.  However, the claim 
that such a shift from an overtly anthropocentric worldview to an ostensibly theocentric 
one remedies the problems of the dominion model – namely, the hierarchical dualism, the 
sense of human sovereignty, and so on – is, in reality, misleading.  Among those who 
draw attention to this largely unacknowledged dilemma is Celia Deane-Drummond, who 
notes that the managerial quality of the stewardship model raises serious questions about 
its validity.  “Stewardship has connotations of management and, arguably, implicit 
exploitative attitudes that principles of stewardship when used in an ecological context 
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are aiming to correct.”239  While a stewardship model of creation might avoid the trap of 
making the created order explicitly anthropocentric from the outset, it also skirts the issue 
of humanity’s direct relationship to the rest of creation.  Furthermore, as Deane-
Drummond has also observed, the emphasis of stewardship as human management 
nevertheless affirms an unquestioned and unchallenged “human supremacy.”240  One 
might argue that at least the dominion model was straightforward in its advancement of a 
notion of human sovereignty, which suggested a sense of ownership (as distorted a view 
as that is in its own right).  In the stewardship model, humanity is no longer the property 
owner, but a cosmic tenant in the divine oikos.  Care for creation, then, is not an inherent 
call or responsibility, but something that arises from the covenantal or contractual 
agreements established between YHWH and Israel.  Humanity’s relationship to the earth 
becomes instrumental, like something akin to a “rental property” for humanity that 
women and men inhabit and promise to take good care of according to the lease 
agreement between God and us.241   
 Other scholars have duly noted this problematic dimension of the stewardship 
model of creation.  John Black has said that, “in relation to the resources of the earth, the 
people of western civilization inherited a picture of God as an absentee landlord, with 
themselves as His steward.”242  Those who advocate for this sort of conceptualization of 
humanity’s relationship to the rest of creation also presuppose a benevolent attitude on 
the part of the human landlords as well as assume that humanity has the capacity to know 
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precisely how to care for the rest of creation.  Recalling the devastating impacts the 
species homo sapiens has had on the planet and its other creaturely cohabitants, Deane-
Drummond has offered her own note of caution to those who assert an overly optimistic 
view of humanity’s capacity even to be stewards.  She explains that, “we deceive 
ourselves if we think that we have the necessary wisdom and knowledge to intervene 
correctly for the good of the biosphere.  Such has been the problem of models of 
‘stewardship’ of the natural environment that presumes human management will be all-
sufficient.”243 
 What results from this approach is “a subcontractor-like relationship among 
creation, humanity, and God that places human beings in the position of ‘God’s landlord’ 
or ‘building manager’ for creation.  The relationship between humanity and the rest of 
creation is seen as defined by explicitly distinct roles with an intrinsically uneven power 
structure.”244  Ruth Page has likewise found this uneven power structure to be inherently 
problematic in stewardship models of creation. 
 
The kind of relationships implied by management – even at its most 
humane – is the area where there is a danger of one-sidedness in the 
exclusive use of the stewardship model.  A steward is necessarily 
something other than the ‘objects’ of stewardship, so this model constantly 
implies distance and difference between humans and all the rest.  This is a 
critical point, for it was this very sense of distance and difference – the 
otherness and superiority of humanity – which made manipulation, indeed 
exploitation, possible in the first place.245 
 
Elsewhere, she adds that, “Management is care over resources, and that immediately 
makes a distinction of kind and not degree between the steward and what is stewarded. 
                                                
 243 Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology, 125. 
 244 Horan, Francis of Assisi and the Future of Faith, 106. 
 245 Ruth Page, “The Fellowship of All Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical 
Perspectives Past and Present, 97.  
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 107 
Hierarchy is also built into the model, for stewards are ‘over’ their charges, not ‘with’ 
them. This form of relationship, therefore, implies distance and superiority between 
human beings and all the rest.”246  This uneven power structure, which results in a self-
aggrandized sense of responsibility or duty to care for the rest of the created order, can 
also be seen from the same vantage point of Steven Jay Gould, who writes that however 
well-meaning our notion of stewardship might be, this approach is “rooted in the old sin 
of pride and exaggerated self-importance.”247  Gould goes on to suggest that humanity is, 
in fact, the steward of nothing.  The rest of creation, he argues, can take care of itself just 
fine without humanity’s intervention as it had for the entirety of its pre-human cosmic 
history.248 
 In addition to the continued, if latent, concerns carried over from the dominion 
model into the stewardship model through the well-intentioned effort to move from an 
anthropocentric worldview toward a theocentric one, Christopher Vena has suggested 
that the managerial or caretaker sense of stewardship also negatively affects one’s 
understanding of God’s immanence.  Vena explains: 
 
Such a model cannot incorporate the theological affirmation of God’s 
creative immanence, which upholds the notion that every moment of 
existence is a gift from and dependent on God.  God’s creative act is not, 
as Deism has it, a punctiliar moment in some distant past but an ongoing 
creativity.  If, indeed, God’s very presence sustains the universe, then a 
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real absence of divine immanence would spell the end of created being.  
Since a steward acts in the owner’s stead, the metaphor excludes the 
possibility of depicting an active immanence on God’s part.  It could be 
argued that a stewardship ecotheology requires something like a deistic 
God – or at least one who is absent from time to time.249 
 
While there are certain aspects of Vena’s claim that stewardship-model proponents might 
find reasonably contestable (e.g., an absolute exclusion of divine immanence), the point 
he aims to make is the weakness stewardship approaches bear under the weight of an 
integrated and systematic conception of theology.  Among those proponents of the 
stewardship model that have defended its usage in the face of similar critiques is Robin 
Attfield.  In response to concerns about the lack of place for divine immanence in the 
stewardship model, he writes: 
 
But believers in stewardship need not in any case reject the belief that God 
indwells the world.  For governments and owners (or any to whom 
stewards are answerable) typically live in the lands they rule or own, and 
so the stewardship model need not convey God’s separateness; if creation 
is continual (rather than a past event), divine activity might in any case be 
expected to pervade the natural order, rather than somehow pass it by.250   
 
Still, Vena’s argument about the de facto minimization of certain theological tenets of 
orthodox approaches to understanding the God-world relationship has been echoed by 
other thinkers including David Field, who critiques the image of stewardship for lacking 
the necessary comprehensive potency to account for the truly complex relationship that 
exists among human persons, the rest of creation, and God.251  One can see the specter of 
                                                
 249 Christopher Vena, “Beyond Stewardship: Toward an Agapeic Environmental Ethic,” an 
unpublished PhD dissertation (Marquette University, 2009), 111. 
 250 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment (Indianapolis: Purdue University Press, 
1999), 47. 
 251 See David Field, “Stewards of Shalom: Toward a Trinitarian Ecological Ethic,” Quarterly 
Review 22 (2002): 383-396. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 109 
the dominion model haunting stewardship approaches when we consider this particular 
critique, which leaves – paradoxically, given its ostensible “theocentric” impetus – very 
little room for a robust notion of God’s relationship to or within the divine oikos. 
 Another way the managerial or caretaker quality of stewardship tends to produce 
problematic theological and, more drastically, praxiological results is due to the lack of 
an “internal logic to stewardship that can govern the character of its function as 
relationship.”252  Vena notes the fundamental ambiguity of the concept of stewardship: 
“The nature of stewardship is inherently vague: it only focuses on the ends (maintenance 
of property or wealth) without recourse to detail on the means to that end.”  He continues, 
arguing that the meaning of stewardship is always extrinsic, for its meaning “is not built 
into the concept itself, thus it has a vulnerability to misuse or misunderstanding.  Even 
carefully articulated versions of the stewardship model that consciously promote care and 
nurture cannot escape the inherent neutrality and ambiguity of the term.”253  Vena’s 
concern about the potential for misuse and susceptibility to misunderstanding 
foundationally present in the stewardship approach is bolstered by the work of the 
philosopher Norman Wirzba, who notes, as did Deane-Drummond, that the concept 
always bears a certain socio-economic context.254  The lack of more concrete relational 
principles in ecological discourse that relies on stewardship can lead to humanity’s abuse 
or “mismanagement” of the rest of creation which, practically speaking, would look very 
similar to what is most widely criticized about the dominion model. 
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 Finally, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, one the most often-cited 
opponents of the dominion model of creation, the historian of medieval technology Lynn 
White Jr., was also critical of the stewardship model that gained additional popularity in 
the wake of his work.  The recent work of Matthew Riley in presenting and analyzing 
White’s research beyond his well-known essay, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis,” offers us another way to understand the limitations of the stewardship model 
from the vantage point of its managerial or caretaker qualities.255  Riley asserts that White 
was critical of the so-called “dominion-stewardship debate,” which emerged in response 
to his 1967 essay indicting Christianity’s over emphasis on a domination-oriented 
dominion model of creation.  White believed that both approaches were inadequate and 
that a “more radical democratic model” of creation found in the writings and tradition of 
Francis of Assisi proved a more tenable Christian approach to creation.256  White 
believed that the medieval mendicant’s worldview was one of the “recessive genes” or 
overlooked resources within Christianity itself for addressing the current environmental 
crisis.257  Despite the caricature that depicted the historian as anti-Christianity or anti-
religion, Riley insists that, “At the core of White’s thought was an impassioned, albeit 
largely overlooked, theological interest in human relationships with other creatures.”258   
 After the publication of his now-classic essay, the general theological consensus 
was overwhelmingly in favor of the stewardship model.  Yet, as Riley explains: 
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White, however, did not agree.  Stewardship, or the idea that Christians 
are the caretakers rather than the rulers of God’s creation, was viewed by 
White as being more like “enlightened despotism” when compared to 
Saint Francis’s model.  White indicated that replacing the idea of 
humanity’s dominion over nature with a stewardship model, or 
“Trusteeship” as he habitually called it, would be an inadequate response 
to the looming environmental crisis.259 
 
White did not dismiss the stewardship model entirely, for he saw its potential as a middle 
or liminal option that Christianity could adopt on the way to this more “radical 
democratic model” in the Franciscan tradition.  White himself explained the Christian 
trajectory he envisioned: “I feel that before too long, however, they will find themselves 
going on to the third legitimately Biblical position, that Man is part of a democracy of all 
God’s creatures, organic and inorganic, each praising his Maker according to the law of 
its being.”260 
 White’s primary issue with the stewardship model was its inability to overcome 
the deep-seated anthropocentrism of the dominion model.  Despite being more 
benevolent than its predecessor approach, stewardship nevertheless maintained a strong 
divide between the human and the other-than-human world.  This continued elevation of 
the human person, now with its distinctive status as steward, still minimizes or even 
entirely overlooks the inherent reality of humanity’s interrelationship and 
interdependence with other-than-human creation.  As Riley notes, White insisted that 
maintaining the stewardship model would actually make the environmental crisis worse. 
 
White believed that replacing the notion of dominion with an ethic of 
stewardship would only exacerbate ecological problems because it 
continues to place humans above other creatures in a value hierarchy that 
allows nonhumans to be exploited.  And, as White observes, a theology or 
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ethic that claims to protect animals while maintaining the human-nature 
divide and allowing other creatures to be valued on prudential, 
anthropocentric grounds is nothing more than an “enlightened self-
interest” that cannot stand the litmus test of theology, ecology, or ethics.261 
 
Thus, according to White, the managerial or caretaker quality of the stewardship model is 
nothing but a semantic cover that allows for the perpetuation of a rigid divide between 
human and other-than-human creation.  
 
C. The Eschatological Implications of the Stewardship Model 
 Scholars critical of the stewardship model of creation have also pointed toward 
concerns that may not seem so obvious at first.  Among these concerns are the 
eschatological implications contained in the affirmation that human beings are the 
managers or caretakers of the rest of the created order.  There are divergent approaches to 
understanding the role of humanity vis-à-vis the rest of the created order’s participation, 
or lack thereof, in God’s salvific plan.  Yet, theologians have noted in their criticism of 
the stewardship model that the Bible and the theological tradition actually supports a 
view that all of creation is included in God’s plan for salvation.  Presuming this inclusive 
notion of the universal return of all creation back to God as the central tenet of Christian 
eschatology, the question arises as to what specific role humanity has in this process.  
Herein lies the problem with the stewardship model. 
 Returning to those characteristics that distinguish the human person from other 
aspects of creation, some proponents of the stewardship model identify part of 
humanity’s caretaking responsibility as the mediator or salvific facilitator for the rest of 
the created order. The Australian theologian Denis Edwards explains: “When stewardship 
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is used to characterize the human stance before other creatures, it can run the risk of 
suggesting an inflated view of the human as a necessary intermediary between God and 
other creatures.  It can seem to suggest that other creatures do not have their own 
relationship with the living God or their own integrity.”262  Instead of somehow being 
humanity’s partner in salvation, with an eschatological goal intrinsically connected to 
ours, the stewardship model focuses on human difference (the duality and alterity 
described in the first section of this chapter) and human agency (the managerial and 
caretaker qualities described in the previous section of this chapter) such that all other-
than-human creation is conceptualized as dependent on, and therefore subject to, the 
actions of humanity in order to reach its God-given telos.263  The corrective, Elizabeth 
Johnson proposes, is to recognize that “the Spirit effects the redemption of both 
languishing vines and broken-hearted merrymakers: that is, the Spirit’s presence is for all 
species.”264   
 This observation of the stewardship model’s tendency to re-center the human 
person in a place as primary actor in salvation history, despite the claim stewardship 
supporters make for its more theocentric horizon, again draws our attention to the often 
unacknowledged sense of “uselessness” or peripheral place that other-than-human 
creation has in God’s concern.265  While the dominion model certainly relegates creation 
to a simple backdrop266 or utility source for humanity, leaving Christians with a sense of 
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its lack of intrinsic value apart from human usage, the stewardship model subtly shifts the 
dominion exclusive teleological anthropocentrism (that human beings are only God’s 
concern in salvation history) to a still-problematic yet seemingly inclusive teleological 
anthropocentrism (that humanity still is God’s primary concern and one part of human 
responsibility is to “bring along” creation according to God’s eschatological vision).  
David Clough argues that, “taking this step of maintaining the centrality of humanity to 
God’s purposes is biblically and theologically both unnecessary and undesirable.”267   
 Although the next chapter will look at both the scriptural and theological 
resources for an alternative paradigm for conceptualizing creation generally and 
humanity’s place within the whole of creation specifically, it is worthwhile to consider at 
least a few of the many scriptural and theological evidences for reconsidering the way 
other-than-human creation relates to the Creator and are included in the cosmic drama of 
salvation history.  In this section of the chapter, we examine some selections from the 
New Testament as well as ancient and modern theological resources.  Though these 
examples are far from exhaustive, they nonetheless contribute to our understanding of an 
integral sense of creation’s place within God’s plan of salvation from an explicitly 
Christian scriptural and theological vantage point. 
 
1. Selected New Testament Resources 
 Perhaps the most famous New Testament passage concerning the salvation of all 
creation is found in Paul’s Letter to the Romans 8:18-25: 
 
I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing 
with the glory about to be revealed to us.  For the creation waits with eager 
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longing for the revealing of the children of God; for the creation was 
subjected to the futility, not of its own will but by the will of the one who 
subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set free from its 
bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of the children 
of God.  We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labor 
pains until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the 
first fruits of the Spirit, grown inwardly while we wait for adoption, the 
redemption of our bodies.  For in hope we were saved.  Now hope that is 
seen is not hope.  For who hopes for what is seen?  But if we hope for 
what we do not see, we wait for it with patience (NRSV). 
 
Typically, the doctrine of salvation is limited to discussion about humanity, human 
sinfulness, and the redemption of human beings in Christ.  Indeed, Bruce Malina and 
John Pilch have noted that Paul’s approach here can be confounding to contemporary 
readers who are used to the anthropocentric reading of the doctrine of salvation in 
scripture.  They offer a contextualization of the passage, stating that: “In his vision of the 
soon to be revealed glorification of Jesus-group members, Paul includes all of God’s 
creation, made subject to sin because of humans.  All of creation includes celestial as 
well as terrestrial entities, since for first-century Mediterraneans, the human environment 
included entities in the sky as well as on the land.  The ancients believed there was 
mutual influence and impact of these spheres on each other – all created by God.”268  
Despite the ubiquity of this first-century Mediterranean imaginary, scripture scholars 
have also noted the uniqueness in Paul’s identification of the whole creation as central to 
the Christian belief in Christ’s salvation.  For example, Brendan Byrne has observed that, 
“This small passage stands as one of the most singular and evocative texts in the whole 
Pauline corpus.  Particularly distinctive is its apparent inclusion of the non-human created 
world (‘creation’) within the sweep of salvation.  Not only is this unprecedented in Paul; 
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from a contemporary perspective also it offers rich hermeneutical possibilities in view of 
current concern for the Earth.”269  
 For Paul the saving action of Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection extends to the 
whole of creation and is not limited to human persons alone.  Malina and Pilch explain 
that, according to Paul, “God’s transforming activity embraces all of creation.”270  The 
way in which Paul is able to so directly affirm all of creation in God’s plan for salvation 
arises from both what Marie Turner describes as Paul’s “inclusive soteriology” and the 
precedential influence of texts in the Hebrew Bible.271  According to Turner, the whole of 
the Letter to the Romans is filled with a Pauline inclusivity regarding salvation, which 
reflects the author’s understanding of the universal and cosmic reach of God’s 
transforming action.272  Additionally, both the Book of Wisdom and the Book of Genesis 
can be seen as shaping Paul’s soteriological imagination.273   
 In light of Romans 8, the stewardship model’s assertion that human beings are 
deputized by the Creator to serve as mediators between God and creation is untenable.  
Paul makes it clear that the divine plan for creation is holistic and all encompassing, and 
not merely human-centered with peripheral consideration for other-than-human aspects 
of the created order.  Whereas Paul could have, like some later theologians, excluded all 
other-than-human creatures within soteriological reflection, he instead identifies their 
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place within the cosmic plan of salvation.  Furthermore, according to the fact that other-
than-human creatures too suffer the effects of human sinfulness (which is one way of 
reading this part of Romans 8),274 one can read Paul’s affirmation of the interrelationality 
and interdependence of all creation.  
 This sense of the cosmic scope of salvation is not limited to the Pauline corpus 
alone, but extends to the other letters and epistles of the New Testament.  For example, 
one could look to the Christological hymn at the opening of the Letter to the Colossians 
(1:15-20) in which Jesus Christ is celebrated not simply as the “Image (eikōn) of the 
invisible God,” but is also “the firstborn of all creation” in whom “all things in heaven 
and on earth were created, visible and invisible.”  David Clough has noted that the 
repetition of “all things” (ta panta) in this hymn is striking because of its inclusive 
implications regarding the entirety of creation.275  The repetitious sense of “all things” (ta 
panta) appears again in the opening chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians, in which we 
read that it was God’s plan from all eternity to reveal the divine self and will in Christ, as 
well as “to gather up all things [ta panta] in him, things in heaven and things on earth” 
(Ephesians 1:9-10).  Pheme Perkins explains that this eternal “plan” (oikonomia), when 
associated with God, “refers to God’s providential direction of all things in the 
cosmos.”276  Furthermore, this pattern of cosmic reference to “all things” (ta panta) 
appears again in the introductory statement of the Letter to the Hebrews: “Long ago God 
spoke to our ancestors in many and various ways by the prophets, but in these last days 
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he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir of all things [ta panta], through 
whom he also created the worlds.  He is the reflection of God’s glory and the exact 
imprint of God’s very being, and he sustains all things [ta panta] by his powerful word” 
(Hebrews 1:1-3a).  Early New Testament Christology affirms an inclusive soteriological 
vision according to which other-than-human aspects of creation are celebrated as co-
subjects of salvation alongside humanity.  Accordingly, this cosmic outlook does not 
drive a wedge of absolute distinction between God’s act of creation and God’s act of 
salvation, but instead reiterates the singularity of the Divine Will in terms of one act of 
creation-salvation.  In this sense we might see a form of theocentrism that situates 
humanity within the broader community of creation in relation, as a whole, to the Creator 
rather than an alternative kind of theocentrism that situates humanity as the “middle man” 
of salvation between Creator and other-than-human creation. 
 
2. Irenaeus of Lyons and Athanasius of Alexandria  
 In the generations that followed the concretizing of the kerygma into what would 
become the canon of New Testament scripture, early Christian theologians developed this 
nascent scriptural eschatology more explicitly.  Two such early-Christian theologians 
who offered substantive reflection on creation and salvation are Irenaeus of Lyons (d. ca. 
202 CE) and Athanasius of Alexandria (d. 373 CE).  Both Irenaeus and Athanasius will 
prove to be highly influential in shaping the theological vision of creation in future 
generations. 
 Writing as he was in response to perceived gnostic errors of his day, Irenaeus’s 
theology is understandably unsystematic and occasional.  Concerned primarily with 
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defending the truth of the Incarnation, the goodness of the material world, and the 
importance of apostolic succession in terms of faith and tradition, Irenaeus’s work 
contains disparate entries on the subject of creation and humanity’s relationship to other-
than-human aspects of creation.  Regarding the relationship between creation and 
salvation in Irenaeus’s thought, Matthew Steenberg has argued that Irenaeus’s whole 
corpus reflects something of a “consistent theology of creation,” and that, “The 
‘consistent theology of creation’ by which his thought is here characterized is nowhere 
treated by Irenaeus as a distinct element of address, separated or separable from the larger 
scope of his soteriological reflections.”277  In other words, what for many modern 
theologians appear to be distinct doctrines – namely, protology and eschatology – are in 
fact never treated apart from one another in Irenaeus’s writing; they are two sides of the 
same coin.  
 When approaching Irenaeus’s theology, it can be difficult at times to identify 
where he stands in terms of humanity’s place within creation.  On the one hand, Irenaeus 
appears to espouse a view closely resembling the stewardship model of creation’s take on 
the reason for other-than-human creation: “creation is suited to man; for man was not 
made for its sake, but creation for the sake of man.”278  Yet, regarding this 
anthropocentric reading of other-than-human creation designed exclusively as the oikos 
of humanity, Julie Canlis has argued that Irenaeus is reflecting here not a Christian 
scriptural or theological influence, but rather a stoic perception of creation invoked 
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against the gnostic view of the material world.  Canlis suggests that the whole of 
Irenaeus’s Against the Heresies suggests a more constructive theocentric view of creation 
than the stoic anthropocentricism occasionally found in isolated portions of the text.279  
And still, Irenaeus’s key theological contribution on the subject of salvation, namely the 
concept of Christ’s “recapitulation” (anakephalaiosis), offers a more-developed version 
of the Pauline theological vision of creation’s place within God’s eternal plan for 
salvation. 
 Irenaeus argues that the concept of recapitulation in Christ is central to 
understanding the doctrine of salvation.  Whereas one might expect a view of salvation to 
encompass the redemption of humanity in a postlapsarian world, Irenaeus’s view of 
Christ’s recapitulative act is more capacious, including both time as such and the entirety 
of material creation alongside human beings.280  For Irenaeus, the Incarnation stands at 
the center of salvation history, joining that which is divine to the material, restoring what 
has become disordered in sin, while also uniting creation and salvation into one doctrine 
and a singular act of divine will in Christ.  As Dai Sil Kim explains, “When Christ acted, 
he redeemed not only humankind but also the entire creation: the perfection of creation is 
inseparably related to the notion of cosmic redemption.”281  It is for this reason that the 
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Orthodox theologian Cyril Hovorun has argued that Irenaeus’s theology of recapitulation 
offers a solid foundation for a Christian approach to ecotheology.282 
 Following Paul, Irenaeus adopts the analogy of the “New Adam” in talking about 
the redemptive effects of the Incarnation, while simultaneously affirming the true 
materiality of Christ’s flesh.  These effects of Christ’s recapitulation traverse the 
boundaries of time and unite the divine acts of creation and salvation into one eternal 
expression of the divine will. 
 
For as by one man’s disobedience sin entered, and death obtained [a place] 
through sin; so also by the obedience of one man, righteousness having 
been introduced, shall cause life to fructify in those persons who in times 
past were dead. And as the protoplast himself Adam, had his substance 
from untilled and as yet virgin soil, and was formed by the hand of God, 
that is, by the Word of God, for “all things were made by Him,” and the 
Lord took dust from the earth and formed man; so did He who is the 
Word, recapitulating Adam in Himself, rightly receive a birth, enabling 
Him to gather Adam [into Himself], from Mary, who was as yet a virgin.  
If, then, the first Adam had a man for his father, and was born of human 
seed, it were reasonable to say that the second Adam was begotten of 
Joseph.  But if the former was taken from the dust, and God was his 
Maker, it was incumbent that the latter also, making a recapitulation in 
Himself, should be formed as man by God, to have an analogy with the 
former as respects His origin…It was that there might not be another 
formation called into being, nor any other which should [require to] be 
saved, but that the very same formation should be summed up [in Christ as 
had existed in Adam], the analogy having been preserved.283 
 
Irenaeus emphasizes the fittingness of the parallel between the “Old Adam” and the 
“New Adam” in order to highlight the true materiality that the Word takes on through the 
Incarnation.  Irenaeus continues, emphasizing the shared dimensions of corporeality 
found in the flesh of Christ and how all aspects of creation are assumed in the salvific act.  
                                                
 282 See Cyril Hovorun, “Recapitulatio (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) as an Aspect of Christian Ecotheology,” 
61-68. 
 283 Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, bk III, ch. 21, no. 10 (454). 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 122 
“For all these are tokens of the flesh which had been derived from the earth, which He 
had recapitulated in Himself, bearing salvation to His own handiwork.”284  In a manner 
more explicit than Paul, Irenaeus asserts the entirety of creation’s reception of salvation 
resulting from Christ’s recapitulation of “God’s handiwork.”  Christ serves as the 
linchpin of God’s creative and salvific action, offering simultaneously a protological and 
eschatological hermeneutic.  As Steenberg explains, “It is the incarnate life of the Son 
that clarifies the Father’s motivation in creation, the nature of creation ex nihilo in cosmic 
yet personal, soteriological terms, and the interconnection of beginnings and ends.”285 
 The second early Christian example is Athanasius of Alexandria, the fourth-
century bishop and theologian perhaps best known for his defense of the true divinity of 
the Word against the Arians, who argued that the Word was a creature.286  Like Irenaeus 
before him, Athanasius’s understanding of theology, particularly with regard to creation 
and salvation, was deeply Christocentric.287  As Denis Edwards explains, “Athanasius 
defends the divinity of the Word and locates the Word in God.  Because the Word who 
became incarnate is truly God, God and creation meet in Christ so that creation is 
transformed and taken into the life of God.  The saving act of incarnation is precisely 
about the union of God and creation in Jesus Christ.”288  Athanasius’s Christocentrism 
does not limit itself to the redemption of human beings alone, instead his understanding 
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of the relationship between God and creation leads to the affirmation of what Khalid 
Anatolios has described as “a Christology conceived in the most universal terms.”289   
 Furthermore, the significance of the Incarnation for understanding salvation in the 
most inclusive sense reaches something of a pinnacle in Athanasius’s assertion of theosis.  
Drawing on what Irenaeus had said in his Against the Heresies, that the “Word of God, 
our Lord Jesus Christ, who did, through His transcendent love, become what we are, that 
He might bring us to be even what He is Himself,”290 Athanasius succinctly states that, 
“For he was incarnate that we might be made god.”291  Edwards argues that Athanasius’s 
emphasis on the ontological over the ethical notion of deification (theopoiēsis) suggests a 
more-capacious vision of Christ’s salvific action, one that includes the radical 
transformation of creation as such over against the “spirit” or “soul” of the ethically 
upright human person alone.292  Although Athanasius is, like many of his Patristic 
counterparts, primarily concerned about salvation and therefore deification of the human 
person, it is his emphasis on “flesh” (sarx) as that which is deified that signals his 
inclusivity.293  
 In both instances, that of Irenaeus and Athanasius, their polemical responses to 
the early Christological heresies elicited a reflection on the place of creation within the 
economy of salvation, even if in an admittedly tangential or oblique way.  Irenaeus’s 
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defense of the singularity of the divine act of creation-salvation, centering his 
understanding of the unity of protology and eschatology on Christ in accord with the texts 
of the New Testament, does not reduce other-than-human aspects of creation to a mere 
stage upon which the drama of human salvation unfolds.  Later, Athanasius will defend 
the primacy of sarx as that which was assumed by the eternal Logos, deified in the Spirit, 
and redeemed by Christ.  Their accounting for and inclusion of the rest of creation’s place 
in salvation history is not ancillary to some divine concern about humanity alone.  
Instead, the whole of creation is seen as brought lovingly into existence by God ex nihilo, 
transformed in Christ through the Incarnation, and deified in accord with God’s plan for 
salvation.   
 In order to avoid being unduly repetitive or even redundant, we will pass over the 
medieval period and move into the modern era.  This is not intended to discount the many 
medieval and other resources found in the period between Athanasius and modernity, for 
these resources will be examined in greater detail in both the following chapter and in 
Chapter Six.294 
 
3. Modern Theological Resources 
 While for centuries there have been voices advocating for a broader and inclusive 
sense of salvation that includes both human and other-than-human creatures, in the last 
century the Christian theological community has offered a strong defense of this 
perspective.  The result has been a call to reconsider models or approaches toward 
understanding creation in which anthropocentrism governs the narration of salvation 
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history.  In the last part of this section, we will briefly explore some of the many 
contemporary theological voices that continue the tradition of a more capacious 
eschatological vision of creation. 
 First, the Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg has been especially attentive 
to the relationship between the natural sciences and theology, which has in part informed 
his reflection on “Creation and Eschatology” in the second volume of his Systematic 
Theology.  Identifying the Letters of St. Paul as one of his formative sources, Pannenberg 
opens this section of his work with the direct claim: “The goal of creation, not just 
humanity, is to share in the life of God.”295  In addition to the Pauline influence, 
Pannenberg acknowledges the work of Teilhard de Chardin as important for 
contemporary consideration of creation in terms of eschatology.  Pannenberg’s reliance 
on Teilhard at times seems to lead Pannenberg toward an unintentionally anthropocentric 
consideration of other-than-human creation, arguing for instance that human beings are 
the only creatures that have “learned to differentiate God from all else, from the whole 
sphere of creaturely reality.”296  While there is truth in the claim that this is what we 
human creatures have done in terms of utilizing our cognitive faculties, which have 
evolved over time, this and other disparate passages could be understood as embracing 
Teilhard’s understanding of an overly linear evolutionary sense to creation with human 
beings ahead of all else.  Despite this occasional anthropocentrism, Pannenberg is 
insistent that, “Creation and eschatology belong together because it is only in the 
eschatological consummation that the destiny of the creature, especially the human 
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creature, will come to fulfillment.”297  Pannenberg makes this claim in the spirit of 
Irenaeus of Lyons, echoing his ancient predecessor also in terms of the relationship the 
“unity of the divine act of creation” has in the consummation of time and material 
reality.298  Also, like Irenaeus and Athanasius, Pannenberg sees the unity between 
creation and salvation as making sense only in light of an understanding of Jesus Christ 
as “the mediator of creation as well as the eschatological bringer of salvation.”299  
Though there are times that Pannenberg is more focused on the necessary redemption of 
human beings, he nevertheless consistently asserts the eschatological transformation of 
the whole of creation, human and other-than-human alike. 
 Second, the Australian theologian Denis Edwards draws, like Pannenberg, on 
Teilhard’s cosmic vision of creation and the unity of creation and salvation.  However, 
Edwards also develops his understanding of the relationship between creation and 
eschatology with the assistance of Karl Rahner.  In a way reminiscent of Patristic writers, 
Edwards asserts that the Christian faith “proclaims a God who embraces flesh in the 
incarnation and who promises in the resurrection of Christ a bodily future in God for 
human beings and, in some way, for all things.”300  As with Pannenberg before him, 
Edwards sees Teilhard’s work as a modern inheritor of the Pauline-Patristic notion of 
creation’s consummation in Christ.301  This process, which begins with cosmogenesis at 
the start of biological evolution, is what Teilhard calls “Christogenesis” or the movement 
of the universe “being transformed into Christ” for “Christ radiates the energy that leads 
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the universe to its culmination in God.”302  Although for both Teilhard and Pannenberg 
the centrality of the human person at the head of this process towards the Christic omega 
point is taken for granted, Edwards is less comfortable with accepting this at face value.  
Instead, he turns to the German theologian Karl Rahner, whom Edwards believes makes 
“more clear the theological connections between faith in Jesus Christ and the future of the 
material universe.”303  Just as Teilhard does, Rahner presupposes the reality of an 
evolutionary world.  However, Rahner takes as his theological starting point the dual 
Christological foci of the Incarnation and Resurrection, and it is the latter doctrine that 
Rahner sees as a particularly significant turning point in the universe’s history.  Informed 
by Patristic theologians such as Irenaeus and Athanasius, Rahner does not maintain a 
“forensic view of redemption, on Christ making up for human sin in legal terms, but on 
God embracing humanity and the world so that they are taken into God and deified.”304  
Rahner’s strong sense of deification (theopoiēsis) is directly connected to the eternal 
Word’s having taken on “flesh” (sarx), which is inclusive of all material creation, just as 
it was for Athanasius in the Fourth Century.  Edwards summarizes well that, for Rahner, 
“the resurrection has meaning for the whole universe,” and not simply humankind.305   
 Third, in the same Rahnerian and Patristic spirit, Elizabeth Johnson has argued 
repeatedly for the universal significance of the Incarnation and Resurrection for not just 
humanity but for all of God’s creation.  In her recent book Ask the Beasts and essay, 
“Creation: Is God’s Charity Broad Enough for Bears?” Johnson explores further the 
significance of the Resurrection for other-than-human aspects of creation.  Quoting 
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Ambrose of Milan, Johnson writes that, “In Christ’s resurrection the earth itself arose.”306  
Drawing on both sacred scripture and the ancient liturgy of the Easter Vigil, Johnson 
recalls that in the Resurrection Christ is not simply the “firstborn from the dead” (Col. 
1:18) in a way exclusive to humanity, but remains also “the firstborn of all creation” 
(Col. 1:15).  She observes that in the great Easter liturgy, the annual Exsultet in praise of 
the transforming power of Christ’s Resurrection addresses not just humanity, but all 
creation: “Exult, all creation, around God’s throne…Rejoice, O earth, in shining 
splendor, radiant in the brightness of your King! Christ has conquered! Glory fills you! 
Darkness vanishes forever!”307  Johnson uses the term “deep resurrection” to describe the 
universal and cosmic significance of Christ’s Resurrection for the whole natural world.  
Drawing on the work of Brian Robinette, Johnson writes: 
 
“The risen Jesus,” as Brian Robinette contends, “is in no way extracted 
from the world’s corporeality and history.”  On the contrary, in a hidden, 
gracious way, the risen Christ “is found at the very heart of creation as the 
concrete and effective promise that creation is indeed going somewhere.”  
This would not be the case if Easter marked simply the spiritual survival 
of the crucified one after death.  But he rose again in his body, and lives 
united with the flesh forever.  Herein lies the hinge of hope for all physical 
beings.  In the risen Christ, by an act of infinite mercy and fidelity, “the 
eternal God has assumed the corporeality of the world into the heart of 
divine life – not just for time but for eternity.”308 
 
Johnson then offers a helpful summation of the theological logic that undergirds this 
eschatological vision of creation in light of the Incarnation and Resurrection, which is 
worth citing at length. 
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The reasoning runs like this.  This person, Jesus of Nazareth, was 
composed of star stuff and earth stuff; his life formed a genuine part of the 
historical and biological community of Earth; his body existed in a 
network of relationships drawing from and extending to the whole 
physical universe.  If in death this “piece of the world, real to the core,” as 
Rahner phrases it, surrendered his life in love and is now forever with God 
in glory, then this signals embryonically the final beginning of redemptive 
glorification not just for other human beings but for all flesh [sarx], all 
material beings, every creature that passes through death.  The evolving 
world of life, all of matter in its endless permutations, will not be left 
behind but will likewise be transfigured by the resurrecting action of the 
Creator Spirit.  The tomb’s emptiness signals this cosmic realism.309 
 
From a particularly Rahnerian theological standpoint, Johnson helps synthesize the 
tradition made famous by the Cappadocian theologians; namely, that as it pertains to 
what the eternal Word took on through the Incarnation, what is “no assumed is not 
saved.”  Accordingly, because humanity as such was not assumed but “flesh” (sarx) was, 
we can confidently assert that all of creation participates in God’s salvific action.310 
 Fourth, as Johnson provides a contemporary Rahnerian framework for 
understanding all of creation as the subject of Christian eschatology, Celia Deane-
Drummond offers insight into what she calls “eco-eschatology” from a theological 
foundation rooted in the thought of Jürgen Moltmann.  Deane-Drummond outlines her 
inclusive vision of redemption, explaining that the concept of “eco-eschatology,” 
 
…is a way of reshaping theological thinking so that it is inclusive, rather 
than exclusive.  I am also interpreting atonement to mean more than just 
the reconciliation that is possible in spite of human, moral sin.  Of course, 
perhaps it is as well to be reminded of this, given the human propensity to 
greed and over-consumption that underlies much of the strain in the carry 
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capacity of the planet.  Rather, atonement means “at-one-ment,” a right 
ordering of relationships that is achieved paradoxically through Christ’s 
own descent into suffering, death and hell.311 
 
According to Deane-Drummond, not only is the assumption of sarx in the Incarnation 
significant for appreciating the inclusivity of God’s salvific act, but also the often-
overlooked death of Christ on the cross.  This is a form of solidarity with the whole of 
living creation, an experience of participation in the mysteries of both life and death.  
Deane-Drummond explains that, “The logic of such a movement is one that expresses the 
deep love of God for all creation, and is consonant with the sentiment of Colossians 1.”312 
 Deane-Drummond finds the centrality of the theme of hope in Moltmann’s 
eschatological vision insightful for reimagining salvation in an inclusive key.  This 
eschatological hope is rooted in two of Moltmann’s key concepts.  First, that hope must 
be rooted in a notion of “future” in terms of adventus rather than futurans.313  The former 
is the common-sense notion of “future,” which emerges out of the present and is 
conceivable in terms of general anticipation or planning.  The latter is “about a breaking 
into the present from the future – the idea that the present anticipates in some way the 
future that is to follow, for it is a foretaste of a transformed reality.”314  Second, 
Moltmann insists that we must understand creation in light of redemption and not the 
other way around, as is often the case in the Christian theological tradition.  Recalling the 
unification of creation and salvation present in Paul’s letters and Irenaeus’s writings, 
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Moltmann suggests that a typically linear reading of salvation history tends to reduce 
salvation to a kind of restoration to some “pristine state” once experienced in creation 
before the fall.315  Instead, in viewing creation from an eschatological vantage point one 
is able to appreciate better a singular act of divine will, which begins ex nihilo, proceeds 
according to creatio continua, and is only completed in the final consummation in the 
eschaton.   
 Deane-Drummond affirms Moltmann’s approach but cautions us to be mindful 
that, although “the future of the earth is one that includes the possibility of the 
redemption of all natural existence,” we must be humble in our attempts to articulate 
what precisely that entails.316  As with discussions of the resurrection of the body dating 
back to Paul’s letters, an assertion of hope in the ultimate consummation of all creation in 
accord with God’s plan for salvation does not mean that we can know with certitude what 
that will look like.  Deane-Drummond explains: “The shape of resurrection and how this 
will be expressed in detail is a matter for speculative theology, and the wisest course in 
this case may be silence, for there are some things we cannot know, since they are hidden 
in the heart of God.”317  And though this invocation of an apophatic stance toward 
eschatological expression may at first appear stymieing, Deane-Drummond offers a note 
of encouragement.  “What we do know, however, is that since God is a God of love, the 
new life we experience will be one that is inclusive of creatures in some way, and that 
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this life will be rich in its experiences, taking up the historical memory of different phases 
of our own history and biography, as well as wider in terms of the cosmos as a whole.”318 
 Finally, this spirit of eschatological hopefulness signaled by Deane-Drummond is 
echoed in the recent work of David Clough, who offers us a summary conclusion for this 
section.  Clough writes:  
 
Those theological accounts that have attempted to make redemption an 
exclusively human enterprise seem in this context to be oddly partial, 
preoccupied with the human condition, inattentive to the breadth of 
biblical witness and – for no good theological reasons – neglectful of the 
other creatures that God had reason to make part of the astonishing 
diversity of creation.  The Christian hope must therefore be that the bodies 
of other-than-human animals are not disposable parts of the current world 
order, but will be resurrected with human bodies in the new creation.  
Such a vision of the redeemed bodies of animals – human and other-than-
human – should encourage Christians to appreciate that their relationships 
with other animals in the present is a particular and pressing concern.319 
 
Given the characteristics outlined in the previous chapter, we can include the stewardship 
model of creation among “those theological accounts” that presents – explicitly or tacitly 
– salvation as pertaining to human beings alone.  In light of the doctrinal importance of 
eschatology and its historical linkage with protology and creation, it is not surprising that 
there are abundant resources throughout the history of Christian theology to raise critical 
questions regarding the adequacy of the stewardship model.   
 Having examined some of the eschatological concerns raised in scripture and the 
tradition that trouble the hitherto accepted focus on anthropomonism, we now move to an 
allied area of study that complements the critical theological reflection on stewardship 
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considered so far in this chapter.  As scripture scholars and theologians have become 
increasingly aware of the possible difficulties latent in the model and discourse of 
stewardship, continental philosophers have likewise delved into questions about the 
porosity of the assumed boundaries between humanity and the rest of creation.   
 
D. The Anthropocentric Phenomenology of Modern Philosophy 
 In this section, we will briefly explore some contemporary critiques of 
philosophical anthropology that has been used to support the advancement of a 
stewardship model of creation.  The work of twentieth-century continental philosophers 
has troubled the apodictic presuppositions of phenomenology, particularly that found in 
the work of Martin Heidegger, whose influence on contemporary Christian theology is 
significant.  The insights of and critiques leveled by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio 
Agamben are of particular interest to us here.  This section of the chapter is organizes 
into three parts.  First, keeping in mind the longstanding influence he has had on modern 
theological reflection, we will briefly review Heidegger’s understanding of the 
relationship between human beings and the rest of creation from the perspective of his 
phenomenology of being.  Second, we will look at Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s 
anthropocentrism.  Finally, we will examine the recent contributions that Agamben has 
made in along similar lines.  
 
1. Martin Heidegger’s “Comparative Examination” 
 In his lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, delivered at the 
University of Freiburg during the Winter Semester of 1929-1930, Heidegger offers his 
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“comparative examination” of “the problem of the world.”320  Early in Chapter Two of 
Part Two, in the section that deals with “The Question: What is World?” Heidegger says 
that, “Here I would just like to give a very general indication of the context in which, 
from an external point of view, the problem of the world initially arises.”321  What 
follows is striking.  He continues: 
 
The most familiar aspect of the problem reveals itself in the distinction 
between God and world.  The world is the totality of beings outside of and 
other than God.  Expressed in Christian terms, such beings thus also 
represent the realm of created being as distinct from uncreated being.  And 
man [Dasein] in turn is also part of the world understood in this sense.  Yet 
man is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears 
and which he makes up in part.  Man stands over against the world.  This 
standing-over-against is a ‘having’ of world as that in which man moves, 
with which he engages, which he both master and serves, and to which he 
is exposed.  Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part 
he is at once both master and servant of the world.322 
 
It doesn’t take much critical awareness to recognize the parallel between the Christian 
theological tradition’s maintenance of dominion and stewardship models of creation and 
the twofold phenomenological presupposition Heidegger predicates of the human person 
[Dasein] as primarily “part of the world” (ens creatum) and secondarily master and 
servant of the world.  What follows in Heidegger’s course is the examination of a 
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continuum of being, constituted by the relation of a given existent to the “world.”  Simply 
put, Heidegger identifies three theses: 
 
1. The stone (material object) is worldless [weltlos]; 
2. The animal is poor in world [weltarm]; 
3. The human [Dasein] is world-forming [weltbildend].323 
 
I do not presume that this set of distinctions is new to most philosophers and theologians.  
Yet, the relationship of Heidegger’s phenomenological reflections to his tacit Christian 
presuppositions has not often been acknowledged.324  Furthermore, the resulting and 
lasting influence of Heidegger’s philosophical anthropology on modern Christian 
theology has not yet been fully examined.  For these reasons, Heidegger’s attempt to 
understand the human person in relationship to other-than-human creatures offers us a 
modern example of a philosophical resource for contemporary theological anthropology 
and theology of creation that remains, like its ancient and medieval predecessors, in need 
of deconstruction and critical analysis. 
 The philosopher Gary Steiner has argued that Heidegger’s treatment of other-
than-human creation in his “comparative examination” is neither concerned with “the 
nature and fate of animals” nor departs significantly from the preceding views of human 
personhood and animality found in the Western philosophical tradition.  Steiner explains: 
 
Like other figures in the Western philosophical tradition, Heidegger tends 
to focus on the ways in which animals lack the capacities and 
characteristics that make human beings distinctive.  Human Dasein is 
distinctive primarily in virtue of two potentialities that animals and other 
nonhuman beings lack: the ability to engage in acts of interpretation or the 
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development of meaning, and the encounter with death that makes 
interpretation possible in the first place.325 
 
What this twofold distinction found in humanity means according to Heidegger is that 
only human beings have the capacity for “existence.”  Elsewhere, Heidegger writes: “The 
being that exists is the human being.  Rocks are, but they do not exist.  Trees are, but they 
do not exist.  Horses are, but they do not exist.  Angels are, but they do not exist.  God is, 
but he does not exist.”326  In Heidegger’s view, it is only according to experience of 
encountering one’s own finitude and considering the limits of one’s own experience in 
the manner unique to humanity that one can be said to “exist.”327  What this suggests is 
that the starting point and continual referent for all metaphysical and phenomenological 
inquiry is the human being because they “can represent beings as such” and “can be 
conscious of such representations.”328   
 In terms of the experience of the world, human beings (Dasein) by their nature 
can “step outside what would otherwise be an animal-like immersion in the midst of 
beings.”329  According to Heidegger, (nonhuman) animals are “captivated by” 
(benommen) or “immersed in” their “surroundings” (Umring),330 however, they do not 
“exist” or experience the world as such.  Heidegger explains: 
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 329 Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 206. 
 330 This is in contrast with the “environment” (Umwelt) that humanity is situated within, a concept 
that Heidegger borrows from Jakob von Uexküll.  
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The animal has a specific relationship to a circumscribed domain with 
respect to its sources of nourishment, its prey, its enemies and its sexual 
maters…The animal’s way of being, which we call “life,” is not without 
access to what is around it and about it, to that amongst which it appears 
as a living being.  It is because of this that the claim arises that the animal 
has an environmental world of its own within which it moves.  
Throughout the course of its life the animal is confined to its 
environmental world, immured as it were within a fixed sphere that is 
incapable of further expansion or contraction.331 
 
The notion that animals operate within and captivated by a “fixed sphere that is incapable 
of further expansion or contraction” is the Armut that defines reality as weltarm (world-
poor), which is characteristic of other-than-human animals.  For Heidegger, an 
ontological “openness” is required to have “world,” and this is characteristic is what is 
unique about the human (Dasein).  As Steiner explains, only human beings “can hold 
specific meanings in openness, retrieve them at will, and form interpretations that have 
the uniquely human character if self-referentiality: Unlike other beings, humans form and 
develop interpretations about interpretations, as part of the questioning activity that 
defines human beings and that animals lack.”332 
 In Heidegger’s account of philosophical anthropology and animality, there is an 
abyss that is both ontological and epistemological, which separates the human from the 
other-than-human animal.  Heidegger acknowledges in his 1947 “Letter on Humanism” 
that our corporeality and its relation to the material composition of other-than-human 
animals creates a challenge.  “Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to 
think about are living creatures, because on the one hand they are in a certain way the 
most closely akin to us, and on the other are at the same time separated from our ek-
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sistent essence by an abyss.”333  The ontological aspect of this divide is rooted in the 
intrinsic and defining characteristics of humanity and all other-than-human creatures, 
respectively.  The epistemological aspect of this divide is the effect that arises from that a 
priori condition for self-transcendence in the human (or its lack in what Heidegger calls 
the weltarm animal), whereby one is able not simply to encounter reality in an objective 
though captivating manner but “have a world” wherein one’s experience is as a self-
referential subject.   
 Heidegger, in considering the various approaches to humanism from the ancient 
Greek and Roman proposals down through the modern thought of the existentialists, 
insists that most attempts to define humanity fall under the category of metaphysics.  This 
is problematic because, according to Heidegger, “Metaphysics closes itself to the simple 
essential fact that man essentially occurs only in his essence, where he is claimed by 
Being.”334  It is, of course, Heidegger’s phenomenological approach that seeks to 
overcome this limitation.  Heidegger also sees this metaphysical prevalence as a concern 
in terms of understanding the human because he believes that, “Metaphysics thinks of 
man on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas.”335  It 
would even appear that Heidegger’s association of animality with metaphysics reflects 
the philosopher’s desire to subordinate both, the former to humanitas the latter to 
phenomenology, in his own project. 
 As in his earlier lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger reiterates that it is only the human (Dasein) that exists, a key proposition 
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further emphasized by the denotation “ek-sistence” or “ek-sist” to highlight the 
uniqueness of Dasein’s Being as “standing out.”  He writes: “This way of Being is proper 
only to man.  Ek-sistence so understood is not only the ground of the possibility of 
reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of man preserves the source that 
determines him.”336  Heidegger then notes the particularity of humanity’s “ek-sistence” in 
contradistinction to other creatures. 
 
Ek-sistence can be said only of the essence of man, that is, only of the 
human way “to be.”  For as far as our experience shows, only man is 
admitted to the destiny of ek-sistence.  Therefore ek-sistence can also 
never be thought of as a specific kind of living creature among others – 
granted that man is destined to think the essence of his Being and not 
merely to give accounts of the nature and history of his constitution and 
activities.  Thus even what we attribute to man as animalitas on the basis 
of the comparison with “beasts” is itself grounded in the essence of ek-
sistence.  The human body is something essentially other than an animal 
organism.337  
 
At every turn, though Heidegger acknowledges an organic or bio-physiological 
dimension constitutive of the human person, he emphasizes humanity’s literal 
“apartness” or the means by which Dasein can “stand alone” (ek-sistence) from the rest 
of what Christians would identify as creation. 
 Given that Heidegger’s primary objective is always an exploration of the human 
phenomenological experience of the world, it should come as no surprise that he uses his 
“third path” or “comparative examination” to draw a dividing line between human beings 
and other-than-human creation.338  Though his interest is not in offering an exposition of 
the Christian approach to creation, his philosophical work lays a modern foundation for 
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constructing a stewardship model of creation.339  The circumscribed experience of reality 
characteristic of other-than-human animals does not afford them the ability to engage in a 
reciprocally subjective relationship with human beings.  Likewise, their inability to 
experience the world as such and therefore their lack of critical self-awareness would 
appear to absolve them of any responsibility of an individual or collective nature.  These 
then leave human beings (Dasein), with their functioning rationality and capacity for 
meaning making in the world, to care for the rest of creation.  Within a particularly 
Christian frame, this could be rendered to support a form of stewardship, which as we 
have seen earlier often relies on an allied form of human separatism and sense of 
responsibility that has been divinely mandated.  
 Nevertheless, as several of Heidegger’s continental philosophical heirs have noted 
in recent decades, Heidegger’s anthropocentric presuppositions cloud his ability to 
consider other-than-human creatures on their own terms rather than according to a 
privative model that arises from a comparative method with humanity.340  We will now 
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look at two examples of such critique in the work of Jacques Derrida and Giorgio 
Agamben. 
 
2. Jacques Derrida: Heidegger’s Insufficiency  
 Jacques Derrida notes in an extemporaneous lecture after the seminar that became 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, that he had been interested in the Heideggerian 
“propositions concerning stone, animal, and man, and notably the ‘poor in world 
[weltarm]’ animal” for a long time.341  At the heart of Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s 
exploration of the “problem of world” is the accusation that what Heidegger claims to 
have done in Being and Time, namely to have uncovered and moved beyond the 
inadequacies of Descartes’s “dogmatic” ergo sum (that foundational esse, being) that 
undergirds the act of cogito, is in fact undermined by a similarly dogmatic and 
presuppositional starting point and point of reference: that is, the phenomenological 
experience of Dasein.342  In other words, Derrida’s contention is that Heidegger’s 
intended consideration of the ontological question of Being in Being and Time as well as 
in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics never overcomes the whole metaphysical 
tradition of subjectivity.  Derrida summarizes his argument concerning Heidegger’s 
thesis of animals as weltarm in a striking sentence: “Insofar as the animal is concerned 
[Heidegger] remains, in spite of everything, profoundly Cartesian.”343 
                                                                                                                                            
beings to develop a more-capacious sense of world, yet it falls short of Heidegger’s affirming the agency of 
other-than-human aspects of creation and therefore falls inevitably back into the difficulties of 
anthropocentric presuppositions associated with dominion and stewardship models of theological 
reflection. 
 341 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), 143. 
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 This counter-thesis nicely encapsulates the central problematic of Heidegger’s 
thesis that “the animal is poor in world,” a position that Heidegger nevertheless maintains 
from Being and Time and Fundamental Concepts through at least his “Letter on 
Humanism” despite the anticipation of such an objection at the end of his via tertia or 
“comparative examination.”344  Heidegger writes: 
 
We must entertain the following objection to our thesis…this 
characterization of animality by means of poverty in world is not a 
genuine one, not drawn from animality itself and maintained within the 
limits of animality, since the character of poverty in world is being 
conceived by comparison with man.  It is only from the human perspective 
that the animal is poor with respect to world, yet animal being in itself is 
not a deprivation of world.345 
 
While there is some equivocation, some recognition in his reflection on the 
inaccessibility of the “essence” of the animal qua animal, even from the vantage point of 
Dasein’s encounter with others as such, he nevertheless maintains the validity of the 
priority of “the perspective of man to whom world-formation belongs.”346  He finally 
concedes that his “thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, 
let alone the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality.”  However, 
Heidegger in the end asserts: “At best [this thesis] is a proposition that follows from the 
essential determinations of animality, and moreover one which follows only if the animal 
is regarded in comparison with humanity.  As such a conclusion, this proposition can be 
traced back to its ground and thus lead us toward the essence of animality.”347  
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 Derrida rightly synopsizes the amount of time and energy Heidegger dedicates to 
the question of the animal as odd considering the starting point of this reflection is 
ostensibly “the problem of world” and that this “comparative examination” consists of 
three theses (on stones, animals, and humans).  Derrida explains: “What matters to me 
here is Heidegger’s strategy, and it is very unusual: once he has posed his three theses, in 
a comparative examination, within these triads of questions, terms, etc., he says that the 
best way to enter into this triple comparative question is by going to the middle.”348  
Heidegger is seemingly obsessed with animals.  Not just in general, but particularly in his 
effort to distinguish the being of Dasein from other living creatures.  He also spends 
comparatively little time distinguishing animals from stones (the weltlos creatures). 
 What emerges from a close reading of Heidegger’s “strategy,” as Derrida puts it, 
is the problem of the “anthropological limit” that Heidegger presupposes as objectively 
constitutive of being, which also marks the “abyss of essence”349 that separates, 
distinguishes, delimits the animal from the human, the weltarm from the weltbildend, the 
“other” from the Dasein.  The attention that Heidegger pays the animal and its 
relationship (or lack thereof) to the world in Fundamental Concepts is an ontological and 
post factum justification for the uniqueness of Dasein (as being-toward-death, as 
singularly capable of logos apophantikos, and so on).350  Masquerading as a datum of 
phenomenological facticity, Heidegger’s classification of non-human animals as weltarm 
is in fact a projection of anthropocentric sovereignty.  The essential problem of 
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Heidegger’s third method in Fundamental Concepts is that there is no “outside” of the 
human vantage point from which to adjudicate or to delimit the human from the non-
human animal, to trace the predication of alterity within the world.  From the standpoint 
of the human, from the there of the Da-sein, Heidegger apodictically posits the privation 
of non-human animal apophanticism – these creatures simply do not experience the world 
“as such” (die als-Struktur).  In his concluding remarks, Derrida posits the question: 
“Whether man, the human itself, has the ‘as such.’”351  Derrida goes on to say that, “to 
relate to the thing such as it is in itself – supposing that it were possible – means 
apprehending it such as it is, such as it would be even if I weren’t there…so can the 
human do that, purely?”352  The implicit answer is, following Nietzsche: no.  Derrida’s 
heuristic comment concerning the possibility that, by Heidegger’s phenomenological 
structure of being, Dasein is also weltarm for it too lacks the true “as such,” reflects his 
earlier assertion that such a hypothesis exists only to serve humanity’s own interests. 
Derrida explains: 
 
The horizon of the ends of the animal is not only a fiction in the service of 
phenomenology or of the eidetic analysis of a structure of the world or of 
Dasein.  It is, if you’ll permit me to say it, the horizon of a real hypothesis.  
For what brings this hypothesis of Descartes to the surface, even if it lasts 
only a moment and retains a sort of pedagogical or methodological value, 
is also a spectacle that is more plausible today than in the seventeenth 
century.  This spectacle can develop only as the symptom of a desire or 
phantasm: the tableau of a world after animality, after a sort of holocaust, 
a world from which animality, at first present to man, would have one day 
disappeared: destroyed or annihilated by man, either purely and simply – 
something that seems almost impossible even if one feels we are heading 
down the path toward such a world without animals – or by means of a 
devitalizing or disanimalizing treatment, what others would call the 
denaturing of animality, the production of figures of animality that are so 
new that they appear monstrous enough to call for a change of name.  This 
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science fiction is more and more credible, having begun with taming and 
domestication, dressage, neutering, and acculturation, and is being pursued 
with medico-industrial exploitation, overwhelming interventions upon 
animal milieus and reproduction, genetic transplants, cloning, etc.353  
 
This sort of phenomenological assertion can be viewed as an exercise analogous to 
human colonization and slave trades, which reflects what we saw earlier in this chapter in 
the work of postcolonial philosophers such as Val Plumwood.  For centuries, fictive 
theses were asserted (e.g., Artistotle’s “natural slave,” etc.) in order to justify the 
dehumanization, enslavement, rape, abuse, and other maltreatment of women and men.  
Similarly, Derrida gestures toward the manner in which we first talk about “animals” in 
order to then act upon them in whatever way we see fitting.  Though certainly different in 
order of magnitude and consequence, the methods of these theories and resulting 
practices shed further credible light on secondary but related critiques leveled against 
Heidegger for his own complicity in Germany’s National Socialism of the 1930s and 
1940s and its role in shaping his own philosophical outlook on questions of anthropology 
and animality.354 
 The fictive thesis of Heidegger, whose lengthy “comparative examination” of 
animality betrays one whose scope was set on the kill to begin with, challenges 
theologians to interrogate the philosophical and ontological claims taken as axiomatic in 
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terms of creation.  It is a call, as Derrida signals at the end of The Animal That Therefore 
I Am, to an existential and metaphysical humility.  Ironically, it is a call of sorts to out-
Heidegger Heidegger in refusing to make ontological claims at all, lest we reinscribe the 
Cartesian problematic of which Heidegger was so afraid.  It is for this reason that Derrida 
concludes that this “anthropological border,” which so neatly and clearly delimits the 
“human” from the “animal” according to essence (and not degree), is insufficient.355   
 
3. Giorgio Agamben: Against the ‘Anthropological Machine’ 
 Like Derrida, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has serious reservations 
about Heidegger’s phenomenological project as it concerns elucidating the meaning of 
and identifying the differences between the human and what is otherwise called the 
“animal.”  Unlike Derrida, whose own deconstructive efforts unsettle the anthropological 
delimitation of Dasein from other-than-human animals takes as its starting point the 
problematic and at times arbitrary distinctions among animal species and individual 
animals from a reflection on animals (e.g., his own pet cat), Agamben’s starting point of 
critical analysis the problem of what he calls the “anthropological machine” and its 
production of the “human.”356   
 In a counterintuitive way, Agamben seeks to deconstruct Heidegger’s 
philosophical conception of Dasein vis-à-vis the weltarm creature not necessarily for the 
creatures themselves, but for the sake of the human; his is an anthropocentric starting 
point.  He reads Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts as contributing to a long history of 
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the “production of man” that has, at various points in Western history, reinscribed the 
mechanism of the “anthropological machine” for the purposes not only of distinguishing 
the human from other-than-human creature, but from the human from the “inhuman” 
individual or group within the species homo sapiens.  Agamben explains: 
 
Insofar as the production of man through the opposition man/animal, 
human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine necessarily functions by 
means of an exclusion (which is also always already a capturing) and an 
inclusion (which is always already an exclusion)…On the one hand, we 
have the anthropological machine of the moderns.  As we have seen, it 
functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from 
itself, that is, by animalizing the human, by isolating the nonhuman within 
the human: Homo alalus, or the ape-man.  And it is not enough to move 
our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of this innocuous 
paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man produced 
within the man, or the néomort and the overcomatose [sic] person, that is, 
the animal separated within the human body itself.  The machine of earlier 
times works in an exactly symmetrical way.  If, in the machine of the 
moderns, the outside is produced through the exclusion of an inside and 
the inhuman produced by animalizing the human, here the inside is 
obtained through the inclusion of an outside, and the non-man is produced 
by the humanization of an animal: the man-ape, the enfant sauvage, or 
Homo ferus, but also and above all the slave, the barbarian, and the 
foreigner, as figures of an animal in human form.357 
 
Agamben points to the history of ad intra human delimitation, which has rendered 
individuals and groups such as European Jews during the Shoa or an enfant sauvage in 
the Western European colonial exploration of the Americas as “animals” and “non-
humans.”  Agamben’s interest here is to highlight how the “anthropological machine,” as 
he refers to it, creates both the human with and against the animal.  He then is concerned 
about the political consequences of such a historical unfolding.   
 Though Heidegger is not identified as being uniquely responsible for the modern 
iteration of this “anthropological machine,” Agamben believes that the 
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phenomenologist’s “comparative method” that proposes his threefold delineation of 
wetlos, weltarm, and weltbildend (Dasein), continues the work of the “anthropological 
machine” in contemporary philosophical anthropology.  As it concerns the human, 
Agamben is concerned that Heidegger’s proposal perpetuates the “anthropological 
machine’s” production of what Kelly Oliver has called a “phantom third category” that 
exists between the two visible categories of the human and the animal.358  It is what 
Agamben names as the “missing link.”  He writes that the “anthropological machine” is  
 
able to function only be establishing a zone of indifference at their centers, 
within which – like a ‘missing link’ which is always lacking because it is 
already virtually present – the articulation between human and animal, 
man and non-man, speaking being and living being, must take place.  Like 
every state of exception, this zone is, in truth, perfectly empty, and the 
truly human being who should occur there is only the place of a 
ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their rearticulation 
are always dislocated and displaced anew.359 
 
The mechanism that is engaged to distinguish the “human” from the “animal” requires a 
middle ground or “missing link” that is either the animalized human or the 
anthropomorphized animal.  This space of the middle position is then predicated of those 
groups or individuals within the polis that need to be subordinated according to the 
“humans.”  It is here that we see the “logic” used to justify slavery and genocide.   
 Though his concern is primarily anthropological and political in nature, Agamben 
notes in his critique of Heidegger that it is precisely the rigid demarcation of the weltarm 
(“animal”) from the weltbildend (Dasein) that is the condition of the possibility for this 
production of the “missing link” or, as Oliver put it, the “dangerous in-between space of 
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sub or non-human homo sapiens.”360  For this reason, “The anthropological machine may 
produce the human and the subhuman within the human, but it also produces a world 
filled with other living creatures and other ‘resources’ that ‘exist’ only for man.”361  The 
concept of “humanity” as such is established in contrast with the other-than-human, 
which results in a relationship that necessarily distinguishes humanity from “animals” in 
an absolute or essential way.  Heidegger, while on some level acknowledging the 
undeniable materiality of our corporeal existence, nevertheless maintained that the 
difference between the “human” and the “animal” was not merely a difference of degree 
but one of quality, which leads Heidegger to repeatedly express that, “the animal is 
separated from man by an abyss.”362  The contradistinctive comparison includes binaries 
that always favor the human, placing Dasein over against the weltarm (and, certainly, the 
wetlos).   
 Agamben believes that this process of identity formation by means of 
subordination of the “non-human” ad intra and the “other-than-human” ad extra, arises 
from an internal refusal of human beings to accept their finitude, corporeality, and 
inherent kinship with the rest of creation.  What Heidegger refers to as “the Open,” that 
which is distinctive about Dasein, allowing it to “exist” and “have world,” Agamben 
believes is merely humanity’s refusal to accept its own animality in order to secure what 
Oliver calls “the privileged place in the dichotomy of man-animal.”363  Agamben 
explains: 
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Being, world, and the open are not, however, something other with respect 
to animal environment and life: they are nothing but the interruption and 
capture of the living being’s relationship with its disinhibitor.  The open is 
nothing but a grasping of the animal not-open.  Man suspends his 
animality and, in this way, opens a “free and empty” zone in which life is 
captured and abandoned in a zone of exception.364 
 
The idea of “the Open” is then, according to Agamben, just a false or empty concept that 
is produced by the “anthropocentric machine,” which reinforces humanity’s self-
adjudicating exceptionalism and denial of its intrinsic animality. 
 It seems quite possible that each “animal” and each aspect of creation (human and 
other-than-human animals and even Heidegger’s weltlos existents), experiences their 
being-in-the-world differently.  Though, Agamben insists that Heidegger’s participation 
in history of the “anthropological machine” circumscribes our consideration of this 
possibility.  Heidegger’s certitude in predicating Dasein’s ability for versetzen (to 
transpose [into another]) is deeply misleading, which is why we cannot know for sure 
what the experience of “world” is for anyone or anything (nor are we certain for 
ourselves, as Derrida has rightly suggested).  There needs to be a restoration of a 
metaphysical humility that has been lost in the neo-Cartesian ontology of master and 
servant arising from Heidegger’s project.  In other words, there needs to be an openness 
to, not just the creational apophatic or the real impossibility of the apophantic, but an 
admittance on our part that we are not the adjudicators of ktiseological alterity as 
Agamben has suggested, using Heidegger as a modern example.  Rather than being 
“natural,” the delimitation of ‘human’ and ‘animal,’ of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ of Dasein and 
weltarm is the process of a transgressive subjectivity, the creation of an artificially 
absolute “abyss.”  Which is, as Eric Meyer has succinctly described following Derrida, 
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the “reflexive activity that produces itself precisely by cutting itself off from ‘the animal,’ 
a disavowal that produces ‘the human’ as that being who goes by a different name.”365  
Agamben explains that, “in our culture man has always been the result of a simultaneous 
division and articulation of the animal and the human, in which one of the two terms of 
the operation was also what was at stake in it.”366  He gestures, with the slightest 
revealing of an imbrication of religion, toward a way forward:  
 
To render inoperative the [anthropological] machine that governs our 
conception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek new – more 
effective or more authentic [pace Heidegger] – articulations, but rather to 
show the central emptiness, the hiatus that – within man – separates man 
and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the 
suspension, Shabbat of both animal and man.367 
 
What does the Sabbath of creation, the “Shabbat of both animal and man” as Agamben 
puts it, look like?  Theologically, the answer is not stewardship, but kinship. 
 Elizabeth Johnson has written that, “If separation is not ideal but connection is; if 
hierarchy is not the ideal but mutuality is; then the kinship model more closely 
approximates reality.  It sees human beings and the earth with all its creatures 
intrinsically related as companions in a community of life.”368  Responding to the 
dualistic and hierarchical tendencies of other theological models, models rooted in the 
anthropocentric presuppositions of Heidegger among others, Johnson argues that, “this 
kinship attitude does not measure differences on a scale of higher or lower ontological 
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dignity but appreciates them as integral elements in the robust thriving of the whole.”369  
In this sense, we can begin to appreciate the radical break from the more-rigidly defined 
distinctions between human and non-human creatures found overtly in the dominion 
model and latently in the stewardship approach.  This delimitation is, in effect, what 
Johnson has described as the “amnesia about the cosmic world” within the history of 
Christian theological reflection and biblical interpretation.370  The naming, the delimiting, 
the hermeneutical blinders of phenomenology-as-metaphysics that in fact constitute the 
condition of the possibility to call ourselves “human” (or anything at all), suggest that 
contrary to grasping the “world” “as such” according to that which is proper to Dasein, 
humanity has been mistaken.  Put in terms of Agamben’s Shabbat heuristic, Johnson’s 
call for a restoration of kinship as the operative theological paradigm is indeed not a 
“new” or “more effective or more authentic” articulation.  Instead, it is perhaps a more-
humble consideration of the possibility that the human “world” and its phenomenological 
encounters with or without the “as such” is not normative in this planetary or cosmic 
reality.  In the next chapter we will examine some of the scriptural and theological 
sources for constructing a non-anthropocentric theology of creation along these lines, in 
an effort to highlight the manifold ways the tradition already provides grounding for such 
an endeavor. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
From the Stewardship Model to a Theology of Kinship: 
Scriptural Sources for a Community of Creation Paradigm 
 
 At its core, the kinship model of creation affirms that humanity’s relationship 
with the rest of creation is best described as familial rather than viewed as contractual.371  
In light of the critiques of dominion and stewardship models, Elizabeth Johnson explains: 
“If separation is not ideal but connection is; if hierarchy is not the ideal but mutuality is; 
then the kinship model more closely approximates reality.  It sees human beings and the 
earth with all its creatures intrinsically related as companions in a community of life.”372  
Responding to the dualistic and hierarchical tendencies of other models, Johnson argues 
that, “this kinship attitude does not measure differences on a scale of higher or lower 
ontological dignity but appreciates them as integral elements in the robust thriving of the 
whole.”373  In this sense, we can begin to appreciate the radical break from the more-
rigidly defined distinctions between human and other-than-human creatures found overtly 
in the dominion model and latently in the stewardship approach.  Furthermore, there are 
scriptural and theological resources that lend themselves toward advancing kinship as the 
most sensible and defensible framework for theological reflection on creation, 
particularly in light of the discoveries of natural sciences. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to identify resources from within the Christian 
scriptural tradition that provide contemporary theologians with insight for moving 
forward in constructing a theology of creation grounded in what I am calling the 
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community of creation paradigm.374  There are numerous texts within the Christian canon 
of scripture that beckon renewed attention and interpretation in an age where human 
discovery has presented us with new tools, both hermeneutical and scientific, that aid us 
in our quest to understand better the meaning of creation and humanity’s place within this 
cosmic community.  This chapter is intended as an introduction to the richness of the 
scriptural sources present within the Hebrew Bible and Christian New Testament for 
developing a community of creation paradigm.  Though not in any way exhausting the 
textual evidence available for consideration within the canonical scriptures, I aim to 
provide a substantive survey of texts that, drawing on the resources available for sound 
exegetical interpretation, illustrate the potential for reimagining our theologies of creation 
in light of scripture.  This chapter includes five parts, with priority given to those 
scriptural books or genres wherein the richness of this kinship tradition is most clearly 
seen. Selections are presented from: (A) the Book of Genesis; (B) the Book of Job; (C) 
Wisdom literature and the Psalms; (D) the Prophets; and (E) the New Testament. 
 
A. The Book of Genesis 
 Although the first creation narrative found in Genesis 1 often receives the most 
blame for contributing to the dominion model of creation (e.g., 1:26 and 1:28), there are 
dimensions of this text that, when read with a renewed interpretative lens, offer a 
contribution to the development of a community of creation paradigm.375  For example, 
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one of the common readings of the Priestly account of creation in Genesis 1 argues that 
the linear development of the act of creation – over the span of six “days” – suggests a 
progressive development or a clear trajectory toward culmination ending with the 
creation of human beings on the sixth day.  Richard Bauckham has noted that the actual 
structure of this creation narrative is spatial and not chronological.376  Furthermore, there 
is no clear cumulative trajectory ending with humanity as if God created “the best for 
last.”  And even if there were such a trajectory, it would be the Sabbath that represents 
the culmination or pinnacle of God’s creation, not the human creatures.377  This spatial 
structure of the creation narrative bears a noticeable logic.  Bauckham explains that, “the 
work of the third day has to follow that of the second, and the environments have to be 
created before their respective inhabitants.  What is lacking, however, is any sense of 
building towards a culmination.  Humans, the last creatures to be created, have a unique 
role within creation, but they do not come last because they are the climax of an 
ascending scale.”378  This is an important observation often overlooked because of 
anthropocentric presumptions informing classical exegesis.  Bauckham notes that 
“creeping things” such as reptiles and insects, which are also created on the sixth day, 
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“are not higher, in some order of being, than the birds, created on the fifth day.”379  
Additionally, a close reading of the narrative reveals God’s appreciation for all aspects of 
creation on each day (“God saw that it was good”) irrespective of humanity created on 
the sixth day.  Such a reading of the text circumscribes the purely instrumental valuation 
of other-than-human creation associated with the dominion model and the absolute 
separation of humanity from the rest of creation commonly seen in the stewardship 
approach.   
 The account in Genesis 1, rather than presenting a divine mandate for domination 
and the shoring up of human sovereignty, presents a creation designed from the 
beginning “to be an interconnecting and interdependent whole, and so the refrain is 
varied at the end of the work of the sixth day: ‘God saw everything that he had made, and 
behold, it was very good’ (1:31). The value of the whole is more than the value of the 
sum of its parts.”380  Even before the exclamation of goodness God offers in light of the 
completed creation we see parallels and continuity between human beings and other-
than-human creation.  Just as God blesses and commands the human beings to “be 
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth” in Genesis 1:28, God also blessed and 
commanded the water and air creatures to do likewise in Genesis 1:22: “God blessed 
them, saying, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the waters in the seas and let birds 
multiply on the earth.’”  Mark Brett has commented that this parallel between humanity 
and other-than-human creatures (including the Earth, which God commands to “grow 
vegetation” [Genesis 1:11]) can be read as the divine bestowal of creative agency to all 
living things.  Instead of being an object for manipulation by God or humanity, other-
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than-human creation is viewed also as co-creators with God, something Brett sees 
bolstered by God’s universal covenant with all creation (vs. humanity alone) later in 
Genesis 9:8-17.381  That the earth is later commanded again to “bring forth living 
creatures of every kind” in Genesis 1:24-25 suggests that, “the creation of these land 
animals is the result of the combined activity of the earth and the Deity,” which connotes 
the co-creativity traditionally reserved for humanity.382   
 While the apparent commands of God to humanity in Genesis 1:26 (“have 
dominion”) and Genesis 1:28 (“subdue”) have seemingly contributed to the justification 
and proliferation of various iterations of the dominion model of creation, the second 
creation account in Genesis offers a scriptural challenge quite distinct from its textual, if 
not historical, mythological-narrative predecessor.383  In the second creation account we 
read that, “the LORD God formed man from the dust of the ground (ădāmâ), and breathed 
into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being” (Gen 2:7).384  The 
formation of human beings out of the ground (ădāmâ) is the same process by which God 
forms all the animals and other creatures: “Now the LORD God had formed out of the 
ground (ădāmâ) all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the air” (Gen 2:19).  There 
is an explicit semantic parallel in this creation account that bespeaks a richly theological 
                                                
 381 Mark G. Brett, “Earthing the Human in Genesis 1-3,” in The Earth Story in Genesis, eds. 
Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 77.  Also, see William P. 
Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation: The Bible, Science, and the Ecology of Wonder (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 44-46. 
 382 William P. Brown, The Ethos of the Cosmos: The Genesis of Moral Imagination in the Bible 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 40-41. 
 383 For more context of the Genesis accounts, see Nahum Sarna, Genesis, JPS Torah Commentary 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), xi-xix; and Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. 
Marks, Old Testament Library, rev. ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1973), 13-44. 
 384 Though the NRSV and most English translations gender the adam (“human”) as male (in both 
the sense of “Adam” as proper noun from the opening of Genesis 2 and the pronoun usage), the Hebrew is 
best rendered “humanity” in general.  The word adam is in the original masculine, but the word ‘îš meaning 
“biological male” does not appear until after YHWH builds the woman.  For more, see Phyllis Trible, God 
and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1978), 72-165; and David W. Cotter, Genesis, 
Berit Olam series (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2003), 29-31. 
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observation, which is echoed elsewhere in the Hebrew Scriptures including in the Book 
of Job: “Your hands fashioned and made me; and now you turn and destroy me. 
Remember that you fashioned me like clay (ădāmâ); and will you turn me to dust 
(ădāmâ) again?” (Job 10:9).385  The relational dimension of this act of creation reveals an 
intimacy between the Creator and creation.  The Creator molds or shapes the created 
world in a way akin to a potter (yāsar) whose hands actualize the intentional design of 
God with the material of the earth.   
 Additionally, human beings and the rest of creation are, according to this account, 
made from the same material and have the same origin.  The same dust or clay of the 
ground physically constitutes humanity as well as other animals, plant life, and so on.  
This originating source and material is reiterated in Genesis 3:19 when God declares the 
punishment for the man stating, “By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread until you 
return to the ground (ădāmâ), for out of it you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you 
shall return.”  
 Classically, what distinguishes humanity from the rest of the created order is the 
breath (rûah) of God bestowed on humanity as part of the act of human formation from 
the earth.  However, some scholars read in Genesis 7:21-22 an indication that God’s 
“breath of life” (literally: nišmat-rûah hayyîm) is the universal animating dimension of 
life and not just something reserved for humanity.386   This is something expressed in a 
succinct way by David Cunningham: “It should be noted that the biblical text never 
denies the attribution of ‘image of God’ to any other element of creation,” a fact that is 
                                                
 385 For more, see the next subsection of this chapter on the Book of Job. 
 386 For example, see Terence Fretheim, “The Book of Genesis: Introduction, Commentary, and 
Reflections,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 1 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 350 and 392.  Also, 
see Cotter, Genesis, 58; and Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 21. 
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undeniable.387  Regardless of one’s interpretation of the flood account and the reservation 
or universal presence of rûah as that which gives life, the second Genesis creation 
account does not leave ambiguity in the source or origin of all life, human and other-than-
human alike.  This interpretation is supported further by the fact that the other-than-
human creatures created by God after the Earth creature adam were created precisely to 
serve as companions for humanity (Genesis 2:18-19).  On this topic, Carol Newsom asks 
why might God have understood this potency for companionship.  Her own response 
summarizes the insight that appears in the second creation narrative: “Because like the 
human creature the animals, too, are created from the earth…both humans and animals 
are united with the Earth and with each other in their derivation.”388   
 In addition to a reexamination of the two creation narratives in Genesis 1-2, which 
form the opening of what is typically referred to as the “primeval history” or first part of 
Genesis found in chapters 1-11, it is important for us to return to the other end of this 
significant section of the Hebrew Bible to explore the “recreation” and covenant depicted 
in the flood narrative of Genesis 6-9.389  After the two creation accounts (P and J), the 
flood narrative is perhaps the best known among the Genesis pericopes highlighting the 
proximity of human beings to other-than-human creatures, as well as the universal 
relationship creation has to the Creator.  The flood does not come out of nowhere, but is 
depicted as God’s response to a gradual decline of the community of creation – composed 
                                                
 387 David Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh: Rethinking the Imago Dei,” in Creaturely 
Theology, 106. 
 388 Carol A. Newsom, “Common Ground: An Ecological Reading of Genesis 2-3,” in The Earth 
Story in Genesis, eds. Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst, The Earth Bible vol. 2 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2000), 65-66. 
 389  A classic examination of this primeval history is Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A 
Commentary, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1974).  For a recent comparative study 
of Genesis 1-11 and other Ancient Near Eastern Texts, see William Greenway, For the Love of All 
Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2015). 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 160 
of humanity and other-than-human creatures – into sin.  Contrary to popular iterations of 
the so-called “fall” of humanity typically limited to actions within and ultimate expulsion 
from Eden in Genesis 3, Bauckham and others have noted that this decline into sin begins 
in Genesis 3, “continues through the story of Cain and his descendants (Genesis 4), and 
reaches its nadir in the corruption of the Earth in the period preceding the Flood (Genesis 
6:1-7 and 11-13).”390  Interestingly, while hubris and the temptation to be other than what 
God created humanity to be are the core themes of transgression portrayed in Genesis 3, 
(“original”) sin is presented as a pertaining to violence in chapters 4 through 6.  What is 
striking about the role of violence-as-sin in these texts is its inclusivity that expands 
beyond typical anthropocentrism, which overlooks other-than-human creatures to count 
animals too.  Animals are presented as not simply victims or the objects of human 
violence, but as perpetrators of violence within and outside of their own species.391  
Keeping this inclusive sense of sin and universal creaturely agency in mind, we can 
anticipate God’s destruction of not only humanity but also all living things in the Great 
Flood.392 
 After the destruction caused by the flood (Genesis 7:10-8:14), we witness the 
narrative of God’s “re-creation,” albeit one that does not presume the utopic intention of 
God presented in Genesis 1 and 2.  Rather, the starting point is now one that presupposes 
the reality of sin and violence in the world, which is why there is now a presumably 
reluctant approbation of eating meat set within the context of a prohibition against 
homicide (see Genesis 9:3-7).  Following the recasting of the original creation mandate 
                                                
 390 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 23. 
 391 See Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 23; Sarna, Genesis, 51; and Bernhard W. Anderson, 
From Creation to New Creation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 142-146. 
 392 One curious exception appears to be the seas and the water creatures.  See Cotter, Genesis, 55. 
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found in the creation narratives of Genesis 1 and 2, God makes the first of four biblical 
covenants found in the Hebrew Bible.393  What is of particular interest to us here is the 
manner in which the subject with whom God enters into covenantal relationship is 
portrayed.  Traditional anthropocentric recounting of the Noahide covenant typically 
reduces the audience of God’s promise to Noah and his (human) descendants.  However, 
the covenant (běrît) is made between God and “all flesh” (kol-bāśār), which means the 
entirety of the created order including both human beings and other-than-human creatures 
such as the Earth (Genesis 9:13).  The passage conveys the inclusivity of the covenant 
directly, repeating the word “covenant” (běrît) seven times and the expression “all flesh” 
(kol-bāśār) five times.394  The pericope opens with a doublet of Genesis 8:21-22 wherein 
God swears privately to never destroy all of creation again regardless of the persistence 
of sin on earth.  From that point onward, we are presented with God’s unilateral promise 
to all creation.  Terence Fretheim explains that, “God is obligated, unilaterally and 
unconditionally.  God initiates and establishes the covenant, and remembering it becomes 
exclusively a divine responsibility.  The covenant will be as good as God is…it will never 
need to be renewed.”395  Opening in a juridical format common in ancient Near Eastern 
literature to signal the establishment of a covenant, the passage states: 
 
Then God said to Noah and to his sons with him, “As for me, I am 
establishing my covenant (běrît) with you and your descendants after you, 
and with every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic 
animals, and every animal of the earth with you, as many as came out of 
                                                
 393 The other three are: [A] The covenant with Abraham (Genesis 15 and 17); [B] The covenant at 
Sinai (Exodus 20, Deuteronomy 5); and [C] The covenant with David about the descendent king to rule 
over Jerusalem and Israel (2 Samuel 7). 
 394 For more on the significance of this covenant and its relationship to other covenants, see Joseph 
Blenkinsopp, Creation, Un-Creation, Re-Creation: A Discursive Commentary on Genesis 1-11 (New York: 
T & T Clark, 2011), 145-151. 
 395 Fretheim, “The Book of Genesis,” 400. 
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the ark.396  I establish my covenant (běrît) with you, that never again shall 
all flesh (kol-bāśār) be cut off by the waters of a flood, and never again 
shall there be a flood to destroy the earth.”  God said, “This is the sign of 
the covenant (běrît) that I make between me and you and every living 
creature that is with you, for all future generations: I have set my bow in 
the clouds, and it shall be a sign of the covenant (běrît) between me and 
the earth.  When I bring clouds over the earth and the bow is seen in the 
clouds, I will remember my covenant (běrît) between me and you and 
every living creature of all flesh (kol-bāśār); and the waters shall never 
again become a flood to destroy all flesh (kol-bāśār).  When the bow is in 
the clouds, I will see it and remember the everlasting covenant (běrît) 
between God and every living creature of all flesh (kol-bāśār) that is on 
the earth.”  God said to Noah, “This is the sign of the covenant (běrît) that 
I have established between me and all flesh (kol-bāśār) that is on the 
earth.” (Genesis 9:8-17). 
 
The explicit inclusion of “all flesh,” whether explicitly (kol-bāśār) or allusively such as 
in Genesis 9:9 (“every living creature”), as the recipient of the covenant further 
strengthens readings of Genesis 1 and 2 that recognize a degree of agency and even 
subjectivity in other-than-human creation.  Unlike the dominion model of creation that 
envisions other-than-human creation as a collection of instrumental objects and 
resources, these Genesis passages present other-than-human creation as intrinsically 
valued and part of a larger whole according to which all aspects of creation (including 
humanity) are, a priori, situated in a complex web of relationships.  And unlike the 
stewardship model of creation that portrays other-than-human creation as in need of 
human care and mediation with the Creator, these Genesis passages affirm a nascent 
sense of agency in all creatures and posit a direct relationship with their creator that does 
not require mediation, but is already capable of entering into covenantal relationship.  
Within the primeval history of Genesis one finds resources for a reconceptualization of 
                                                
 396 The NRSV notes that the original Hebrew adds “every animal of the earth” at this point, a gloss 
not insignificant for the current discussion. 
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creation that, even though it is expressed in human language and oriented to a human 
audience, nevertheless gestures toward a non-anthropocentric Christian ktiseology. 
 
B. The Book of Job397 
 There are many ways that the Book of Job stands out within the canonical 
scriptures in terms of its import for developing a non-anthropocentric theology of 
creation, not the least of which is the sustained poetic reflection in chapters 38-41 on the 
community of creation that extends far beyond the confines of the world of human 
experience.398  Additionally, the broader context of the wisdom literature of lament and 
theodicy that best describes the tenor of the Book of Job aligns well with experiential 
priority given in postcolonial theory to the “subaltern” voices gone unrecognized and 
occluded, as we will see in the next chapter.  Job’s unique social context “as a non-
Israelite character,” whose identity is constructed according to one on the outside of the 
community of the Chosen People and yet a foreigner in their midst who offers a critical 
perspective from the margins, further bolsters this text’s postcolonial relevance.399   
 William P. Brown has suggested that the Book of Job be likened to a “thought 
experiment” according to which we are able, just as Job’s ancient audience was able, to 
gain new insight into questions of evil, suffering, divine providence, and the mystery of 
                                                
 397 Although scripture scholars often count the Book of Job among those canonical texts 
considered “Wisdom Literature,” it will be treated separately here given the direct and sustained reflection 
on creation and theological anthropology throughout the text.  Other examples of resources from the 
Hebrew Wisdom Literature will be explored in the following subsection. 
 398 Bauckham observes that, “Chapter 38-39 of the book of Job are the longest passage in the Bible 
about the non-human creation,” in The Bible and Ecology, 38. 
 399 For a recent study on Joban marginality in a postcolonial perspective, see Alissa Jones Nelson, 
Power and Responsibility in Biblical Interpretation: Reading the Book of Job with Edward Said (London: 
Routledge, 2014).  Also, see R. S. Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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creation.400  It is the latter theme that we are interested in here.  The story is well known.  
Job is a righteous man without blame or fault.  One of God’s messengers, known as “the 
Satan” (not to be confused with the historical figure of “the devil” or a demonic figure, 
but rather one more akin to a “devil’s advocate” in the juridical sense),401 challenges the 
Lord’s boast about how faithful Job is, claiming that Job is only faithful because God has 
been so good to him.  In response, and for reasons left unexplained, God grants the Satan 
control of Job’s life.  Tragedy and misery befall Job and yet he still persists in his 
faithfulness to God.  His friends, holding to the received tradition of temporal retribution, 
interpret this bad luck to Job’s lack of innocence, despite his protestation to the contrary.  
What unfolds is a critical unveiling of traditional wisdom and theology.  Eventually Job 
concludes that God must be unjust because he knows in an irrefutable way that he is 
innocent and without blame.  In 9:21-24, Job asserts that God makes no distinction 
between the righteous and the wicked, effectively rejecting the foundational principle that 
grounded the moral order of the ancient Near East.402  It is within this literary context of 
lament that later God offers a series of poetic speeches in response. 
 From within a “whirlwind” (sĕ’ārâ), which no doubt contains an allusion to the 
primordial pre-formed chaos of Genesis 1 as well as other theophanic settings in the 
Hebrew Bible,403 God’s response is both rich with creational imagery and yet ambiguous 
in answering Job’s experience of loss and suffering.  At first glance, God’s responses 
form a confusing rhetorical pattern of questioning that appears devoid of content or 
                                                
 400 William P. Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation: The Bible, Science, and the Ecology of 
Wonder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 115-117. 
 401 Kathleen M. O’Connor, Job, New Collegeville Bible Commentary, vol. 19 (Collegeville: 
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 402 Carol A. Newsom, “The Book of Job,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. IV (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 2000), 412. 
 403 See Theodore Hiebert, “Theophany in the OT,” in The Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. D. N. 
Freedman, 6 vols. (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 1992), 6:505-506. 
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constructive insight.404  Yet, in fact, these responses provide a wealth of information, 
though this might not have satisfied a suffering Job.405  As Bauckham explains, “What 
God does is to invite Job into a vast panorama of the cosmos, taking Job on a sort of 
imaginative tour of his creation, all the time buffeting Job with questions…the effect is to 
desconstruct and reorder Job’s whole view of the world.”406  This is performed in two 
divine speeches pertaining to God’s cosmic design (‘ēșāh) and divine justice or 
governance (mišpāț) in 38:1–40:2 and 40:6–41:34, respectively.407  Though much more 
could be said about these two speeches in greater detail, I will not attempt a complete 
exegesis of the approximately one-hundred-and-twenty-three verses in God’s poetic 
response, opting instead to highlight the most significant dimensions of these passages 
for developing a community of creation paradigm. 
 In the first speech (Job 38:1–40:2), we read a divine soliloquy in which the 
presumed anthropocentrism (and, perhaps at this point, a particular self-centeredness as 
well) of Job is deconstructed by God’s deployment of rhetorical questions.  As Kathryn 
Schifferdecker has observed, whereas other biblical reflections on creation (e.g., Genesis 
1 or Psalm 8) presumes a human dominion (rādâ) over the rest of the created order, the 
divine speeches in the Book of Job “emphasize again and again the ferocity and freedom 
of Job’s fellow creatures.”408  Though some have suggested in reading God’s ostensibly 
                                                
 404 This is in part the claim of Michael V. Fox, “Job 38 and God’s Rhetoric,” Semeia 19 (1981): 
53-61, at 58-60. 
 405 See J. Gerald Janzen, Job, Interpretation Bible Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1985), 225-228. 
 406 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 39. 
 407 Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 126. Also, see James L. Crenshaw, “When Form and 
Content Clash: The Theology of Job 38:1–40:5,” in Creation in the Biblical Traditions, eds. Richard J. 
Clifford and John J. Collins (Washington, DC: The Catholic Biblical Association, 1992), 70-84. 
 408 Kathryn Schifferdecker, “Of Stars and Sea Monsters: Creation Theology in the Whirlwind 
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insensitive response to Job’s individual suffering a callous deity,409 what also seems to be 
unfolding is the deconstruction of Job’s presumptions about the cosmos and his place 
(and humanity’s in general) within God’s creation.410  An alternative interpretation of the 
text at hand might suggest a divine de-centering of the human person, wherein the 
particular suffering of an individual human is then re-contextualized within the broader 
scope of God’s creation.  The world as God knows it far exceeds the experiential horizon 
of an individual human being as well as that of the entire human race. 
 God’s opening subject matter in the first speech is a sweeping recollection of the 
establishment of the cosmos and its ongoing ordering and design (‘ēșāh).  The first 
portion of the text (Job 38:4-38) includes ten sections that serve as an exercise in cosmic 
cartography, which reiterates in greater detail the vast expanse of creation. 
 
1. The creation of the earth (38:4-7) 
2. The formation of the oceans (38:8-11) 
3. The regulation of the dawn (38:12-15) 
4. The establishment of the underworld (38:16-18) 
5. The separation of the light from the darkness (38:19-21) 
6. The creation of adverse weather (38:22-24) 
7. The creation of life-giving or sustaining weather (38:25-27) 
8. The mysteries of the origin of weather (38:28-30) 
9. The ruling of stars and constellations (38:31-33) 
10. The controlling of weather (38:34-38)411 
 
In listing these cosmic elements at the outset, the opening of God’s first speech 
establishes two key principles: the first is identifying the contours of God’s cosmic order 
                                                
 409 For example, see William Safire, The First Dissident: The Book of Job in Today’s Politics 
(New York: Random House Publishing, 1992). 
 410 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 39. 
 411 Here I follow the delineation of Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 40-46.  Likewise, see 
Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 600-605. 
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and the second is Job’s “cosmic humility.”412  What is presented here in Job is “a far from 
anthropocentric vision of the cosmos.  Most of the features of creation described do have 
some relevance to human life, but hardly any reference is made to this human relevance.  
This is a universe that is what it is quite independently of us.”413  The tenor of this 
theophany is deeply anti-anthropocentric from the start.414 
 Beginning with verse 39 of chapter 38, the first speech shifts from the physical 
dimensions of the universe to the other-than-human inhabitants of this world.  In a way 
that presumes the physical description of each respective animal species, the rhetorical 
voice of God asks Job to give his account of the comprehension of this broader world of 
creatures and the means by which each individual species and animal is provided with 
life and sustenance.  Like the inanimate dimensions of creation described in verses 4-38, 
the proceeding section can be demarcated according to subject matter. 
 
1. The lion (38:39-40) 
2. The raven (38:41) 
3. The mountain goat and the deer (39:1-4) 
4. The wild ass (39:5-8) 
5. The wild ox/buffalo (39:9-12) 
6. The “sand grouse”/ostrich (39:13-18)415 
7. The war horse (39:19-25) 
8. The hawk (39:26) 
9. The vulture (39:27-30)416 
                                                
 412 On the virtue of “cosmic humility,” see Lawrence L. Mick, Liturgy and Ecology in Dialogue 
(Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1997), esp. 33-34.  Additionally, see Bauckham, The Bible and 
Ecology, 46: “We need the humility to know ourselves as creatures within creation, not gods over creation, 
the humility of knowing that only God is God.” 
 413 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 45. 
 414 For more on this theme, see Dale Patrick, “Divine Creative Power and the Decentering of 
Creation: The Subtext of the Lord’s Addresses to Job,” in The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions, eds. 
Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 103-115. 
 415 Bauckham prefers the term “sand grouse” in an effort to remain true to the original Hebrew, yet 
what precisely this animal is has been the subject of significant scholarly debate.  For more information, see 
Arthur Walker-Jones, “The So-Called Ostrich in the God Speeches of the Book of Job (Job 39:13-18),” 
Biblica 38 (2005): 494-510. 
 416 Again, here I follow with some adaptation the delineation of Bauckham, The Bible and 
Ecology, 47-49.  Likewise, see Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 607-612. 
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Although the particular physical characteristics of the individual creatures is absent, the 
general description provided by the divine voice of the umwelt or “environment” of each 
creature is worth noting.  Whereas humanity is largely preoccupied with its own 
experience of the world and the minutia of quotidian existence, which often results in 
creational myopia and an anthropocentric outlook, God is not oblivious to the reality of 
all creatures, including those to which human beings pay little heed.  That these animals 
are “wild” (i.e., not typically found in the Hebrew Bible among those animals that were 
domesticated) only strengthens the non-anthropocentricism that pervades this divine 
discourse.  Bauckham offers an insightful interpretation of the descriptions found in these 
passages, which complement the primarily anti-anthropocentric lesson directed at Job 
(and, by extension, all of the people of Israel and us). 
 
They express God’s sheer joy in his creatures, their variety and 
idiosyncrasies, the freedom of the wild ass and the massive strength of the 
wild ox and the horse, the soaring flight of the hawk and even the apparent 
stupidity of the sand grouse.  Their divine designer and provider is also 
proud of their independence, delights in their wildness and rejoices in the 
unique value of each.  Job is invited to join God in this delight.  This wild 
world of the animals, so different from Job’s own world of sheep and 
camels, draws him out of himself into admiration of the other.417 
 
Irrespective of human valuation, God’s relationship to creation transcends the categories 
of human instrumentalization.  In a way that echoes the canticle found in the Book of the 
Prophet Daniel (3:57-88) and anticipates Francis of Assisi’s Canticle of the Creatures 
(ca. 1225/6), the second half of God’s first speech to Job celebrates the subjectivity of 
wild animals and appears to presuppose creaturely agency that allows for a relationship 
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with the Creator in an unmediated manner.418  Rather than speaking on behalf of the rest 
of creation, humanity in general and Job in particular are invited to join the chorus always 
already underway in its praise of the Creator upon whom the entire cosmos depends.  The 
empathic response that God elicits from Job is not an invitation to flatten all distinctive 
qualities among species or individual creatures.  Instead, as Marc Bekoff has suggested in 
drawing on the latest insights from the natural sciences, human beings are called to 
deploy what I will call a “strategic anthropomorphism,” which counters the ever-present 
Cartesian mechanistic view of other-than-human creation.419  By “strategic 
anthropomorphism” I mean the openness to the possibility that other creatures may 
experience the world in a way analogous to our own experience, which is the condition 
that may elicit an empathetic response from us leading to respect for and celebration of 
the diversity of all created life and its respective a priori relationship to the Creator.  In 
turn, like the invitation extended to Job in God’s first speech, scripture and the 
theological tradition read with eco-theological lenses continues beckoning us to decenter 
human beings in order to grasp a richer appreciation for God’s cosmic design and 
celebration of our place alongside all else that God created as “very good” (Genesis 
1:31).   
 In the second speech (Job 40:6–41:34), God introduces the characters of the 
“Behemoth” and the “Leviathan,” both of which have been the subjects of significant 
scholarly debate.  Though some commentators have suggested over the years that 
                                                
 418 On the subject of other-than-human creaturely agency, see the recent work of Marc Bekoff.  
For example, Marc Bekoff, Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Reflections on Redecorating Nature 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Marc Bekoff and P. Sherman, “Reflections on Animal 
Selves,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 19 (2004): 176-180; and Marc Bekoff, “Wild Justice and Fair 
Play: Cooperation, Forgiveness, and Morality in Animals,” Biology and Philosophy 19 (2004): 489-520; 
among others.  For a theological contextualization of Bekoff’s work, see Jay McDaniel, “All Animals 
Matter: Marc Bekoff’s Contribution to Constructive Christian Theology,” Zygon 41 (2006): 29-57. 
 419 See the previous note. 
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Behemoth was an ancient referent to the hippopotamus, most scholars now believe that 
this is in fact not the case.420  Likewise, the character of Leviathan, sometimes portrayed 
as a large crocodile, has been dismissed by contemporary scholarship.  Though both 
Behemoth and Leviathan are described in hybridized form, drawing perhaps from images 
of extant creatures of the day, they are nonetheless believed to be mythical monsters 
invoked for allegorical purposes.  As with the first speech, this second speech directed at 
Job serves to remind him “of how he cannot control the cosmos, the sun, the stars, the 
weather, or the wild animals.”421  Here one recalls Job’s eventual lament in earlier 
chapters wherein he finally accuses God of injustice and lack of cosmic control in light of 
the suffering he has so far endured.  The discursive tone and rhetorical questioning of 
God’s address shifts from the establishment and order of creation in the first speech to 
lessons about control and divine justice or governance (mišpāț) in the second speech.   
 Not the least of the lessons presented in the second speech is the “creaturely 
equality” that God identifies between the beasts represented by Behemoth and Leviathan 
(and perhaps those creatures named in the first speech) and Job himself (Job 40:15).  As 
Kathleen O’Connor notes, “In the midst of the storm, God draws Job’s attention away 
from himself to the awesomeness of the cosmos and its residents, kin to him, fellow 
creatures, untamed, and following their own paths.”422  God is challenging Job to reorient 
his sense of community and kinship in an effort to present to him the intrinsic 
                                                
 420 For example, see O’Connor, Job, 93; Marvin H. Pope, Job, Anchor Bible vol. 15, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Doubleday Publishing, 1979), 321-322; Othmar Keel, Jahwes Entgegnung an Ijob (Göttingen: 
Verlag Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 138-139; and Edouard Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of 
Job, trans. Harold Knight (London: Nelson Publishing, 1967), 618. 
 421 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 56. 
 422 O’Connor, Job, 96. 
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interrelational dynamic of the cosmos already underway and yet seemingly absent from 
Job’s present worldview.423 
 Unlike Job, whose own vantage point is notably limited as illustrated by God in 
the first speech, God is in fact able to not only approach and control these land and sea 
creatures of inordinate strength and power but also able to create them.  Job’s falling into 
silence at the outset of this speech (Job 40:3-5) anticipates and reflects the divine rebuke 
of Job’s hubris (and by extension, that of all anthropocentric worldviews) that unfolds in 
this second and last address from God.  Bauckham offers a helpful overview of this 
rhetorical move in the second speech: 
 
God moves from the arrogant human sinners to the monstrous creatures 
that personify arrogant rebellion against God.  If Job wants to order the 
universe more justly than God, then these are what he is up against.  Job 
has to realize that only God can cope with them.  There are forces of chaos 
and destruction in creation that God contains and controls, but has not yet 
abolished.  Job, in his ignorance of all that God is doing in the wider world 
beyond his own preoccupations, has no way of understanding how God’s 
dealings are, ultimately, just.  He can know only that God has evil under 
control and will in the end abolish it.424 
 
There is a strong perspectival critique at work in this second speech.  Whereas Job 
perceived from his initial egocentric and anthropocentric outlook an unjust (or perhaps 
even absent) God at work in the cosmos, now God replies with hyperbolized illustrations 
of chaos and violence at play in creation, which God nevertheless controls despite Job’s 
self-interested myopia.   
 In addition to the de-centering of humanity present in God’s revelation of the 
divine vision of creation, there is also the re-centering of God as the singular source of 
                                                
 423 For more on Job’s place within creation, see Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 130-131. 
 424 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 61-62. 
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alterity, justice, and life itself.  As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, 
postcolonial theory offers a contemporary critical lens that complements God’s discursive 
critique of anthropocentrism in Chapters 38-41 in the Book of Job.425  Misinterpretations 
and selective readings of the biblical tradition have occluded the wisdom found in 
pericopes such as these passages from Job.  Subsequently, an anthropocentric 
hermeneutic has dominated the Christian creational imagination, which we have come to 
recognize as both no longer tenable and an inadequate accounting of the biblical tradition.  
As Elizabeth Johnson has observed, the Book of Job provides one of the strongest cases 
for developing a contemporary community of creation paradigm (in contrast to either the 
dominion or stewardship approaches) and shifting our hermeneutical lens from an 
anthropocentric to a “cosmocentric” outlook.426  And yet, Job is just one of the many 
examples of wisdom literature in the Hebrew Bible that support such a constructive 
theological project. 
 
C. The Wisdom Literature and the Psalms 
 Though not as sustained or detailed as what is found in the Book of Job, much of 
the rest of Wisdom Literature in the Hebrew Bible offers a wealth of diverse insight into 
creation, humanity’s place within it, and God’s relationship to it.  Wisdom (hokmâ in 
                                                
 425 On a related note, Carol Newsom explains that, “The divine speeches do not contain an explicit 
moral teaching that can be simply summarized.  Indeed they do not seem to employ much explicitly 
‘moral’ language at all.  God does not remake Job’s moral world for him; that remains a properly human 
task.  But God does provide Job and the reader with the resources for that undertaking.  The divine 
speeches contain the lumber from which a new house of meaning can be built.  The resources God offers to 
Job and to each reader include provocative questions about identity, new ways of perceiving the world, 
patterns and structures of thought different from accustomed ones, and, above all, images that can become 
generative metaphors fro a renewed moral imagination” (Newsom, “The Book of Job,” 625).  In light of 
this keen observation, we might rightly identify the task before us as not just ethical or moral, but 
foundationally theological in striving to construct a fundamental theology of creation that is non-
anthropocentric yet accurately reflects the Christian scriptural and theological traditions. 
 426 Elizabeth A. Johnson, Ask The Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2014), 269 and 271. 
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Hebrew, sophia in Greek), personified as female, figures prominently throughout the 
scriptural tradition.  Though the early Christian communities will come to associate 
Wisdom with Jesus Christ, Elizabeth Johnson reminds us that, “the earlier tradition more 
often associates her with the world-enlivening presence of the Spirit.”427  This live-giving 
spirit is seen as a symbol of divine immanence throughout the Hebrew Bible and reflects 
both the proximity of the Creator to creation and the loving intention present in the act of 
creation and the sustaining action of God’s creatio continua.  The nature metaphors used 
to describe this immanence of God and the presence of wisdom in creation (e.g., wind, 
water, fire, bird, etc.) offer us insight into the presence and activity of God in the natural 
world.428 
 In the Wisdom Literature two key themes continually appear that are of particular 
interest to us: (a) the order of the cosmos and (b) the theme of creation.429  With regard to 
the first theme, we see the scriptural attestation of God’s initiated cosmic order in the 
Book of Proverbs echoing the two speeches in the Book of Job.  An example of the 
frequent analogies drawn between human and other-than-human creatures to illustrate 
cosmic order is Proverbs 6:6-11:  
 
Go to the ant, you lazybones; 
 consider its ways, and be wise. 
Without having any chief  
 or officer or ruler, 
it prepares its food in summer, 
 and gathers its sustenance in harvest. 
How long will you lie there, O lazybones? 
 When will you rise from your sleep? 
                                                
 427 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 141.  Also, see Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God 
in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1992). 
 428 Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 143. 
 429 Richard J. Clifford, “Introduction to Wisdom Literature,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, eds. 
Leander E. Keck et al., vol. 5 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 9-10. 
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A little sleep, a little slumber, 
 a little folding of the hands to rest, 
and poverty will come upon you like a robber, 
 and want, like an armed warrior. 
 
The reference to the ant and its diligent work at respective times and seasons is a call to 
human beings to model their own discipline and action in like accord because “the ant 
acts in harmony with the cosmic rhythm of the seasons.”430  Other-than-human creatures 
attest to the divinely established cosmic order by their actions, something human beings 
with all their intelligence nevertheless so often lack in their planning and behavior.  Here 
one might recall Job’s own words to his friends, seemingly attesting to the wisdom of 
God that other-than-human creation holds, several chapters before God discloses 
precisely this insight about the cosmic order. 
 
“But ask the animals, and they will teach you; 
 the birds of the air, and they will tell you; 
ask the plants of the earth, and they will teach you; 
 and the fish of the sea will declare to you. 
Who among all these does not know 
 that the hand of the Lord has done this? 
In his hand is the life of every living thing 
 and the breath of every human being” (Job 12:7-10). 
 
Not only does God delight in these other-than-human creatures and know them directly, 
but they too know their creator and act according to the cosmic order established from the 
beginning.  In this way, we might consider the hubris arising from anthropocentrism that 
does not recognize that human beings so often are the ones acting out of step within the 
broader community of creation. 
                                                
 430 Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, eds. 
Leander E. Keck et al., vol. 5 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 75. 
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 The second theme – that of creation in general – pervades the Wisdom Literature, 
appearing in each of the major texts of this genre: Proverbs, Sirach, and Wisdom.431  The 
Book of Proverbs includes two significant cosmogonies.  The first appears in Chapter 
3:19-20: “The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he established the 
heavens; by his knowledge the deeps broke open, and the clouds drop down the dew.”  
Raymond Van Leeuwen explains that the trifold mention of “earth,” “heavens,” and the 
“deep,” serves a shorthand reference for the entirety of creation.432  In this we have a 
concentrated presentation of God’s creational intent and control over creation.  There is 
also a poetic allusion to the “ongoing order of creation, represented by the waters, 
[which] also enables life to flourish,” suggesting God’s proximity to the whole cosmos in 
the spirit of creatio continua.433  The second Proverbs cosmogony appears in the famous 
passage at 8:22-31 in which Wisdom personified offers a first-person narrative of God’s 
creative action.434  Though later Christians will find in the temporal priority of Wisdom 
cause for affirmation and controversy surrounding early Christological debates, within 
the Proverbial context there is a strong sense of the immanent presence of the Creator 
God from (before) the beginning.  This proximity of the Creator to creation is not limited 
to the human sphere alone but, on the contrary, temporally precedes even the creation of 
humanity.  Furthermore, God as Creator is depicted here according to the witness of 
                                                
 431 Clifford, “Introduction to Wisdom Literature,” 10.  Obviously the Book of Job should rightly 
be counted among the other three books, but because of the dedicated focus on Job in the previous 
subsection, I have omitted Job from further consideration here. 
 432 Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” 53-54.  Also, see Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History 
or the Myth of the Eternal Return (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971; 2005). 
 433 Van Leeuwen, “The Book of Proverbs,” 54 
 434 See Gale A. Yee, “The Theology of Creation in Proverbs 8:22-31,” in Creation in the Biblical 
Traditions, eds. Richard J. Clifford and John J. Collins (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association, 
1992), 85-96. 
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Wisdom as taking delight in all creation, especially with consideration of its participation 
in the divinely intended cosmic order.   
 Reflection on creation in the Book of Sirach takes on an additional salvific and 
juridical tone.  The most significant passage pertaining to creation is found in Sirach 
16:24–18:14, which itself is composed of about four or five distinct poems.435  It opens, 
like much of the Wisdom Literature, with a laudatory reflection on and praise for God’s 
intended cosmic order and moves into the second major theme of this genre: creation 
itself.  As with the Genesis accounts of creation, Sirach’s cosmogony presents other-than-
human creation temporally prior to the creation of humanity.436  Like the rest of creation, 
humanity is expected to participate in the divinely established cosmic order, though 
Sirach notes that human beings have what we might anachronistically call “free will,” 
and often fail to live “wisely” or justly.  For this reason, God the Creator is not only the 
maker of the cosmos, but its judge as well.  The Book of Sirach depicts God as a 
“righteous and merciful judge whose majesty surpasses human imagination,” and in turn 
offers a reflection on the lowliness of human beings in comparison with God and situated 
within the grand cosmos, a theme again echoed in the Book of Job.437  Human beings are 
called then, in the spirit of wisdom, to offer their obedience and worship to the Creator in 
a way that is presumably already always done by the rest of creation.438   
 As with the Book of Sirach, the Book of Wisdom presents the theme of creation 
alongside that of judgment and redemption.  The text opens with acknowledgement that 
                                                
 435 The number and demarcation of these constitutive poems is debated among biblical scholars, 
see James L. Crenshaw, “The Book of Sirach,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, eds. Leander E. Keck et al., 
vol. 5 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 729. 
 436 Crenshaw, “The Book of Sirach,” 730. 
 437 Crenshaw, “The Book of Sirach,” 731. 
 438 Clifford, “Introduction to Wisdom Literature,” 10. 
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the cosmos was created by Wisdom (echoing the Book of Proverbs) and was inherently 
“salvific” (i.e., created “very good”).439  As Michael Kolarcik notes, the whole of the 
Book of Wisdom is unique among the Wisdom Literature for its emphasis on the 
“wholesomeness” of the cosmos.440  This is conveyed in the poetic reflection on the 
interrelatedness and integrity of all creation.  Additionally, the whole of creation 
participates in the cause of justice, which is God’s intention for the cosmic order and the 
community of creation persisting in right relationship.441  As likewise witnessed in the 
Book of Job, this text reinforces an inclusive vision of God’s creation of which human 
beings are but one part.  And, as we have seen in the Book of Sirach, human beings have 
the freedom to act justly or unjustly.  The Book of Wisdom opens then with a reminder of 
our duty within this community of creation to join the good work of creation already 
underway in an effort to maintain authenticity, justice, and integrity.  Likewise, the Book 
of Wisdom closes with a reaffirmation of this cosmic community of creation’s ongoing 
struggle against injustice.  There is continuity between creation and salvation present in 
the Book of Wisdom that anticipates the rich theological reflection of the early Christian 
apologists and theologians such as Irenaeus of Lyons.442  In between, we have frequent 
reiterations of both God’s delight in the entirety of creation as well as God’s immanence 
to creation (e.g., Wisdom 11:24–12:1).443 
 In addition to the wealth of insight and resources concerning creation highlighted 
in the brief examination above of a few examples from the Wisdom Literature, we can 
                                                
 439 Clifford, “Introduction to Wisdom Literature,” 10. 
 440 Michael Kolarcik, “The Book of Wisdom,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, eds. Leander E. 
Keck et al., vol. 5 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 456. 
 441 Kolarcik, “The Book of Wisdom,” 456. 
 442 Kolarcik, “The Book of Wisdom,” 599. 
 443 On these themes, see Johnson, Ask the Beasts, 129-134. 
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also look to the Psalms for textual evidence in support of developing a community of 
creation paradigm.444  One of the most fecund sources for constructing a community of 
creation paradigm is Psalm 104, which bears notable resemblance to the first theophanic 
speech in Job 38–39.  Like the Book of Job, Psalm 104 presents a panoply of other-than-
human creation in such a manner as to deemphasize human supremacy.  Yet, unlike in 
Job, Psalm 104 does not strike at the hubris of anthropocentrism with the fierceness and 
directness of God’s address, which seems at times a slight to an already suffering Job.  
Instead, as Bauckham has suggested, “there is a sense that within the praise of God for 
his creation we [human beings] fall naturally into the place he has given us alongside his 
other creatures.”445  Psalm 104 is a lengthy poetic reflection on the concert of praise 
offered to the Creator for the diversity and goodness of the created order.  As William 
Brown describes so well, “as a whole, Psalm 104 represents a panoramic sweep of 
creation from the theological and cosmological to the ecological and the biological, all 
bracketed by the doxological.”446  In particular, Psalm 104 offers us at least two key 
constructive resources pertinent to this current project: (a) another non-anthropocentric 
depiction of the created order; and (b) a robust sense of agency among other-than-human 
creatures. 
 Rather than presenting an anthropocentric universe established by a deity that 
bestows the rest of creation to humanity for its exclusive and unrestricted use, there is an 
immediate affirmation of divine sovereignty and majesty at the outset (Psalm 104:1-4).  
                                                
 444 With respect to brevity, I will not attempt even a partial study of all the instances of creational 
themes within the Psalms, but instead use Psalm 104 as illustrative of this body of text.  For more on the 
theme of creation in the Palms more generally, see Richard J. Clifford, “Creation in the Psalms,” in 
Creation in the Biblical Traditions, eds. Richard J. Clifford and John J. Collins (Washington, DC: Catholic 
Biblical Association, 1992), 57-69; and the essays in The Earth Story in the Psalms and the Prophets, ed. 
Norman C. Habel (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001). 
 445 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 65.   
 446 Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 145. 
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The context for this poetic reflection on creation is a theocentric cosmos that places 
humanity within its rightful place as one creature among others.447  Interestingly, human 
beings do not make an appearance in the psalm until verse 14 where we are told that it is 
divine providence that accounts for the “plants for people (‘ādām) to cultivate.”  
Interestingly, there is no distinction made between the way in which God provides for 
humanity and the way that God provides for other-than-human creatures.448  It is 
precisely this sense of God’s providential care that is the “common denominator among 
all creatures” according to the psalmist and that leads to humanity’s presumptive place as 
one species among others.449  “Humankind is nowhere featured in the psalms as the 
dominant species on the animal planet, let alone the culmination of creation.”450  Rather 
than an “anthropic” principle according to which all of creation is relativized or ordered, 
the psalmist here contextualizes the community of creation according to what Brown 
calls a “biotic principle,” which states that each species has its place and receives its 
sustenance within the deeply intertwined network of cosmic relations.451   
 Psalm 104 also presents other-than-human creatures as having agency not 
otherwise found according to anthropocentric readings of creation such as presented in 
the dominion and stewardship models.  For example, take the psalmist’s depiction of how 
night and day are the respective domains for lions and humans to work in verses 20-23:  
 
You make darkness, and it is night, 
 when all the animals of the forest come creeping out. 
The young lions roar for their prey, 
                                                
 447 See J. Clinton McCann, Jr., “The Book of Psalms,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, eds. 
Leander E. Keck et al., vol. 4 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 1096. 
 448 McCann, “The Book of Psalms,” 1098. 
 449 Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 150. 
 450 Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 153. 
 451 Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation, 153. 
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 seeking their food from God. 
When the sun rises, they withdraw 
 and lie down in their dens. 
People go out to their work 
 and to their labor until evening. 
 
This passage resembles the allegorical recounting of the work of ants in Proverbs 6:6-11, 
which serve as a model of industry and discipline in contrast to human laziness.  Here the 
psalmist adopts the demarcation of light from darkness, day from night originating in 
Genesis 1 in order to assign comparable domains to human and other-than-human 
creatures.  As people go to work in the daytime, so likewise lions and others go to work 
in the night.  The parallel works in opposite direction from the proverbial lesson of the 
ant with the agency of lions affirmed by the corresponding actions of humanity.  This 
instance further illustrates the respective places all creatures have within the order of 
creation.   
 Additionally, there is a sense of agency depicted later in Psalm 104 when the 
psalmist reiterates the universal dependence of creation on God in verses 27-30 in terms 
of material sustenance (vv. 27-28) and metaphysical being (vv. 29-30).  In the latter case, 
we read: 
 
When you hide your face, they are dismayed; 
 when you take away their breath (rûah), they die 
 and return to their dust. 
When you send forth your spirit (rûah), they are created; 
 and you renew the face of the ground. 
 
The resonances with Genesis 2 are easy to recognize.  However, instead of applying the 
“breath” or “spirit” to human beings in an exclusive sense as an anthropocentric reading 
of the Genesis accounts would suggest, Psalm 104 uses this sense of “breath” and “spirit” 
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(both are rûah in this case) in an inclusive way to refer to all members of the community 
of creation.452  That which has classically been associated with the agential empowerment 
of human beings (the reception of the life-giving rûah in Genesis 2) is applied to all 
living creatures in Psalm 104.   
 Though diverse in their content and style, the various texts that compose the 
Wisdom Literature in the Hebrew Bible, as well as the Book of Psalms, offers us 
numerous illustrations of the created order depicted in scripture as a community of 
creation.  Human beings, though certainly distinctive, are not distinct from the rest of 
creation.  Instead, the Wisdom Literature time and again reaffirms humanity’s true place 
within the broader cosmos.453  Furthermore, other-than-human creatures are not simply 
machines or “resources” for human instrumentalization, but creatures known to their 
Creator, are a source of delight for their Creator, and have been endowed with some sort 
of agency that is in no way dependent on human beings.   
 
D. The Prophets 
 Throughout the prophetic literature of the Hebrew Bible we see accounts of the 
interrelatedness of humanity and the rest of creation that reflect the scriptural vision of a 
cosmic community of creation.454  In terms of interrelatedness, the sinfulness and 
                                                
 452 McCann, “The Book of Psalms,” 1099. 
 453 Of course, this is not to dismiss the admittedly human focus of much of the biblical texts, 
which includes historical chronicles, social norms, divine laws, and soteriological reflections all written by, 
centered on, and directed to a human audience.  Rather, throughout the wisdom literature – as with the book 
of Genesis, Job, etc. – there is notably clear, if frequently overlooked or minimized, attention given to the 
broader cosmic scope of God’s salvific plan and humanity’s place within and among the entirety of 
creation.   
 454 For a substantive overview of the prophetic literature in the Hebrew Bible, see Joseph 
Blenkinsopp, A History of Prophecy in Israel, rev. ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996). 
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selfishness of human beings appear to have a direct impact on the land and other-than-
human animals.  Such is the case in Hosea 4:1-3:  
 
Hear the word of the Lord, O people of Israel; for the Lord has an 
indictment against the inhabitants of this land.  There is no faithfulness or 
loyalty, and no knowledge of God in the land.  Swearing, lying, and 
murder, and stealing and adultery break out; bloodshed follows bloodshed.  
Therefore the land mourns, and all who live in it languish; together with 
the wild animals and the birds of the air, even the fish of the sea are 
perishing. 
 
The broader context of Hosea reveals the author’s understanding of a rich and complex 
relationship among God, Israel, and other-than-human creation.455  Long before the 
contemporary sense of an ecological crisis, the Hebrew prophets conceptualized of how 
human action and sinfulness could adversely affect the rest of creation.  Furthermore, the 
agency of other-than-human creatures witnessed in the Wisdom Literature is present also 
in the prophetic texts.  Metaphorically depicted, the land and other-than-human creatures 
“mourn” in response to the “effect human wrongdoing has had on all its non-human 
inhabitants, both flora and fauna.”456  As Carol Dempsey has noted, an underlying theme 
present in texts such as we find in Hosea reflect a prophetic call for God’s people to shift 
from relationships of “power over” to “power with” in terms of establishing communities 
of harmonious relationship among all creation, human beings included.457 
 The concept of the mourning and lamentation of other-than-human creation is 
also seen in the book of the prophet Jeremiah, in which he asks: “How long will the land 
mourn, and the grass of every field wither?  For the wickedness of those who live in it the 
                                                
 455 See Laurie J. Braaten, “Earth Community in Hosea 2,” in The Earth Story in the Psalms and 
the Prophets, 185-203. 
 456 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 92. 
 457 See Carol J. Dempsey, The Prophets: A Liberation-Critical Reading (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000), 151-181. 
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animals and the birds are swept away, and because people said, ‘He is blind to our ways’” 
(Jeremiah 12:4).458  Frequently one finds themes in the prophetic texts of widespread 
destruction, or what Bauckham has described as “a kind of un-creation,” which serves as 
a shorthand for the ill effects of human sinfulness on the rest of the created order.459  This 
is also seen in the book of the prophet Joel (1:10-12, 17-20), in which a variety of other-
than-human creatures – both plants and animals – are described in a mode of entropy 
accompanied by lament and mourning.  Curiously, the sense of creational agency in the 
prophetic texts sometimes shifts the blame from humanity as such to God.  Such is the 
case in Ezekiel chapters 6 and 35-36, argues Kalinda Rose Stevenson.460  This response 
on the part of the personified mountains that accuse God of mistreatment is only possible, 
even in its admittedly metaphorical state, with an appreciation for what John Barton has 
described as the “cosmic covenant” between God and the whole of creation.461  Recalling 
the postdiluvian covenant, we can imagine the context of these prophetic oracles in the 
Hebrew Bible presupposing the capaciousness of creation with which God’s promise is 
made.   
 Though there are many other illustrations of creational discourse reflective of the 
community of creation paradigm in the prophetic texts of the Hebrew Bible, their 
                                                
 458 For a fuller study of Jeremiah from an ecological perspective, see Terence E. Fretheim, God 
and World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 
171-181. 
 459 Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 93. 
 460 Kalinda Rose Stevenson, “If the Earth Could Speak: The Case of the Mountains against 
YHWH in Ezekiel 6:35-36,” in The Earth Story in the Psalms and the Prophets, 158-171. 
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theologies of creation and environmental ethics are found elsewhere, e.g. Job and the Wisdom Literature.   
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dispersive presence would require more space than is available here to treat each instance 
fully.  For that reason, let me point to one additional example that offers a general 
representation of the significance of the prophets as a resource for contemporary 
theological reflection on creation.  The text to consider is Second Isaiah (chapters 40-55), 
which has long been recognized among biblical scholars as one of the most fecund 
locations in the Hebrew Bible for reflection on creation.462  Its historical setting is 
important to note for it provides the occasion for striking utilization of creation language.  
One of the key themes of Second Isaiah is God’s response to the people of Israel during 
the Babylonian exile (ca. 550-540 BCE).  At a time when the chosen people of God 
considered their circumstances the just punishment of a God whom they had abandoned 
in their increasing disinterest in maintaining the covenant, the Israelites in exile imagined 
God had abandoned them in turn.  Overwhelmingly, the oracles of Second Isaiah are 
aimed at affirming God’s concern and care for the chosen people, despite what their 
immediate circumstances might have suggested to the contrary.   
 The use of creation in Second Isaiah as a response to exilic lament and loss of 
identity takes form in several modalities.  The first is as a means to reaffirm the goodness 
of the chosen people precisely as situated within the broader community of creation, 
which God created “very good.”  This is seen in Isaiah 43:7, 44:21, 45:9-11, and 51:13, 
among other passages.  Terence Fretheim explains that:  
 
                                                
 462 For a sampling of the literature concerned with creation in Second Isaiah, see Carroll 
Stuhlmueller, Creative Redemption in Deutero-Isaiah (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute Publishing, 
1970); Richard J. Clifford, Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible (Washington, DC: 
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Creation language, related as it is to every stage in Israel’s life – from 
birth to death – is used to speak rich words of comfort and assurance.  At a 
time when Israel has been cut off from its particular history, given to 
wonder about the value of its historical heritage, creation language could 
reach deeply into the substratum of life and thought, into the heart of their 
very identity as human beings.463 
 
The use of creation in general and the sense of a “community of creation” in particular 
allows the people of Israel to see their inherent goodness and place in God’s eternal plan 
by going back to the foundations of humanity’s place within the broader cosmic order 
and part of the whole order of creation God loved into existence. 
 The second use of creation in Second Isaiah centers on the restoration of the 
particular identity of the chosen people.  This has to do with a reaffirmation of YHWH’s 
place as the One God in contrast to the Babylonian gods now worshipped in Israel’s 
midst.  The recollection of the Sinai covenant, which includes the affirmation that there 
are no gods by YHWH, is directly tied to God’s fundamental identity as Creator.464  This 
is seen in passages including 41:21-29, 43:10-13, 44:6-8, and 46:9, among others.  The 
conscious reestablishment of YHWH as the Creator also plays a role in the way Isaiah 
reassures his audience that God has the power to rescue Israel from captivity.   
 The third mode in which creation language appears in Second Isaiah is in 
association with the prophet’s discussion of salvation and redemption.  Though used 
interchangeably at times throughout the text, the former term can be understood as 
broadly inclusive while the latter pertains particularly to the God’s specific actions on 
behalf of the chosen people.465  For our purposes, the distinction between salvation and 
redemption is not especially important given the way in which Second Isaiah continually 
                                                
 463 Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament, 183. 
 464 Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament, 184-185. 
 465 Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament, 345 n.86. 
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ties the cosmic with the national, using creation as a means through which to 
communicate God’s enduring support of Israel.  The way creation is used in a salvific key 
signals that God, precisely as Creator, is inalienably present to creation from the 
beginning, through the present, and into the future.  “Isaiah 40-55 shows that redemption 
is not something extracreational or extrahuman, something different from what God gives 
in creation; redemption makes ordinary human life in creation possible once again.”466  
The times in which God is celebrated most for being the savior or the one who brings 
good news to the exiles is when God is identified as Creator (e.g., Isaiah 40:27-31, 44:24-
28, 45:11-17, 50:1-3, and 54:4-10, among others).  In a way that resembles the doctrine 
of recapitulation in the early Christian theological work of Irenaeus and others, Second 
Isaiah identifies God’s saving action as inseparable from God’s creative action, which 
includes the cosmic community of creation.  What Isaiah depicts in the end is the divine 
work of salvation played out in the restoration of right relationship among “human 
beings, the animals, and the natural order more generally.”467 
 Throughout Second Isaiah the theme of an eschatological “new creation” is 
repeated.  Instead of a sudden and enveloping transformation or even replacement of the 
order of creation that exists now, the vision presented through these exilic oracles is of 
God’s continued working within the community of creation and among the chosen 
people.468  The Babylonian exile provides a concrete, historical occasion for the people of 
Israel to reflect, at the prophet’s instigation, on how God calls them to live in right 
relationship according to the divine plan for creation.  Among the human members of this 
                                                
 466 Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament, 193. 
 467 Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament, 196. 
 468 Brown, The Ethos of the Cosmos, 268-269. 
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community of creation, the seeds of God’s plan are seen to germinate when righteousness 
(sĕdāqâ) and justice (mišpāt) flourish.   
 
E. The New Testament 
 The New Testament also contains a significant number of scriptural resources for 
a kinship model or community of creation paradigm.  The most important passages are 
usually drawn from the Pauline letters, which includes texts grounded in a robust 
Christological sense of the inseparable relationship between God’s creative and creating 
action and salvation understood as the ultimate return of all creation back to God.  The 
best-known example comes from Paul’s Letter to the Romans 8:20-23 in which we read 
again about the proximity of humanity to the rest of the created order and recognize the 
familiar lamentation of creation seen earlier in selections from the Hebrew Bible.469   
 
For the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the 
will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set 
free from the bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of 
the children of God.  We know that the whole creation has been groaning 
in labor pains until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who 
have the first fruits of the Spirit, grown inwardly while we wait for 
adoption, the redemption of our bodies. 
 
Here we have a sense of the familial bond between humanity and the rest of creation in 
anticipation of the promise of redemption that began, in some sense, with the covenant 
after the flood between God and Noah, his family, and all living creatures (Gen 9:16) and 
comes to fulfillment in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.470  Joseph 
                                                
 469 For more on this, see Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology, 100-102. 
 470 Relatedly, an excellent discussion of Paul’s anthropology and his “inclusive soteriology” is 
found in Marie Turner, “The Liberation of Creation: Romans 8:11-29,” in Creation is Groaning: Biblical 
and Theological Perspectives, ed. Mary L. Coloe (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2013), 57-69.  Sheila 
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Fitzmyer explains further the deep universal quality of this passage from Romans: 
“[Redemption] is no longer considered from an anthropological point of view; it is now 
recast in cosmic terms.  Human bodies that are said to await such redemption (Romans 
8:23) are merely part of the entire material creation, which is itself groaning in travail 
until such redemption occurs.”471  The central point of this passage, Fitzmeyer continues, 
is to realize that “the Christ-event is expected to affect not only human beings, but all 
material or physical creation as well.”472   
 Another key New Testament example from the letters of Paul comes to us from 
the first chapter of the Letter to the Colossians (1:15-20).473  This passage, thought by 
many scholars to be a pre-Pauline Christological hymn,474 bears a bipartite structure: the 
first part focuses on Christ’s role in creation and the second focuses on his role in 
redemption.  Denis Edwards summarizes this movement as an illustration that, “the God 
                                                                                                                                            
E. McGinn also notes some of these themes, the problematic history of their interpretation, and the potency 
that exists to engage Romans 8 constructively in feminist biblical interpretation and ecofeminist theology.  
See her essay, “All Creation Groans in Labor: Paul’s Theology of Creation in Romans 8:18-23,” in Earth, 
Wind, & Fire: Biblical and Theological Perspectives on Creation, eds. Carol J. Dempsey and Mary 
Margaret Pazdan (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2004), 114-123. 
 471 Joseph Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible, vol. 33 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1993), 507.  Also, see Brendan Byrne, Romans (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 247-274. 
 472 Fitzmyer, Romans, 507.  Elsewhere, Brendan Byrne has offered a hermeneutical contribution to 
the interpretation of this text, arguing that too often those who read Romans 8:19-22 with ecological lenses 
risk proof-texting the passage and pushing it far beyond the original intention of its first-century author.  
That said, Byrne acknowledges that the ecological hue of the passage and its creational inclusivity does not, 
in fact, run counter to the intent of the text.  He encourages scholars to engage this passage “from a wider 
horizon of discourse,” which may also include the broader horizon of our contemporary ecological 
concerns.  His insightful essay is “An Ecological Reading of Rom. 8:19-22: Possibilities and Hesitations,” 
in Ecological Hermeneutics, 83-93. 
 473 For an overview on the question of authorship, which remains a subject of scholarly debate, see 
Margaret Y. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, Sacra Pagina vol. 17 (Collegeville: The Liturgical 
Press, 2000), 6-9.  Whether it belongs counted among those texts of deutero-Pauline authorship or as an 
authentic Pauline text is a question beyond the scope of this project.  For the sake of simplicity and 
consistency, I will refer to Paul as the author of this letter in the body of the text, while acknowledging here 
that this remains an open question. 
 474 The scholarship on this point is mixed. For an overview of the debate, see Andrew Lincoln, 
“The Letter to the Colossians,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. XI (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000), 
601-605.  See also the bibliography provided in Eduard Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, trans. William R. 
Poehlmann and Robert J. Karris, Hermeneia Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1971), 41 n. 64. 
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of redemption is the God of creation.”475  The passage begins: “He [Christ Jesus] is the 
image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things in heaven 
and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or 
rulers or powers – all things have been created through him and for him” (Col 1:15-16).  
Christ’s agency in the establishment of all terrestrial and cosmic forces is clear, but what 
is of particular interest to us is the unified notion of creation that is present throughout the 
text.  Likewise, the eschatological goal or salvific telos of all creation is expressed in the 
conclusion of this pericope: “Through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all 
things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross” 
(Col 1:20).  According to Andrew Lincoln, the twofold concept of “heaven and earth” is 
a summary way to stress “that the ‘all things’ reconciled through him are to be 
understood equally comprehensively.”476  There is no demarcation among the various 
facets of creation, such as one might expect within the philosophical and cultural context 
of Paul’s world, that might suggest humanity holds pride of place or is sovereign in the 
created order.477  Instead, there is an a priori unity that includes both those things visible 
and invisible, which accounts for everything in the cosmos: humans and non-human 
creation alike.  Both the origin and the goal of all creation is the same.478 
 These two New Testament examples are hardly exhaustive.  Other examples that 
deserve further exploration at another time include: Ephesians 1:9-10, where Christ is 
                                                
 475 Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2006), 5. 
 476 Lincoln, “The Letter to the Colossians,” 601. 
 477 Celia Deane-Drummond keenly notes that this was a deliberate rhetorical strategy on the part 
of Paul (or whoever the original author of this hymn was, if it were pre-Pauline) to emphasize the true 
humanity of Jesus Christ and the intrinsic goodness of the corporeal world in relationship with the rest of 
material creation against gnostic efforts to suggest the contrary.  See Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology, 
101. 
 478 For more on the universal significance of the Incarnation for all creation, see Clough, On 
Animals: Systematic Theology, esp. 86-89 and 133-172; and Denis Edwards, “The Redemption of Animals 
in an Incarnational Theology,” in Creaturely Theology, 81-99. 
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again heralded as the one, according to God’s eternal plan, that will “gather all things in 
him, things in heaven and things on earth”; Hebrews 1:2-3, where we are reminded of 
Christ as the “appointed heir of all things, through whom he also created the worlds”; 
John 1:3, where the famous Johannine prologue states that “all things” (ta panta) came 
into being through Christ; and Revelation 3:14, where creation is again described in a 
notably inclusive or singular sense; among others.479  This sense of inclusivity reflected 
in these disparate New Testament passages bolsters the position that the canonical 
scriptures of Christianity provide contemporary theologians with resources for 
developing a community of creation paradigm.   
 Finally, like the other New Testament texts surveyed above, the synoptic Gospels 
also provide us with insight about the community of creation.  Admittedly, the synoptics 
have been less studied in terms of an ecological hermeneutic or with theology of creation 
in mind than other passages from the New Testament, especially Paul’s letters, the 
deutero-Pauline texts, and the Book of Revelation.480  A few scholars have even 
suggested that other-than-human creation is not in fact “a salient theme in the gospels” 
and therefore not worth considerable examination in this way.481  The incredulity of a few 
notwithstanding, many ecologically sensitive scripture scholars have noted some 
significant insights present in the synoptic texts that shed additional light on how 
Christians might conceive of the community of creation and their place within it.   Sean 
                                                
 479 For more on these and other non-synoptic New Testament passages, see the essays in Norman 
C. Habel and Vicky Balabanski, eds., The Earth Story in the New Testament, The Earth Bible vol. 5 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002); Mary L. Coloe, “Creation in the Gospel of John,” in Creation 
is Groaning, 71-90; Barbara E. Bowe, “Soundings in the New Testament Understandings of Creation,” in 
Earth, Wind, & Fire, 57-66; and Dan Lioy, Evolutionary Creation in Biblical and Theological Perspective 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2011), esp. 127-220. 
 480 Richard Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures: Green Exegesis and Theology (Waco: Baylor 
University Press, 2011), 63.   
 481 Murray, The Cosmic Covenant, 126. 
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Freyne has suggested that a fecund location in the synoptics for further examination and 
subsequent theological reflection on creation is found in the parables of Jesus.  He writes 
that these pericopes “are the product of a religious imagination that is deeply grounded in 
the world of nature and the human struggle with it, and at the same time deeply rooted in 
the traditions of Israel which speak of God as creator of heaven and earth and all that is in 
them.”482  Richard Bauckham has noted that Jesus’s social and religious context formed 
his ecological worldview such that the kergymatic form of his teaching passed down 
through the synoptic canon inevitably reflects his notable awareness of other-than-human 
creation.483  With an appreciation for the formative effects of his context and religious 
tradition, one is able to see how frequently other-than-human creatures – sentient and 
otherwise – appear in his parables and preaching about the coming kingdom of God.   
 Bauckham argues that Jesus’s preaching about the kingdom is tied to the Hebrew 
Bible’s eschatological assertion of God’s eventual renewal of creation.  The 
presupposition of his Jewish theological heritage includes a belief in the God who is 
Creator and sustainer of all things (ta panta) as is reflected in passages such as Matthew 
19:9 and Mark 10:6.  Additionally, Jesus asserts that this same God, his Father and 
Creator, is “Lord of heaven and earth” as seen in Luke 10:21 and Matthew 11:25 and the 
One who cares for all creatures.484  As we see in Gospel passages including Matthew 
6:26-30 and Luke 12:24-28, Jesus advances an argument  “from the lesser (wild flowers 
and birds) to the greater (human), but again the lesson for Jesus’s hearers cannot be had 
                                                
 482 Sean Freyne, Jesus, a Jewish Galilean: A New Reading of the Jesus Story (London: T & T 
Clark, 2004), 59.  Also, see Mary Catherine Hilkert, “Nature’s Parables and the Preaching of the Gospel,” 
in The Wisdom of Creation, 107-118; and Vincent Mora, La Symbolique de la Création dans l’Évangile de 
Matthieu (Paris: Cerf, 1991). 
 483 Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 64-70. 
 484 See Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 70. 
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without the premise that God cares for birds and wild flowers.”485  In such instances, 
Jesus echoes Hebrew Bible passages like Psalm 104:27-28 and Job 38:41 in which we see 
a similar parallel between God’s providential care for human beings as well as other-
than-human creation.  
 Furthermore, Jesus’s preaching of the kingdom of God in the synoptic Gospels 
often extends beyond words to include his so-called miraculous deeds.  Among these 
actions we find several nature miracles ranging from his communing with “wild animals” 
in Mark 1:13 to his calming of the storm in Mark 4:35-41 (also Matthew 8:23-27 and 
Luke 8:22-25).  Here as in the expelling of demons or the healing of physical ailments, 
we see both what Michael Northcott identifies as Jesus’s “supreme harmony with the 
natural order”486 and symbolic representations or glimpses of the messianic work that 
announces the eschatological future.  This latter point refers back even to the Hebrew 
Bible’s vision of the harmony among all creation and in a special way of “healing the 
enmity between humans and the rest of God’s creation.”487  Notably these instances 
found throughout the Gospels consistently reveal a proximate relationship between the 
Creator and all of creation symbolized in the preaching and deeds of Jesus Christ.  God’s 
concern is not simply anthropocentric, but also inclusive of other creatures in their own 
right.488  The coming kingdom is good news not only for human beings, but is also good 
news for the entire cosmic family of creation.  
                                                
 485 Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 71. 
 486 Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 224. 
 487 Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 78. 
 488 For a detailed study of Jesus’s relationship to nonhuman animals in the Gospels, an interesting 
but nevertheless extraneous topic for this project, see Bauckham, Living with Other Creatures, 79-132. 
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 With an appreciation for the ways in which the community of creation paradigm 
exists in its nascent form within the canonical scriptures, we move in the next chapter to 
explore the ways in which this framework can be discovered throughout the Christian 
theological tradition according to a number of key thematic loci.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
From the Stewardship Model to a Theology of Kinship: 
Theological Sources for a Community of Creation Paradigm 
 
 Having explored some of the scriptural tradition for textual evidence that supports 
a theology of creation rooted in a community of creation paradigm, we now move in this 
chapter to survey the post-biblical theological tradition in order to identify examples of 
this cosmically oriented outlook grounded in a spirit of universal kinship.  Given the 
expansive nature of the Christian theological tradition, which spans some two thousand 
years, any attempt at an exhaustive study of the tradition is necessary precluded.  What 
follows in this section is an illustrative selection of the manifold texts and figures that 
could be consulted in such a study.489  Particular attention has been given to include a 
chronologically diverse representation, while the Franciscan tradition itself has been 
bracketed for in-depth engagement and analysis in chapter six.   
 This section is organized into four thematic sections: (A) The intended mutuality 
and interrelationship of all creation; (B) The cosmic chorus of divine praise; (C) 
Theological reflection on the Imago Dei; and (D) the relationship between God and 
creation. 
 
A. The Intended Mutuality and Interrelationship of All Creation 
                                                
 489 In this way, the following section echoes the methodological prioritization that editor Cherryl 
Hunt outlines in her introduction to the second section of the Ecological Hermeneutics volume.  In 
explaining the approach of her contributors, she writes: “With the entire history of Christian interpretation 
to choose from, this section necessarily provides only a sample of the resources within the tradition for 
exploring a fruitful ecological hermeneutic.  Our various contributors each examine how individual 
thinkers, or particular approaches, in the history of interpretation have read or used the Bible in relation to 
what are now perceived to be ecologically relevant themes; in most cases this reading centers on the 
relationship between God and creation as a whole, and the particular status and role of human beings in 
relation to the rest of creation” (Hunt, “Introduction to Part II,” in Ecological Hermeneutics, 123).   
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 Irenaeus of Lyons’s (ca. 130-202 CE) apologetic and admittedly occasional 
theological reflections do not provide us with a sustained or systematic theology of 
creation.  However, Irenaeus’s response to what he viewed as the gnostic errors of his 
time provide us with rich insight into how at least one early and influential Christian 
theologian understood humanity’s place within the community of creation.490  Francis 
Watson has rightly acknowledged that Irenaeus’s primary concern was anthropocentric in 
nature, meaning that he was focused on the relationship between creation and salvation as 
it pertains to the human person.  “Yet the crucial question is how the being of anthrōpos 
is understood, and what kind of “center” this being constitutes.”491  And this is where one 
of Irenaeus’s major contributions toward understanding better the community of creation 
arises.  Watson argues that, “by emphasizing creatureliness as fundamental rather than 
accidental, Irenaeus excludes the claim that human existence is a life in exile from one’s 
true home, and restores the human being to the community of heaven and earth.”492  
Despite the overt anthropocentrism, Irenaeus’s focus on the human person actually seeks 
to resituate the species within the broader material, corporeal reality of creation.  Of 
course, this response on his part is elicited by the gnostic view that the material and 
corporeal world is, at best, lesser and, at worst, something to be despised in contrast to 
the so-called spiritual world. 
 The affirmation of humanity’s place within the community of creation precisely 
as material creature is perhaps best seen in Irenaeus’s defense of the Incarnation against 
the Ebionite heresy.  For Irenaeus, as for Paul, Christ is the exemplar of creation and the 
                                                
 490 See Thomas Holsinger-Friesen, Irenaeus and Genesis: A Study of Competition in Early 
Christian Hermeneutics (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns Publishing, 2009). 
 491 Francis Watson, “In the Beginning: Irenaeus, Creation and the Environment,” in Ecological 
Hermeneutics, 135. 
 492 Watson, “In the Beginning,” 135. 
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archetype of the human person.493  In affirming Christ’s real incarnation as sarx in the 
material world, Irenaeus likewise affirms humanity’s creaturely material state.  In 
Chapter III of Against Heresies, Irenaeus discusses this within the context of his well-
known doctrine of “recapitulation” and by means of an analogy drawn between Genesis 2 
and the Gospel accounts of the Incarnation. 
 
And as the protoplast himself Adam, had his substance from untilled and 
as yet virgin soil…, and was formed by the hand of God, that is, by the 
Word of God, for “all things were made by Him” (John 1:3), and the Lord 
too dust from the earth and formed man; so did He who is the Word, 
recapitulating Adam in Himself, rightly received a birth, enabling Him to 
gather up Adam [into Himself], from Mary, who was as yet a virgin.  If, 
then, the first Adam had a man for his father, and was born of human seed, 
it were reasonable to say that the second Adam was begotten of Joseph.  
But if the former was taken from the dust, and God was his Maker, it was 
incumbent that the latter also, making a recapitulation in Himself, should 
be formed as man by God, to have an analogy with the former as respects 
His origin.494 
 
The twofold agenda reflected in Irenaeus’s apologia simultaneously affirms both the 
goodness of the created, material order as well as the authenticity of the Incarnation.  In 
situating protology alongside his Christology, Irenaeus highlights the cosmic importance 
of the Incarnation beyond the restrictive anthropomonist view of soteriology.495  Despite 
the presenting issue of human redemption, Irenaeus nevertheless affirms the 
interrelatedness of the created order in which human beings are a part and into which the 
eternal Word became flesh (sarx).   
                                                
 493 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies 5.1.3, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Ex 
Fontibus, 2010), 556-557.  Hereafter, this translation is cited parenthetically according to page number 
following the original textual reference. 
 494 Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.21.10 (375-376). 
 495 See M. C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption 
(Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2008), 213-216. 
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 Basil of Caesarea (ca. 330-379 CE), one of the three so-called Cappadocian 
Fathers, is perhaps best known for his writings on the Holy Spirit and the monastic 
religious life of asceticism.496  In addition to these themes, Basil also offers us significant 
resources for theological reflection on the subject of creation in his homilies on the 
Hexaëmeron, that is the six days of creation.  Among Basil’s relevant insights is his 
affirmation of the interrelationship and order found within creation, which arose from 
God’s eternal will and divine plan.  Basil writes: 
 
But God, before all those things which now attract our notice existed, after 
casting about in His mind and determining to bring into being time which 
had no being, imagined the world such as it ought to be, and created 
matter in harmony with the form which He wished to give it.  He assigned 
to the heavens the nature adapted for the heavens, and gave to the earth an 
essence in accordance with its form.  He formed, as He wished, fire, air, 
and water, and gave to each the essence which the object of its existence 
required.  Finally, He welded all the diverse parts of the universe by links 
of indissoluble attachment and established between them so perfect a 
fellowship and harmony that the most distant, in spite of their distance, 
appeared united in one universal symphony.497 
 
Basil’s metaphysical reflection advances a position regarding creation that does not 
simply presuppose the cosmos was created as the background for human salvation but, as 
Jame Schaeffer describes Basil’s view on this point, “God empowered all creatures with 
innate capacities to function in relation to one another in orderly ways through the end of 
time.”498  Also, in his homilies on the Hexaëmeron, Basil is keen to incorporate his 
developing pneumatology by asserting not only a sense of creatio ex nihilo in accord with 
                                                
 496 For example, see Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, trans. Stephen Hildebrand (New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011). 
 497 Basil of Caesarea, “On the Hexaemeron” 2.2.  All translation of this text are from Saint Basil: 
Exegetic Homilies, trans. Agnes Clare Way (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
1963). 
 498 Jame Schaeffer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic 
and Medieval Concepts (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 122. 
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God as Creator, but also a strong awareness of the persistence of divine immanence in the 
sense of creatio continua in accord with God as Spirit.499  Basil’s attention to God’s 
intention of mutuality among creatures and the interrelationship of all creation further 
grounds our conviction that the primary hermeneutic of a Christian theology of creation 
must take seriously the theological tradition’s affirmation of a community of creation.   
 The great theologian and doctor of the church, Augustine of Hippo (ca. 354-430 
CE) also contributes to the theological resources that affirm the community of creation 
paradigm.  In addition to his extensive reflections on the Book of Genesis in treatises 
dedicated to this text, which offer varying methodological approaches to scriptural 
exegesis,500 he offers additional sustained reflections on creation in the last books of 
Confessions, Books 11 and 12 of The City of God, and at various points in On the 
Trinity.501  It is the latter text that is of particular interest to us here.  Echoing the spirit of 
divine immanence found in Basil’s pneumatological outlook and referencing Psalm 104, 
Augustine offers a theocentric vision of creatio continua that presupposes the divinely 
intended mutuality among creatures – visible and invisible, material and otherwise – that 
is represented according to the “highest concord and friendship” and whom make up 
“what we may call this vast and all-embracing republic of the whole creation.”502   
                                                
 499 For example, see Basil of Caesarea, “On the Hexaemeron” 2.1-2.8. 
 500 See his De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, and De Genesi 
ad litteram libri duodecim in Augustine, On Genesis trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 
2002). 
 501 See Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 221-306; Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. R. W. Dyson (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 449-540; and Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City 
Press, 1991) [This translation of The Trinity is hereafter cited by page parenthetically after the textual 
reference]. 
 502 Augustine, The Trinity 3.4.9 (132): “There the will of God presides, as in his house or his 
temple, over the spirits who are joined together in the highest concord and friendship, fused indeed into one 
will by a kind of spiritual fire of charity; as it is written, ‘He makes spirits his angel-messengers, and a 
burning fire his ministers’ (Psalm 104:4).  From that lofty throne, set apart in holiness, the divine will 
spreads itself through all things in marvelous patterns of created movement, first spiritual then corporeal; 
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 Despite the scholarly critiques of Thomas Aquinas’s anthropocentrism, which has 
been described as circumscriptive with regard to other-than-human creation and permits 
care for and conservation of the environment only in terms of instrumental value,503 Jame 
Schaeffer has argued convincingly that Thomas’s thought may nonetheless offer 
contemporary theologians helpful resources.  She identifies a twofold “sacramental and 
functional” approach to the unity of creation in Thomas’s thought.504   
 Sacramentally, Thomas’s rigid hierarchical ordering of creation notwithstanding, 
he makes the sacramental argument in question 47 of the Summa Theologica, stating that, 
 
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from 
the intention of the first agent, who is God.  For He brought things into 
being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and 
be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be 
adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and 
diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the 
divine goodness might be supplied by another.  For goodness, which in 
God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided; and 
hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more 
perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.505 
 
It is by means of the material world that God communicates God’s own self, or divine 
goodness in this case.  Given the disparity in perfection, which is for Thomas not only 
                                                                                                                                            
and It uses all things to carry out the unchanging judgment of the divine decree, whether they be corporeal 
or incorporeal things, whether they be non-rational or rational spirits, whether they be good by his grace, or 
bad by their own will…And so the whole of creation is governed by its creator, ‘from whom and by whom 
and in whom’ (Romans 11:36) it was founded and established.  And thus God’s will is the first and the 
highest cause of all physical species and motions.  For nothing happens visibly and in a manner perceptible 
to the sense which does not issue either as a command or as a permission from the inmost invisible and 
intelligible court of the supreme emperor, according to his unfathomable justice of rewards and 
punishments, favors and retributions, in what we may call this vast and all-embracing republic of the whole 
creation.” 
 503 For example, see Ryan Patrick McLaughlin, “Thomas Aquinas’s Eco-Theological Ethics of 
Anthropocentric Conservation,” Horizons 39 (2012): 69-97. 
 504 Schaeffer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics, 124. 
 505 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.47 art. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, 5 vols. (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, 1948), 1:246.  Unless otherwise noted, translations of the 
Summa are taken from this edition, which hereafter will be cited parenthetically after the textual reference. 
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one of degree but also of kind, no single or even group of creatures would be sufficient to 
receive this divine self-revelation, nor could such a restrictive sense of creation reflect 
back this goodness.  Although Thomas later restricts the imago Dei to the human person 
alone, our contemporary resourcing of Thomas’s theological reflection might allow for a 
more capacious rendering of the meaning and instantiation of this divine image, here 
expressed in terms of goodness.   
 Functionally, Thomas makes an argument that the diversity of creation is 
endowed with that which is necessary to work in unity to reflect the perfection of God 
within the created universe.506  Furthermore, the universe functions and does so, 
mirroring the relational perfection of God, in unity and as a whole.  In a reply to an 
objection, Thomas draws on the shift in Genesis 1 from God’s proclamation that those 
creatures brought into existence individually on each day are merely “good” whereas the 
entire whole of creation is described as “very good.”   
 
Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, 
according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single 
creature best but one better than another.  And therefore we find it said of 
each creature, “God saw the light that it was good” (Genesis 1:4); and in 
like manner of each one of the rest.  But of all together it is said, “God saw 
all the things that He had made, and they were very good” (Genesis 
1:31).507 
 
Not only does creation as inclusive community reflect God’s goodness most perfectly 
according to its diversity, but it also communicates God’s goodness when it functions 
together in a way according to the divine will.508    
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 507 Summa Theologica 1.47 art. 2, repl. 1. 
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 Moving into the modern era, we can see evidence to support the a priori 
interrelationship and mutuality of all creation in the work of theologians such as 
Rosemary Radford Reuther and Elizabeth Johnson.  Reuther understands the mutuality of 
creation as being “a spirituality and ethic of mutual limitation and of reciprocal life-
giving nurture, the very opposite of the spirituality of separation and domination.”509  
Ruether’s vision of mutuality challenges Christians to critically reflect on their image of 
God.  According to a kinship model or community of creation paradigm, which is made 
manifest in a radical acknowledgement of the mutuality intrinsically present in the 
interrelationship and symbiotic interdependence of the whole created order, the image of 
God shifts in positive and inclusive ways.  “God is the font from which the variety of 
particular beings ‘co-arise’ in each generation, the matrix that sustains their life-giving 
interdependency with each other, and also the judging and renewing insurgency of life 
that enables us to overcome the distortions that threaten healthy relations.”510   
 Similarly, Elizabeth Johnson expresses a theological outlook that understands 
mutuality and the inherent interrelationship of all creation as foundational to a 
community of creation approach. 
 
The natural world has given birth to all living things, and sustains us all.  
It is the matrix of our origin, growth, and fulfillment.  Articulated within a 
religious perspective, the kinship stance knows that we humans are 
interrelated parts and products of a world that is continually being made 
and nurtured by the Creator Spirit.  Its attitude is one of respect for the 
earth and all living creatures including ourselves as a manifestation of the 
Spirit’s creative energy; its actions cooperate with the Spirit in helping it 
flourish.  What goes on in this stance is neither a sentimental love of 
nature nor an ignorance that levels all distinctions between human beings 
                                                
 509 Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Ecofeminism: The Challenge to Theology,” in Christianity and 
Ecology, 104.  Also, see Dawn Nothwehr, Mutuality: A Formal Norm for Christian Social Ethics (San 
Francisco: Catholic Scholars Press, 1998). 
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and other forms of life.  Rather what is involved is a recognition of the 
truth: human existence is in fact one with the immensity of all that is.511 
 
The German theologian Jürgen Moltmann also contributes to developing theological 
resources along the same lines as Johnson.  In his classic book, God in Creation, 
Moltmann reminds us that, “to be alive means existing in relationship with other people 
and other things.  Life is communication in communion.  And, conversely, isolation and 
lack of relationship means death for all living things…if we want to understand what is 
real as real, and what is living as living, we have to know it in its own primal and 
individual community, in its relationship, interconnections and surroundings.”512  What 
Reuther, Johnson, and Moltmann all point to in their advocacy on behalf of a theological 
approach to creation according to a kinship model, is the intrinsic and undeniable 
interrelatedness, mutuality, and interdependence of all elements of creation – from the 
smallest quanta to the human person, creation can only be conceived in terms of 
relationship.  The problem, it seems, is that humanity has lost a sense of this theological 
truth and is in need of recovering this primordial context for life.513 
 This recovery, or what I might call the “anamnesis of creation,” is what Edwards 
describes as “a form of conversion”514 and what Johnson claims is the recovering of “the 
cosmocentric power of the fuller Christian tradition.”515  This entails certain dispositional 
transitions that necessitate the broadening of ethical concerns from just the human socio-
political sphere to the whole cosmic expanse of creation.  “It involves extending the love 
                                                
 511 Johnson, Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit, 31-32. 
 512 Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 3. 
 513 Johnson, “Losing and Finding Creation in the Christian Tradition,” 3-22. 
 514 Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith, 24. 
 515 Johnson, “Losing and Finding Creation in the Christian Tradition,” 18. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 203 
of neighbor to embrace creatures of other species.  It involves extending the love of 
enemy to involve creatures that confront us as other and inspire fear in us.  It involves 
loving and valuing others as God loves and values them.”516 
 While some might see the call to eschew stewardship approaches to creation and 
embrace a kinship model as a modern or postmodern concern devoid of an historical 
Christian imperative, both classic sources and the work of contemporary theologians, 
merely sampled here, support the claim that advocacy for a community of creation 
paradigm is not simply the proposal of a novel normative model, but is in fact a 
descriptive enterprise that calls us to return to our theological and material roots.   
 
B. The Cosmic Chorus 
 Among the ways humanity’s relationship to the rest of creation has been imagined 
over the centuries is according to a divinely mandated sacerdotal role.  This is seen most 
clearly in the writings of Orthodox Christian theologians who understand human 
distinctiveness tied to humanity’s role as the “priest of creation,” the intermediary 
between the Creator and the other-than-human natural world.  Contrasting this sacerdotal 
perspective with that of a sort of “paganism,” which understands the world as sacred and 
therefore to be worshipped, John Zizioulas writes that, “The Christian regards the world 
as sacred because it stands in dialectical relationship with God; thus he respects it 
(without worshipping it, since it has no divine presence in its nature), but he regards the 
human being as the only possible link between God and creation, a link that can either 
bring nature into communion with God and thus sanctify it; or condemn it to the state of a 
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‘thing’, the meaning and purpose of which are exhausted with the satisfaction of man.”517  
In a way that offers a general summary of this view, Zizioulas succinctly reiterates the 
apparent binary of “paganism” and “Christianity” on this liturgical or doxological theme 
and states: “Paganism sees man as part of the world; the Christian way sees him as the 
crucial link between the world and God, as the only person in creation that can lead it to 
survival.”518   
 Although this sacerdotal perspective accounts for a more benevolent and 
deontological view than many alternative conceptualizations of the relationship between 
humanity and other-than-human creatures, given the emphasis on exclusive responsibility 
and the divinely mandated need to care for creation it presupposes, it nevertheless does 
not represent the full range of theological views within the Christian tradition.519  In fact, 
in addition to Francis of Assisi’s vernacular theological expression of all creation’s 
agency and praise of God that will be explored in full detail later, there are several other 
paradigmatic resources within the tradition that articulate a sense of the cosmic chorus of 
divine praise.  That other-than-human creatures do not require a human middle-person to 
relate to their Creator helps restore a more capacious sense of agency and relationship 
best expressed in terms of a community of creation paradigm. 
 Returning to Basil of Caesarea’s Hexaëmeron, we see in Sermon III a glimpse of 
this Cappadocian’s understanding of the cosmic chorus of praise to God in creation.  
                                                
 517 John Zizioulas, “Priest of Creation,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives – 
Past and Present, 289-290. For a helpful overview beyond Zizioulas as illustration, see E. Theokritoff, 
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Presence: An Orthodox View of Nature (Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications, 1978). 
 519 Celia Deanne-Drummond offers a constructively critical response to Zizioulas’s defense of 
humans as priests of creation, suggesting that, “The priestly role [of humanity] could be said to point to the 
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‘concelebrants in the offering of glory to God,’” which offers a broader interpretation of the way creation 
and humanity respectively worship and relate to the Creator (Deanne-Drummond, Eco-Theology, 61). 
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Basil reads the Book of Daniel and Psalm 148 alongside Genesis 1:6-8 wherein we read 
that God separated the waters with a dome in the sky.  His starting point is to contest 
other biblical exegetes who have offered overly metaphorical interpretations of the 
separation of the waters and who have then argued that the waters above represent good 
“spiritual and corporeal powers” whereas the waters below, on earth, represent “the 
wicked spirits.”520  He rejects this interpretation in favor of a universal sense of goodness 
in creation, which is later confirmed in his opinion by Genesis 1:31.521 
 In offering a counter-interpretation, Basil draws on the Book of Daniel and Psalm 
148 to bolster the claim that other-than-human creatures – including the waters now 
separated above and below the heavens – give praise and glory to God, “the Lord of the 
Universe.”522  For Basil, this is further evidence that all of creation is created good and 
that nothing stands apart from God’s plan or design.  Furthermore, though we might not 
recognize the manner in which other-than-human creatures praise God, this does not 
mean that only human beings are in direct relationship with the Creator.  To support this 
claim, Basil draws on the psalmist in 148 and writes, “Thus the singer of the Psalms does 
not reject the deeps which our inventors of allegories rank in the divisions of evil; he 
admits them to the universal choir of creation, and the deeps sing in their language a 
harmonious hymn to the glory of the Creator.”523  Whereas the other exegetes argue that 
“the deep,” found as it is beneath the heavens, is a metaphor for that which is wicked, 
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Basil finds support in the psalms for even this other-than-human dimension of creation’s 
legitimate praise of God.   
 This does not mean that Basil recognized human-like intelligence in other-than-
human creatures.  On the contrary, he asserts that these aspects of creation are not 
“intelligent beings” in the same way that humans are rational animals.  Nevertheless, he 
recognizes some degree of agency and independence present in these creatures.  He 
points to the Book of Daniel for further justification and acknowledges, as mentioned 
earlier, each aspect of creation including “the deep” sings in its own language given to it 
by God.  As Jame Schaeffer has observed about this passage in Basil’s Hexaëmeron, “For 
Basil, God is the creator of the chorus of creatures, each of which has been endowed with 
a language of its own.  All are intended to harmonize with one another through their 
interrelationships, and all have been empowered by God to do so from the beginning of 
the world.”524  There is a divinely intended harmony within creation, and each aspect of 
creation has been given its particular line, language, and voice.  In contrast with the 
intermediary perspective represented by the sacerdotal paradigm, which might otherwise 
be viewed as an anthropocentric “solo act,” Basil asserts that God’s plan for creation is 
symphonic and harmonious, unifying a plurality of praise in mutuality.  In addition to 
what creation is intended to do in terms of the cosmic chorus of praise, Basil says 
something about how God perceives this creation.  Here he concludes his reflection on 
the second day of creation with an illustrative shift from chorus to visual art, explaining 
that God looks at all of creation and admires each individually first and then collectively 
as one complete whole.  This is why “Scripture depicts to us the Supreme Artist, praising 
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each one of His works; soon, when His work is complete, He will accord well deserved 
praise to the whole together.”525 
 Like Basil, Augustine was particularly captivated by the depiction of other-than-
human creature’s praise of the Creator in the psalms.  In his Confessions, Augustine 
draws on Psalm 148 to consider the way in which the rest of creation relates to and 
praises its Creator.  In Book VII, Augustine mirror’s Basil’s ostensible concern about 
those who believe there are aspects of creation that are evil.  Given Augustine’s well-
documented Manichean past, this desire to affirm the goodness of creation as such is not 
surprising.  It is here that he draws on Psalm 148 in order to list the various aspects of the 
created order that work together in chorus to praise God in their own unique ways.  
Augustine writes: “That you are to be praised is shown by dragons on earth, and all 
deeps, fire, hail, snow, ice, the hurricane and tempest, which perform your word – 
mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars, beasts and all cattle, reptiles and 
winged birds; kings of the earth and all peoples, princes and all judges of the earth, young 
men and maidens, old men with younger: let them praise your name.”526  He continues 
with the list, naming angels, powers, sun, moon, stars, and the waters above the heavens, 
observing how they too are called upon to give praise to the Creator in Psalm 148.  
Nowhere does he associate humanity as necessary for other-than-human creatures’ praise 
of God.  On the contrary, in this extended passage, Augustine notes that left to his own 
devices he might foolishly wish that some particular creature be better than it is.  Yet, he 
explains, when taken en masse, considered as a whole, “These elements are congruous 
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with other elements and as such are good, and are also good in themselves.”527  
Augustine keenly relays that it is incumbent on us human beings to recall the totality of 
the community of creation, within which all things have their divinely prescribed place 
and purpose, even apart from our observation or need. 
 Augustine returns to the theme of creation’s praise of God in his Commentary on 
the Psalms.  In his reflections on Psalm 26 we discover a telling passage in which 
Augustine first celebrates the vestigia of the Creator in all of creation, leading him to 
praise God upon considering the manifold creatures of the world.  But then he moves 
from his particular human perspective to consider how, when beholding the earth, one 
sees that, “its numbers of seeds, its varieties of plants, its multitude of animals” all give 
glory and praise to the Creator.  Augustine continues: “Go round the heavens again and 
back to the earth, leave out nothing; on all sides everything cries out to you of its Author; 
nay the very forms of created things are as it were the voices with which they praise their 
Creator.”528  Beyond the recognition that other-than-human creatures give praise to their 
Creator apart from human mediation, Augustine identifies the mode of each creature’s 
praise as pertaining to its divinely intended way of being in the world.  By being simply 
what it is, doing what it is intended to do, these creatures give glory to God. 
 In this vein, Augustine is laying the foundation for the Franciscan theological 
contributions to follow centuries later.  In addition to his reflections on the Psalms, he 
comments on the manner in which other-than-human creatures give praise to God in his 
famous treatise De Libero Arbitrio.  While reflecting on the passing quality of finite 
matter, Augustine states that other-than-human creatures “act in accordance with what 
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they have received, and they pay their debt to [God] to whom they owe their being, in 
accordance with the measure of their being.”529 Particularly striking about this 
contribution are the impressive imaginative efforts necessary to move outside his 
otherwise deep-seated anthropocentric worldview.   
 Following this sampling of Patristic authors, we now turn to the mystical writings 
of the Carmelite friar John of the Cross (1542-1591), who offers us something of a 
synthetic and poetic presentation of earlier insights found in Basil and Augustine.  While 
John is best remembered for his The Dark Night and The Ascent of Mount Carmel, his 
lesser-known text The Spiritual Canticle provides us with the most fecund resources 
concerning the cosmic chorus of praise.  Like Basil, John uses musical imagery to 
express the manner of praise that the rest of creation offers to the Creator.  However, 
instead of drawing on the Psalmody of the Hebrew Bible, John structures his The 
Spiritual Canticle after the example of the Song of Songs.530  Written while imprisoned 
in Toledo, John calls to mind the text of the Songs of Songs, which he had committed to 
memory, and is inspired during contemplation to compose his own poetic illustration of 
the relationship between the soul (the bride) and Christ (the bridegroom).  Here John 
includes other-than-human creatures in the poetic dialogue between bride and 
bridegroom.  Rather than serve as mere background for the drama unfolding, each aspect 
of creation is recognized as having the capacity to “speak” and therefore give praise and 
glory to God.531  As in Basil’s writing, John recognizes creation’s ability to give glory to 
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the Creator in both the particular and in the collective.  “As each one possesses God’s 
gifts differently, each one sings His praises differently … All of them together form a 
symphony of love.”532   
 John’s mystical vision of creation echoes not only Basil but also Augustine, 
particularly when the Carmelite writes about how the respective “voices” of other-than-
human creatures can be imagined in a relative manner, reflecting the particularity of their 
created reality as intended by God.  Each creature “magnifies God” in “its own way, 
bearing God within itself according to its capacity.”533  Also in the spirit of Augustine, 
John believes that human beings have the capacity to recognize this “silent music” of 
creation always already underway in praising God, but only when the spiritual faculties 
are properly disposed.534  This recognition of the cosmic chorus of creation is then an 
invitation for the human person to join in that relational symphony, giving glory to God, 
for it is “tranquil wisdom that all creatures, higher and lower ones alike, according to 
what each in itself has received from God” should give praise to the Creator.535 
 The twentieth-century Trappist monk and author Thomas Merton (1915-1968), 
who was influenced by the thought of John of the Cross as well as the Franciscan 
tradition,536 also expressed a sense of this cosmic chorus of creation.  One telling passage 
of Merton’s awareness of the rest of creation’s capacity to praise God apart from human 
intervention, while at the same time recognizing his relationship to this broader cosmic 
chorus of praise, appears late in his book Sign of Jonas. 
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But now I am under the sky, away from all the noise. The birds are all 
silent now except for some quiet bluebirds. The frogs have begun singing 
their pleasure in all the waters and in the warm green places where the 
sunshine is wonderful. Praise Christ, all you living creatures. For Him you 
and I were created. With every breath we love Him. My psalms fulfill 
your dim, unconscious song, O brothers in this wood.537 
 
Rather than claiming that the rest of creation requires human intervention and sacerdotal 
mediation to connect to the Creator, Merton speaks to his “brothers in this wood” as a 
fellow supplicant before God, offering up his own prayer in a complementary and 
fulfilling way alongside his other-than-human counterparts.538 
 Another twentieth-century scholar, author, and activist, Thomas Berry (1914-
2009), a Roman Catholic priest of the Passionist congregation who preferred the 
vocational title “geologian,” also writes about the cosmic chorus that exists within the 
community of creation.  In addition to rereading the Hebrew and Christian scriptures in 
light of a keen ecological consciousness, Berry often pointed to the experiential wisdom 
of indigenous peoples of North America and elsewhere in an effort to broaden the scope 
of Christian dialogue about the environment.539  In a particularly striking essay titled, 
“The Spirituality of the Earth,” Berry critiques the Christian theological tradition for its 
forgetfulness concerning the “spiritual qualities” or, alternatively, the “numinous 
qualities” of the Earth and the rest of the cosmos.540  Berry writes about the “pathology” 
of anthropocentrism that has plagued the created world and which is in need of 
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correction, particularly within the Christian community.  He calls for a paradigm shift, 
gesturing toward a community of creation model.  He writes: 
 
What is needed is a new spiritual, even mystical, communion with Earth, a 
true aesthetic of Earth, a sensitivity to Earth’s needs, a valid economy of 
Earth.  We need a way of designating the Earth-human world in its 
continuity and identity rather than exclusively by its discontinuity and 
difference.  We especially need to recognize the numinous qualities of 
Earth.541 
 
His vision operates with the presupposition of creaturely solidarity, relationship, and 
communion rather than what David Clough has called “human separatism.”  What 
follows from this awareness that all creation shares a relationship of deep 
interdependence in communion is the realization that there is a “spiritual” dimension to 
all creation.  Human and other-than-human creatures alike share the capacity to praise 
their Creator and relate to one another as subjects.  Berry explains: “Recovery of this 
capacity for subjective communion with the Earth is a consequence and a cause of a 
newly emerging spirituality.  Subjective communion with the Earth, identification with 
cosmic-Earth-human process, provides the context in which we now make our spiritual 
journey.”542   
 Berry writes frequently about the lost sense of the awe and wonder humans have 
suffered as they have become increasingly concerned with themselves and disinterested 
with their rightful place within the broader community of creation.  In his book The Great 
Work, Berry observes that it was in fact the rhythms and patterns of cosmic praise that 
shaped human worship of the divine.  “From an early period Christians adopted a liturgy 
that carefully observed the correspondences of human praise with the numinous moments 
                                                
 541 Berry, “The Spirituality of the Earth,” 73. 
 542 Berry, “The Spirituality of the Earth,” 79. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 213 
of the dawn and sunset and with the transitions of the various seasons of the year.”543  
Our loss of intimacy with the natural world of which we are an inextricable part has 
promoted a spirit of delusion that has bolstered a human sense of superiority and 
uniqueness when it comes to relationship with the divine.  Berry asserts that not only can 
and ought we learn from our other-than-human kin, but that our own human form of 
praise has arisen from and is patterned after the rest of creation.  
 This subsection began with a consideration of the well-established tradition of 
human mediation between other-than-human creatures and the Creator in terms of cosmic 
priesthood.  And yet, there remains another form of silencing that exists within the 
history of Christian theological reflection from the past up through the present.  In 
contrast with the representatives of a minority tradition that celebrates the cosmic chorus 
of divine praise, most considerations of humanity and its relationship with other-than-
human creatures reflect the persistence of what Laura Hobgood-Oster rightly calls “an 
imaginary, but deeply ingrained wall.”  This wall, border, or barrier “assumes that 
humans are so Other and that human language is so unique a quality that language is our 
salvation.”544  Quoting the researcher Donna Haraway, Hobgood-Oster continues by 
drawing together the related concerns of agency, eschatology, and relationship with the 
Creator for other-than-human creatures. 
 
Do Christians really only have faith by language and by hearing?  What an 
impoverished life and faith that would be and, unfortunately, is.  Animals 
really respond; humans just cover our eyes and plug our ears in order to 
claim that they are mute.  The speaking animals in the history of the 
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Christian tradition invite those who have ears to hear to enter the 
conversation with them in order that all species might have life together, 
“holding in esteem, and regard, open to those who look back reciprocally. 
Always tripping, this kind of truth has a multispecies future. 
Respecere.”545 
 
Though difficult at times for human beings to imagine, saturated as we are with the 
histories of anthropocentric scriptural interpretation, theological reflection, and 
contemporary culture, there are plenty of instances within the Christian tradition where 
mystics and theologians, exegetes and poets have recognized the cosmic chorus of divine 
praise that points again to the tenability of a community of creation paradigm.  
 
C. Reconsidering the Imago Dei 
 As we saw in chapter one, the emergence of the dominion model of creation 
within the Christian tradition was inextricably tied to the position that human beings were 
absolutely unique and therefore categorically distinct from the rest of creation.  In 
response to this presupposition, advocates of what would become the dominion model 
interpreted this characteristic of humanity as a license for absolute sovereignty over 
other-than-human creatures and located this in the doctrine of humanity as created Imago 
Dei (Genesis 1:26-27).546  It is striking that an expression that appears in the Hebrew 
bible only three times, and each time only in the Book of Genesis (1:26-27, 5:1, and 9:6), 
would serve such a definitive purpose in the course of theological reflection on the 
human person and her relationship to the rest of creation.  Recently, scripture scholars 
and theologians have revisited the concept of Imago Dei, particularly as it emerges in the 
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canonical scriptures.  J. Richard Middleton has noted that the longstanding inattention to 
the context of the Hebrew Bible, generally, and of the Book of Genesis, specifically, has 
led many interpreters of scripture to “turn to extrabiblical, usually philosophical, sources 
to interpret the image and end up reading contemporaneous conceptions of being human 
back into the Genesis text.”547  Whereas we examined previously the rise and the 
development of the dominion model in connection with the misinterpretation of the few 
biblical references to the Imago Dei, here we will consider what contemporary scholars 
have suggested in terms of the possible broadening of the category to include other-than-
human creatures alongside their human kin.  Yet, before delving into the contemporary 
efforts to reconceive of the doctrine of the Imago Dei, we must first examine the 
ambiguity of the concept in scripture that created the condition of the possibility for a 
renewed understanding.  
 As David Fergusson, Ian McFarland, David Clough, and David Cunningham, 
among others, all agree, there is no absolutely clear or conclusive meaning that can be 
tied to the doctrine of the Imago Dei.548  Middleton has offered the most thorough study 
to date on the biblical context and broader influence of Ancient Near Eastern texts and 
cultures on the history of the Imago Dei.  His work convincingly argues that, “most 
patristic, medieval, and modern interpreters typically asked not an exegetical, but a 
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Proposal,” Zygon 48 (2013): 439-453; Ian McFarland, The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 1-6; David Clough, “All God’s Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human 
and Nonhuman Animals,” in Reading Genesis After Darwin, eds. Stephen C. Barton and David Wilkinson 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 145-161; and David S. Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh: 
Rethinking the Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans, and Other Animals, eds. Celia 
Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 100-117. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 216 
speculative question: in what way are humans like God and unlike animals?”549  And yet, 
the uncertainty about the meaning of the terms “image” (selem) and “likeness” (demut), 
which appear in Genesis 1:26-27 and serve as the foundation of the Christian doctrine, 
can be traced back to the texts themselves and long before Philo of Alexandria and those 
who follow him began to engage in anthropocentric speculative reflection.550   
 Examination of the possible meaning of Imago Dei from a primarily literary 
context results in the discovery that the Hebrew words selem and demut are not all that 
common in the Hebrew Bible: selem appears 17 times and demut appears 25 times.  
Middleton suggests, then, that word studies alone offer very inconclusive results.  
Instead, what is uncovered upon close examination of these words’ contexts is the wide 
semantic range they present to interpreters.  The word selem (“image”) primarily 
designates three-dimensional cult statues of various “false gods” (i.e., “idols”), but can 
also refer to three-dimensional statues that are not of deities.  Middleton suggests that 
selem is best understood to mean a “carved or hewn statue or copy.”551  The word demut 
(“likeness”), particularly as it is used in reference to human beings, such as it is found in 
Genesis 5:3 where Seth’s affinity with his father Adam is described, typically appears as 
a term of comparison between two things wherein one thing has the “appearance” or 
“form” of the other.  Oftentimes, the context includes phrases such as “like, as, something 
like, similar to,” and so on.552  Modern exegetes have made distinctions between these 
two terms, suggesting that selem is primarily a reference to some physical or concrete 
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quality, whereas demut means something more abstract.553  Subsequently, Middleton 
posits two things that follow from these observations of the literary context itself.  First, 
neither selem nor demut is univocal in meaning.  They are both polysemous and therefore 
have a respective range of signification.  Second, even if we accept the general trend to 
distinguish between the two terms by means of “concreteness” versus “abstraction,” they 
still do not disclose exactly what the resemblance or likeness of humanity to God actually 
is.554 
 It has been proposed by thinkers such as Karl Barth that the line “male and female 
he created them” (Genesis 1:27), which immediately follows the identification of creation 
in selem of God, offers the interpretive key.  This is the root of Barth’s claim that 
relationality is the distinctive characteristic of humanity and therefore what is meant by 
the references to selem and demut.555  Middleton insists that this interpretation is 
incorrect, at least from a literary perspective, because the third line of this particular 
Hebrew poetic construction does not repeat earlier patterns, but introduces a new idea.556  
Therefore, the text itself provides us with no specified meaning, especially regarding 
human uniqueness.  
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 The most formidable proposal Middleton introduces into the discussion relies not 
on exegesis of the Hebrew Bible as such, but requires an inter-textual reading drawing on 
Ancient Near East texts that provide parallels in usage.  Middleton constructs his 
proposal in two steps.   
 First, while it is not immediately clear what the precise meaning of Imago Dei is, 
Middleton asserts there is an intentional connection established between selem and demut 
with rādâ (“rule”) two verses later in Genesis 1:28 along with the verb kābaš (“to 
subdue”).  Though often used in a royal sense, rādâ is understood by Middleton to 
include the semantic category of “shepherding” (e.g., Ezekiel 34:4).  Further support is 
lent to this argument by the presence of the animals, including livestock, in Genesis 1.  
Middleton suggests that in Genesis 1:28, kābaš refers, minimally, to the “right of 
humanity to spread over the earth and make it their home. Since the earth has already 
sprouted with vegetation in 1:12 and plants for human consumption are mentioned in 
1:29, kābaš may even anticipate human cultivation of the earth by agriculture.”557  To 
understand what “rule” (rādâ) means here, it might be helpful to look at the broader 
context of creation during the preceding days during which each aspect of the created 
order (the firmament, the sun/moon, etc.) were expressed along with their purpose.  The 
firmament separates, that is what it does and how it is intended to function.  In this way, 
rādâ may be a purpose statement that suggests the Imago Dei should be understood in 
terms of the “rule” that human beings exercise by virtue of being human.558 
 Second, Middleton takes what he sees as the close association and perhaps 
“purpose statement” of rādâ and compares and contrasts this term and usage with intra-
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biblical passages elsewhere in Hebrew Bible.  He then compares and contrasts rādâ with 
those of other Ancient Near East texts.  Middleton claims that this type of study renders 
two results.  “On the one hand, careful exegesis of Genesis 1:26-28, in conjunction with 
an intertextual reading of the symbolic world of Genesis 1, does indeed suggest that the 
Imago Dei refers to human rule, that is, the exercise of power on God’s behalf in 
creation.  This may be articulated in two different, but complementary, ways.  Humans 
are like God in exercising royal power on earth [and] the divine ruler delegated to 
humans a share in his rule of the earth.”559  The ruling style and quality of oversight 
implied by rādâ is seen as modeled after divine action and intention.  The condition of 
the possibility for this particular kind of rule is therefore humanity’s creation Imago Dei.  
In contrast to other Mesopotamian narratives in which only the monarch was granted a 
kind of semi-divine standing by virtue of titles like Imago Dei, the narrative of Israel 
appears to be a democratizing concept that subverts the exclusivity of contemporaneous 
monarchical traditions.  Regarding the Imago Dei, Middleton notes that, “correlative with 
this mutuality of power and agency is the implicit claim of the Imago Dei that all persons 
have equal access to God simply by being human.”560  When examined alongside 
comparable Ancient Near Eastern texts and usage, selem and demut are deployed in a 
more egalitarian way, applied to all humans rather than a select individual or particular 
sect.  In this sense, the Imago Dei can be seen as the fulfillment of a universal duty or 
purpose performed rather than some particularly inherent trait or characteristic that 
identifies human uniqueness as such.561 
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 Undoubtedly, Middleton’s method here brings him closer to the historical and 
semantic context than does that of most first-century interpreters of the Imago Dei such 
as Philo of Alexandria.  However, Middleton’s effort to discover meaning apart from the 
textual landscape of the scripture itself nevertheless casts a shadow of incredulity over 
any definitive meaning.  The comparative analysis intra-biblically and then again inter-
textually does not render an absolute definition or clear meaning.  It certainly does not, in 
itself, make apodictic the assertion that only human beings bear what we call the Imago 
Dei nor that this is the most significant dimension of either theological anthropology or 
theology of creation.562  The persistent ambiguity has elicited further critique from 
contemporary theologians who have presented alternative interpretations that provide 
additional support for a community of creation paradigm.563 
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 David Clough has argued that restricting the notion of Imago Dei to human beings 
alone re-inscribes a “human-separatist view that posits a qualitative distinction between 
human beings and other species that is incompatible with the belief that human beings 
evolved from other animals.”564  Against J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, who has argued that 
human beings, through biological and cultural evolution, have crossed an absolute divide, 
which distinguishes them from other creatures, Clough is convinced that the 
inextricability of inter-species relationship presupposed by the theory of evolution 
prohibits such an absolute demarcation.  Clough accuses such “separatist” views as “pre-
Darwinian” in that they fail “to appreciate the full consequences of what the Darwinian 
revolution means for Christian theology.”565  Likened to issues such as gender equality 
and the immorality of slavery, Clough insists that we must allow our theological 
reflection on the Imago Dei and creation to be challenged and informed by our scientific 
and cultural knowledge.566  That the tradition of Christian theological reflection has been 
so overtly anthropocentric does not preclude the possibility of its revision, which is 
especially timely given the continuity recognized between humanity and other-than-
human creatures in both scripture and the natural sciences.  In this same spirit, several 
theologians have attempted just such a reconsideration of the meaning of Imago Dei in 
terms of a more-capacious capacity; here, we will examine three such lines of 
exploration. 
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 First, Langdon Gilkey has argued that we should extend our understanding of 
what it means to represent the divine according to the Imago Dei and in doing so we will 
be able to include the entire natural world within this theological category.567  Gilkey 
suggests that we begin our consideration of the Imago Dei with an appreciation for those 
divine characteristics that have been unveiled through revelation.  Among these 
characteristics he identifies power, order, and the dialectical relationship between life and 
death.568  Gilkey makes the case that, “nature manifests or reveals certain unmistakable 
signs of the divine” in an analogous way to the manner in which humanity has long been 
understood to manifest such signs.569  The semantic framework Gilkey proposes is that of 
a vestigial approach, according to which we might “draw out, articulate, and so bring into 
clearer view those traces of the divine, of the activity and presence of God in nature, that 
are to be dimly discerned in our experience of nature.”570  He explains that 
anthropologists and other scholars have noted the longstanding presence of such 
recognition of the divine in nature as a tenet of archaic religious traditions.571  This 
appreciation for the manifold ways the divine is made manifest in creation, beyond the 
anthropocentric view, has been lost in recent history.  Nevertheless, the Christian 
tradition retains often-overlooked resources that can be retrieved in order to renew such 
an awareness of the Imago Dei in other-than-human creation. 
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 Gilkey proposes three aspects of the divine image that is borne not just by 
humans, but also by the entire natural world.  The first is the dynamic power present 
within the order of creation.  Drawing on the notion that power’s dynamic process within 
creation can be equated with being as such, “to existing, that is, to coming into being, 
remaining there, and projecting into the future,” he sees in the presence of the divine 
image in the collective community of creation’s creating, sustaining, and moving into a 
future.572  The second is the order present within the community of creation.  Gilkey 
asserts that order is present throughout the whole of creation, though analogously existent 
within it according to whichever “level” of creation we are examining.  Empirical science 
and technology have disclosed this reality, mysterious as it nonetheless remains.  Echoing 
Elizabeth Johnson, who sees a pneumatological process underway in what Gilkey 
describes as the paradox of order amid “radical spontaneity and openness,” the assertion 
here is that the order established by the Creator is both microcosmically and 
macrocosmically present throughout the natural world.573  The principle of an ordered 
creation is not present only within the human species, but found within the whole 
community of creation.  The third is what Gilkey describes as the unity of death with life 
in nature.  Admittedly, this is perhaps the weakest approach of the three he proposes.  He 
argues that this is, like power and order, a unifying principle of creation shared across 
species-delimited borders.  “Everywhere we look life is interlocked with death, being 
seems intertwined with non-being: in nature, in historical experience, and in individual 
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life.”574  Gilkey then examines the ways that the unity of life and death in nature connects 
to divine revelation.   
 
What is only dimly and obscurely seen in nature, and reflected in early 
human religion, becomes clear and explicit in revelation.  Then we can, 
with hindsight, see or begin to see what these signs and traces in nature 
meant.  Life is fulfilled only when it is willing to give itself for another, 
only when love directs and suffuses the affirmation of life.  And such love 
incarnates the courage that makes the affirmation of life in the face of 
possible death a reality.  Correspondingly, the God who creates life and 
death and who wills a world structured in terms of both is also the God 
who calls us to life and to face death for God’s sake – and who promises 
an existence beyond life and death.575 
 
Though perhaps more of a reach than power and order, the interplay between life and 
death at all levels of creation can be seen as reflecting what is concretely disclosed in the 
scriptural witness of divine revelation.  The interdependence of each aspect of the whole 
community of creation bears an intuitive likeness, carries a distinguishable trace of the 
agapic love described as God’s very being in the New Testament and modeled for us in 
the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.576 
 Second, and more recently, both David Cunningham and David Fergusson have 
offered reflections on alternative considerations of the Imago Dei, which would include a 
broader spectrum of creatures than do the traditional anthropocentric approaches that are 
restricted to the human family.  Cunningham believes that there are a number of reasons 
why the Imago Dei can describe other-than-human aspects of creation, suggesting in fact 
“the entire creation bears the ‘mark of the maker’ to at least some degree.”577  His 
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intention is to trouble the presumptive view that the doctrine of Imago Dei represents a 
binary category, that is, he seeks to move from a system of absolute demarcation toward 
one of degree.  It is important to note that Cunningham does not reject the idea that 
human beings can rightly be described as created Imago Dei, the account in Genesis 1 
clearly states as much.  However, as we will see shortly, he believes that the theological 
and biblical tradition simply does not preclude other-than-human creation from being 
recognized as also bearing the Imago. 
 Following Middleton, Clough, and others, Cunningham does not find any 
compelling evidence to suggest that – at least, theologically – one can assert a definitive 
distinction between humans and other animals.  Rather, so presupposed is such a 
distinction that few ever actually argue for it and instead simply take it for granted.  And 
yet, Cunningham likens such an apodictic demarcation to other classical distinctions 
made throughout history and which have been “justified” by ostensible empirical and 
cultural influences.  Here one might think of subordinating and discriminatory 
distinctions based on sex or gender, sexual orientation, race or ethnicity, and the like.  
While Cunningham does not believe that the human/other-than-human distinction is 
necessarily as egregious as the examples just cited, he does want to contest such 
axiomatic distinctions and believes that they are not theologically warranted.578 
 Concerning the distinction generally presupposed in the doctrine of the Imago 
Dei, Cunningham notes that, “if we wish to maintain this distinction, we must do so on 
theological grounds because the scientific distinction has long fallen out of favor and no 
longer sustains the evidential critiques of history and research.”579  Indeed, evolutionary 
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biology, contemporary ethology, psychology and other social sciences have all bolstered 
a more complex vision of the creaturely family within which the human spiecies is found, 
rather than affirming an absolute distinction that has been long presumed.580  On the 
subject of scientific consultation in theological reflection on creation, Cunningham makes 
the point that, 
 
A shift in scientific thinking need not require us to create a new argument 
based on the new science; but it may well behoove us to stop basing our 
arguments on old science. And this may lead us to observe that we had 
perhaps been relying rather too heavily upon manifestly a-theological or 
anti-theological accounts to buttress our (supposedly) theological 
arguments.581 
 
In addition to what recent scientific discoveries have uncovered, there is again the matter 
of the lack of biblical support for asserting that an absolute distinction is characteristic of 
the Imago Dei.  Cunningham returns to Genesis 1-11 to recount that throughout that key 
section of the text, “human beings are grouped or categorized with a wide varying range 
of constellations of the other elements of creation.”582  Human beings are therefore not so 
easily categorized or grouped singularly even in the biblical texts. 
 Before offering his proposed alternative to the over-emphasis on the Imago Dei as 
has been the tradition for centuries, Cunningham makes a compelling argument for a 
more-capacious reading of “image.”  While affirming that Genesis does attribute the 
Imago to human beings, he keenly notes at the same time that, “the biblical text never 
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denies the attribution of the Imago Dei to any other element of creation.”583  In light of 
this fact, Cunningham returns to the word “image” itself in order to illustrate that it 
necessarily resists being conscripted for such demarcating purposes and instead 
designates something roughly analogous to degree or a continuum of representation.  His 
example of visual art is worth citing at length. 
 
[T]he word “image” does not lend itself to a simple either/or test.  Imagine 
a painting that you know well; it might be Van Gogh’s Vase with Fifteen 
Sunflowers or Caravaggio’s Calling of St. Matthew or Mary Cassatt’s The 
Child’s Bath.  Now imagine a very fine reproduction of that painting, of 
the same size and shape, with every detail precisely in place, right down to 
the texture of the pain and the irregularly faded colors of the pigments.  
This reproduction – so accurate it borders on forgery – would certainly be 
an image of the original.  Now imagine a slightly less accurate 
reproduction – smaller, perhaps, or without texture.  It would seem odd to 
deny such a work the label “image,” when a momentary glance would 
immediately identify it as a reproduction of the famous painting.  Now 
make the image a bit less detailed – a vey small reproduction, perhaps, 
printed from a home computer on a printer with fairly low resolution.  Still 
an image?  How about one of those modern digital mosaics, in which the 
various colors of the whole are duplicated by individual blocks that are 
themselves images of something else altogether?   When we get up close, 
this will look very different from the original; but from a distance it is 
clearly recognizable as a reproduction.  Now imagine a child’s watercolor 
drawing of the painting, unrecognizable as such to anyone but the fondest 
parent.  At what point (in this journey of increasing distance from the 
original) does the attempted copy cease to be appropriately described as an 
image?584 
 
Although it may at first seem that Cunningham is arguing for a Jain-like “leveling” of 
creation, this is in fact not the case.  Instead, he is challenging the presupposition of 
absolute human distinctiveness by highlighting the internal inconsistencies of even the 
language we use to talk about the doctrine of Imago Dei.   
                                                
 583 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 106. 
 584 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 110. 
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 In lieu of “image,” Cunningham makes the bold proposal that we ought focus 
more on the term “flesh” (sarx, in Greek).  His claim is that “flesh” (sarx) is the primary 
way in which God relates to creation, such as one finds in John 1:14, where we read that 
“the Word became flesh (sarx).”  God’s relational life ad extra is not only with human 
beings, but rather it extends to all flesh, all creatures.585  Although he does not fully 
develop his proposal to shift attention from image to flesh, he does argue that Christian 
theologians would be able to develop a theology “that could better account for the 
complex and nuanced relationship between human beings and other animals,” if they 
were to focus as much attention to flesh as has been afforded the Imago.586  Furthermore, 
he offers five heuristic points to guide future consideration and bolster the case for sarx 
over imago.  Cunningham points to: 
 
• The Abundance of Biblical Reference – The term “flesh” (Hebrew basar and 
Greek sarx) appears 321 times in the NRSV translation of the Bible, which lends 
greater support for focusing on this term over the infrequently appearing Imago 
Dei.  Additionally, it is used in many ways including to describe the body of both 
humans and other-than-human animals.  The idea of kinship also appears 
frequently within the broader context of “flesh,” such as when the expression “all 
flesh” is used in reference to all living creatures, which appears 36 times.587 
 
• The Relationship Between God and ‘All Flesh’ – In several cases, particularly 
in the books of Genesis, Job, and throughout the Psalms, God’s relationship to 
                                                
 585 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 114. 
 586 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 117. 
 587 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 114-115. 
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creation is described in terms of “all flesh” rather than restricted to human beings 
alone.  This is precisely what is illustrated by the so-called Noahide covenant after 
the flood when God enters into renewed relationship with “all flesh.”588 
 
• Commonality and Differentiation – Unlike the expression Imago Dei, which 
has often been used in an absolutist, either/or way, “flesh” (basar, sarx) offers 
both a sense of commonality and differentiation.  Every creature has flesh, but 
there are many different kinds.  Even Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 15:39 about the 
different types of flesh found among creatures as diverse as human beings, birds, 
and other animals.  It is a concept that speaks both to what is shared and what is 
distinguishing among the community of creation.589 
 
• Linking Christology and Creation – Whereas Imago Dei in the New Testament 
most often distances Christ from the rest of humanity, referring to a notably high 
Christological characteristic, “flesh” is that which the Incarnate Word shares most 
intimately with both human beings and the entirety of creation.  In the Gospels 
and in early Christian tradition, it is Christ’s fleshiness that is treated as primary, 
his humanity and its accidental qualities come secondarily.590   
 
• The Need for Redemption Throughout the Entire Cosmos – Looking to the 
letters of Paul, among other sources, we can say that all of creation is somehow 
                                                
 588 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 115.  Also, for example, see Genesis 6:13, 17, 19; 7:15-
16, 21; 8:17; 9:8-11; Job 34:14-15; Psalm 136:25; and Psalm 145:21. 
 589 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 115. 
 590 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 116. Also, see earlier sections of this dissertation on 
Irenaeus and the Cappadocians. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 230 
affected by the finitude of what we have long referred to as “the fall,” which leads 
all of creation to groan for that shared redemption (e.g., Romans 8).  Because the 
whole creation is in need of healing, this further bolsters the significance of the 
previous heuristic point in which we reconnect the Incarnation to all of creation, 
not just for human beings.591 
 
Each of these themes draws on the broader theological and scriptural tradition to 
encourage reconsideration of the longstanding presumption of human uniqueness 
associated with the doctrine of Imago Dei and refocus attention toward the broader reality 
of the community of creation. 
 Third, Leslie Muray has proposed another way to consider the doctrine of Imago 
Dei according to a more-capacious interpretation.  Unlike Cunningham who proposes 
bracketing the terminology of “image” to focus on “flesh,” Muray wants to rehabilitate 
the category to include other-than-human creatures alongside their human counterparts 
within the community of creation.  Setting up his proposal in contradistinction to J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen’s ardent defense of human uniqueness, Muray argues that we 
cannot go beyond a claim of “human distinctiveness.”592  The simple argument for this 
terminology is: “While human uniqueness has the connotation of a ‘quantum leap’ 
between the human and non-human, human distinctiveness suggests that while there is 
differentiation between the human and non-human, that difference is not absolute.”593  
Furthermore, “while humans are different from non-humans and have a ‘special’ role to 
play (as do all species), we are firmly implanted in non-human nature…humans and non-
                                                
 591 Cunningham, “The Way of All Flesh,” 116-117. 
 592 Muray, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness,” 306. 
 593 Muray, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness,” 306. Emphasis original. 
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humans alike are part of the natural world.  The difference between humans and non-
humans is a matter of degree and not of kind.”594  There is a sense in which Muray’s 
assessment of the community of creation resembles that of Cunningham as expressed in 
the latter’s identification of the interpretive fluidity inherent in the term “image” 
discussed earlier.   
 Muray’s particular contribution to this discussion of Imago Dei is found in his 
argument that the concept of Imago Dei is best understood as an expression of 
“individual-in-community.”  Muray explains:  
 
Describing the individual, human and non-human, as an individual-in-
community is to claim that the self is a relational self, internally related to 
its environment, human and non-human.  The word ‘community’ includes 
the whole of the environment, human and non-human, of any individual 
event.  The individuated event is part of the whole of that community, and 
the community is a part of the individuated event.595 
 
In other words, to understand the Imago Dei as pertaining to a collective network of 
relations – or, as Muray suggests, “the all inclusive matrix of relationality”596 – is to 
incorporate the truth of the community of creation unveiled in scripture and confirmed in 
large part by contemporary natural science into Christian doctrine explicitly.   
 The contributions of Gilkey, Cunningham, Fergusson, Muray, among others, shed 
invaluable light on the inherent resources the Christian theological tradition offers in 
support of a community of creation paradigm.  There is room for distinction amid 
relationship, diversity within the family of creation.  However, in order to move beyond 
                                                
 594 Muray, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness,” 306.  Additionally, although she is 
not as uncomfortable with the emphasis on rationality as a dimension of humanity’s expression of the 
Imago Dei as others, Kathryn Tanner nevertheless also allows for a continuum or system of degree in 
assessing the whole of creation’s ability to, in some way, bear the divine image.  See Christ the Key (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9-17 and passim. 
 595 Muray, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness,” 308. 
 596 Muray, “Human Uniqueness vs. Human Distinctiveness,” 309. 
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the anthropocentricism that has and largely continues to govern reflection on humanity’s 
relationship to other-than-human creation, we must reconceive of the Imago Dei in terms 
of broader inclusivity or, as Cunningham ultimately contends, turn to another concept 
entirely to express this doctrine.   
 
D. The Relationship between God and Creation 
 In this final subsection, we turn to look briefly at what the Christian theological 
tradition has to say about the relationship between God and the entirety of creation.  How 
we conceive of this relationship can significantly affect the way we view humanity and 
its relationship to other-than-human creation.  In recent years the classic doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo has come under severe scrutiny for what has been described as its 
subjugating and dualistic implications for the intra-human community, especially for 
women.597  The realities resulting from centuries of destructive patriarchy that has been 
inappropriately supported by proof-texting scripture and misunderstanding the tradition 
notwithstanding, the alleged problematic qualities of creatio ex nihilo may, in fact, 
actually bolster a sounder theological perspective than has been suggested by its 
contemporary critics.  Brian Robinette has argued convincingly that the doctrine actually 
contributes to a holistic understanding of three essential dimension of Christian faith; 
                                                
 597 Early ecofeminist critiques, in particular, of the doctrine creatio ex nihilo can be found in 
Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1980); Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1987); and Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993).  More recently, see Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: 
Routledge, 2003); John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington, IN: 
University of Indiana Press, 2006); and Mary Jane Rubenstein, “Cosmic Singularities: On the Nothing and 
the Sovereign,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 80 (2012): 485-517. 
 For substantive responses to these concerns, see Rowan Williams, “On Being Creatures,” in On 
Christian Theology (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 63-78; Brian D. Robinette, “The Difference 
Nothing Makes: Creatio Ex Nihilo, Resurrection, and Divine Gratuity,” Theological Studies 72 (2011): 
525-557; and Ian A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2014). 
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namely, the affirmation of both divine transcendence and immanence, the distinction 
between God and creatures, and the universal significance of the resurrection, which joins 
together both protology and eschatology in the spirit of Irenaeus and others.598  It is my 
contention that Robinette and others who have defended the ancient doctrine are correct 
and that a renewed appreciation for what creatio ex nihilo implies in terms of theological 
reflection on creation lends additional support for proceeding with what I have been 
calling a community of creation paradigm. 
 Rather than rehearse the recent debates on the pros and cons of creatio ex nihilo, I 
want to focus our attention on the implications of what Kathryn Tanner articulates in 
terms of a “non-contrastive” account of divine transcendence.599  Her approach is 
particularly helpful in this project because her work takes seriously a “commitment to 
engage ‘classical’ theological approaches in a postmodern context,”600 an approach that 
finds a complement in the following chapters of this project, which are focused on 
postcolonial theory and the Franciscan tradition.  Tanner proposes “two rules” for what 
constitutes that which a “Christian can and cannot go on to say if Christians talk about a 
transcendent God who creates the world is to be coherent.”601  The first rule is that when 
speaking of the transcendence of God with regard to creation, one must “avoid both a 
simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and world and a simple contrast of the 
                                                
 598 Robinette, “The Difference Nothing Makes,” 532-557.  Both Robinette and McFarland follow 
the important work of Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early 
Christian Thought (London: T & T Clark, 1994) in sketching the historical development of the doctrine in 
the early Christian centuries. 
 599 Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1988).  
More recently, Tanner has returned to this theme in “Creation Ex Nihilo as Mixed Metaphor,” Modern 
Theology 29 (2013): 138-155. 
 600 Robinette, “The Difference Nothing Makes,” 532 n. 14. 
 601 Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1988), 
47.  Tanner’s work is particularly helpful here because, as Brian Robinette has observed, her project takes 
seriously the “commitment to engage ‘classical’ theological approaches in the postmodern context” 
(Robinette, “The Difference Nothing Makes,” 532 n.14). 
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divine and non-divine predicates.”602  Tanner’s concern here is that God’s transcendence 
be authentically maintained amid the logical pitfalls that attempts at description 
necessarily present.  The second rule is to “avoid in talk about God’s creative agency all 
suggestions of limitation in scope or manner.”603  What is at stake here is maintaining the 
“genuinely radical” immanence of God in creation.   
 Both of these rules serve as a constructive response to the inherited problematics 
of the longstanding Hellenistic influence on Christian philosophy and theology.  
According to that ancient worldview, there is a “contrastive” relationship established 
between God and the world, between the divine and the material.  “Transcendence” is 
understood within an absolute demarcating and oppositional frame, which allows for no 
intimate overlap between the divine and the created.  According to this contrastive 
relationship, emphasis on divine transcendence limits divine agency and involvement in 
the world.  In response, Tanner believes that a non-contrastive theological solution arises 
when “Christian talk of God’s creative agency [is] worked out in a genuinely radical way: 
God must be directly productive of everything that is in every aspect of its existence.”604  
In other words, Tanner asserts that anything less than an absolute embrace of the doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo results in a diminishment of God’s transcendence.   
 The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo radicalizes the position that God is not an object 
among others whose identity is formed according to a system of oppositional or 
contrastive relationships.  As such, God as Creator does not exist in a contrariwise 
manner vis-à-vis finite reality and, therefore, there is no distance between the Creator and 
creation.  The absolute transcendence of God affirmed in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
                                                
 602 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 47. 
 603 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 47. 
 604 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 47. 
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is what provides the condition of the possibility for God’s immanent presence to 
creatures in God’s absolute alterity.  Stated simply, God’s transcendence does not 
preclude divine presence to creation, but instead is that which, as Irenaeus of Lyons 
argues, “assures God’s direct and intimate relation with every creature in the entirety of 
its physical and particular being.”605  In summary, Tanner explains that, 
 
God’s transcendence over and against the world and God’s immanent 
presence within it become non-exclusive possibilities, then, when God’s 
primary transcendence is a self-determined transcendence essentially 
independent of a contrast with the non-divine.  The ordinary mutually 
exclusive predicates ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ may both be 
applied to one and the same self-determining divine subject.  The apparent 
mutual exclusiveness of those terms has to give way before a God who is 
freely self-determining.606 
 
The notion of a Creator God who is at once un-coerced, entirely free, and yet radically 
present to the very creation brought into existence, presupposes creatio ex nihilo.607  To 
those who would view the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo as supporting a notion of divine 
power that is tyrannical or capricious, such as is presupposed in the various critiques 
cited earlier, Rowan Williams offers an insightful reply.  He writes: 
 
                                                
 605 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 56. 
 606 Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, 79. 
 607 In a way anticipating the connection between the doctrine of creation and the Incarnation, Ian 
McFarland offers a Christological recapitulation of this point when he writes: “Interpreting creation from 
nothing as meaning that in the beginning there is nothing but God, that there is created nothing apart from 
God, and that in creating nothing limits God – this interpretation in the first instance suggests very 
traditional views of divine self-sufficiency, omnicausality, and sovereignty, respectively.  Read within the 
specifically Christological framework suggested by the opening verses of John’s Gospel, however, these 
forbidding-sounding attributes acquire a rather different spin: Nothing but God points to the fact that divine 
self-sufficiency takes the form of love that is realized in the mutual communion of the Father with the Son 
in the power of the Spirit.  Nothing apart from God proposes a vision of divine omnicausality as the 
extension outside of God of the sharing of being that constitutes God’s own triune life.  Nothing limits God 
means that divine sovereignty is perfected in God’s making the life of a creature to be God’s own, as a 
means of ensuring creation’s flourishing.  Viewed in this threefold, Christological mode, the point of 
creation from nothing is not, as the doctrine’s critics fear, to affirm God’s ultimate indifference to creatures 
but rather God’s total and unrestricted dedication to them” (McFarland, From Nothing, 106). 
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Creation in the classical sense does not therefore involve some uncritical 
idea of God’s ‘monarchy.’  The absolute freedom ascribed to God in 
creation means that God cannot make a reality that then needs to be 
actively governed, subdued, bent to the divine purpose away from its 
natural course.  If God creates freely, God does not need the power of a 
sovereign; what is, is from God.  God’s sovereign purpose is what the 
world is becoming.608 
 
It is precisely the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo that grounds, rather than supplants, the 
belief in a God whose alterity and creative power is “wholly pacific and generative, 
limitlessly nurturing and empowering of contingent creation.”609   
 What is of particular interest to this project concerning this discussion about the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is precisely the establishment of divine alterity such a 
theological position presupposes.  As we saw in the first part of the last chapter, one 
significant problem confronting the stewardship model of creation is the unresolved issue 
of human-derived alterity.  The “otherness” of other-than-human creation is understood, 
at least tacitly, to be associated with human agency as an exclusive attribute.  In effect, 
human beings – consciously or otherwise – imagine themselves as something still over 
against the rest of creation, understandably “other” in relation to the Creator, but also 
“other” in relation to the rest of creation.  The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, as expressed 
according to Tanner’s non-contrastive articulation, undermines a human-oriented position 
of alterity to relocate the human species within and among the inclusive community of 
creation.  The radical affirmation of divine immanence that arises from the radical 
embrace of divine transcendence assures us of God’s enduring, non-competitive, and 
                                                
 608 Williams, “On Being Creatures,” 69.  For another sympathetic view on God’s “power” and 
“omnipotence” in this regard, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1988), 1:410-422. 
 609 Robinette, “The Difference Nothing Makes,” 538. 
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proximate relation to humanity, but to humanity precisely as creature alongside all other 
aspects of the created order. 
 Having examined both the scriptural sources in the previous chapter and the 
theological sources in this chapter that are found within the Christian tradition and lend 
substantive support for pursuing a constructive theology of creation rooted in the 
community of creation paradigm, we now turn in the next chapter to contemporary 
theoretical, philosophical, and theological discussions that highlight the critical 
postmodern concerns surrounding theologies of creation, while also introducing new 
resources for contemporary theological reflection on creation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Postcolonial Theory, Theology, and ‘Planetarity’ 
 
 The previous four chapters have focused on the origins and development of the 
stewardship model of creation, which arose in response to the popular yet problematic 
dominion model; a multifaceted critique of the stewardship model; and an exploration of 
the resources present within the Christian scriptural and theological traditions for 
constructing a theology of kinship according to a community of creation paradigm.  This 
chapter inaugurates a critical move in the effort to develop a constructive theology of 
creation that takes seriously the sources examined and the foundations laid in the 
previous chapters, while concurrently advancing the scholarly conversation with the aid 
of contemporary critical theory.610   
 Postcolonial theory presents itself as a promising operative hermeneutic for 
several reasons.  First, there is an allied sensibility between the theological and 
philosophical critique of unexamined anthropocentrism and the postcolonial concern with 
restoring the agency of the postcolonial subject in the wake of persistent and strategic 
deployment of imperial power.  Second, the postcolonial commitment to poststructuralist 
methodology offers a helpful frame according to which we may critique problematic 
theologies of creation through deconstruction.611  Third, while some theologians and 
                                                
 610 By “critical theory,” I do not mean the more-restrictive usage in reference to the so-called 
Frankfurt School of Western-European Marxist philosophy (e.g., see Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and 
Critical Theory” [1937], in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell [New York: 
Continuum, 1999], 188-243.  Rather, I intend “critical theory” in the accepted broader sense, which 
pertains to those fields of cultural, philosophical, literary, or political studies that aim explicitly at liberation 
and transformative praxis. 
 611 As will be explained in greater detail in what follows, by “deconstruction,” I mean that critical 
philosophical process which simply aims to uncover the internal contradictions and fallacies already 
unraveling within the logic of a given system.  For an introductory overview, see Mark C. Taylor, 
“Introduction: System…Structure…Difference…Other,” in Deconstruction in Context: Literature and 
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environmentalists have engaged postcolonial theory with the work of their respective 
fields, there remains a dearth of theological reflection on the subject of creation from a 
postcolonial perspective.612  Fourth, the neologism “planetarity,” introduced into the 
postcolonial discussion by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, bears something of a provisional 
or even tacit theological sensibility that beckons to be fleshed out systematically through 
a deliberate theological intervention such that it may be appropriated in an effort to 
construct a renewed theology of creation.  
 This chapter proceeds in four sections: (a) an introduction to postcolonial theory; 
(b) the life and work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, as well as an overview of her term 
“planetarity”; (c) a development of a “theological grammar” of planetarity; and (d) the 
promise of “planetarity” as a discursive frame for creation. 
 
A. An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory 
 Postcolonialism is a complicated and multivalent term.613  On the one hand, to 
speak about postcolonialism is to suggest a historical epoch or a linear chronology, as in 
                                                                                                                                            
Philosophy, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 1-34.  Also, see Graham 
Ward, “Deconstructive Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76-91. 
 612 Furthermore, at the time of writing this project, there has been no known theological reflection 
on the subject of creation from a postcolonial perspective that also bring in the Franciscan tradition as a 
constructive interlocutor. 
 613 Certainly, a complete introduction to postcolonial theory far exceeds the scope and space 
limitations of this current project.  What follows is the briefest effort to foreground some of the key 
foundational threads that led to the emergence of what we today call postcolonial theory with particular 
attention given to what coalesced to form the ground of Spivak’s work, with which we are primarily 
concerned.  There already exist several helpful introductions to the discipline.  In addition to those cited 
below, see John McLeod, Beginning Postcolonialism, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2010); Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London: Verso Books, 
1997); Bruce King, ed., New National and Post-Colonial Literatures: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996); and Elleke Boehmer, Colonial and Postcolonial Literature: Migrant Metaphors (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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“that which comes after an experience of colonialism.”614  However, that meaning, which 
is understandable given a preliminary examination of the term, is almost never the focus 
within academic discourse.  Instead, postcolonialism refers generally to two distinct yet 
interrelated foci.  On the one hand, postcolonialism is a disciplinary field in which “the 
effects of imperialism, colonialism (until the independence of colonies), and 
neocolonialism (in the 20th and 21st centuries) on societies and individuals” serves as the 
primary object of academic inquiry, analysis, and criticism.615  For the purposes of 
clarity, we will refer to this meaning of postcolonialism as “postcolonial studies.”  On the 
other hand, postcolonialism is also invoked in reference to “an interdisciplinary 
methodology grounded in poststructuralist and postmodern critique.”616  Eva Botella-
Ordinas explains: 
 
As a methodology, postcolonialism provides several theories as a guide 
for transdisciplinary research to give voice to agents, relations, practices, 
representations, knowledges, narratives, and subaltern cultures silenced by 
traditional disciplines.  It tries to avoid binary concepts (East-West, 
colonizer-colonized, subject-object, male-female, human-animal), which 
are conceived as imperialist, and to study how subaltern and colonized 
peoples transformed in relation to colonizers, opening processes of 
                                                
 614 This sense of the term is now often described according to the category of discourse centering 
on the “post-colonial state.” See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn 
Stepputat, States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2001).   
 On a related note concerning style, some scholars have insisted on including a hyphen (i.e., “post-
colonial”) when referring to this form of historical study to distinguish it from the more theoretical field of 
analysis and critique.  For more on this debate, see Bill Ashcroft, “On the Hyphen in Postcolonial,” New 
Literatures Review 32 (1996): 23-32. 
 615 Eva Botella-Ordinas, “Colonialism and Postcolonialism,” in Oxford Bibliographies (accessed 
on March 17, 2016) available at: www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199730414.  
Also, see Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); and Robert J. C.  Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2001). 
 616 Botella-Ordinas, “Colonialism and Postcolonialism.” 
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hybridity and creating creative resistances, sometimes digested by 
dominant/imperial/hegemonic discourses.617 
 
Again for the sake of clarity, we will refer to the methodological meaning of 
postcolonialism as “postcolonial theory” which, as Botella-Ordinas summarizes well, 
suggests a broad applicability that extends beyond the historical confines of the 
Eurocentric or North American imperial enterprises of past colonial and even current 
neo-colonial experiences.  Indeed, it is out of the disciplinary field that the 
methodological tools of postcolonial theory first emerged.618  However, the importance of 
postcolonial studies in its own right notwithstanding, for the purpose of the present 
project we will concern ourselves primarily with postcolonial theory.   
 Despite the widespread academic recognition of postcolonialism as both a field of 
study and an interdisciplinary methodology today, the concept of “the postcolonial” 
remains a diffuse, complicated, and rather nebulous category.619  Leela Gandhi suggests 
at the outset of her own mapping of postcolonial thought that one reason this is the case is 
                                                
 617 Botella-Ordinas, “Colonialism and Postcolonialism.”  Also, see Leela Gandhi, Postcolonial 
Theory: A Critical Introduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
 618 R. S. Sugirtharajah expresses this point when he writes, “…in its earlier incarnation, 
postcolonialism was never conceived as a grand theory, but as creative literature and as a resistance 
discourse emerging in the former colonies of the Western empires.  Postcolonialism as a methodological 
category and as a critical practice followed later,” in Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 11. 
 619 On postcolonialism as a recognized category within the academy, see two major 
interdisciplinary journals that attend to this subject: Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial 
Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy. 
 For the sake of brevity, I will bracket any sustained discussion about the allied field of “decolonial 
studies.”  A good place to begin is with the essays in Globalization and the Decolonial Option, eds. Walter 
D. Mignolo and Arturo Escobar (London: Routledge, 2010). For a sampling of other literature on the 
subject, see Walter D. Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial 
Options (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Ramón Grosgouel, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies 
and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality,” 
Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1 (2011): 
available online at http://scholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq; Walter D. Mignolo, “The Geopolitics of 
Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 101 (2002): 57-96; and Walter D. 
Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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that unlike Marxism or Derridean deconstruction, postcolonial theory seems to lack an 
“originary moment.”620  Rather, there are key intellectual influences that coalesce in the 
thought of foundational figures of postcolonial theory and in their respective texts.621  
Twentieth-century Marxist studies and the Poststructuralism movement of mid-twentieth-
century continental philosophy stand out as key influential sources for postcolonial 
theory and its theoretical points of departure. 
 With regard to the Marxist influence, one can trace the earliest inklings of an anti-
imperialist hermeneutic in the writings of classic Marxists thinkers like Vladimir Lenin, 
Nikolai Bukharin, and Rudolf Hilferding, among others.622  But it is in the work of Italian 
Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci that postcolonial theory found its most utilized Marxist 
resources; namely, his critique of hegemony and the adaptation of the concept of “the 
subaltern.”623  These trajectories are most apparent in the postcolonial criticism of some 
early and foundational theorists in the field including Said and Spivak.624  However, as 
Neil Elliott and Gandhi have noted, many recent “postcolonial analysts rarely 
                                                
 620 Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, viii. 
 621 It should be noted that none of the three major figures identified in what follows – Edward 
Said, Homi Bhabha, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak – never set out “to do” postcolonial theory or 
criticism.  Rather, their respective works were, in retrospect, identified as emblematic and proved highly 
influential. (Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation, 16).  Furthermore, this does 
not take into consideration the many, what we might call, “proto-postcolonial” writers such as Frantz 
Fanon, Ananda Coomaraswamy, C. L. R. James, among others.  A full evaluation of the rich foundations 
and twentieth-century trajectory of the field and history of criticism sadly exceeds the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 622 Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, 23.  Also, see Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: 
A Critical Survey, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1990); and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Marx After Marxism: 
History, Subalterneity, and Difference,” in Marxism Beyond Marxism, eds. Saree Makdisi, Cesare 
Casarino, and Rebecca E. Karl (London: Routledge, 1996), 55-70. 
 623 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, trans. Quentin Hoare 
(New York: International Publishers, 1978). 
 624 For example, see Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 
1993); and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, ed. 
Sarah Harasym (London: Routledge, 1990); among others. 
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acknowledge their ‘genealogical debt’ to Marxism.”625  This can be attributed, in part, to 
the incredulity of postcolonial (and, later, decolonial) theorists toward European systems 
of knowledge that construe the non-European world according to its own self-serving 
narratives and agendas.  In this way, Marxism as such has come under scrutiny.626   
 In a way more recognized than the Marxist influence has been, the impact of 
poststructuralist philosophy on postcolonial theory has been noted and especially 
acknowledged in the work of those theorists operating within the field of literary 
criticism.  In particular, the work of mid-twentieth-century French philosophers Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Derrida has been universally identified as instrumental in shaping 
the thought and methodology of the best-known postcolonial theorists.627  Though often 
included under the shared heading of “Poststructuralism,” which generally denotes that 
line of continental philosophy that follows the linguistic theory and philosophical 
reflection known as “Structuralism,”628 the respective thought and methods of Foucault 
and Derrida vary considerably. 
                                                
 625 Neil Elliott, “Marxism and the Postcolonial Study of Paul,” in The Colonized Apostle: Paul 
Through Postcolonial Eyes, ed. Christopher D. Stanley (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 40; and 
Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, 24. 
 626 For example, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who 
Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” Representations 37 (1992): 1-26.  However, Spivak has been direct about the 
need to engage in a sort of dialogue between Western and non-Western epistemologies, signaling an 
ongoing openness to European systems of thinking in an effort of liberation.  See Spivak, Outside in the 
Teaching Machine (London: Routledge, 1993). 
 627 Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, 25-26; and Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical 
Interpretation, 21-22.  It should be noted that other seminal thinkers, such as Jacques Lacan, have also had 
significant impact on the individual projects and collective disciplinary efforts of postcolonial theory.  
However, for the sake of brevity and concision, we will focus our attention on Foucault and Derrida, the 
two most notable sources of poststructuralist influence. 
 628 Presentation of a comprehensive overview of Structuralism exceeds the scope of this project. 
Fortunately, many good volumes have already attempted such an introduction.  For example, see François 
Dosse, History of Structuralism: The Rising Sign 1945-1966, Volume 1, trans. Deborah Glassman 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); François Dosse, History of Structuralism: The Sign 
Sets 1967-Present, Volume 2, trans. Deborah Glassman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998); Terence Hawke, Structuralism and Semiotics, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003); John Sturrock, 
Structuralism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003); and Jean Piaget, Structuralism (London: 
Routledge, 1971). 
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 The sheer volume and scope of Foucault’s written corpus prohibits an adequate 
summary, let alone assessment, here.629  However, there are a few central contributions 
that his thought has provided for the development of postcolonial theory worth noting.  
Key among these is Foucault’s notion of “discourse” as he developed it in his texts The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and Discipline and Punish.630  Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, 
and Helen Tiffin offer one of the best, and briefest, summaries of Foucault’s 
understanding of discourse as it is distinguished from the term’s commonplace usage to 
refer to any typical act of speaking. 
 
For Foucault, a discourse is a strongly bounded area of social knowledge, 
a system of statements within which the world can be known.  The key 
feature of this is that the world is not simply ‘there’ to be talked about; 
rather, it is through discourse itself that the world is brought into being.  It 
is also in such a discourse that speakers and hearers, writers and readers 
come to an understanding about themselves, their relationship to each 
other, and their place in the world (the construction of subjectivity).  It is 
the complex of signs and practices which organizes social existence and 
social reproduction.631 
 
At the heart of this notion of discourse stands the relationship between knowledge and 
power as Foucault presents it.  There exists what we might describe as “rules” that govern 
how, about what, and in which manner we talk about given realities, such as what 
constitutes an individual and her relationship to herself and her relationship to a larger 
community, among other relations.  The Foucauldian notion of discourse points to these 
                                                
 629 For additional background and introduction to Foucault’s work, see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983); Gary Gutting, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Gary Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 630 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knoweldge: And the Discourse on Language, trans. 
Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010); and Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The 
Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
 631 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds., “Discourse” in Postcolonial Studies: The 
Key Concepts, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 83. 
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rules at play and helps to unveil the interplay between knowledge and power beneath or 
behind the seemingly objective surface.  These discursive principles of exclusion and 
inclusion operate in a way to control (that is, discipline) knowledge, signaling to those 
enmeshed within these largely unseen networks of relationship what is “acceptable” and 
what is not, what is “real” and what is not, what is “valid” and what is not.  This is 
understood within a postcolonial frame as the deployment of colonial power, which does 
not always constitute brute physical force, but rather is the much larger and more 
pervasive formation of a “world” as noted in the quote above.  The history of colonialism 
has shown that, “the will of European nations to exercise dominant control over the 
world, which led to the growth of empires, was accompanied by a capacity to confirm 
European notions of utility, rationality, and discipline as truth.”632   
 Foucault helped shine light on the otherwise occluded reality that categories like 
“objectivity” and “rationality” are not static, universal, and timeless actualities, but parts 
of constructed worlds shaped and governed by conscious and, at times, unconscious 
discourses.  It is this dimension of poststructuralist philosophy that Edward Said engaged 
in his now-classic work Orientalism.633  In this text Said analyzes the way in which “the 
Orient” has been and continues to be constructed by Eurocentric logic and thinking.  This 
place is an “other” created by Eurocentric colonial power, which resulted in European 
culture gaining “strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of 
surrogate and even underground self.”634  Specifically naming Foucault’s concept of 
discourse as his philosophical grounding, Said explains how the colonial logic (i.e., 
                                                
 632 Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, “Discourse,” in Postcolonial Studies, 85. 
 633 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979). 
 634 Said, Orientalism, 3. 
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knowledge) of European domination is tied to the construction of the “other” that is “the 
Orient.” 
 
Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point 
Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for 
dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, 
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over 
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient.635 
 
What Said’s Orientalism argues in sum is that the construction of the regulation or 
disciplining of knowledge by the European deployment of colonial logic not only 
governed and shaped the way non-European peoples, cultures, religions, etc., were 
discussed, but it also effectively constructed the other.  Foucault was deeply concerned 
about the relationship between the discursive modes of history and the experience of 
those silenced, marginalized, or otherwise de-legitimized by such deployment of 
power/knowledge.  As it pertains to the subsequent development of postcolonial theory, 
Foucauldian analysis offers a useful hermeneutic for rereading the conditions that 
undergird seemingly static, objective, or universal epistemologies.  Said and others 
recognized this dynamic at play in colonial logic and appropriated insights for further 
critical analysis of the relationship between colonizer and the colonized.   
 Foucault’s own insights did not arise ex nihilo, but rather follow in a line of 
thinkers that were critical of the “destructive powers of Western rationality,” to borrow a 
phrase from Gandhi.636  Many of those who have sketched out a rough genealogy of the 
development of critical philosophical and theoretical analysis point to Friedrich Nietzsche 
as the cardinal figure in the shift from the largely uncritical embrace of Kantian 
                                                
 635 Said, Orientalism, 3. 
 636 Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, 37. 
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enlightenment thinking to a new mode of analysis and reflection.  Foucault himself 
identifies Nietzsche’s twofold critique of the myth of “pure origins” and the myth of 
teleological progress as significant for his own work and that of a renewed attention to 
the interplay of power/knowledge.637  When one begins to reexamine the discursive 
constructions hitherto understood to be inert and sacrosanct realities, there is an 
opportunity to uncover what Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges,” which Foucault 
describes as “knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath 
the required level of cognition or scientificity.”638  Here we begin to see the appeal for 
Said, which will lead to his application of this methodological insight in a postcolonial 
analytical setting.  Foucault’s approach advocates for the complication of seemingly 
universal standards of knowing and speaking, highlighting the deeply intertwined and 
complex realities of power and knowledge at play among discourses.  Said, in examining 
the European history of colonization, pulls the thread of colonial discursive logic that 
held together the myth of “Orientalism” as an objective and “true” category in order to 
invite a reexamination of subjugated knowledges silenced and erased by European 
colonialism. 
 In addition to Foucault, the work of Jacques Derrida has also been a significant 
source of influence in the development of postcolonial theory.  Derrida’s particular 
“brand” of Poststructuralism has come to be known as “deconstruction.”  The label has 
been frequently misunderstood, at times conflated with or mistaken for “destruction,” 
                                                
 637 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 76-100.  Also, see Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
 638 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 82. 
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which understandably strikes the perceiver as a malicious act.  However, deconstruction 
as identified and explained by Derrida refers not to some external dismantling of 
structures, institutions, cultures, and the like, but rather it is a reference to that which is 
always already underway beneath the surface of signification.639  It was the work of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss linguist often considered the “father” of Structuralism, 
that served as the impetus for Derrida’s seminal poststructuralist work, especially his Of 
Grammatology.640  Saussure argued that the relationship between the signifier (e.g., a 
word) and the signified (e.g., that to which the concept refers) is entirely arbitrary.641  
That for “meaning” to arise there has to be a community of interpreters that share a 
common system of signs, which is both relational and diacritical.642  By relational, this 
theory means that no one-for-one meaning—between word and “object”—exists.  Rather, 
meaning is constructed by a signifier’s relationship to other signs.  By diacritical, this 
theory means that, “these associations work through the principle of exclusion” or 
“through a system of differentiation from other signs.”643  In other words, language is not 
static but fluid, and signifiers receive meaning from their relationship to what they are 
not as much as from what interpreters claim to assert positively. 
 There were many who took Saussurean linguistic claims and attempted to 
systematize them, not the least of whom was Claude Lévi-Strauss.  The result was the 
                                                
 639 Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction is notoriously complex and subtle.  For our purposes in 
this project, particularly in light of this section dedicated to providing an introductory survey, what follows 
is a necessarily limited account of some key themes in his thought that have been significant for the 
postcolonial theorists that have followed his deconstructive intuition.  For a more comprehensive 
introduction to his thought, see Mark Dooley and Liam Kavanagh, The Philosophy of Derrida (Québec: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); and the many excellent essays in A Companion to Derrida, eds. 
Zeynep Direk and Leonard Lawlor (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell Publishers, 2014). 
 640 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
 641 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), 35. 
 642 See Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011). 
 643 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 35. 
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emergence of a field of semiotic and philosophical analysis known as Structuralism.  
Lévi-Strauss argued that there was a secure “outside ground” from which one could trace 
the establishment of meaning within the system or structure of language.  However, 
Derrida launched his critique of Lévi-Strauss through what we might call a radical 
reading of Saussure, arguing that Lévi-Strauss did not fully appreciate the true instability 
of the relationship between the signifier and the signified.644  The groundwork for this 
critical effort is laid out in the opening chapters of Of Grammatology, in which Derrida 
explains that there is always something of a gap between a sign and that which it 
signifies.  As Ania Loomba notes, “The slippage between words or signs and their 
meaning is evident in every representation, every utterance.  Accordingly, no utterance or 
text is capable of perfectly conveying its own meaning.  But all texts, if analyzed closely 
enough, or deconstructed, reveal their own instability, and their contradictions.”645  The 
key concept that Derrida will advance to describe this linguistic and semiotic 
phenomenon is différance, which is Derrida’s neologism that refers to “the systematic 
play of differences, of traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements 
are related to each other.”646  Différance is the name given to the phenomenon that no 
linguistic meaning exists on its own or independently, but only has meaning in 
relationship to that which it is not (it differs) and for this reason meaning is always 
somehow out of immediate grasp (it defers).   
                                                
 644 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, esp. 101-164. 
 645 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 36.  With the above-cited lines, Loomba nicely 
summarizes what Derrida painstakingly develops in his seminal essay, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), 278-294. 
 646 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 27. 
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 What Derrida strives to suggest with the concept of différance is that language is 
constructed.  Furthermore, as Derrida contends elsewhere, language “is seen to construct 
the subject.”647  These Derridean insights contribute to the critical toolbox of the 
postcolonial theorists who, following Foucault, seek to reexamine history and the 
epistemology that provides the condition for reading that history, which has been 
heretofore considered absolute and objective.  Not only are history and its associated 
discourses constructed, but the very meaning of language that appears at first glance to 
convey an inert meaning is also a construction, if only an unseen one.  The différance 
Derrida identifies always at play in linguistic meaning sheds light on a epistemological 
bias (and what Derrida might call a myth) of “metaphysical presence,” which again has 
reaffirmed a claim to the certain stability and immutability of meaning.  However, 
différance names, in part, the binary oppositional system of difference that governs 
meaning making.  As Gandhi explains, postcolonial theorists have drawn on Derrida’s 
contributions and recognize that “colonial discourse typically rationalizes itself through 
rigid oppositions such as maturity/immaturity, civilization/barbarism, 
developed/developing, progressive/primitive.”648  This critical awareness of the 
“othering” (and “erasure”) that rests at the heart of colonial discourse is something that 
Spivak, among others, has highlighted in her work in the pattern of Derrida’s 
deconstruction.649   
 While various strains of Marxism, Foucault’s particular poststructuralist 
philosophy, and Derrida’s deconstruction all vary in notable ways, there are identifiable 
                                                
 647 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 36. 
 648 Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory, 32. 
 649 See, especially, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Can The Subaltern 
Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 237-291. 
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similarities in goals and purpose among them.  Regarding the influence on postcolonial 
theory, Loomba comments that these various threads of philosophy 
 
do intensify and sharpen debates about the social fabric, and make it 
imperative for us to weave the economic realities of colonialism with all 
that was hitherto excluded from ‘hard’ social analysis – sexuality, 
subjectivity, psychology, and language.  They remind us that the ‘real’ 
relations of society do not exist in isolation from its cultural or ideological 
categories.  And these various radical ways of thinking about language and 
ideology do share this much: they challenge any rigid demarcation of 
event and representation, or history and text.650 
 
What results from this confluence of critical analytical sources is a way of seeing and 
means of interpretation that does not presume language, culture, and the like to be 
inherently innocent and without its own history of construction.  The deconstruction of 
colonial logic unveils unacknowledged “realities” at the margins, which have served a 
caricatured oppositional function such as “the Orient,” or have been effectively 
subjugated or even erased such as the epistemologies of the colonized.   
 At its core, postcolonial theory seeks to uncover, explain, and contest the complex 
relationships of knowledge production and power at play in a multiple contexts, but 
especially as it impacts those at the margins of a system of cultural, political, 
epistemological, or religious hegemony, among others.  This is certainly true for those 
peoples affected by the European colonization.  And yet, as Susan Abraham notes, “What 
postcoloniality advances for critical thinking is an analysis of conditions of unequal 
power that is not limited to the historical phenomenon of European colonialism over the 
past five hundred years.”651  For this reason, though many of the key issues that fall under 
                                                
 650 Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, 37. 
 651 Susan Abraham, “Critical Perspectives on Postcolonial Theory,” in The Colonized Apostle: 
Paul through Postcolonial Eyes, ed. Christopher D. Stanley (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 32. 
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the larger umbrella of postcolonialism originated in the wake of the decolonization of 
those peoples and lands previously dominated by European nation-states, many of these 
concerns have now migrated to other fields including literary and cultural criticism, 
history, philosophy, and theology, among others.652  It is in this light that we explore 
some of the key issues with an eye toward how postcolonial theory has shaped 
contemporary theology generally and can provide us with helpful methods and resources 
for developing a constructive theology of creation specifically.653 
 
B. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and ‘Planetarity’ 
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s contributions to postcolonial theory, literary 
criticism, and feminist philosophy, to name only a few fields, are significant.  Her 
original and constructive work spans a career now in its fifth decade, which explains why 
the brief treatment of her life, thought, and writings that follows is inevitably inadequate.  
There already exist several excellent studies of her oeuvre that can be consulted for 
                                                
 652 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and 
Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), 193-194; and 221-222. 
 653 This is perhaps a good place to express awareness of the potential critique that could be leveled 
against a project such as this; namely, that that the appropriation or (better put) the deployment of 
postcolonial theory in another field or engaging circumstances outside those of a marginalized population is 
itself a form of academic neocolonialism.  Indeed, this concern is not new (for example, see Arif Dirlik, 
“The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the age of Global Capitalism,” Critical Inquiry 20 
[1994]: 328-356; and Aijaz Ahmad, “The Politics of Literary Postcoloniality,” Race and Class 36 [1995]: 
1-20; among others).  The exercise of colonial logic does not take a singular form and can be recognized in 
myriad instances, locations, places, and relationships.  The insights of postcolonial theory, as well as the 
poststructuralist foundations that support it, point to a truth that transcends the historical realities of 
European colonialism.  The problematic of deeply sedimented systems of knowledge production found in 
other areas, for example, in the human/other-than-human creation relationship, must also be critiqued for its 
own form of colonial logic.  
 On the subject of postcolonial theory and the environment, specifically, see Ashcroft, Griffiths, 
and Tiffen, The Empire Writes Back, 213-216; and Rob Nixon, “Environmentalism and Postcolonialism,” 
in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, eds. Ania Loomba et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 233-
251.  Nixon has recently published a full-length book that engages, among others, the postcolonial thought 
of Edward Said with the environmentalism of Rachel Carson; see Slow Violence and the Environmentalism 
of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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further introduction and exploration of her life and work.654  And yet, perhaps one of the 
most insightful lenses through which to view Spivak are the many substantive interviews 
she has given and that have been subsequently published.655  Before moving to some of 
her scholarly contributions, we should first allow her to be situated according to her own 
social-geopolitical location.  
 
1. A (Very Brief) Biography 
 Born in Calcutta on February 24, 1942, during the last days of “British India”656 
during World War II, Spivak describes her upbringing as “growing up as a middle-class 
child.”657  Educated first at a Christian missionary school, Spivak credits the women 
teachers she had in school having an early influence on her, noting that they were 
“women who were absolutely underprivileged but who had dehegemonized Christianity 
in order to occupy a space where they could teach social superiors.”658  Growing up at a 
time when India was achieving political independence, she recalls in interviews how her 
own experience of coming of age and receiving an education—primary, secondary, and 
                                                
 654 For example, see Stephen Morton, Gayatri Spivak (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); and Mark 
Sanders, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: Live Theory (New York: Continuum, 2006).  I am indebted to both 
of these texts for foundational information provided in the early part of this section of the current chapter. 
 655 For example, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, 
Dialogues, ed. Sarah Harasym (London: Routledge, 1990).  Furthermore, Sangeeta Ray has published an 
ambitious and insightful study of Spivak, which in part critiques the aforementioned curating of Spivak’s 
disparate interviews without fuller context and background.  In addition to the texts mentioned above in 
note 45, I am also grateful for the supplemental background—especially the biographical and contextual 
contributions—Ray provides; see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: In Other Words (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
Publishers, 2009).  Additionally, important interviews are found in The Spivak Reader, eds. Donna Landry 
and Gerald Maclean (London: Routledge, 1996), esp. 15-28 and 287-308. 
 656 Spivak’s phrase.  See Leon de Kock, “Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: New Nation 
Writers Conference in South Africa,” Ariel: A Review of International English Literature 23 (1992): 32. 
 657 Spivak, “Bonding in Difference: Interview with Alfred Arteaga,” in The Spivak Reader, eds. 
Landry and Maclean, 16. She goes on in more detail to explain: “I come from the bottom layer of the upper 
middle class or the top layer of the lower middle class, depending on which side of the family you are 
choosing” (17). 
 658 Spivak, “Bonding in Difference,” 17. 
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undergraduate—at this time distinguished her experience from that of those who would 
follow just a generation after her.  “We were not adults; yet we were not born after 
independence.  In a way, it’s more interesting to have been in my generation than to have 
been a midnight’s child, to have been born at independence, to be born free from 
chronological accident.”659 
 Spivak began studies in 1955 at Presidency College of the University of Calcutta 
and graduated in 1959 with First Class Honors (in accord with the British university 
system) with a bachelor’s degree in English literature.  She described her experience as 
one reflecting her and her peers’ unique historical location: “My generation at college 
was among the first generations to really kind of feel that they were in independent 
India.”660  Shortly thereafter she began preliminary graduate work and, as she explained 
in an interview, borrowed money to attend Cornell University in the United States having 
by that point decided firmly against studying in England but still wanting to have an 
experience outside of India.661  At Cornell Spivak earned a master’s degree in 
comparative literature and in 1965 took a job at the University of Iowa while finishing 
her doctoral dissertation on W. B. Yeats under the direction of Paul de Man.662  At this 
point, neither Spivak nor de Man had read the work of Jacques Derrida, a philosopher 
who would come to play a major role in each of their lives.663  In the case of Spivak, her 
                                                
 659 Spivak, “Bonding in Difference,” 17. 
 660 de Kock, “Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” 32. 
 661 de Kock, “Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” 33. 
 662 Spivak later revised her research and published it as Myself Must I Remake: The Life and 
Poetry of W. B. Yeats (New York: Thomas Crowley Publishing, 1974).  Though this text is not well known, 
even by Spivak scholars, I believe it is no mere coincidence that this example of her early independent 
work begins in the published form with a nod to British imperialism and colonialism.  The very opening 
line of the book reads: “Ireland, that beautiful green island off the western coast of England, was ruled by 
the English for over eight hundred years” (1). 
 663 Regarding Paul de Man and Derrida, they would become intellectual interlocutors and friends.  
De Man came under serious scrutiny after it was revealed in 1987 that he had been a journalist for German-
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connection to Derrida came through her translation and introductory work on the English 
edition of his Of Grammatology, which was published in French in 1967 and which 
Spivak purchased shortly thereafter.664  It was this translation that first brought her to 
international attention after its publication in 1976, but her own contributions to the fields 
of literary criticism, feminism, contemporary Marxism, and postcolonialism—all of 
which have been deeply influenced by deconstruction following the work of Derrida—
have garnered Spivak her own acclaim.  In addition to her numerous essays, book 
chapters, and books, her translation work continued, albeit to English from Mahasweta 
Devi’s Bengali rather than Derrida’s French.665 
 Over the decades Spivak has held numerous academic posts and is currently 
University Professor in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at 
Columbia University.  Though best known for her work in postcolonial theory and 
literary criticism, her primary self-identification is as a teacher and a pedagogue whose 
interests include working to highlight marginalized ways of knowing within an otherwise 
                                                                                                                                            
controlled papers during World War II and his writings reflected an overt anti-Semitism.  Derrida 
maintained a complicated relationship with de Man, which can be seen in his essay, “Like the Sound of the 
Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War,” Critical Inquiry 14 (1988): 590-652; and, shortly thereafter, 
in the expanded monograph, Memoires for Paul de Man, trans. Avital Ronell and Eduardo Cadava, rev. ed. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).  Also, for an analysis of this relationship, see Jon Wiener, 
“The Responsibilities of Friendship: Jacques Derrida on Paul de Man’s Collaboration,” Critical Inquiry 15 
(1989): 797-803. 
 664 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976 [rev. ed., 1997]). Spivak has recently released a new and fully revised 
translation of the text in honor of its fortieth anniversary of publication: Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 40th Anniversary ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2016). 
 665 These are Spivak’s translations of Mahasweta Devi’s writing, which itself has been 
occasionally incorporated into or the focus of Spivak’s literary criticism.  For a sampling, see Mahasweta 
Devi, Imaginary Maps, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: Routledge, 1994); Mahasweta Devi, 
Breast Stories, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Seagull Books, 1997); and Mahasweta Devi, 
Chotti Munda and His Arrow, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 
2003). 
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hegemonic system of western knowledge production.666  Additionally, Spivak travels 
internationally to work with educators in rural parts of the world, particularly in India and 
Bangladesh, doing what she calls “fieldwork,” an effort to foster rural literacy.667 
 
2. Highlighting Some Key Themes in Spivak’s Work 
 As would be expected, a full treatment of Spivak’s work exceeds the aim and 
scope of this project.  Such an effort is a separate and worthwhile project (or projects) in 
its own right.  What follows in this subsection is a basic overview of some key themes in 
Spivak’s work, which are presented here to provide a theoretical framework for situating 
and understanding better her concept of “planetarity” that will be examined in the next 
subsection. 
 Perhaps the most well known theme of Spivak’s expansive corpus is that of the 
ability (or lack thereof) of the “subaltern” to “speak,” an inquiry made famous by the 
titular essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”668  The term “subaltern” has its origins in 
Marxist studies long before postcolonial theory emerged as an independent discipline.  
                                                
 666 In addition to her attestation of this in various interviews, this is perhaps best seen in the essays 
collected in two volumes: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine; and, especially, 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012). 
 667 One example of this theory-to-praxis movement can be seen in the foundation she established 
in 1997, the Pares Chandra and Sivani Chakravorty Memorial Foundation for Rural Education, which funds 
primary schools in West Bengal, India, and provides ongoing educational formation for local teachers and 
farmers. 
 668 This essay has become a touchstone of postcolonial studies and has been anthologized in many 
places.  The original edition of the essay is “Can the Subaltern Speak” Speculations on Widow-Sacrafice,” 
Wedge 7/8 (1985): 120-130, but was shortly thereafter expanded into the most oft-cited edition: “Can the 
Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence 
Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271-313.  Decades later, a conference was 
convened on the interpretation and influence of this essay, the contributions of which were later published 
in a volume that included a revised version of Spivak’s essay that sought to clarify many of the repeated 
misinterpretations of her thesis and arguments: see Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of 
an Idea, ed. Rosalind Morris (New York: Columbia University, 2010), 21-78 [All future references to this 
essay will be from this edition unless otherwise noted]. 
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Most narrations of the emergence of this “social category” trace its first usage in this 
sense to the work of the Italian communist thinker Antonio Gramsci, from whom the 
“Indian Subaltern Studies Group” adopted the moniker.669  Spivak takes the category of 
the subaltern from Gramsci’s near-synonymous use of it for the proletariat and 
appropriates it as a category for the muted and most marginalized of marginalized people; 
people who have been erased by systems of colonial logic.670   
 Spivak has been critical of what she understands to be the frequent 
misappropriation of the category of the subaltern.  She explains in an interview that, 
“everyone thinks the subaltern is just a classy word for the oppressed, for the other, for 
somebody who’s not getting a piece of the pie.”671  One of the key distinguishing 
characteristics of what constitutes this group is precisely the inability to speak (or, more 
accurately, the impossibility of being heard).  An essential marker of subalternity is the 
impossibility of self-representation, which results in effective invisibility and the erasure 
of agency.  For someone to claim this status for themselves or for another group is 
precisely counter to the condition for being subaltern.  The subaltern is not properly a 
“subject” and cannot properly be a subject precisely because she is not recognized by, 
what Spivak calls, the “hegemonic discourse” of the given epistemological frame or, 
alternatively, to borrow from Foucault, the operative “systems of knowledge production.”  
The subaltern does not nor cannot “speak” the language of the empire or in a register that 
                                                
 669 For example, see The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. David 
Forgacs (New York: NYU Press, 2000); Antonio Gramsci, The Southern Question, trans. Pasquale 
Verdicchio (West Lafayette: Bordighera Press, 1995); and Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
eds., Selected Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 670 It is important to note that Spivak herself disapproves of the use of the qualifier “marginalized” 
for its popularity and lack of particularity (a point to which I am sympathetic).  Nevertheless, due to the 
limitations of discursive resources in this regard, I have chosen to keep some of this discussion colloquial 
for the sake of intelligibility rather than invoke or be forced to invent perceptively trendy neologisms.  
 671 de Kock, “Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” 45.   
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is perceptible to those who operate within the parameters of such hegemony.  The 
subaltern cannot be recognized and therefore is something more akin to a specter that 
haunts the imperial and even neocolonial context than a participant in the social or 
political sphere.  This is not for the subaltern’s lack of trying to speak or for actually 
existing at the margins of reality.  One striking quality of subalternity about which Spivak 
theorizes is the abject inability to encounter, recognize, or hear the subaltern because, if 
or when you are able to do so, even in a theoretical sense, the person previously 
conceived as subaltern is de facto no longer such.   
 One of Spivak’s major contributions in developing this concept in a post-Marxist 
fashion is to uncover the gendered reality of the subaltern, which was overlooked by 
Gramsci and by the Subaltern Studies project of which Spivak had been most critical.672  
Spivak’s critique of those engaged in the Subaltern Studies project had to do with the 
essentialism upon which the historiography of the subaltern groups of India’s 
independence movement was predicated.  The fragmented and marginal nature of 
“unheard” subaltern persons was masked over by a collective presentation expressed in 
the discourse of the elite, which silenced and erased subaltern women in their 
particularity all the more.  Spivak goes after the flawed historiography that cannot take 
into account the lived reality of the subaltern by virtue of the narration’s hegemonic 
logic, which has no room for nor means to recognize the “social conditions and practices 
of subaltern groups in their own terms.”673  As Stephen Morton nicely summarizes, “If 
the subaltern’s political voice and agency could not be retrieved from the archive of 
colonial or elite nationalist histories, then it could perhaps be gradually re-inscribed 
                                                
 672 See Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” esp. 37-66.  Also, see Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, 49-56. 
 673 Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 50. Emphasis original. 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 259 
through a critique of dominant historical representation.”674  And this is Spivak’s agenda, 
which she acknowledges bears an inherent political and even social-activist goal, even if 
the latter aim is indeterminate at the theoretical stage.675 
 Spivak’s work refuses to simply “represent” the subaltern as she accuses the 
Subaltern Studies project of doing, for such a homogenizing of difference falls prey to a 
temptation toward uncritical essentialism and the silencing of the subaltern.676  The 
subaltern must “start participating in the production of knowledge about themselves,” 
which is hitherto preempted by the dominant colonial logic and resultant discourse.677  As 
a result, Spivak shows that not only are they effectively “silenced” and “erased from 
history,” but also they are not even aware of their own struggle so that they “could 
articulate [herself or] himself as its subject.”678  What is at stake goes far beyond the 
politics of nationalism or class recognition to include criticism of operative 
epistemologies and whole systems of representation, signification, and meaning.679 
 By way of a brief anticipatory interlude, it is worth noting how the critical and 
deconstructive reading of historiography deployed by Spivak in the case of the Subaltern 
Studies project lends contemporary theologians a path to rereading the master narratives 
about creation and humanity’s place within it, which have been written and reinforced by 
means of a hegemonic discourse and a kind of colonial logic.  Difference in the other-
                                                
 674 Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 51. 
 675 Spivak has been the focus of criticism for her theory and method as well on the grounds that 
her postcolonial theorizing is itself a form of neocolonial intellectualizing.  For example, see R. O’Hanlon, 
“Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia,” Modern 
Asian Studies 22 (1988): 189-224, and Benita Parry, “Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse,” 
Oxford Literary Review 9 (1987): 27-58. 
 676 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman’s 
Text from the Third World,” In Other Worlds (London: Routledge, 1998), 349-351. 
 677 Spivak, “A Literary Representation of the Subaltern,” 349. 
 678 Spivak, “A Literary Representation of the Subaltern,” 350.  Also, see Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 259. 
 679 It is in this sense that Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy continues to be a key source of 
influence and a methodological heuristic for Spivak’s ongoing work. 
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than-human world has been flattened and erased by “elite” narratives of human 
superiority and sovereignty.  The result has been more than theoretical or “purely 
theological,” and instead has had drastic environmental effects that likewise mirror the 
political and social activist imperative Spivak highlights in her writings about the 
subaltern and responsibility to contest hegemonic systems of subjugation and erasure.  As 
we will explore in greater detail later in this chapter and in the conclusion, a challenge for 
humanity is to resist the hubris that reduces all agential expression and subjective 
communication to modes of human discourse.  Theologians, drawing perhaps from the 
Christian mystical and scriptural traditions, might discover (or, better, rediscover) a 
discipline that recognizes the manifold worlds (umwelten) within which other-than-
human creatures live and move and have their being, and from which they articulate 
themselves according to modalities of expression (e.g., “speaking”) otherwise proscribed 
by the hegemonic logic of anthropocentrism. 
 Another key theme in Spivak’s work is what she calls in an interview with 
Elizabeth Grosz, “un-learning our privilege as our loss.”680  While the concept as such 
emerges from within Spivak’s critique of western feminism, it serves well as an 
illustration of a recurring strategy in Spivak’s broader work.  Morton explains that, “this 
project [of unlearning our privilege as our loss] involves recognizing how dominant 
representations of the world in literature, history, or the media encourage people to forget 
about the lives and experiences of disempowered groups.”681  In the context of western 
feminism, unacknowledged privilege—the personal disadvantages an individual might 
                                                
 680 Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic, 9.  For a more-expansive discussion about the concept, see 
Sara Danius and Stefan Jonsson, “An Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,” Boundary 2 20 (1993): 
24-50. 
 681 Morton, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 77. 
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experience notwithstanding—and “ethnocentric universality” (to borrow a phrase from 
Chandra Mohanty)682 further occludes the existence of the subaltern, the particularity of 
the subjugated individual or group, and contributes to their erasure.  Additionally, this 
system of marginalization, silencing, and erasure is the very condition for the 
establishment of a privileged identity.  It is in this way that Spivak also continues to be 
informed by Derridean deconstruction of binary oppositions that seek subjectivity by 
establishing an oppositional relationship to the other.683 
 The imperative presented is for those in the center to embrace a critical self-
awareness and self-consciousness of one’s relationship to the other so as to not slip into 
the trap of representation and the reinscription of silencing norms.  An example of this 
drawn from the common critique of western feminism is the presumption that all Muslim 
women who wear the Burka are doing so because they occupy a place of subjugation, 
when in fact there are some women who elect to dress in that manner in an effort to 
exercise their agency in the form of deliberate self-expression.  Such privilege in need of 
critique extends beyond social location to include gender, race, ethnicity, and class, 
among other categories.  What it means then to unlearn one’s privilege as one’s loss, as 
Spivak says elsewhere, is that “the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-
hegemonize their position and themselves learn how to occupy the subject position of the 
other,” so as to move beyond the repetition of ethnocentric universality.684  This critical 
awareness will become especially important in our current project in critically analyzing 
                                                
 682 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses,” Feminist Review 30 (1988): 66. 
 683 For an excellent constructive project that illustrates this process well in the case of race and 
gender, see Ellen T. Armour, Deconstruction, Feminist Theology, and the Problem of Difference: 
Subverting the Race/Gender Divide (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
 684 Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic, 121. 
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the human position within the broader context of creation, governed as it generally is by 
the colonial logic and discourse of anthropocentrism, which itself is a form of privilege. 
 Finally, while there are indeed many other themes in Spivak’s work worthy of 
closer attention, we conclude this subsection with an eye toward another omnipresent 
concern of Spivak’s critical scholarship that directly lead to her development of the 
neologism “planetarity,” which will be more fully examined in the next subsection.  This 
concern is pedagogy.  Though Spivak positions herself primarily as a teacher and 
therefore her pedagogical interests are indeed aimed, at times, at the classroom or within 
the academy as such (what she calls “the teaching machine”), her interest in pedagogy 
extends beyond the confines of formal education to include epistemological critique of 
knowledge production in various institutions.  According to postcolonial theorist Bart 
Moore-Gilbert, this emphasis on pedagogy distinguishes Spivak from fellow postcolonial 
theory pioneers such as Edward Said and Homi Bhabha, neither of whom addresses the 
subject of pedagogy in such a concerted manner.685  Although much of her work is 
relevant to numerous areas of academic inquiry, many of Spivak’s essays focus on “the 
context of the teaching environment and the problems which it involves,” and in a 
particular manner her work “seeks new ways to admit non-Western cultural production 
into the Western academy without side-stepping its challenges to metropolitan canons 
and modes of study and consequently perpetuating the ‘subalternization’ of so-called 
‘third-world’ literatures.”686  In this assessment of her interest, a clue to her methodology 
is revealed.  Spivak writes in a simultaneously critical and self-aware manner that allows 
                                                
 685 Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London: Verso Press, 
1997), 77. 
 686 Morre-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory, 77. An excellent illustration of this pedagogical frame for 
postcolonial criticism is Spivak’s essay, “A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman’s Text 
from the Third World,” in In Other Worlds, 332-370. 
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her to identify her own complicity in the neo-colonization of knowledge as one situated 
comfortably within the Western academy.  This move allows her to then engage texts, 
systems, institutions, and cultures directly, albeit in a prose that is strikingly ambivalent 
(and understandably so given the complexity of intellectual and political vectors 
intersecting at any given time in her projects).687  The result is an admittedly difficult 
style that performs an ongoing series of “negotiations,” which is the term Spivak prefers 
in describing her deconstructive efforts.   
 The centrality of pedagogy in her thought and work reflects, in a sense, the 
previous theme named above—that is, “unlearning one’s privilege as one’s loss”—in 
practice.  At its core, such a critical disposition seeks to uncover the instability and 
fragility of positions and structures once viewed as “natural” or self-evident.  Another 
layer added to the complexity of her critical work is the manner in which she is open to 
the impermanence of her own thought, acknowledging shifts in thinking and a critical 
approach to thinking that is “aware of the limits of knowing.”688  She thereby 
demonstrates in her writing a process of critical analysis that she seeks to model, which is 
admittedly in constant need of revision and which can never be absolute.689  What is at 
stake is the question of how (and according to whom) political identities are constructed 
and negotiated.  In alignment with Said’s insight best expressed in his classic text 
Orientalism, Spivak’s view is that the elite classes (in a given society, academic system, 
etc.) “create” the Other in terms and according to categories that ultimately silence and 
                                                
 687 The complexity of Spivak’s thought and writing is highlighted by multiple classification of 
Spivak’s “method” under five different headings in the collection, Redrawing the Boundaries: The 
Transformation of English and American Literary Studies, eds. Stephen J. Greenblatt and Giles B. Gunn 
(New York: MLA Press, 1992). 
 688 Gayatri Charavorty Spivak, “More on Power/Knowledge,” in The Spivak Reader, 142. 
 689 In a sense, this is the impetus for her essay “More on Power/Knowledge,” which is the 
occasion for Spivak to revise her position on the potential contributions of Michele Foucault, whom she 
underestimated years earlier beginning with her landmark essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 
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erase the oppressed, especially the subaltern.  Spivak describes the mode of this 
production and its implications best herself in an essay titled, “Who Claims Alterity?” 
 
How are historical narratives put together?  In order to get to something 
like an answer to that question, I will make use of the notions of writing 
and reading in the most general sense.  We produce historical narratives 
and historical explanations by transforming the socius, upon which our 
production is written into more or less continuous and controllable bits 
that are readable.  How these readings emerge and which ones get 
sanctioned have political implications on every possible level.690 
 
The construction, repetition (conscious or otherwise), dissemination, critique, 
contestation, and appropriation of historical narratives are directly affected by questions 
pertaining to pedagogical theory.   
 This all too brief survey of some key themes in Spivak’s work does not do justice 
to the breadth and depth of her work and unfortunately many themes have had to be 
bracketed (e.g., her contributions to the fields of feminism, ethics, translation, etc.) in 
order to move on to Spivak’s concept that is most of interest to this current project; 
namely, “planetarity.”  What has been examined in this section provides background to 
this important and fecund concept, which will be the focus of the remainder of this 
section and the rest of this chapter. 
 
3. The Development of ‘Planetarity’ 
 Spivak first spoke about the concept of “planetarity” on December 16, 1997 while 
delivering a keynote address to the Swiss non-governmental organization Stiftung-
                                                
 690 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Who Claims Alterity?” in An Aesthetic Education in the Era of 
Globalization, 57. 
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Dialogik.691  In a 2006 article, Spivak explains that this organization “had been formed to 
give shelter to refugees from the Third Reich,” but that in the 1990s it had shifted its 
focus to “accommodate refugees from various countries of Asia and Africa, torn asunder 
by violence and poverty.”692  It was on this occasion of marking the organization’s 
redirected attention to “new” refugees and immigrants that Spivak offered the first in a 
newly inaugurated series of lectures on the current state of global affairs and migration.  
Spivak later explained her aim in introducing the neologism planetarity to Stifung-
Dialogik in Zurich. 
 
I was asking them to change their mindset, not just their policy.  And I 
recommended planetarity because “planet-thought opens up to embrace an 
inexhaustible taxonomy of such names including but not identical with 
animism as well as the spectral white mythology of post-rational science.”  
By “planet thought” I meant a mind-set that thought that we lived on, 
specifically, a planet.  I continue to think that to be human is to be 
intended toward exteriority.  And, if we can get to planet-feeling, the 
outside or other is indefinite.693 
 
The presenting target of her criticism is the rapid expansion of “globalization” and its 
particular system of knowledge production, for which planetarity offers an alternative.  
She opens her address with a nod to the work of Hermann Levin Goldschmidt, in which 
he advocates for a philosophy of “dialogics” that does not settle for either a comfortable, 
universal solution as the necessary outcome of dialectics or a kind of rampant pluralism, 
                                                
 691 The full text of address, in both English and German, was subsequently published as: Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, Imperatives to Re-imagine the Planet/Imperativ zur Neuerfindung des Planenten, ed. 
Willi Goetschel (Vienna: Verlag Passagen, 1999).  A slightly revised version later appeared in 2012 as 
“Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” in An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, 335-350.  
For the sake of ease of accessibility, all future references to this address come from the 2012 edition unless 
otherwise noted. 
 692 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “World Systems & The Creole,” Narrative 14 (2006): 107. 
 693 Spivak, “World Systems & The Creole,” 107. 
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but rather affirms the “freedom of contradiction without synthesis.”694  It is within this 
frame that her deconstructive reading of the state of globalization finds a welcome 
context.   
 Recalling the problematic effects of colonial logic and hegemonic discourse that 
silences the subaltern, one can recognize the inherent epistemological dangers of 
globalization.  Spivak explains: 
 
Globalization is achieved by the imposition of the same system of 
exchange everywhere.  It is not too fanciful to say that, in the gridwork of 
electronic capital, we achieve something that resembles that abstract ball 
covered in latitudes and longitudes, cut by virtual lines, once the equator 
and the tropics, now drawn increasingly by other requirements—
imperatives?—of Geographical Information Systems.695 
 
Globalization is a form—perhaps better, the form—of neocolonialism in the 
contemporary age.  As Sangeeta Ray explains, “Since globalization is tied to the march of 
capital and development, the other is erased as other, consolidated as the almost same, 
reproduced as subjects of tradition, or negated as not quite subject yet of Reason.”696  
And yet, Spivak is also quick to point out that just like the colonial logic of Eurocentric 
imperialism of decades and centuries past, globalization is not “real” but a fiction created 
to shelter a strategic deployment of power.  “The globe is on our computers.  It is the logo 
of the World Bank.  No one lives there; and we think that we can aim to control 
globality,” writes Spivak.697  Her response is to re-imagine the planet as a means for 
                                                
 694 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 335.  For the work of Goldschmidt, see Freiheit 
für den Widerspruch (Schaffhausen: Verlag Novalis, 1976); and Die Frage des Mitmenschen und des 
Mitvolkes: 1951-1992 (Zürich: Selbstverlag, 1992), the latter of which addresses the issue of migration 
through the lens of his dialogical proposal. 
 695 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338. 
 696 Ray, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: In Other Words, 84. 
 697 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338. 
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seeking a new way to understand subjectivity, identity construction, and the adjudication 
of alterity apart from totalizing colonial logic of capital and the nation-state.   
 As always, her concern is to call to mind the subaltern, not simply as a theoretical 
universal category of disenfranchised people, but as a community of real individuals 
whose identity is stripped by the homogenizing and marginalizing effects of 
globalization.  Furthermore, her interest in proposing planetarity is pedagogical, 
encouraging a mindset shift that requires a kind of reeducation in place of a mere change 
in policy.  Spivak suggests that, “The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to 
another system; and yet we inhabit it, indeed are it.  It is not really amenable to a neat 
contrast with the globe.  I cannot say [the planet] ‘on the other hand.’”698  The reason 
planetarity does not allow for a “neat contrast” with globalization is because the planet, 
conceived as Spivak advocates, is not of our making.  It exists a priori and serves as the 
true ground of alterity in a way that “the globe” as a product of globalization (and not 
merely a synonym for the planet Earth) cannot because the latter is the fabrication of 
capitalist and state powers whereas the former is something else entirely.   
 Being avowedly disinterested in religion as such, Spivak does not propose an 
explicitly theological solution or divine source for the planet.699  Instead, she offers a 
notably agnostic and even ambivalent list of a possible “origin of this animating gift of 
animation, if there is any: Mother, Nation, God, Nature.”700  Though she circumscribes an 
                                                
 698 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338. 
 699 However, like Jacques Derrida in his later years, Spivak has become increasingly interested in 
questions centering on ethics and has been more open to discussions with theologians and philosophers of 
religion about the possible intersections between their fields.  Perhaps the most sustained illustrations of 
this is the volume: Planetary Loves: Spivak, Postcoloniality, and Theology, eds. Stephen Moore and Mayra 
Rivera (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011). 
 700 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338.  Ray keenly observes that Spivak rejects 
any individual one of these figurations because, in something of a Rahnerian vorgriff ad esse move, Spivak 
believes that alterity (and a fortiori the source of this foundational alterity) exists logically and temporally 
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endorsement of any one originating name over another, she nevertheless acknowledges 
that these all “are names of alterity, some more radical than others” and that “Planet-
thought opens [us] up to embrace an inexhaustible taxonomy of such names.”701  In the 
next section, we will begin to look at how, from a theological perspective, the figuration 
of God as the “origin of this animating gift of animation” aligns well with the a 
constructive project that retrieves the resources of the Christian tradition of kinship while 
developing a contemporary community of creation paradigm.  However, at this time, it is 
important to say a little more about Spivak’s arguments and proposal as such. 
 Returning to the original impetus for the introduction of planetarity, Spivak’s 
interest is in modeling a way of thinking-in and being-in-the-world that can recognize the 
manifold realities of this planet’s inhabitants, most of whom are not visible to or included 
in “the globe.”  Her starting point for developing the concept of planetarity is rooted in a 
philosophical anthropology that takes as its starting point the imperative to “think” the 
subaltern.  She writes: “In order to think the migrant as well as the recipient of foreign 
aid, we must think the other.  To think the other, as everyone knows, is one meaning of 
being human.”702  The centrality given to alterity and the recognition of agency 
transcending the limited and politicized categories that result from globalization emerges 
somewhat counterintuitively from the recognition of our cosmic location.  Spivak 
explains:  
 
If we imagine ourselves as planetary accidents rather than global agents, 
planetary creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived 
from us, it is not our dialectical negation, it contains us as much as it flings 
                                                                                                                                            
prior to any religious or philosophical reflection of naming (see Ray, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: In Other 
Words, 84). 
 701 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338. 
 702 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 338. 
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us away—and thus to think of it is already to transgress, for, in spite of our 
forays into what we metaphorize, differently, as outer and inner space, 
what is above and beyond our own reach is not continuous with us as it is 
not, indeed, specifically discontinuous.  My efforts for the last decade tell 
me that, if we ask the kinds of questions you are asking [about immigrants 
and refugees], seriously, we must persistently educate ourselves into this 
peculiar mind-set.703 
 
But how does one acquire this “peculiar mind-set?”  Spivak offers at least one tentative 
answer to this question in her 2003 book Death of a Discipline, in which she argues for 
the frame of planetarity as that which should govern the ever-fracturing field of 
comparative literature.704   
 Again, we see her pedagogical interest come into focus as she interrogates her 
own area of academic specialization, concerned about the state and future of a discipline.  
Though the presenting symptom is literary in this case, I believe there are insights worth 
considering for broader educational reflection.  Spivak alludes to this herself near the end 
of her closing chapter on planetarity, and writes: “I keep feeling that there are 
connections to be made that I cannot make, that pluralization may allow the imagining of 
a necessary yet impossible planetarity that neither my reader nor I know yet.”705  She uses 
literary text as the vehicle for such opportunities for imagining alternatively, for 
“returning” (in a non-reactionary way) to a conceptual place that has now become 
unfamiliar, “uncanny” (unheimlich) in the borrowed grammar of Freud.  Spivak 
encourages the encounter with and embrace of the uncanny, which can be the process by 
which—whether through literature or another medium perhaps—one may reimagine the 
globe as planet.  “The Heimlich/Unheimlich relationship is indeed, formally, the 
                                                
 703 Spivak, “Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet,” 339.  
 704 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2003). 
 705 Spivak, Death of a Discipline, 92. 
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defamiliarization of a familiar space…Colonialism, decolonization, and postcoloniality 
involved special kinds of traffic with people deemed ‘other’—the familiarity of a 
presumed common humanity defamiliarized, as it were.”706  To put it plainly, the 
“reality” of globalization and its effects that have been taken to be and remain so familiar 
are, in fact, quite the opposite of what it means to imagine a world and humanity within it 
according to planetarity, which has not become so unfamiliar.  What is at stake is a matter 
of operative epistemology and what must change is the means by which the inquiring 
mind is formed. 
 
C. The Theological Grammar of ‘Planetarity’ 
 Spivak’s early work in postcolonial theory is unapologetically critical of—if not 
expressly hostile toward—the discipline of theology and, given the complicity of 
religious institutions in the history of European colonization, it is not surprising that 
someone concerned with the agency of the subaltern, the unlearning of one’s privileged 
epistemologies, and the formation of transformative pedagogy would be skeptical of or 
even hostile toward religion.  And yet, the complex relationship between the colonial 
center and religious thinking notwithstanding, several theologians and scholars of 
religion have been attracted to postcolonial theory in general and Spivak’s work in 
particular.  The work of theologians and biblical scholars engaging postcolonial theory 
over the last three decades lays out a precedential path for contemporary projects such as 
this dissertation. 
 
1. Foundations of Postcolonial Theology 
                                                
 706 Spivak, Death of a Discipline, 77. 
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 Among the first religious scholars to engage postcolonial theory seriously were 
those who specialize in biblical studies.  Some of the early interlocutors with postcolonial 
theory in biblical hermeneutics and scriptural studies were R. S. Sugirtharajah, Fernando 
F. Segovia, and  Musa W. Dube.  In many ways, Sugirtharajah has come to be recognized 
as the “father” of postcolonial biblical interpretation.  Having published early key texts 
such as The Postcolonial Bible, Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism: 
Contesting Interpretations, and The Bible and the Third World: Precolonial, Colonial, 
and Postcolonial Encounters, his books and editorial work have shaped a new subfield 
within the discipline of biblical scholarship.707  Segovia, whose foundational work in 
Latino/a scriptural hermeneutics later led him to engage biblical scholarship with 
postcolonial theory, offers something of a cartographical outline for developing what he 
calls a “postcolonial optic” in reading scripture.708  Though he does not follow her model 
closely, Segovia’s work bears a resemblance to Spivak’s in that he is also concerned 
about pedagogy and the formation of critically reflective praxis.  A former student of 
Segovia, Dube, a Methodist scripture scholar who teaches in Botswana, is best known for 
                                                
 707 See R. S. Sugirtharajah, ed., The Postcolonial Bible (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1998); R. S. Sugirtharajah, Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialsm: Contesting Interpretations 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); R. S. Sugirtharajah, The Bible and the Third World: 
Precolonial, Colonial, and Postcolonial Encounters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); R. S. 
Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002); R. S. Sugirtharajah, Postcolonial Reconfigurations: An Alternative Way of Reading the Bible and 
Doing Theology (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2003); R. S. Sugirtharajah, The Bible and Empire: Postcolonial 
Explorations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); R. S. Sugirtharajah, ed., The Postcolonial 
Biblical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006); and R. S. Sugirtharajah, Exploring Postcolonial 
Biblical Criticism: History, Method, Practice (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishers, 2011); among others.  
Now an emeritus professor at the University of Birmingham, Sugirtharajah remains the series editor for 
Bloomsbury Academic’s “Bible and Postcolonialism” series. 
 708 See Fernando F. Segovia, Decolonizing Biblical Studies: A View from the Margins (Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 2000), esp. 119-144.  Segovia’s work has been published in numerous volumes and journals, 
a sampling of his editorial contributions include Postcolonial Biblical Criticism: Interdisciplinary 
Intersections, eds. Fernando F. Segovia and Stephen D. Moore (New York: Continuum, 2007) and A 
Postcolonial Commentary on the New Testament Writings, eds. Fernando F. Segovia and R. S. 
Sugirtharajah (New York: Bloomsbury, 2009), among others. 
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her 2000 book Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible, in which she 
compellingly interrogates the double bind of the gendered postcolonial subject as 
portrayed in the colonized readings of the bible and literature.709  This early biblical work 
has inspired a whole generation of scripture scholars that have taken up the task of 
working with a postcolonial hermeneutic.710 
 The engagement of theology and postcolonial theory arrived not long after the 
biblical studies field took up the task in earnest.  Beginning in the early 2000s it was first 
feminist theologians who saw in postcolonial theory the promise of theological 
engagement.  Catherine Keller, a professor at Drew University and founder of the 
Transdisciplinary Theological Colloquia, has edited several volumes featuring 
constructive theological engagements with postcolonial theory, authored numerous 
essays in the area, and has incorporated postcolonial themes in her books.  One 
particularly influential essay of Keller’s is “The Love of Postcolonialism: Theology in the 
Interstices of Empire,” which is part apologia for her work in postcolonial theology as a 
white, American, feminist theologian and part heuristic for further theological 
reflection.711  Kwok Pui-lan, a professor at Episcopal Divinity School, has been a pioneer 
in postcolonial feminist theology.  Kwok’s most well known work is found in her 2005 
book Postcolonial Imagination & Feminist Theology, in which she engages questions 
                                                
 709 See Musa W. Dube, Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 
2000). 
 710 The list of scholars and their work is too numerous to include in full here, but a sampling of 
some of the notable contributors to this still-growing field include Neil Elliott (United Theological 
Seminary/Fortress Press), Stephen D. Moore (Drew University), Erin Runions (Pomona College), Laura E. 
Donaldson (Cornell University), Roland Boer (University of Newcastle), and Tat-Siong Benny Liew 
(College of the Holy Cross), among others. 
 711 See Catherine Keller, “The Love of Postcolonialism: Theology in the Interstices of Empire,” in 
Postcolonial Theologies: Divinity and Empire, eds. Catherine Keller, Michael Nausner, and Mayra Rivera 
(St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2004), 221-242.  Also, for additional examples, see Catherine Keller, Face of the 
Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003); Catherine Keller, God and Power: Counter-
Apocalyptic Journeys (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005); and Catherine Keller, Cloud of the Impossible: 
Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
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found at the intersection of theology, postcolonial theory, feminist theory, and gender 
theory.712  Joerg Rieger, a professor at the Perkins School of Theology at Southern 
Methodist University, has written extensively on the subject of liberation theologies, 
economics, postcolonial theory, and marginalized voices.  Perhaps his best-known work 
in postcolonial theology is Christ & Empire: From Paul to Postcolonial Times.713  Like 
the pioneering work of the biblical scholars mentioned earlier, the work of these three 
theologians, in addition to others scholars,714 has helped shape a new but growing 
subfield of postcolonial theological reflection.715   
 
2. Engaging Spivak Theologically 
 In addition to the engagement of postcolonial theory with biblical studies and 
theology generally, several theologians have examined the possible theological 
sensibilities of Spivak’s postcolonial criticism.  As stated earlier, Spivak herself is not 
                                                
 712 See Kwok Pui-lan, Postcolonial Imagination & Feminist Theology (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2005).  Also, see Beyond Colonial Anglicanism: The Anglican Communion in the 
Twenty-First Century, eds. Ian I. Douglas and Kwok Pui-lan (New York: Church Publishing, 2001); 
Postcolonialism, Feminism, & Religious Discourse, eds. Laura E. Donaldson and Kwok Pui-lan (London: 
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 713 Joerg Rieger, Christ & Empire: From Paul to Postcolonial Times (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2007).  Also, see Opting for the Margins: Postmodernity and Liberation in Christian Theology, ed. Joerg 
Rieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Joerg Rieger, God and the Excluded: Visions and 
Blindspots in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009); and Nestor Miguez, Joerg 
Rieger, Jung Mo Sung, Beyond the Spirit of Empire (London: SCM Press, 2009); among others. 
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Gender, and Politics (London: Routledge, 2000); and Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New 
Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999). 
 715 For a sampling of postcolonial theological work, see Susan Abraham, Identity, Ethics, and 
Nonviolence in Postcolonial Theory: A Rahnerian Theological Assessment (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007); Marion Grau, Rethinking Mission in the Postcolony: Salvation, Society, and Subversion 
(New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011); Wonhee Anne Joh, Heart of the Cross: A Postcolonial 
Christology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006); Jea Sophia Oh, A Postcolonial Theology of 
Life: Planetarity East and West (Upland, CA: Sopher Press, 2011); Diarmuid O’Murchu, On Being a 
Postcolonial Christian: Embracing an Empowering Faith (Charleston: CreateSpace Publishing, 2014); 
Mayra Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2007); and Mark Lewis Taylor, The Theological and the Political: On the Weight of the 
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expressly interested in theological reflection.716  As Stephen Moore once put it, “the 
relationship of Spivak’s thought to theology is oblique, to say the least.”717  And yet, as 
Moore goes on to explain, despite the complex (if not at times overtly hostile) 
relationship between Spivak’s criticism and the academic exercise of theology, this 
encounter between two seemingly disparate fields “has the potential to stretch theological 
thinking to its limits and, perhaps, beyond, to deform and reform it in productive 
ways.”718  Or, as Catherine Keller has observed, “Christianity itself is lost on her 
[Spivak].  It is not what she needs.  But perhaps something Christian theology needs for 
its own work gets found in postcolonial translation?”719  Indeed, this is the wager at the 
heart of this current project’s engagement of postcolonial theory with theology of 
creation.  Likewise, others have previously ventured down parallel paths in an effort to 
mine the inchoate theological ore of Spivak’s theory. 
 In a 2004 essay, Mark Lewis Taylor highlights what he calls postcolonial theory’s 
“turn to spirit,” which suggests a pre-thematic-like theological sensibility.720  He points to 
the ways that institutionalized religious forces, such as the missionary enterprises 
                                                
 716 In fact, in an oft-quoted passage, Spivak writes: “Indeed, it is my conviction that the 
internationality of ecological justice in that impossible, undivided world of which one must dream, in view 
of the impossibility for which one must work, obsessively, cannot be reached by invoking any of the great 
religions of the world because the history of their greatness is too deeply imbricated in the narrative of the 
ebb and flow of power” (Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 382).  It is worth pausing to 
acknowledge a certain degree of irony present in Spivak’s assertion that “the religious” is incompatible 
with ecological justice.  As someone generally concerned with marginalized epistemologies and discursive 
expressions, Spivak appears quick to dismiss a whole mode of knowledge as illegitimate.  In a sense, 
Spivak might rightly be critiqued in passages like this as deploying a form of elitist, anti-theological logic 
common in some western academic circles; a view that seems hardly sympathetic or open to the very “way 
of knowing” common to many indigenous communities.  This tendency in Spivak’s work is contested by 
the theologians examined in this section, each of whom argues that, her expressed anti-theological stance 
notwithstanding, Spivak’s work nevertheless bears insights important for contemporary constructive 
theology. 
 717 Stephen D. Moore, “Situating Spivak,” in Planetary Loves, 15. 
 718 Moore, “Situating Spivak,” in Planetary Loves, 15. 
 719 Keller, “The Love of Postcolonialism,” in Postcolonial Theologies, 240. 
 720 See Mark Lewis Taylor, “Spirit and Liberation: Achieving Postcolonial Theology in the United 
States,” in Postcolonial Theologies, 39-55. 
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launched concurrently with European colonization, are more complex than merely 
representing an additional arm of subjugation.  Instead, scholars including Jean and John 
Comaroff have reexamined the colonial archives to demonstrate how missionaries also 
used religion to subvert colonial hierarchical relations.721  In this way, there is a 
longstanding if subtle thread of constructive congruence between anti-colonial efforts and 
the sentiments of a critical theological enterprise that has often been overlooked 
historically.722   
 Rather than seeing an antithetical pairing in Spivak’s postcolonial theory and 
theological reflection, theologians Mayra Rivera and Susan Abraham have each created 
spaces in which a dialogue might unfold in a constructive mode.723  In the case of Rivera, 
her book The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God interrogates the 
history of divine transcendence in the Christian tradition, unveiling the ambiguous quality 
of such discourse.  Adopting a postcolonial theological lens, Rivera critiques the ways in 
which divine transcendence has been used to (a) justify hierarchal social ordering and (b) 
reinforce an orientation of religious life away from concerns about the present order and 
the need for social transformation.724  Rivera uses Spivak’s critique of the social 
production of “otherness”—what Spivak calls “worlding”—to problematize theological 
presumptions of the strong distinction between immanence and transcendence, which has 
                                                
 721 See Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991).  Also, see Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, 63. 
 722 Mayra Rivera, “God at the Crossroads: A Postcolonial Reading of Sophia,” in Postcolonial 
Theologies, 201-202. 
 723 In the interest of the limited scope of this project, I have elected to present just two examples of 
constructive theological projects that explicitly engage Spivak’s postcolonial theoretical work and shed 
some light on the fecundity of such an endeavor.  For additional illustrations, consider the essays in the 
volumes Postcolonial Theologies and Planetary Loves. 
 724 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, esp. 1-15. 
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led to the subordination and erasure of certain marginalized populations.725  Rivera 
explains: 
 
As we continue to use categories to name ourselves and others, these 
categories tend to appear as natural, as if they were characteristics innate 
to persons or to the world we live in—as if they were external to 
ourselves.  Thus names, descriptions, and values become inscribed in the 
world and its inhabitants; they become the way in which we perceive, 
experience, and react to the world around us.  Certain people become 
strangers; not only do we identify them as such, but we develop social, 
political, and economic structures in which they are defined as 
strangers…Spivak calls these processes “worlding,” the practices through 
which sociopolitical configurations of the world are constructed and 
inscribed (as if) on the earth.726 
 
Rivera describes Spivak’s method as “intentionally interruptive,” meaning that she 
deploys a critical stance that seeks to unsettle the “coherence of another framework,” one 
that is governed by a colonial logic.727  Though Rivera is clear that “Spivak’s main 
concern is not divine transcendence,” she nevertheless affirms that, as a theologian, she 
finds Spivak’s “use of terms such as ‘wholly other,’ ‘absolutely other,’ and ‘radical 
alterity,’ to name just the most common, occupy a space that I, as one who does use 
religious language, associate closely with transcendence.”728  Spivak’s critique of the 
construction of the “other” within a subjugating and dualistic frame bears an inherently 
theological sensibility for Rivera, which the latter finds as a useful ally in a constructive 
project that recasts transcendence as a theological category so as to not reinforce 
structural systems of oppression and marginalization.  
                                                
 725 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 104-105.   
 726 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 105-106. Also, see Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason, 212. 
 727 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 111. 
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 Also interested in the theological implications latent in Spivak’s theoretical work, 
Abraham explores the ethical nature of postcolonial theory as a resource for a 
constructive theological project in her book Identity, Ethics, and Nonviolence in 
Postcolonial Theory: A Rahnerian Assessment.  Whereas Rivera believes that Spivak’s 
theoretical work bears an implicit if underdeveloped theological sensibility, Abraham 
believes that it is precisely because Spivak hesitates to specifically engage theological 
issues that a space is created “for a postcolonial theological imagination to develop a 
specifically postcolonial theological ethics.”729  Abraham introduces the twentieth-
century theology of Karl Rahner into this creative space, acknowledging as she does that 
Rahner’s theological anthropology supplements the critical lens of postcolonial theory 
while Spivak’s criticism problematizes Rahner’s ostensible anthropological essentialism.  
Abraham explains that, “Spivak is vital to a postcolonial theology in that she brings the 
concerns of women to the fore and also that she opens up new possibilities for theology 
in a primarily theoretical and secular space.”730  In other words, Abraham asserts a 
complementary relationship between theological reflection and Spivak’s postcolonial 
theory, although she admits that reading Spivak’s work with a theological lens is at first 
glance a counterintuitive and catachrestic task.731  The result of her exploration of the 
mutually critical and enriching relationship between Spivak’s work and Rahner’s 
theology is a postcolonial theological conception of love that is not necessarily linked to 
traditional Christian ethics, which “was too easily tied to imperialist agendas of 
benevolence” and was shaped “in the binary logic of civilized/savage.”732  Abraham 
                                                
 729 Abraham, Identity, Ethics, and Nonviolence, 107. 
 730 Abraham, Identity, Ethics, and Nonviolence, 108. 
 731 Abraham, Identity, Ethics, and Nonviolence, 109. 
 732 Abraham, Identity, Ethics, and Nonviolence, 141. 
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believes that postcolonial theology drawn in part from Spivak’s work might allow 
theologians to “retrieve the unique agency of the gendered subaltern” and radically 
reshape the way in which difference is conceived in terms of “relative difference” instead 
of “the violence of absolute difference,” which leads to the erasure and effective silencing 
of the other.733 
 Though both differ from one another in their respective theological foci and the 
interlocutors they place in dialogue with Spivak, Rivera and Abraham both demonstrate 
the theological fecundity of postcolonial theory in general and Spivak’s contributions in 
particular.   
 
3. The Theological Valence of ‘Planetarity’ 
 The previous subsection offered two brief illustrations of theological engagement 
with Spivak’s work in general, this part of the chapter presents a succinct overview of the 
specific theological quality of planetarity in order to flesh out both the critical and 
constructive potential of the concept in the last part of this chapter.  It is also worth noting 
here that Spivak anticipates the possibility that some will uncritically embrace of her 
neologism for the purpose of promoting what we have been calling a “stewardship 
model” of creation.  In 2015, she wrote: 
 
My use of “planetarity,” on the other hand, does not refer to any 
applicable methodology.  It is different from a sense of being the 
custodians of our very own planet, although I have no objection to such a 
sense of accountability…the sense of custodianship of our planet has led 
to a species of feudality without feudalism couples with the method of 
“sustainability,” keeping geology safe for good imperialism, emphasizing 
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capital’s social productivity but not its irreducible subalternizing tendency.  
This is what translates and provides the alibi for good global capitalism.734 
 
Though Spivak understandably supports ecological consciousness and preservation, she 
explains that adopting the term planetarity for mere “custodianship of our planet” or as a 
synonym for the “stewardship model” of creation is not only a misappropriation of her 
concept, but actually contributes to the re-inscribing of creation’s instrumental value 
within a system of global capitalism.  On the one hand, this elucidation on Spivak’s part 
further bolsters our critique of the “stewardship model” already underway, adding to it a 
capitalist complicity not always immediately visible.735  And, on the other hand, Spivak 
offers us further heuristic guidance in how we might critically engage the concept beyond 
her particular analysis of globalization. 
 In terms of the theological quality of planetarity, there are several dimensions of 
Spivak’s admittedly secular proposal to “re-imagine the planet” that may be interpreted 
through a distinctively theological lens given their otherwise indeterminate quality.  For 
example, in light of the ethical impetus of her work in general and planetarity in 
particular, Spivak’s writing offers what we might call a rich yet tacit theological 
anthropology.736  Rivera highlights this dimension of Spivak’s postcolonial theoretical 
                                                
 734 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Planetarity,” Paragraph 38 (2015): 290-291, emphasis original. 
 735 Although, it is interesting that Pope Francis also ties capitalism with environmental concerns in 
Laudato Si.  Despite his overwhelming support of the “stewardship model,” he nevertheless cautions 
against blind adaptation of what he calls “green rhetoric” (no. 49), which aids in the numbing of 
consciences and promotes a spirit of destructive indifference.  Furthermore, such shorthand can be coopted 
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simultaneously contributing to the complacency of the affluent. 
 736 By “tacit theological anthropology” I am imagining something akin to Karl Rahner’s famous, 
though frequently misunderstood, concept of “anonymous Christianity” used to articulate a soteriological 
inclusivism centered on Christ as absolute savior. In this passing allusion, I mean to suggest—following 
Rivera’s work—that Spivak’s own response to globalization and multiculturalism in the neologism 
planetarity bears a certain theological fecundity, although Spivak herself would likely dismiss such 
assessment.  On “anonymous Christianity,” see Karl Rahner, “The Christian among Unbelieving 
Relations,” in Theological Investigations, trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger, vol. 3 (Baltimore: Helicon 
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work on what the former calls in shorthand Spivak’s “planetary humanity.”737  Spivak’s 
creative call for a renewed consideration of human identity in relationship, for us to 
reimagine ourselves in relation to the otherwise unnamed source of originating alterity, is 
for Rivera not only a secular ethical mandate but also an imperative with deeply 
theological implications.  Rivera explains: 
 
Although Spivak would not expound a Christian cosmological 
transcendence based on human-divine participation in creation, she might 
be closer to such theological anthropology than she would admit. “If we 
imagine ourselves as planetary subjects rather than global agents, 
planetary creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived 
from us.”  This view of the planet, she adds, “is not our dialectical 
negation, it contains us as much as it flings us away.”  It is an alterity not 
only underived from us, but also sacred.  “Sacred,” she quickly adds, “ 
need not have a religious sanction, but simply a sanction that cannot be 
contained within the principle of reason alone.”738 
 
Rivera honors Spivak’s admitted non-religious commitments, as I also wish to do in this 
project, by not seeking to “Christianize Spivak’s figure” and instead “explore the ends to 
which we could deploy these figures in the service of the ‘large-scale mind change’ for 
which Spivak prays.”739  Rivera believes that this sacred act of reimagining in terms of 
planetairty about which Spivak writes cannot help but bear a theological fecundity.  
“Despite the repeated setting-off gestures by which Spivak distances her work from it, 
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Implicit Christianity,” in Theological Investigations, trans. Graham Harrison, vol. 9 (New York: Herder & 
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 737 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 123. 
 738 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 123.  The passages from Spivak that Rivera cites are 
from Death of a Discipline, 73 and The Spivak Reader, 275. 
 739 Rivera, The Touch of Transcendence, 123-124. 
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theology will keep haunting planetarity: that sacred alterity which is always underived 
from us that marks us as planetary creatures.”740 
 Beyond the more overt categories of transcendental figurations (e.g., God, 
mother, etc.) and language of “the sacred” Spivak employs in her elucidation of 
planetarity, she also draws upon more implicit theological descriptors such as “creatures” 
in describing those beings in relation that compose a cosmic community within the frame 
of planetarity.  Such discursive choices are frequently invoked in part to reference an 
existent’s source of existence; a Creator behind the creature, that originating source of 
alterity reimagined according to a postcolonial hermeneutic of planetarity.  Put directly: 
“Theology names that reality God—as that which exceeds all names and with which our 
very existence is related.”741   
 In the spirit of the theological “haunting” of planetarity, as Rivera describes it, it’s 
worth turning to Catherine Keller’s analysis of Spivak’s apparent dismissal of Christian 
liberation theology, which the postcolonial theorist believes is too deeply enmeshed in 
the problematic colonial power dynamics of Christianity to offer a hand in “reimagining 
the planet.”  In a direct challenge to Spivak’s alleged rejection of theology, Keller points 
to “liberation theologians such as Leonardo Boff and Ivone Gebara, and European 
American ecotheologians such as Rosemary Reuther, Sallie McFague, Jay McDaniel, and 
John Cobb, [who] have long moved so close to the proposed ‘animist liberation theology’ 
[Spivak references], and so far from any dichotomy of nature/supernature, that one 
wonders if theology is ‘alien’ because Spivak doesn’t read any.”742  Keller points to the 
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capacity for a constructive alliance between many contemporary theological agendas and 
the guiding aims of Spivak’s postcolonial criticism.   
 Keller takes her analysis of Spivak’s criticism a step further and, like Rivera, 
argues for an interpretation of Spivak’s work that unveils an implicit theological valence.  
Keller writes: 
 
The ecotheological tendency of Spivak’s thought symptomizes an “in-
between” of great promise: Freeing itself from the orthodox forms of 
socialism and of religion, there is emerging a planetary spirituality of the 
interstices.  No locality can be located apart from its interrelations.  Close 
and alien, intimate and systematic, they add up to the global.  But the 
planetary is greater than the sum of global parts.  No theory holds a 
monopoly on its spatiality.  I have indicated that there is taking place also 
in this space a metamorphosis of Christianity, in a form no longer 
interested in religious triumph but in ‘justice, peace, and the integrity of 
creation.’  In its passion for the creation—as ecoscocial commitment—it 
suggests a planetary motivation, a cosmopolitan spirit that takes radically 
ecumenical form and thus, I believe, makes contact with the interreligious 
(im)possibility Spivak also seems to sense.743 
 
In effect, Keller turns Spivak’s postcolonial criticism back on itself, arguing that the 
space created by the imperative to “reimagine the planet” in fact provides the very ground 
for a new theological imagining of creation, and one that emphasizes the a priori 
“ecosocial commitment” grounded within the Christian theological tradition.  
Furthermore, Keller rightly notes that Spivak’s own deconstruction of globalization 
concurrently troubles longstanding models of creation interested in “religious triumph” 
from an explicitly anthropocentric vantage point.  Given the interrelatedness inherent in a 
call for planetarity imagining, not even theology can escape the postcolonial critical 
moment and nor can it evade the constructive reimagining that follows it.  Although 
Spivak herself might not outright endorse such a claim as advanced by Keller or this 
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current project, nevertheless, as Rivera keenly remarks, “Theology may offer us a 
language to say what Spivak seems to desire, but cannot quite say, even when she 
ventures into the affirmative mode.”744 
 
D. ‘Planetarity’ as Discursive Frame for Creation 
 Having established a preliminary sense for the theological valence of planetarity, 
we now move to examine the ways in which planetarity can serve as the discursive frame 
for creation within a constructive theological project.  This final section of the chapter is 
intentionally liminal in purpose.  It serves to link the critical efforts first deployed in 
Chapter Two and what will appear in the first part of what follows here with the historical 
retrieval found in Chapters Three and Four, as well as the constructive efforts articulated 
in the conclusion.  My intention is to show how planetarity provides theologians with a 
discursive frame for reconceiving creation, especially in light of the Franciscan tradition 
to be fleshed out in the next chapter.   
 The methodology of postcolonial criticism, which is deeply deconstructive in a 
Derridean sense, serves as but a single instant within a broader effort to respond to the 
theological needs of our time.  As theologian David Tracy has suggested, such theoretical 
and poststructuralist critiques rightfully serve to uncover illusory axioms, practices, and 
paradigms that have gone largely unexamined.745  Yet, the contributions of the 
postcolonial critical moment are insufficient by themselves to serve as a foundation for 
theological reflection.  Rather, Tracy sees this as a “therapeutic moment,” one that is both 
diagnostic and heuristic: in this case, the postcolonial critical dimensions of planetarity 
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helps identify the still-present problems of anthropocentrism and then points to a rich 
discursive frame for advancing a constructive theology of creation. 
 In a spirit that aligns well with Tracy’s assessment above, Susan Abraham has 
claimed that, “Postcolonial theology provides two moments for the theological task of 
presenting the manner in which faith and power relate in the postcolonial 
context…Deconstruction must be followed by concrete proposals for reconstruction and 
such reconstruction will need the help of social sciences and other disciplines that 
articulate varied proposals on how we can address the inequalities we encounter in the 
world.”746  Therefore, this section is organized in accord with this two-moment, 
deconstructive/constructive frame.  First, with an eye to the deconstructive contributions 
of postcolonial theory, we will look at the critical challenge that planetarity presents to a 
contemporary theology of creation.  Second, with an eye to the constructive contributions 
of postcolonial theory, we will explore the promise planetarity offers us in moving 
forward in developing a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation.  
 
1. The Critical Challenge of ‘Planetarity’ 
 The late ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood has keenly noted that, “Forms of 
oppression from both the present and the past have left their traces in western culture as a 
network of dualisms, and the logical structure of dualism forms a major basis for the 
connection between forms of oppression.”747  Given both the historical and anecdotal 
veracity of this statement, one can see the promise of postcolonial theory across contexts 
of oppression for its effort to contest the construction of identities of opposition 
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established according to a system of colonial logic.  While the foundational starting point 
of postcolonial theory—including the concept of planetarity from which it emerged—has 
been a critical analysis of the colonial logic of Eurocentric imperialism and domination, 
Plumwood helps focus our attention on allied areas of critical inquiry and concern where 
postcolonial theory can be deployed to combat what she calls “dualism: the logic of 
colonization” elsewhere.  “By means of dualism, the colonized are appropriated, 
incorporated, into the selfhood and culture of the master.  The dominant conception of the 
human/nature relation in the west has features corresponding to this logical structure.”748  
As stated earlier in Chapter Two, Plumwood believes that, “the concept of colonization 
can be applied directly to non-human nature itself, and that the relationship between 
humans, or certain groups of them, and the more-than-human world might be aptly 
characterized as one of colonization.”749  If we begin to see the relationship of the human 
to the other-than-human community of creatures as one that has been governed by 
dualism and the logic of colonization, then the resources of postcolonial theory appear all 
the more relevant. 
 Plumwood calls for a kind of “decolonizing” conceptual move that unsettles the 
operative epistemology founded on the colonial logic she unveils.  Drawing parallels 
between Eurocentric colonialism and the colonial logic that reifies a human/other-than-
human divide, she explains: 
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The colonization of nature thus relies upon a range of conceptual 
strategies that are employed also within the human sphere to support 
supremacism of nation, gender, and race.  The construction of non-humans 
as “Others” involves both distorted ways of seeing sameness, continuity or 
commonality with the colonized “Other,” and distorted ways of seeing 
their difference or independence.  The usual distortions of continuity or 
sameness construct the ethical fields in terms of moral dualism, involving 
a major boundary or gulf between the “One” and the “Other” that cannot 
be bridged or crossed.750 
 
Spivak’s challenge to “reimagine the planet” in terms of a postcolonial planetarity 
interrupts this “range of conceptual strategies,” to “displace this historical alibi,” in 
several ways.751 
 First, by displacing the human as the adjudicator of alterity and recalling the 
“transcendental figurations of what we think is the origin of this animating gift,”752 which 
Christians call God, imagining planetarity means an active cognitive evacuation of 
categories, binaries, and dualistic logical presumptions that establish human beings as 
necessarily over against other-than-human creatures (as found in the dominion model) or 
benevolently concerned with yet still ontological distinct from other-than-human 
creatures (as found in the stewardship model).  Conceiving and talking about creation 
according to planetarity reintroduces the divine as the source of our identity and 
relational capacity, what theologian Karl Rahner calls the Wholly Other, which is our 
transcendental ground and eschatological whither.753  Alternatively, we can speak of 
planetarity’s imaginative effects in something of negative terms as Spivak once did: 
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To explain: If we planet-think, planet-feel, our “other”—everything in the 
unbounded universe—cannot be the self-consolidating other, an other that 
is a neat and commensurate opposite of the self.  I emphasize 
“education”…and I mean specifically training the imagination.  Gifted 
folks with well-developed imaginations can get to it on their own.  The 
experimental musician Lorie Anderson, when asked why she chose to be 
artist-in-residence at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
put it this way recently: “I like the scale of space.  I like thinking about 
human beings and what worms we are.  We are really worms and specs.  I 
find a certain comfort in that.”  She has put it rather aggressively.  That is 
not my intellectual style, but my point is close to hers.  You see how very 
different it is from a sense of being the custodians of our very own planet, 
for god and for nature, although I have no objection to such a sense of 
accountability, where our own home is our other, as in self and world.  But 
that is not the planetarity I was talking about.  Planetarity, then, is not 
quite a dimension, because it cannot authorize itself over against a self-
consolidating other.754 
 
In this passage written to explain her invocation of the planet and her call for imagining 
planetarity, Spivak emphasizes the relative status of humanity within the broader 
community of creation; it is not objectively central, as the dominion and stewardship 
models would suggest, but parallel with the rest of creation while occupying a place 
within and not above the broader cosmos.  
 Second, the postcolonial critical mode of planetary thought challenges the 
uncritically accepted privilege humanity has bestowed upon itself and subsequently 
supported with philosophical and theological claims about absolute human 
distinctiveness.  By introducing the neologism of planetarity into conversations of 
anthropocentric privilege, we can trouble hegemonic discourse that has so deeply shaped 
the way Christians speak about “us” and “them” in terms of the constructed divide 
between the human species and the rest of creation.  In addition to the restoration of the 
single divine source of alterity that planetarity presupposes, the use of this postcolonial 
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term also introduces a call for theologians to embrace a critical self-awareness and self-
consciousness of one’s relationship to the rest of the created order.  Plumwood has 
described the tendency within anthropocentric frameworks, such as what has been 
identified as operative in the stewardship model of creation, for “monological 
relationships” with other-than-human creation.  These monological relationships are 
especially dangerous for their contributions to systemic environmental degradation.  
According to this iteration of colonial logic, “Humans are seen as the only rational 
species, the only real subjectivities and agents in the world, and nature is a background 
substratum that is there to be exploited.  This is the rationality of monologue, termed 
monological because it recognizes the Other only in one-way terms.”755  As self-
appointed “stewards,” “gardeners,” or “caretakers” of other-than-human aspects of 
creation, human beings have engaged in a form of colonialization that rejects 
“communicative and negotiated ecological relationships of mutual adaptation in favor of 
one-way relationships of self-imposition.”756  This unacknowledged privilege silences 
and erases those aspects of the created order not counted as human and reduces 
humanity’s relationship to the rest of creation to the status of absolute decision-maker 
and unilateral actor.757 
 Drawing on Spivak’s postcolonial work, the engagement of planetarity in a 
theological mode challenges Christians to “unlearn one’s privilege as one’s loss” such 
that human beings as the “holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their 
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position and themselves learn how to occupy the subject position of the other.”758  
Ethologists and other scientists have suggested that this move is needed not only in the 
theological or popular imagination, but it is also necessary within the scientific 
community.759  The widespread anthropocentrism of our species is a deeply ingrained 
form of colonial logic that has justified unfounded degrees of human privilege.  
Planetarity can help critique this privilege in order to open a space for reimaging 
ourselves within the community of creation as described in scripture and the longstanding 
(albeit sometimes overlooked or silenced) theological tradition explored earlier and to 
which we will return in the next chapter. 
 Third, planetarity also introduces a critique of humanity’s discounting and erasure 
of other-than-human creaturely agency.  Here we may find Spivak’s work centered on the 
category of the subaltern to be most enlightening for a contemporary theology of 
creation.760  As with the gendered subaltern silenced and excluded according to the 
process of Eurocentric colonialism, other-than-human creatures are prohibited in an 
axiomatic way from recognized subjectivity within frameworks governed by pervasive 
anthropocentrism.  Such is the case, for example, with the Christian stewardship model of 
creation that endows (by means of self-appointment) humanity with the responsibility 
and freedom to “care for” creatures that presumably cannot care for themselves and do 
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not have the agential capacity to know what is best for their respective species.  The 
result has been a form of denial and instrumentalization of other creatures arising from 
humanity’s exercise of colonial power.  It is not that other-than-human creatures cannot 
or have not expressed themselves within the broader cosmic community of creation, but 
rather it is the human family’s inability to hear the subaltern creatures because of the 
operative colonial logic that bolsters the hubris of “human separatism.”  Theologically 
speaking, this dynamic plays out in manifold ways that have been explored earlier in 
Chapter Two, including in the way that other-than-human creatures have been portrayed 
as mere “backdrop” for the anthropomonic drama of salvation history and the 
presumption of irrationality according to the longstanding anthropological standards 
found in the traditions of Western philosophy and theology. 
 Imagining planetarity calls into question otherwise presumptive standards of 
agency that have been heretofore restricted to human beings alone.  Rather than silencing 
and erasing the respective agential quality of different creatures, planetarity calls us to 
stop representing or “speaking for” the rest of creation in order to begin listening to the 
myriad “voices” of other creatures in the family of creation on terms other than those of 
our anthropocentric making.  Plumwood has argued that, in order to effectively correct 
this anthropocentric dismissal of other-than-human agency,  
 
a double movement or gesture of affirming kinship and also affirming the 
Other’s difference, as an independent presence to be engaged with on its 
own terms, is required.  To counter the ‘othering’ definition of nature that 
is outlined above, we need a depolarizing re-conception of non-human 
nature that recognizes the denied space of our hybridity, continuity and 
kinship, and which is also able to recognize, in suitable contexts, the 
difference of the non-human in a non-hierarchical way.761 
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In other words, what the deployment of a postcolonial criticism under the concept of 
planetarity demands of us is both a reconsideration of how we define ourselves and also 
how we define the other, which is in this case other-than-human creatures.   
 These are but three illustrations of how the embrace of planetarity can unsettle the 
colonial logic that undergirds so much of our inherited Christian theologies of creation 
and demand of us new ways to envision our place in relationship to the rest of creation as 
well as to our Creator.  Planetarity does not only offer a critical challenge to our 
conceptualizations of creation, but also provides us with a constructive promise in 
framing our theological discourse according to a different paradigm, one that presupposes 
not “human separatism” but kinship within a community of creation. 
 
2. The Constructive Promise of ‘Planetarity’ 
 The postcolonial theologian Kwok Pui-lan has insightfully observed that, 
“Spivak’s writing has a provisional quality to it,” which invites further elucidation and 
engagement.762  The concept of planetarity in Spivak’s writing fits precisely this 
description of the provisional.  Though Spivak has attempted in a number of essays and 
interviews to clarify what she was intending during that original lecture at the Stiftung-
Dialogik event in 1997—that we must imagine an alternative to the capitalist and colonial 
logic of globalization—her neologism remains still provisional and open to 
interpretation.763  Like others, including Kwok, Dhawn Martin, and Jea Sophia Oh, I see 
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in the provisional quality and openness of planetarity a constructive promise, one that 
provides contemporary theologians with a discursive frame for speaking of the 
community of creation in new ways through creative retrieval of scripture and 
tradition.764  In what follows, I wish to highlight briefly several of the ways planetarity 
offers a constructive promise with an eye toward the concluding chapter in which I will 
develop a fuller explication of planetarity as a Franciscan theology of creation. 
 The first way that planetarity shows constructive promise is in terms of its 
potential linguistic contributions to theology.  As has been demonstrated in earlier 
chapters, the current language used to articulate models of Christian theological reflection 
on creation bear implicative weight that unduly complicates creative reconsideration of 
humanity’s place within the created order.  From the overt human separatism of the 
dominion model to the deontological imperative that pervades the stewardship model, the 
inherited paradigms that have been long embraced by the Christian theological 
community are inextricably tied to an unhelpful discursive frame.  Rather than attempting 
to recast in a positive light a descriptor that carries with it meaning and signification 
already found to be inadequate, planetarity offers theologians a new discursive 
framework for the constructive process of reimagining what the scripture, tradition, and 
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contemporary sciences tell us about the community of creation and our place as humans 
within that cosmic family. 
 A second dimension of planetarity’s constructive promise is found in the 
postcolonial application in which it was first developed.  As noted earlier, Spivak’s 
commitment to justice for the marginalized, silenced, and erased subaltern informs her 
imperative to reimagine the planet in response to the hegemony of globalization.  In the 
spirit of Val Plumwood’s work, Jea Sophia Oh has argued that ecotheologians should 
take seriously the potential of planetarity to be applied directly to discussions about 
creation, noting that other-than-human creatures constitute a subaltern class in their own 
right.  She writes: “Elaborating on the Spivakian notion of subaltern, we should rethink 
postcolonial/colonial subalternization of nature as similar to the subaltern woman as the 
‘other subject,’ nature (nonhuman/more than human) is the ‘othered subject’ in the 
subalternization of nature as objects of discursive management and control.”765  The 
potency for theological reflection on creation in terms of planetarity can be likened to an 
ecological liberation theology, one that bears within the signification of the term itself an 
analogous sense of the “preferential option for the poor” wherein the subaltern class is 
other-than-human creation.   
 A third way that planetarity shows constructive promise is in how it can be 
appropriated in an explicitly transdisciplinary theological register, by which I mean that 
when planetarity is viewed as the locus of contemporary theological reflection on 
creation, it serves as a cardinal point for systematic engagement with other 
subdisciplinary areas.  For example, Dhawn Martin has creatively tied reflection on the 
scriptural concept of the “kingdom of God” (Basileia tou Theou) with a political 
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theological consideration of planetarity.  Such an imagining, richly theological in its 
sourcing and intention, gestures toward a soteriology that includes a notion of God’s 
intended cosmic community of which we human beings are one part among many.  
Martin explains that this planetary kingdom of God “proclaims no lost paradise to regain, 
but rather proposes a cosmos to reinhabit—strategically.  Reinhabitation consists of 
diligent awareness of a fall not from grace but into planetary conviviality, into mutual 
interdependence immersed in structures both of oppression and liberation.”766  There is 
nothing simplistic or reductionist about Martin’s proposal for considering the kingdom.  
Instead, her identification of planetarity with kingdom discourse opens up a possibility of 
our conceptual and imaginative “reinhabitation” of the community of creation intended 
by the Creator from the beginning.  Martin also makes a point to note that creation itself, 
and not just humanity as such, is the privileged location of encountering the transcendent: 
“This transcendence reveals not the extraterrestrial but rather the transterratorial.  The 
wholly/holy other transcends in the very midst of humus and human relations.”767  Such 
possibilities for theological reflection within the discursive frame of planetarity extend 
far beyond Martin’s exemplary engagement between creation and the kingdom of God to 
include any number of other theological loci.768 
 Finally, to conclude this initial sampling of planetarity’s constructive promise, 
one of its greatest contributions to theological reflection on creation is the inclusivity 
inherent in the concept, which discloses a particular penchant for maintaining unity amid 
diversity.  To talk about creation, nature, ecology, the environment, or any number of 
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other terms associated with theologies of creation in any ordinary or colloquial sense 
without further qualification is to invite a tacit human separatism.  Such discursive 
patterns have a long history, within theology and outside it, of presupposing a dualistic 
dynamism that de facto excludes the human from the other-than-human, the rational from 
the irrational, the subject from objects, and so on.  Planetarity, on the other hand, 
presupposes all that has been created, human and other-than-human alike, without the 
historical and theological remnants found in other descriptors.  Within a cosmic 
community of creation imagined in terms of planetarity, alterity is underived from 
humanity and instead originates solely with the creator, placing us as agential subjects 
alongside every other species of creature that constitutes a universal kinship otherwise 
dismissed or mitigated according to the dominant models of dominion and stewardship.  
Planetarity offers the promise of a community of diverse subjects rather than the 
subalternatizing erasure of the “other” according to the sameness that is constitutive of a 
colonial logic of universalization; what is called the logic of “globalization” in other 
contexts.769   
 As promising as postcolonial theory is in general and planetarity is in particular, 
neither is sufficient left alone in its respective theoretical mode or provisional status.  
This theoretical framework expressed in terms of planetarity invites a theological 
supplément, which, as I will argue in the next chapter and conclusion, is best found in the 
medieval Franciscan tradition.  By supplément, I am referring to the particular Derridean 
concept central to the philosophy of deconstruction and not the typical usage of the 
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English word “supplement,” which means to add an extra element or amount to 
something else.770  Instead, what is meant by supplément is more complex.   
 The origin of Derrida’s concept of supplément is found in the second part of his 
Of Grammatology and is a key aspect of his methodological approach to philosophy.771  
Derrida arrives at the term from a close reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau against himself 
(i.e., reading “Rousseau against Rousseau”).  As with Derrida’s readings of Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Claude Levi-Strauss, his reading of Rousseau uncovers a number of 
tensions and ostensible contradictions in his arguments concerning the relationship 
between writing and speech.  Rather than the “inessential extra added to something 
complete in itself” that Rousseau claimed a supplément to be, Derrida holds that you 
cannot add something from without to a thing complete in itself.  Rather, a supplément 
can only take place where there is an “original lack.”  Accordingly, as Arthur Bradley 
summarizes so well in his study of Derrida’s text, “the supplement is another way of 
theorizing the fact that every apparently self-identical presence depends upon what it 
places outside, below, or after itself in order to obtain even the effect of identity.”772  
 In terms of the application of this deconstructive insight for this project, I believe 
that the contributions of postcolonial theory are incomplete in themselves or contain 
something of an “original lack” that elicits a supplément, which is fulfilled in the double 
reading of the Franciscan tradition with the postcolonial concept of “planetarity.”  By 
“double reading,” I mean a hermeneutical approach that begins with that which is 
                                                
 770 It is for this reason of clarity that I retain Derrida’s French spelling of supplément when 
referring to the deconstructive concept. 
 771 See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), esp. 141-164. 
 772 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), 
102. 
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uncovered in the postcolonial critique examined earlier and throughout this current 
chapter, then moves to the theological supplément of the Franciscan tradition to be 
explored in the next chapter, and ultimately returns to postcolonial theory in the 
conclusion to articulate the way in which theological engagement creatively reconstitutes 
the concept of planetarity for use in a non-anthropocentric theology of creation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Franciscan Resources for a Postcolonial Theology of Creation 
 
 This chapter’s central argument centers on the conviction that the Franciscan 
theological and philosophical tradition offers especially fecund resources for the 
development of a constructive theology of creation.  Following the previous chapter in 
which we explored postcolonial theory and introduced the concept of planetarity, both of 
which serve to provide a preliminary therapeutic moment that signals the need for 
something more in terms of a theological supplément, the thinkers and themes of the 
Franciscan tradition are presented and examined here in response to such a need.  After 
the explication of the Franciscan resources for a theology in this chapter, we will return to 
postcolonial theory, planetarity, and the insights gleaned from the medieval tradition in 
the concluding chapter to offer a framework for imagining a postcolonial Franciscan 
theology of creation. 
 This chapter proceeds in six parts: (a) a reexamination of the origins of the 
Franciscan theological tradition in the thought and writings of Francis of Assisi; (b) a 
methodological interlude; (c) an exploration of the medieval theological sources of the 
tradition in terms of the interrelationship, mutuality, and intended harmony of creation; 
(d) a consideration of the intrinsic dignity of all creation, both human and other-than-
human; (e) a heuristic appropriation of Peter John Olivi’s category usus pauper for use in 
navigating the tension between the simultaneity of creation’s intrinsic and instrumental 
value; and (f) a proposal that environmental praxis be rooted in a Franciscan 
understanding of pietas for and with all of creation. 
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A. Francis of Assisi: Origins of a Franciscan Theology of Creation 
 Contrary to the depiction of Francis of Assisi as “mediator” and “microcosm of 
creation” as proposed, for example, by Nonna Verna Harrison in her book, God’s Many-
Splendored Image, the medieval saint’s understanding of humanity’s relationship to the 
rest of creation and to the divine does not flow from a cosmological-spiritual location of 
mediation between the corporeality of “nature” and the spirituality of the 
“transcendent.”773  This attempt to understand the hagiographical narratives of Francis’s 
engagement with creation is not uncommon, but nevertheless remains inadequate.  Its 
inadequacy stems primarily from the sense in which Francis is here depicted as an agent 
that stands apart from the two poles between which he ostensibly serves as mediator, 
thereby neglecting the participatory dimension of Francis’s self-awareness and 
recognition of the other (and the divine Other) with whom he was always already in 
relationship.  Harrison is not the only scholar to have suggested this way of 
understanding Francis.  Even a cursory examination of some of the many volumes written 
on Franciscan spirituality reveals that a robust consideration of Francis’s own 
understanding of the human person and its relationship to the rest of the created order is 
usually lacking.   
 A more nuanced approach to understanding Francis’s relationship to creation 
comes in the popular reference to him as a “nature mystic,” a descriptor that presupposes 
the phenomenological quality of Francis’s experience of himself, the world, and God.774  
Franciscan theologian Ilia Delio offers one such explanation: 
                                                
 773 Nonna Verna Harrison, God’s Many-Splendored Image: Theological Anthropology for 
Christian Formation (Grand Rapids: BakerAcademic, 2010), 123-146. 
 774 The late British friar and theologian Eric Doyle saw his entire mystical outlook tied to his 
vision of creation. See Eric Doyle, St. Francis and the Song of Brotherhood and Sisterhood (St. 
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A nature mystic is one whose mystical experiences involves an 
appreciation of creation as God’s handiwork; nature manifests the divine.  
Francis’s nature mysticism included a consciousness of God with the 
appropriate religious attitudes of awe and gratitude … he took 
spontaneous joy in the material world, singing its praises like a troubadour 
poet.  With a disarming sense of immediacy, he felt himself part of the 
family of creation.775 
 
An authentic Franciscan theology of creation needs to take into account Francis’s 
experience of relationship understood through the lens of his particular vision for living 
the Gospel (vita evangelica).  While not expressed in the more technical theological 
categories of his day, as I have noted elsewhere, “the thought of Francis of Assisi as 
articulated in his own writings—prayers, rules of life, and letters—and in the writings of 
the early Franciscans about Francis reveals a theology of Creation that is easily 
identifiable with the kinship model.”776  This return to the primary source tradition of 
Francis’s writings and the early texts of the Franciscan movement to uncover the inchoate 
or, to borrow Bernard McGinn’s classification, “vernacular” theology of creation 
discloses a wealth of resources that are easily identifiable with the kinship model and can 
help theologians construct a contemporary theology of creation.777   
                                                                                                                                            
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997), ix: “At the heart of his mysticism was a passionate 
belief in the unity of creation, and almost everything he said and did was inspired by it.” Additionally, the 
Franciscan friar and environmental scientist Keith Douglass Warner helpfully nuances the term “nature 
mystic” in a constructive and, therefore, retainable way.  See “Taking Nature Seriously: Nature Mysticism, 
Environmental Advocacy, and the Franciscan Tradition,” in Franciscans and Creation: What is Our 
Responsibility? ed. Elise Saggau (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 53-82.  
 775 Ilia Delio, A Franciscan View of Creation: Learning to Live in a Sacramental World (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 7. Emphasis added.  Also, see Edward A. 
Armstrong, Saint Francis: Nature Mystic — The Derivation and Significance of the Nature Stories in the 
Franciscan Legend (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), esp. 5-17. 
 776 Daniel P. Horan, Francis of Assisi and the Future of Faith: Exploring Franciscan Spirituality 
and Theology in the Modern World (Phoenix: Tau Publishing, 2012), 109. 
 777 See Bernard McGinn, “Meister Eckhart and the Beguines in the Context of Vernacular 
Theology,” in Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics: Hadewijch of Brabant, Mechthild of Magdeburg, 
and Marguerite Porete, ed. Bernard McGinn (New York: Continuum, 1994), 4-14; Bernard McGinn, The 
Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New Mysticism — 1200-1350 (New York: Crossroads, 
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 Keith Douglass Warner, in his insightful and humorously titled essay, “Get Him 
Out of the Birdbath! What Does it mean to have a Patron Saint of Ecology?” argues that 
otherwise innocuous efforts to promote Francis as a symbolic representative for 
environmental advocacy and stewardship, such as was the case when Pope John Paul II 
named Francis the official “patron saint of ecology” in 1979, can actually mask the 
radical quality of the lived witness and theological vision of the poverello.778  
Fortunately, there have been scholars over the years that have recognized the significance 
of what was distinctive about Francis’s worldview.779  The best-known study of Francis’s 
contribution to shifts in Christian conceptualizations of the natural world is Roger 
Sorrell’s now-classic 1988 monograph, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature.780  In addition to 
the broader hagiographic recollections of the early Franciscan community about Francis’s 
words and deeds, as well as the smaller texts of his Admonitions in which the saint from 
Assisi makes explicit reference to the interrelatedness of creation, Sorrell argues that 
Francis’s Canticle of the Creatures is perhaps the most direct example of Francis’s 
contribution to Christian theological reflection on creation.781  Sorrell writes: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1998); and Dominic Monti, “Francis as Vernacular Theologian: A Link to the Franciscan Intellectual 
Tradition?” in The Franciscan Intellectual Tradition: Washington Theological Union Symposium Papers 
2001, ed. Elise Saggau (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2002), 21-42. 
 778 Keith Douglass Warner, “Get Him Out of the Birdbath! What Does it Mean to Have a Patron 
Saint of Ecology?” in Franciscan Theology of the Environment: An Introductory Reader, ed. Dawn 
Nothwehr (Quincy: Franciscan Press, 2002), 361-375. 
 779 For example, see Wirzba, The Paradise of God, 121-122; and Sallie McFague, Super, Natural 
Christians: How We Should Love Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 4. 
 780 Roger Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature: Tradition and Innovation in Western Christian 
Attitudes Toward the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
 781 See Francis of Assisi, “The Canticle of the Creatures,” in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, 
eds. Regis Armstrong, J. A. Wayne Hellmann, and William Short, 3 vols. (New York: New City Press, 
1999-2001), 1:113-114 (121-123). The most recent critical edition of Francis’s writings is Carlo Paolazzi, 
ed., Francesco D’Assisi: Scritti (Rome: Collegio San Bonaventura, 2009).  Further references to Francis’s 
writings from these sources will be noted as FAED followed by the volume and page number followed by 
the page number of the critical edition cited parenthetically.  Also, see François Delmas-Goyon, François 
d’Assise: Le Frère de Toute Créature (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2008). 
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To the casual observer, the Canticle, with its rustic language and apparent 
naiveté and simplicity, might seem to lack a certain depth and 
sophistication.  However, when it is seen in terms of Francis’s other works 
and the motivation behind its composition, the poem in fact acquires 
indisputable claim to originality and complexity of thought.  Although not 
the product of an intellectual, the Canticle is the highest poetic expression 
of an original Christian thinker … Here Francis’s assumptions about the 
worth of creation, and the complex relationships of interdependence and 
mutual service among creatures, reach their clearest expression.  It is in 
this area of assumed interrelationships that Francis’s poem attains its 
greatest significance and complexity.782 
 
Similarly, the late Franciscan theologian Eric Doyle, a scholar to whom Sorrell is also 
indebted, explains that one of the most significant dimensions of Francis’s Canticle is its 
call to move away from an instrumental view of other-than-human aspects of creation 
and return to a more kinship-based or fraternal vision of the dignity of all aspects of 
creation.  “As a prayer of praise to God the Creator, The Canticle is a sublime expression 
of the authentic Christian attitude to creation, which is to accept and love creatures as 
they are.”783  What makes Francis’s attitude toward creation “authentically Christian,” to 
stay with Doyle’s phrase, is precisely this innate sensitivity to the universal kinship of all 
creation as experienced in the mystical and fraternal worldview of Francis.  The brilliance 
of the canticle is multilayered, staged as it is in overlapping strata of increasing agency 
within creation.784  Most dimensions of the created world—planetary bodies, weather 
phenomena, elemental features of the earth, vegetation, human beings and death—are 
                                                
 782 Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature, 136-137. 
 783 Eric Doyle, “‘The Canticle of Brother Sun’ and the Value of Creation,” in Franciscan 
Theology of the Environment: An Introductory Reader, ed. Dawn Nothwehr (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 
2002), 157-158. 
 784 I have written on this subject elsewhere with regard to the Canticle’s treatment of death, see 
Daniel Horan, “Embracing Sister Death: The Fraternal Worldview of Francis of Assisi as a Source for 
Christian Eschatological Hope,” The Other Journal 14 (January 2009).  Also see Horan, Francis of Assisi 
and the Future of Faith, 131-144. 
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included in this hymnic reflection of the interrelationship of creation.785  Although non-
human animals are not expressly included in this canticle, Francis’s reverence for all 
creatures shines through in the more hagiographical sources and the earliest traditions of 
the Franciscan movement.786  Given the historical and theological significance of 
Francis’s Canticle it is worth greater exploration here.  The full text is as follows: 
 
1Most High, all-powerful, good Lord, 
 Yours are the praises, the glory, and the honor, and all blessing, 
2To You alone, Most High, do they belong, 
 and no human is worthy to mention Your name. 
3Praised be You, my Lord, with all Your creatures, 
 especially Sir Brother Sun, 
 who is the day and through whom You give us light. 
4And he is beautiful and radiant with great splendor; 
 and bears a likeness of You, Most High One. 
5Praised be You, my Lord, through Sister Moon and the stars, 
 in heaven You formed them clear and precious and beautiful. 
6Praised be You, my Lord, through Brother Wind, 
 and through the air, cloudy and serene, and every kind of weather, 
 through whom You give sustenance to Your creatures. 
7Praised be You, my Lord, through Sister Water, 
 who is very useful and humble and precious and chaste. 
8Praised be You, my Lord, through Brother Fire, 
 through whom You light up the night, 
 and he is beautiful and playful and robust and strong. 
                                                
 785 As Dawn Nothwehr and Jacques Dalarun, among others, have noted, the absence of a full 
bestiary does not preclude a sense of completeness or entirety of creation. On the contrary, that Francis 
elects to highlight the four classical elements of creation—earth, air, water, and fire—is symbolic and 
allegorical, signaling a capacious inclusion of all creatures, named and unnamed.  See Dawn M. Nothwehr, 
Ecological Footprints: An Essential Franciscan Guide for Faith and Sustainable Living (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2012), 89-96; and Jacques Dalarun, The Canticle of Brother Son: Francis of Assisi 
Reconciled, trans. Philippe Yates (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2016), 47-48. 
 786  For example, see Thomas of Celano, “The Life of Saint Francis,” nos. 80-81, in FAED, 1:250-
251; and “The Assisi Compilation,” nos. 83 and 88 in FAED, 2:184-187 and 192.  Limitations on the scope 
of this current project prevent a more substantive engagement with Francis’s experience of the other-than-
human animal world as such.  For more on this, see Armstrong, Saint Francis: Nature Mystic.  Also, see 
Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature, 39-97; Thomas Murtagh, “St. Francis and Ecology,” in 
Franciscan Theology of the Environment: An Introductory Reader, 143-154; James Edmiston, “How to 
Love a Worm? Biodiversity: Franciscan Spirituality and Praxis,” in Franciscan Theology of the 
Environment: An Introductory Reader, 377-390; Brian Moloney, Francis of Assisi and His “Canticle of 
Brother Sun” Reassessed (New York: Palgrave MacMillian Publishers, 2013); and Paul Allen and Joan 
deRis Allen, Francis of Assisi’s Canticle of the Creatures: A Modern Spiritual Path (New York: 
Continuum, 1996), 45-65. 
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9Praised be You, my Lord, through our Sister Mother Earth, 
 who sustains and governs us, 
 and who produces various fruit with colored flowers and herbs. 
10Praised be You, my Lord, through those who give pardon for Your love, 
 and bear infirmity and tribulation. 
 11Blessed are those who endure in peace 
 for by You, Most High, shall they be crowned. 
12Praised be You, my Lord, through our Sister Bodily Death, 
 from whom no one living can escape. 
 Woe to those who die in mortal sin. 
 13Blessed are those whom death will fin in Your most holy will, 
 for the second dearth shall do them no harm. 
14Praise and bless my Lord and give Him thanks 
 and serve Him with great humility.787 
 
The Canticle begins with an address to God as Creator and Lord of creation: “Most High, 
all-powerful, good Lord, Yours are the praises, the glory, and the honor, and all blessing, 
to You alone, Most High, do they belong, and no human is worthy to mention Your 
name.”788  The significance of this particular address to God and the immediate claim that 
human persons are not worthy to speak the name of God is often underappreciated.  The 
significance of this proscription is that humanity, due to sin rooted in pride and hubris, 
has forgotten its intrinsic relationship with the rest of creation and rightful place within 
the created order, which is ostensibly reflected in the impediment of humanity from 
recognizing its right relationship to the Creator and offering, in a literal sense, orthodoxy 
or “right praise.”  Immediately, however, Francis recognizes that the rest of the created 
order, although similarly finite, is not impeded by sin from “praising” God.789  What 
                                                
 787 Francis of Assisi, “The Canticle of the Creatures,” in FAED, 1:113-114 (121-123).  I have 
added numbers corresponding to the verses as they appear in the critical edition for ease of reference.  The 
organization of the translation according to sense lines follows the format of the English translation editors 
of FAED. 
 788 Francis of Assisi, “The Canticle of the Creatures,” in FAED 1:113 (121). 
 789 The moral context of this opening sequence is affirmed elsewhere in the authentic writings of 
Francis of Assisi.  For example, see Francis of Assisi, “Admonition V,” nos. 1-5, in FAED 1:131 (358): 
“Consider, O human being, in what great excellence the Lord God has placed you, for He created and 
formed you to the image of His beloved Son according to the body and to His likeness according to the 
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follows from verses three through nine is a series of joyful professions of gratitude for 
and recognition of the rest of creation’s “rightly ordered praise.”  The sun, the moon, the 
earth, stars, wind, fire, and water are all acknowledged for the praise of God that is 
offered by and through them.790  The other-than-human creatures have, according to 
Francis’s cosmic and fraternal vision, no inhibition or problem praising God through the 
actions that most accurately reflects God’s plan for a well-ordered creation.  It is 
humanity—which Francis explicitly names in verse ten—that must be reminded of what 
it means to be truly human.791  Humanity does not stand apart from the rest of creation in 
Francis’s eyes, but all men and women do need to be reminded that they give praise to 
God when they are in right relationship through the giving of pardon, the bearing of 
infirmity and tribulation, and endurance in peace.792  In this way, the other-than-human 
aspects of creation can serve as teachers and models, reflecting God and reminding 
human persons to live their vocations as creatures-in-relationship. 
 Doyle continues to contextualize and explain well the place of the created order 
for Francis as it is seen in this famous hymn of praise. 
 
Nature for Francis was not just a reflection of human activity and 
reactions, because this would have been to destroy the unique value of 
                                                                                                                                            
Spirit.  And all creatures under heaven serve, know, and obey their Creator, each according to its own 
nature, better than you.  And even the demons did not crucify Him, but you, together with them, have 
crucified Him and are still crucifying Him by delighting in vices and sins.  In what, then, can you boast?  
Even if you were so skillful and wise that you possessed all knowledge, knew how to interpret every kind 
of language, and to scrutinize heavenly matters with skill: you could not boast in these things.” Emphasis 
added. 
 790 There has long been a scholarly debate about the most authentic translation of Francis’s use of 
the word “per” in the vernacular Umbrian-Italian dialect of his day as the preposition preceding each aspect 
of creation in the Canticle.  Most scholars today translate it as “through,” with the generally recognized 
denotation that each aspect of the created order Francis names is, in fact, “praising” God by doing what it 
was created or intended to do (in contradistinction to humanity, for example, which sins and lives in 
discord with God’s original intention, according to Francis).  For more, see Susanna Peters Coy, “The 
Problem of ‘Per’ in the Cantico di frate sole of Saint Francis,” Modern Language Notes 91 (1976): 1-11. 
 791 See Francis of Assisi, “The Canticle of the Creatures,” v. 10, in FAED 1:114 (122-123). 
 792 Francis of Assisi, “The Canticle of the Creatures,” v. 10, in FAED 1:114 (122-123). 
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other creatures.  They are not mirrors of us, but like us, they reflect God.  
He began with equality: we are all created...we are all brethren.  Francis 
believed the doctrine of creation with his whole heart.  It told him that the 
entire universe – the self and the total environment to which the self 
belongs (microcosm and macrocosm) – is the product of the highest 
creative power, the creativity of Transcendent Love.793 
 
For Francis of Assisi, each aspect of the created order is intrinsically valuable and ought 
therefore to be valued.  This sensibility arose not from the fact that other-than-human 
aspects of creation were utilizable for human purposes or consumption, but rather it came 
from the recognition of a dignity bestowed on all aspects of creation by God due to each 
having been contingently and lovingly brought into existence.   
 Timothy Johnson has suggested that Francis’s recognition of the independent, 
intrinsic, and unalienable dignity and value of all aspects of creation reflects Francis’s 
belief that “the creatures of the world” that he encountered “are not objects but subjects 
in a wide-ranging network of relationships, marked by gendered equality and a shared, 
mutual source of vitality and life.”794  As subjects, Francis saw in the other-than-human 
elements of creation a certain sense of agency that permitted him and the rest of humanity 
to enter into relationship with creation in a familial or fraternal way.795  The early 
hagiographer Julian of Speyer articulated this sense of subjectivity, fraternity, and agency 
well when he wrote in his The Life of Saint Francis around the years 1232-1235: “Since 
he [Francis] traced all things back to their one first beginning, he called every creature 
‘brother,’ and, in his own praises, continuously invited all creatures to praise their one 
                                                
 793 Doyle, “‘The Canticle of Brother Sun’ and the Value of Creation,” 158-159. 
 794 Timothy Johnson, “Francis and Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Francis of Assisi, 
ed. Michael Robson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 145.   
 795 Johnson, “Francis and Creation,” 146. 
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common Creator.”796  While unexpressed in terms of an explicit “model of creation,” 
which is understandable given his lack of formal theological education, Francis’s 
worldview nevertheless exhibits a bold and distinctive kinship approach that reflects a 
community of creation paradigm seen in scripture and the theological tradition. 
 The Brazilian theologian and former Franciscan friar Leonardo Boff has also 
observed this creational model of kinship in the thought and practice of Francis of Assisi.  
Boff goes so far as to suggest that, in opposition to other predominant and classic models 
of creation, Francis was in fact “the living embodiment of another paradigm, one of a 
spirit that acts in kinship, one that is filled with compassion and respect before each 
representative of the cosmic and planetary community.”797  Francis’s way of living in the 
world was one of intimate relationship in which Francis lived with the world and not 
above and against it as others so commonly do.  Boff explains that for Francis nothing 
was simply available for human possession or consumption, but instead there exists only 
God’s magisterial creation that is related to all other parts of creation in a divine 
interconnectedness.   
 Furthermore, the medieval historian Jacques Dalarun has taken to calling 
Francis’s kinship approach to envisioning the community of creation “the Franciscan 
revolution” for its radical assertion of the fraternity and sorority of all creation.798  
Dalarun sees Francis’s vernacular theology of creation fitting into his larger project of 
Christian living, noting that, “it has the value of a program of minority,” which responds 
                                                
 796 Julian of Speyer, “The Life of Saint Francis,” no. 44, in FAED, 1:401. 
 797 Leonardo Boff, Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1997), 203-204.  Also, see Leonardo Boff, Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm, trans. 
John Cumming (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1995), 52-54. 
 Similarly, Roger Sorrell notes that Francis’s approach to creation “most certainly breaks new 
ground” when he “enfraternizes all creation in God – accepting the creatures into his spiritual family as 
brothers and sisters,” thereby affirming Boff’s intuition.  See Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature, 127. 
 798 Dalarun, The Canticle of Brother Sun, 49-50. 
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in critique and exhortation to the medieval structures of domination and lordship with an 
alternative vision that has “theological, economic, and social expectations.  It hints at a 
political vision.”799  The model and pattern for this “Franciscan revolution” or “political 
vision” is the entire world itself with its diverse creatures, sentient and otherwise.  At the 
center is our “Sister Mother Earth,” to whom Francis points for an exemplar of 
orthopraxis.  Dalarun explains: 
 
This is the governance model suggested by Francis, a maternal governance 
at the opposite extreme of paternal domination.  The one true Father in 
heaven, the mother on earth, the mother-earth who nourishes because she 
governs and governs because she nourishes.  The very fact of celebrating 
the one true Lord, the only one to whom are owed “praises, glory and 
honor and all blessing,” is a way of reducing, or even of annihilating all 
the lordships claimed here below, which proliferated in the Middle Ages 
and burdened the backs of the lowly.800 
 
When taken within the broader context of his vita evangelica, the creational vision of 
Francis of Assisi begins to reflect what we might recognize as resembling a nascent 
postcolonial critique.  Concerned as he was with the power differentials and the “paternal 
domination” of humanity over the rest of creation in opposition to the original intent of 
the Creator, his kinship approach to creation suggests an alternative way of constructing a 
theology of creation, which is a task that was taken up by Franciscan theologians in the 
generations that followed him.801  Francis’s vernacular theological reflection presents the 
Franciscan tradition of later generations with the first seeds of a community of creation 
paradigm that, even to this day, have not been fully harvested.  The remainder of this 
                                                
 799 Dalarun, The Canticle of Brother Sun, 52. 
 800 Dalarun, The Canticle of Brother Sun, 52. 
 801 Though less developed than Francis’s writings and less examined in the secondary literature, 
Clare of Assisi offers additional insight into the early Franciscan movement’s understanding of creation.  
For more, see Elizabeth A. Dreyer, “‘[God] Whose Beauty the Sun and Moon Admire’: Clare and 
Ecology,” The Way, supplement 80 (1994): 76-86. 
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chapter is an exploration of the various components that I will suggest we bring together 
to imagine a fleshed-out postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation in the concluding 
chapter, but first a note on method. 
 
B. A Methodological Interlude 
 In the decades following Francis of Assisi’s death, the path of the Order of Friars 
Minor, which arose out of the nascent penitential movement he founded, became quickly 
intertwined with the emergence of the new university systems developing in Paris, 
Oxford, and elsewhere.802  It was within this context that the earliest vernacular theology 
of creation exhibited in the writings of and hagiography about Francis of Assisi 
blossomed into robust theological reflection in accord with the scholasticism of the age.  
This is seen in the work of luminaries that compose the multifarious “Franciscan school,” 
including Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (d. 1274), John 
Peckham (d. 1292), Roger Bacon (d. ca. 1292), Peter of John Olivi (d. 1298), John Duns 
Scotus (d. 1308), Peter Aureoli (d. 1322), and William of Ockham (d. 1347), among 
many others.803   
 I describe the Franciscan school as “multifarious” because the content of the 
thought and the perspectives contained therein varies so widely from one Franciscan 
thinker to another, rarely exhibiting a clear line of influence akin to Thomism or 
                                                
 802 For more on this, see Neslihan Şenocak, The Poor and the Perfect: The Rise of Learning in the 
Franciscan Order, 1209-1310 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); and Bert Roest, “Francis and the 
Pursuit of Learning,” in The Cambridge Companion to Francis of Assisi, 161-177.  For a general overview 
of the nascent university system and the role of religious orders, see Edward Grant, God & Reason in the 
Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 803 For an overview of these and other Franciscan medieval masters, see Kenan B. Osborne, The 
Franciscan Intellectual Tradition: Tracing Its Origins and Identifying Its Central Components (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003). Additionally, see the entries of these and other 
Minorite figures in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, eds. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. 
Noone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
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Augustinianism, to name but two examples.  One classic illustration of this plurality is 
the divergence of opinion in the famous Cur Deus Homo disputations of the Middle Ages 
wherein Alexander of Hales, the first holder of the Franciscan chair of theology at Paris, 
offered a tentative supralapsarian perspective while Bonaventure, his most-famous 
student, maintained a strict infralapsarianism.  A generation later, John Duns Scotus 
would come along and make one of the strongest cases for supralapsarianism the 
Christian theological tradition had seen up to that time.804  It is important that we 
acknowledge the diversity of thought and perspectives found within the Franciscan 
school because it provides us with both a challenge and an explanatory hypothesis.   
 The challenge is found in the difficulty of substantiating simple claims to 
uniformity within the tradition or comfortably synthesizing these diverse perspectives.  
Historical discussions about the medieval Franciscan contributions to theology typically 
take a focused, individual perspective rather than a more general approach that seeks to 
present a collective sense within a medieval school as found elsewhere during that period 
(e.g., that of the School of St. Victor, etc.).  The explanatory hypothesis actually arises 
from this challenge; namely, that maybe one reason the Franciscan theological tradition 
has been consistently overlooked throughout the centuries is the seeming unwieldy 
quality of the intellectual landscape.  This reality has appeared to be even more the case 
in terms of a constructive theology of creation.  While isolated studies exist that examine 
particular dimensions of an individual Franciscan thinker’s corpus with regard to 
creation, a substantive presentation of what might boldly be called a “Franciscan 
theology of creation” remains lacking.   
                                                
 804 For more on this, see Daniel P. Horan, “How Original Was Scotus on the Incarnation?  
Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste,” 
Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 374-391. 
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 Given the history of this challenge and its accompanying explanatory hypothesis 
that surrounds the Franciscan intellectual tradition, this chapter does not attempt to unify 
or comfortably homogenize the contributions of all medieval Franciscan masters or even 
some of them.  Instead, what follows is an exercise in critical ressourcement, which 
recognizes the plurality of voices inspired by Francis of Assisi’s earliest vernacular 
theological vision, while also acknowledging the distinctive contributions several of these 
thinkers present to modern theologians interested in constructing a non-anthropocentric 
theology of creation.  And yet, a question naturally arises concerning what serves to 
govern an effort to bring together such disparate projects and thinkers under the singular 
heading “Franciscan.”  While an historical project that fully addresses this concern 
exceeds the scope of the current project, it is worth saying a little about the hermeneutic 
used to identify these sources as particularly Franciscan.   
 Indeed, while the temporal contexts, geographical locations, cultural influences, 
theoretical questions, and even scholarly methodologies of Bonaventure, John Duns 
Scotus, and Peter of John Olivi vary widely during the first centuries of the Franciscan 
movement, at least one key element of continuity can be traced through each of their 
respective lives and work.  Namely, the figure and vernacular theology of Francis of 
Assisi as examined in the previous section is the indisputable guiding principle for all 
three thinkers.  In addition to the distinctive styles, questions, and propositions found 
within the multifarious Franciscan theological movement noted earlier, another possible 
reason the Franciscan tradition has been largely overlooked has been the dismissal or 
disregard for Francis of Assisi’s own substantive theological reflection.  For centuries 
Francis was seen as a spiritual giant of the Christian tradition, but rarely recognized for 
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his admittedly non-scholastic theological contributions.805  I believe that the figure of 
Francis of Assisi and the vernacular theological contributions he presents indelibly 
inform the respective projects of Bonaventure, Scotus, and Olivi.  And this influence can 
be traced back to Francis in a way closely resembling what Paul Ricoeur identifies as the 
functioning symbol that gives rise to both a surplus of meaning and “the problem of 
plurivocity” within hermeneutical theory.806 
 Beyond the overlooking of a legitimate theology at work in the writings and 
person of Francis—the sum of which we might call “the figure of Francis” for short—
there exists an unrecognized relationship between the singular (Francis) and the plural 
(the Franciscan tradition).  If we consider the person of Francis of Assisi apart from his 
work and the richly symbolic milieu “the figure of Francis” has come to represent over 
time, it can be difficult to make the connection.  Yet, as David Tracy has suggested, there 
exist within the Christian tradition certain “classics,” which are “understood as those 
texts, events, images, persons, rituals and symbols which are assumed to disclose 
permanent possibilities or meaning and truth.”807  Lawrence Cunningham, to give but one 
example, has identified Francis of Assisi as precisely this sort of “classic,” distinguishing 
in other words what I would call the historical “person” of Francis from the symbolic 
“figure” of Francis: “We could think of Francis as a kind of spiritual classic in the sense 
that he should be understood in his own terms as a historical person who lived in a 
                                                
 805 As we saw in chapter five, the reality of epistemological subjugation extends beyond the 
postcolonial subject to be seen even in the “mainstream” of medieval theological schools.  In this way, 
perhaps we might even identify the dismissal of Francis as a valid source for theological reflection and 
contributor to the theological tradition as yet another instance in which knowledge is policed by those 
operating according to a sort of (proto)colonial logic. 
 806 See Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), esp. 25-44. 
 807 David Tracy, Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroads Publishing, 1981), 68. 
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precise historical period but whose meaning is available for other generations to learn 
about as a source of Christian wisdom.”808 
 Accepting Francis as a classic in this sense, we can return to Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutical theory of symbol and meaning to appreciate better how the very figure of 
Francis of Assisi provides the hermeneutical thread among the otherwise seemingly 
disparate inheritors of the tradition.  Far more significant than the nominal affiliation with 
Francis as members of the Order of Friars Minor, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Olivi each 
tacitly and, at times, explicitly identify the figure of Francis as the governing inspiration 
and guide for their work.  In the case of Bonaventure, as we shall see shortly, even some 
of his most significant theological work takes the figure of Francis as the starting point 
and primary object of reflection.  In the case of Scotus, Mary Beth Ingham has argued for 
the significance of the figure of Francis in shaping the theological outlook of the Subtle 
Doctor.809  And in the case of Olivi, it is Francis of Assisi’s Regula Bullata and his lived 
example that serve as the primary impetus for his theological reflection on the vita 
evangelica.   
                                                
 808 Lawrence Cunningham, Francis of Assisi: Performing the Gospel Life (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 2004), 127. Emphasis added. 
 Elsewhere, David Tracy himself speaks of the Francis of Assisi in this way, observing also the 
ways in which Francis has been overlooked and dismissed: “Dialogue with Buddhists has also forced me to 
see how even so classic a Christian witness as Francis of Assisi can be allowed to speak anew to all 
Christians concerned to establish new relationships to all creatures (not only humans) and thereby to the 
whole earth. This may seem a strange claim, for Francis of Assisi is the one Christian saint whom all 
Westerners profess to love, even if most quietly continue to view him as a kind of holy fool who somehow 
wandered off the pages of Dostoevsky. But the usual view of Francis is no longer even the noble one of. 
Dostoevsky's holy fool; Francis now lives in common memory as something like the lost eighth member of 
Walt Disney's seven dwarfs, somewhere between Happy and Bashful. But Francis was in fact -- as 
Buddhists see clearly -- a Christian of such excess and challenge to ordinary, even good, Christian ways of 
understanding all of God's creation as beloved that we still cannot see him clearly. We have not yet, in 
Christian theological dialogue, taken even Francis of Assisi seriously” (David Tracy, “God, Dialogue, and 
Solidarity: A Theologian’s Refrain,” The Christian Century [October 10, 1990]: 904). 
 809 See Mary Beth Ingham, “Fides Quaerens Intellectum: John Duns Scotus, Philosophy, and 
Prayer,” in Franciscans at Prayer, ed. Timothy J. Johnson (Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2007), 167-194. 
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 For each of these creative and original thinkers, the figure of Francis serves as the 
symbol that, as Ricoeur asserted so frequently, provides a surplus of meaning that cannot 
be entirely exegeted or understood.  This meaning bears a fecundity that informs the 
respective theological engagements within the later Franciscan tradition.  The figure of 
Francis is, in Tracy’s summation of Ricoeur’s insight, “the symbol that gives rise to 
thought; yet thought is informed by and returns to the symbol.”810  Though this 
hermeneutical circle is not always so easily seen in linear form (from Francis to the 
“Franciscan tradition” as such), the return to the symbol of the figure of Francis can be 
recognized in the later Franciscan theological tradition retrospectively.   
 The engagement of Franciscan sources in the remainder of the chapter presumes 
this interpretative mode.  The following excavation of the medieval Franciscan tradition 
can be said to resemble a bricolage, which brings together seemingly disparate insights 
that in fact form a constructive source rooted in the figure of Francis and provides for the 
critical moment of postcolonial theory a theological supplément within which to respond 
to the environmental challenges of our time and the longstanding anthropocentrism that 
has governed so much theological reflection on creation.811   
 
C. The Interrelatedness and Harmony of Creation 
                                                
 810 David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 209.  Also, see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 
1967). 
 811 For more on bricolage, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966); and, on postmodern methodology, see Dan R. Stiver, “Theological Method,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 170-185. 
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 One of the most significant developers of Francis of Assisi’s nascent theological 
reflection on creation was Bonaventure,812 who affirmed that one of the quintessential 
aspects of Francis’s mystical vision of creation was his awareness of the interrelatedness 
that is reflected in his experience of radical kinship with other-than-human creatures as 
well as other humans.813  Timothy Johnson has helped to draw attention to Bonaventure’s 
commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences as a helpful starting point—both 
chronologically within the expansive written corpus of the Seraphic Doctor and 
reflexively when it comes to approaching the thought of Bonaventure on the subject of 
creation.814  In his Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri 
Lombardi, Bonaventure distinguishes himself from his medieval contemporary Thomas 
Aquinas concerning humanity’s relationship to other-than-human creatures.  Thomas 
spends comparatively little time on this subject, arguing that human beings are not 
obligated to “love irrational creatures.”815  Bonaventure, in contrast, explicitly refers to 
Francis of Assisi in his arguing in favor of the position that, in Johnson’s words, “men 
                                                
 812 For a sampling of work exploring Bonaventure’s theological insights on creation, see Zachary 
Hayes, “Incarnation and Creation in the Theology of St. Bonaventure,” in Studies Honoring Ignatius 
Charles Brady Friar Minor, eds. Romano Almagno and Conrad Harkins (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan 
Institute Publications, 1976), 309-330; Ilia Delio, Simply Bonaventure: An Introduction to His Life, 
Thought, and Writings (New York: New City Press, 2001), 54-66; Delio, A Franciscan View of Creation, 
21-32; Christopher Cullen, Bonaventure (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 128-133; Zachary 
Hayes, Bonaventure: Mystical Writings (Phoenix: Tau Publishing, 1999), 55-73; Zachary Hayes, “The 
Cosmos, A Symbol of the Divine,” in Franciscan Theology of the Environment, 249-268; Phil Hoebing, 
“St. Bonaventure and Ecology,” in Franciscan theology of the Environment, 269-280; Ewert Cousins, 
Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978); Alexander 
Gerken, “Identity and Freedom: Bonaventure’s Position and Method,” Greyfriars Review 4 (1974): 91-115; 
Dawn Nothwehr, Ecological Footprints: An Essential Franciscan Guide for Faith and Sustainable Living 
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2012), 103-128; Bernardino de Armellada, “Antropología, Creacíon, 
pecado, gracia, escatología,” in Manual de Teología Franciscana, eds. José Antonio Merino and Francisco 
Martínez Fresneda (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2003), 365-414; and Johnson, “Francis and 
Creation,” esp. 146-153. 
 813 See Hayes, Bonaventure: Mystical Writings, 58.  Also, see Christopher M. Cullen, Bonaventure 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 129: “In Bonaventure’s hands, this nature mysticism [of 
Francis of Assisi] receives a new philosophical depth thanks to his semiotic metaphysics rooted in divine 
exemplarism.” 
 814 Johnson, “Francis and Creation,” 150. 
 815 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica II.2, q. 25, art. 3 (1281-1282). 
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and women are obliged to love irrational creatures since they are created to praise God 
and foster the salvation of humanity.”816  Despite his distinguishing defense of 
humanity’s obligation to “love irrational creatures,” Bonaventure, nevertheless a man of 
his time, maintains a qualified anthropocentric and hierarchical view of the created 
order.817  This can be viewed as something of a departure from Francis’s more egalitarian 
worldview concerning all creation, but several of the primary sources—especially 
Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum818 and Collationes in Hexaëmeron819—reveal 
a more complicated attempt by the Seraphic Doctor to correlate or engage Francis’s 
intuitive and vernacular approach with the formal scholastic tradition, which read the 
Scriptures, patristic sources, and monastic theologies in the particular light of the 
thirteenth-century theological milieu.820  Bonaventure, recognizing the intrinsic 
relationality of all aspects of the world, following Francis’s fraternal outlook, connects 
this sense of creation’s inherent interrelatedness to his hierarchical view of creation.  He 
does so by first arguing that there are three levels or orders within creation that each bear 
some intrinsic likeness to the Creator.  These orders are vestigium, imago, and 
similitudo.821   
                                                
 816 Johnson, “Francis and Creation,” 150. 
 817 Cullen, Bonaventure, 130-131; and Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s 
Theology, 85-104. 
 818 See Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, eds. Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes 
(St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2002) (Opera Omnia, V:293-316).  The critical edition 
of Bonaventure’s work is Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, eds. PP. Collegii S. 
Bonaventurae, 10 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1882-1902).  Reference to texts from this 
critical edition are indicated by volume and page numbers in parenthesis noted by Opera Omnia. 
 819 See Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, ed. José de Vinck (Paterson, NJ: St. Anthony 
Guild Press, 1970) (Opera Omnia, V:327-454). 
 820 Hayes, Bonaventure: Mystical Writings, 57: “Bonaventure takes up St. Francis’s vision of 
creation and enriches it by relating to some of the great philosophical insights that have helped humans to 
define their place in the world.” 
 821 Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, 106: “The internal and 
intrinsic order within the divine essence is also the foundation of the internal and intrinsic order within each 
created essence.”  This is seen most clearly in Bonaventure’s Commentaria in Quatuor Libros 
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 The most foundational level is that of the vestige (vestigium), which is found in 
every aspect of creation.  Understood from its etymological roots, Bonaventure conceives 
of each aspect of the created order as bearing something like a “footprint” (vestigio) of 
the divine, a particular imprint of that which is the source of the thing’s very existence.  
Because all creatures have an intrinsic relationship to God as principium creativium, 
every creature is therefore a vestige.822  Every stone, blade of grass, tree, squirrel, bat, 
dog, and person is, at least, a vestige of the Creator and therefore (a) inherently capable 
of revealing something about God to the rest of creation and (b) intrinsically related to all 
other aspects of creation according to what Francis recognized as a singular cosmic 
fraternitas and what we might contemporarily call kinship.  The hierarchical dimension 
of Bonaventure’s theology of creation states that human persons, in addition to being a 
vestigium, are also the imago of God.  The distinction of degree here has to do with 
epistemological views of humanity’s capacity to relate to the divine “not only insofar as 
God is the cause [like all creation as vestiges], but also insofar as God is the object.”823  
This is a cognitive distinction that makes sense according to the generally anthropocentric 
cosmology of Bonaventure’s sources and time, but one that still needs further nuancing in 
light of contemporary scriptural exegesis, theological reflection, and scientific discovery 
presented in earlier chapters of this project.  Furthermore, Bonaventure explains that 
humanity also has the capacity to reflect God as a part of creation by means of similitudo 
or in the “likeness” of God.  This occurs when humanity as imago is able to order itself, 
                                                                                                                                            
Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, II, d. 16, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (Opera Omnia, II: 395a), and can also be 
found in his Collationes in Hexaëmeron and Breviloquium. 
 822 See Bonaventure, Quaestiones disp. De scientia Christi, q. 4, resp., ed. Zachary Hayes (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1992), 135-136 (Opera Omnia, V:24a); and Bonaventure, 
Quaestiones disp. De mysterio SS. Trinitatis, q. 1, art. 2, resp., ed. Zachary Hayes (St. Bonaventure: 
Franciscan Institute Publications, 1979), 128-129 (Opera Omnia, V:54).  Also, see Hellmann, Divine and 
Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, 107. 
 823 Hellmann, Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure’s Theology, 107. 
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through grace as the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, in the most intimate way toward God.  
When humanity is similitudo it exhibits the “ordered soul” (anima ordinata) and bears a 
proximity to the Creator that has been otherwise limited by the effects of sin.824 
 Bonaventure’s admittedly hierarchal depiction of the created world reveals that 
everything created bears some inherent resemblance to the Creator and reflects that 
identity beyond itself to other aspects of the community of creation.  In a sense, we might 
see this aspect of Bonaventure’s thought anticipating the argument for interpreting the 
Imago Dei according to degree or by means of variability along a continuum as we saw 
earlier in Chapter Four.  Furthermore, Bonaventure’s understanding of interrelatedness 
seen in what we might colloquially refer to as a shared “family resemblance,” albeit one 
that accounts for diversity and notable differentiation, points to an important aspect of 
Bonaventure’s vision of creation: all creatures come from the same, singular source, 
which is the Triune God.  It is Bonaventure’s Trinitarian view of creation that is the 
ground of his assertion of creation’s interrelatedness and intended harmony. 
 Although a full exploration of Bonaventure’s theology of the Trinity far exceeds 
the scope of this project, it is important to recall that, for him, the fact that God is triune 
serves as the foundation for all Christian theology and reflection on the faith.825  In many 
ways this claim may seem obvious, but Bonaventure’s entire work is structured and 
formed according to this principle.  This is so much the case that even the very 
organization of his many treatises and elucidation of Christian doctrines bears a threefold 
                                                
 824 See Bonaventure, Quaestiones disp. De scientia Christi, q. 4, resp., 136 (Opera Omnia, V:24); 
 825 See Bonaventure, Quaestiones disp. De mysterio SS. Trinitatis, q. 1, arts. 2 con. (Opera Omnia, 
V:54b). 
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quality.826  The primary way his Trinitarian outlook informs his theology of creation is in 
terms of emanation (emanatio).  While present elsewhere in his written corpus, it is most 
fully developed in Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaëmeron.  In the Twelfth Collation, 
Bonaventure draws upon the metaphor of artwork to illustrate how the Trinity creates by 
means of emanation in a recognizably Platonic key. 
 
It must be assumed by faith that God is the Creator of all things, the Ruler 
of actions, the Teacher of intelligences, the Judge of merits. And from this 
we may understand that He is the Cause of causes, the Art originating in 
an outstanding manner, the Leader governing most providently, the Light 
declaring or representing most manifestly, the Right retributing and 
judging most justly…The creature comes forth from the Creator, but not 
through nature, since it is of another nature.  Hence it comes forth through 
art, since there is no other noble manner of emanation besides through 
nature and through art, that is, out of an act of the will…Now, Scripture 
speaks of Him who is the Exemplar, by whom every creature lives in the 
eternal forms.  What was made of Him was life [John 1:3].  For it lives 
through knowing and loving; and anyone who denies this denies eternal 
predestination.  For God knew the creature from all eternity and loves it 
[even now], since He made it for glory and grace.827 
 
Bonaventure uses Platonic imagery to express both the source (God) and the divine 
intention (love/will) for the act of creation.  It is worth noting that Bonaventure also 
asserts the eternality of God’s knowledge of and love for each aspect of created order 
without prejudice for the human species.  Creation is the result of the contingent, free, 
loving act of the Creator, which creates a finite community of creation that shares in the 
“infinite divine community of love,” which is the Trinity itself.828 
                                                
 826 See Gregory LaNave, “Bonaventure’s Theological Method,” in A Companion to Bonaventure, 
eds. Jay M. Hammond, J. A. Wayne Hellmann, and Jared Goff (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2014), 81-120. 
 827 Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, 12:1-7, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson: St. Anthony 
Guild Press, 1970), 173-175. (Opera Omnia, V:384a-385b). 
 828 Delio, Simply Bonaventure, 55. 
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 According to Bonaventure, God is understood primarily in terms of “fruitful 
being” or “supreme goodness,” from which creation emerges by a singular act of the 
divine will.829  The means by which the creational act takes place, that is the expression 
of the divine will outside God’s self, is through the uncreated, Eternal Word, which is the 
Son.830  As Zachary Hayes explains, “Since the Father expresses all that He is in the 
Word, the entire triune structure of God, including the procession of the Spirit, is focused 
in the Word in an exemplary way; for as center of the divine life, the Word is the 
ontological basis for all that is other than the Father.”831  As the ancient Colossians 1:15-
20 hymn proclaims, Bonaventure asserts the centrality of the Word as that through whom 
and by means of whom all creation comes into existence.832  This Christological 
principle, which remains inseparable from Bonaventure’s Trinitarian theology, is the 
grounding for the theological claim that all creatures share an inherent relationship: First, 
with the eternal Word through whom they each came into existence, emanating from the 
self-diffusive love/good of the Trinity; and Second, with one another in terms of a 
kinship that arises by virtue of the singular, universal, and divine source of their 
existence.833   
                                                
 829 See Bonaventure, Quaestiones disp. De mysterio SS. Trinitatis, q. 8, resp. (Opera Omnia, 
V:114).   
 830 See Bonaventure, Collationes in Hexaëmeron, 9:2 and 3:7 (Opera Omnia, V:373 and V:344). 
 831 Zachary Hayes, “Incarnation and Creation in the Theology of St. Bonaventure,” in Studies 
Honoring Ignatius Brady Friar Minor, eds. Romano Stephen Almagno and Conrad L. Harkins (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1976), 314.  Also, see Ewert H. Cousins, Bonaventure and 
the Coincidence of Opposites (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978), 97-130. 
 832 See Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, I, d. 
27, p. 2, a. un., q. 2 (Opera Omnia, I: 485).  Here Bonaventure refers to the uncreated Word as the 
“exemplar factivum et dispositivum” following the Colossians Christological axiom. 
 833 On the inherent Trinitarian quality of the divine act of creation, the universality of the Trinity’s 
imago in creation as vestige, and creation’s intrinsic relationship to the Word in Bonaventure, Hayes 
masterfully summarizes: “The first and primal relation is that between the Father and the Word, and in it is 
contained the basis of all other relation.  So it is that He who is the center of the divine life is also the 
exemplar of creation; and creation itself may be seen as an external word in which the one inner Word is 
objectified.  If it is true that the triune God creates after His own image, that is, after the Word, then it 
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 In addition to Bonaventure’s understanding of the inherent interrelational aspect 
shared by creation, a view that arises from his Trinitarian and Christological vision of 
creation, the Seraphic Doctor holds that the divine act of creation also establishes a sense 
of harmony and order within creation.  That we human beings cannot always see the 
harmony of creation intended by the Creator is, as Bonaventure asserts, a direct result of 
our sinfulness and distorted view of reality.  However, for those who are able to see the 
world as it really is by experiencing a mystical-prophetic outlook akin to Francis of 
Assisi, this harmony of creation becomes recognizable.  This is most clearly seen in 
Bonaventure’s Itinerarium, in which he ties together the divine attributes of goodness and 
beauty to the vestigial representation found in all creation.834  Ilia Delio further elaborates 
on Bonaventure’s synthesis: “The beauty, order and harmony of creation signified to 
Bonaventure that this created world is not simply a stage for human activity or a 
backdrop to human longings, but that the whole of creation has meaning and purpose.”835 
 It must be recalled that Bonaventure’s knowledge of the natural sciences was 
limited to the Ptolemaic universe in which the planetary objects revolved around the 
Earth.  While this limited way of thinking mitigates the ways in which we can directly 
appropriate the scientific foundations of his theological reflection, it does not seem to 
impinge directly on a sense of divine intention or purpose behind creation, which does 
not conflict with the evolutionary view of the universe we now accept.  According to the 
Ptolemaic outlook, “Unity and proportionality characterized this universe in the same 
                                                                                                                                            
follows that any created reality will possess, in its inner constitution, a relation to this uncreated Word.  In 
as far as the one Word is the expression of the entire inner-trinitarian structure of God, that which is created 
as an expression of the Word bears within itself the imprint of the Trinity” (Hayes, “Incarnation and 
Creation,” 314). 
 834 Bonaventure, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, ch. 1, vv. 14-15 (Opera Omnia, V:299). 
 835 Delio, Simply Bonaventure, 55. 
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way that creation itself was marked by unity in multiplicity.  Bonaventure saw that, 
within this Ptolemaic universe, everything in creation is ordered one to another, since 
everything has its proper location, arrangement, and purpose.”836  What is most important 
about this perception of divine harmony in creation is not so much the scientific 
underpinnings that must be bracketed in our time, but the end toward which this theory 
was oriented; namely, that just as everything in creation shares an interrelatedness and 
kinship because of its common source in the Creator, so too everything was directed to a 
singular goal or telos: God.837  Harmony in this case does not arise from a particular 
medieval theory of scientific understanding, but rather from a cosmic sense of divine 
purpose and intentionality reminiscent of Irenaeus of Lyon’s emphasis on the unity of 
protology and eschatology as a singular divine act of recapitulation. 
 Bonaventure is not the only Franciscan theological master to develop further 
Francis’s nascent theology of creation.  According to the Scotist scholar Mary Beth 
Ingham, it was “in the writings of one of its greatest medieval metaphysicians, John Duns 
Scotus, that the Franciscan love for all creatures was both established philosophically and 
defended theologically.”838  In one sense, Scotus builds upon his Franciscan 
predecessor’s work, arguing with Bonaventure that God freely elects to enter into 
relationship, ad extra, through the divine act of creation.839  And as the single source of 
all creation, there is an intrinsic relationship shared among all that exists within the 
created order—both in terms of relationship to the Creator as well as relationship to one 
                                                
 836 Ilia Delio, A Franciscan View of Creation: Learning to Live in a Sacramental Universe (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 24. 
 837 Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, d. 47, a. 
u. 3, concl. (Opera Omnia, I:844). 
 838 Mary Beth Ingham, “The Testimony of Two Witnesses: A Response to Ask The Beasts,” 
Theological Studies 77 (2016): 471. 
 839 See John Duns Scotus, Quodlibet 14, n. 16, 14.63 in God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal 
Questions, trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 332. 
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another.  From this interrelationship arises a divinely intended harmony of creation that 
Scotus describes as the “order of essences,” which is derived and adapted from 
Aristotle’s reflections on the relationship between that which is prior and posterior.  This 
is the sense of connection that unifies the whole of creation in harmonic accord.840  
Scotus’s sense of a harmony of creation moves beyond Bonaventure’s originating and 
teleological understanding to include a dynamic sense of relationship, which includes 
both God and creatures.  Although it is true that Scotus maintains God is not equal to 
creation and vice versa, Scotus does assert a radical notion of what Ingham calls “weak 
mutuality” meaning that, although ontologically unequal, the relationship with Creation 
involves both God and creatures.  Ingham explains that, “the essential order is a great 
sweep of being, a unified whole of reality which includes God.  As First Principle, God 
does not exist outside the order of being nor outside of relationship with the created 
order.”841 
 Scotus describes this dynamic of harmony within creation in terms of divine 
artistry or aesthetics.  It is God, the Creator-Artist, who freely loves into existence the 
whole universe and situates it within an ordered frame of interrelatedness.842  Scotus’s 
emphasis on the primacy of the will over the intellect in the divine act of creation forms 
the foundation for his prioritization of contingency in discussing creation.  For Scotus, as 
                                                
 840 For example, see John Duns Scotus, De Primo Principio, 1.5, ed. Allan B. Wolter (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1966), 2: “I do not take the essential order, however, in the strict sense as do some 
who say that what is posterior is ordered whereas what is first or prior transcends order. I understand it 
rather in its common meaning as a relation which can be affirmed equally (relation aequiparantiae dicta) 
of the prior and posterior in regard to each other. In other words, I consider prior and posterior to be an 
adequate division of whatever is ordered, so that we may use the terms order and priority or posteriority 
interchangeably.” 
 841 Mary Beth Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John 
Duns Scotus, 2nd ed. (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2012), 38-39. 
 842 See Scotus, De Primo Principio, 3.26 (ed. Wolter, 36).  Also, see Daniel P. Horan, 
Postmodernity and Univocity: A Critical Account of Radical Orthodoxy and John Duns Scotus 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), esp.157-188. 
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for Bonaventure before him, God’s desire to express God’s self in terms of divine love ad 
extra results in the act of creation sharing in divine goodness.  Or, as Ingham has 
described it, “God chose to share divine goodness, to create co-lovers of divine infinite 
goodness and beauty.”843  This act of God ad extra is in no way necessary, but instead a 
reflection of the harmony and order of divine love God intended from the beginning.  The 
contingency of God’s creative act signals for Scotus divine beauty and love, which 
undergirds the created universe and of which all creatures are a part.844 
 One final note on this subject: for Scotus, the realities of disharmony and disorder 
are not overlooked.  They are introduced by the experience of human sinfulness and 
privative evil, but these are not realities that God directly wills into existence.  
Furthermore, just as sin enters through the hubris of humanity in myriad ways, so too 
Scotus argues that human beings have the moral capacity to act in accord with the 
aesthetic sense of beauty, justice, and harmony that God intends from the beginning.  It is 
in this sense that the Franciscan primacy of praxis in theology comes to the fore as a 
response to the modern crises of environmental degradation and the mistaken claims to 
dominion and stewardship of previous ages.845   
 
D. Particularity and the Intrinsic Value of Creation 
 While Scotus builds upon the insights and metaphysical foundations Bonaventure 
developed regarding God’s creative act, which led to significant contributions to the 
                                                
 843 Mary Beth Ingham, Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (St. Bonaventure: 
Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 49. 
 844 Ingham, Scotus for Dunces, 48. 
 845 A fuller treatment of this exceeds the scope of this project, for more on this see Ingham, “The 
Testimony of Two Witnesses,” 470-474; Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness, esp. 181-224; and Nothwehr, 
Ecological Footprints, 155-323. 
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Franciscan discussion of the interrelatedness and harmony of creation, perhaps Scotus’s 
most original contribution to a Franciscan theology of creation is his metaphysical 
proposal for a principle of individuation.  This philosophical approach to addressing the 
question of the relationship between particulars and universals further challenges a 
utilitarian or purely instrumental view of both human and other-than-human aspects of 
creation.   
 Determining what specifically distinguishes singulars from universals, what 
makes one thing or person different from others of a similar kind, has been one of the 
perennial controversies of the Western philosophical and theological tradition.  This was 
especially true during the Middle Ages.846  Scotus departs from his predecessors—
including Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas—in a radically innovative way, positing a 
principle of individuation that is not conditioned by the more traditional readings of 
Aristotle’s metaphysical work concerning singulars and universals.  Within the 
hylomorphic framework that constitutes Aristotelian philosophy, everything that exists 
(that which is ens creatum) is composed of matter and form.847  Matter was understood in 
the first order as relating to the substantia (from substare, “to stand beneath”) that was 
                                                
 846 See Allan Wolter, “Scotus’s Individuation Theory,” in The Philosophical Theology of John 
Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 68: “The problem 
of individuation in the latter portion of the thirteenth century became on of the more controversial and hotly 
discussed issues in university circles, especially at Paris and Oxford.” 
 847 This, of course, is an overly simplified way of summarizing Aristotle’s understandably 
complex metaphysics.  For the sake of brevity and space, I have opted to distill this approach to the most 
accessible form possible in order to set the stage for our discussion of Scotus to follow.  For more 
information on this, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). Also, see Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Introduction: The Problem of Individuation,” in 
Individuation in Scholasticism: The Latter Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650, ed. 
Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: The SUNY Press, 1994), 1-20; Jorge J. E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem 
of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984); 
and Henry Veatch, “Essentialism and the Problem of Individuation,” Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 47 (1974): 64-73. 
 On the approaches of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas in particular, see Peter O. King, 
“Bonaventure,” in Individuation in Scholasticism, 141-172; and Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas,” in 
Individuation in Scholasticism, 173-194. 
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the “bearer of qualities” and the essence or quiddity of the given thing (e.g., “dog-ness,” 
“human-ness,” etc.).  The substance of the thing was that which various things of a 
similar kind primarily shared in common.  The form referred to the accidental properties 
of the singular substance and, simply put, determined the particular individual thing.  
Medieval efforts to understand what made an individual a particular typically relied upon 
this Aristotelian framework. 
 Scotus surveyed various theories of individuation prior to advancing his own 
argument.848  To gain a basic understanding of Scotus’s theory of individuation, we will 
examine what he means in responding to the question, “Is a material substance individual 
through something positive determining the nature to be just this individual 
substance”;849 with his response, “I reply therefore to the question that material substance 
is determined to this singularity by some positive entity and to other diverse singularities 
by other diverse positive entities.”850  In other words, Scotus’s starting point for 
understanding particularity among individual substances is not some accidental quality or 
extrinsic material.  Rather, as Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer summarize well, 
Scotus posits that, “the material substance becomes individual through a principle that 
                                                
 848 The primary text for the five theories Scotus engages prior to advancing his own is Lectura II, 
d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–5, in Opera Omnia: Studio et Cura Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita, 21 
vols., critical ed., ed. Carlo Balíc et al.. (Vatican City: Vatican Polyglott Press, 1950–), 229–273 [hereafter 
Vatican]. Subsequent references to this edition will be noted by the Latin text with this edition’s internal 
notion, followed by the volume and page number in parenthesis. Unless otherwise noted, English 
translations of this section of the Lectura are from John Duns Scotus, Early Oxford Lecture on 
Individuation, trans. Allan Wolter (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2005). Wolter’s 
paragraph numbering in his translation differs from that of the Vatican Latin text, although he cites the 
Vatican critical edition. My numbering here follows the Vatican’s. Additionally, Scotus’s slightly later 
reflections on the principle of individuation can be found in the Ordinatio. For selections see Giovanni 
Duns Scoto, Filosofo della libertá, ed. Orlando Todisco (Padua: Messaggero Padova, 1996), 164–85.   
 For an introduction to these other medieval views on individuation not yet cited, see Gracia, 
Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, 2nd ed.; and Gracia, ed., 
Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650. 
 849 Lectura II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 6, n.139 (Vatican 18:273). 
 850 Lectura II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 6, n. 164 (Vatican 18:280). 
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contracts the common nature (natura communis) to singularity.  Scotus calls this 
principle the individuating entity (entitas individualis).  In the literature on Scotus, this is 
as a rule described as ‘thisness’ or haecceitas, a term that Scotus uses in his Questions on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics.”851   
 Furthermore, for Scotus the individuating principle (haecceitas) is not “added to” 
the nautra communis, but rather is prior to that which is shared among similar things and 
intrinsic to the individual or singular substance.852  Allan Wolter explains that, “this 
positive entity to which we attribute singularity [i.e., haecceitas] must be formally other 
than the entity constituting the specific nature [i.e., substantia].”853  While the 
individuating principle (entitas individualis or haecceitas) is prior to the natura 
communis, it is in fact ontologically identical to or “one with” the natura communis, 
albeit “formally distinct” from it.854  Ingham and Dreyer summarize this point: 
This distinction of the common nature [natura communis] from the 
principle of individuation [entitas individualis or haecceitas] is a formal 
one; the two are merely formally distinct [formaliter distinctae] in the 
individual. While two individuals are in themselves really distinct, two 
formally distinct entities are not in themselves distinct in reality; instead, 
they only become distinct through the intellect, i.e., they can be conceived 
                                                
 851 Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus 
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 113.  Also, see John Duns Scotus, Questions on 
the Metaphysics of Aristotle, eds. Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure: 
Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997-1998). 
 852 Lectura II, dist. 3, pars 1, q 6, n. 167 (Vatican 18:281). 
 853 Wolter, “Scotus’s Individuation Theory,” 90. 
 854 Following in the tradition of Bonaventure’s distinctio rationis and Henry of Ghent’s 
“intentional distinction,” Scotus develops the notion of the “Formal Distinction,” which is a via media of 
sorts between something that is only conceptually (and, therefore, nonextramentally) distinct and 
something distinct in reality (like an apple and an orange). For a more extended treatment of this 
philosophical theory, see Allan Wolter, “The Formal Distinction,” in The Philosophical Theology of John 
Duns Scotus 27–41; Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University, 1999), 149; Ingham and 
Dreyer, Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, 33–38; Marilyn McCord Adams, “Universals in the 
Fourteenth Century, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Anthony Kenny et al. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 411–439; and Stephen Dumont, “Henry of Ghent and 
Duns Scotus,” in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John Marenbon (London: Routledge, 1998), 291–328. 
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independently of one another. Nevertheless, they are not mere concepts 
because the intellect does not produce them.855 
 
Put simply, Scotus maintains that what makes an individual thing this thing and not that 
thing is not something “added to” the generic substance of “dog” or “stone” or “human.”  
Rather, what makes an individual an individual is identical with a thing’s very existence 
or being.  It is not an external, accidental, or material modification of an eternal idea or of 
a universal substantia but a real, positive, unique, unalienable, and unrepeatable 
principle.  This principle, haecceitas, is absolutely intrinsic to that which it individuates 
within creation – including both material and nonmaterial things – and is really identical 
with such an individual thing’s very being.856  It cannot be taken away, modified, or 
contested.  That someone or something exists is indicative of that thing’s inherent value 
and dignity according to God’s loving and contingent creative act.857 
 What Scotus does in positing haecceitas as the individuating principle, one that is 
a positive dimension of every concrete and contingent being, while at the same time 
remaining identical with that being’s very existence, is “shift the metaphysical focus from 
the necessary and universal to the contingent and particular.”858  Ingham explains why 
this metaphysical theory is so significant for consideration of the inherent value of each 
thing in itself:  
                                                
 855 Ingham and Dreyer, Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus, 116. 
 856 See Ordinatio II, dist. 3, q. 6, n. 188 (Vatican 7:483). An excellent translation of this distinction 
can be found in Paul Vincent Spade, ed., Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1994), 107: “Therefore, this individual entity [entitas individualis] is not matter or 
form or the composite, inasmuch as each of these is a nature. Rather it is the ultimate reality of the being 
that is matter or that is form or that is the composite…” 
 857 Scotus makes this claim in several places (including Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, q. 11, n. 9). He 
does so succinctly in his Quodlibetal Questions. See John Duns Scotus, Quodlibet 14, n. 16, 14.63 in Felix 
Alluntis and Allan Wolter, eds., God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 332: “All such external motion consequently is contingent and hence has God’s 
will itself as its immediate principle.” 
 858 Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness, 35. 
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As a philosophical term of individuation, haecceitas enabled Scotus to 
emphasize the ineffable value of each contingent being and, indirectly, the 
enormous liberality of God who created this haec out of numerous 
possibilities.  Haecceitas is a central insight within a vision of reality 
where rational divine freedom functions as primary cause.859 
 
As Timothy Noone notes, Scotus values common natures (natura communis) too, but it is 
the individual that is of ultimate importance and should be valued prior to that which is 
shared in common.860  This is not to be mistaken for a contemporary sense of 
“individualism,” but rather it is the Subtle Doctor’s strong conviction that God creates the 
particular, prioritizes this individual over the collection of singulars, the common nature, 
or the possible genus under which a specific being might otherwise be classified. 
 Scotus’s concept of haecceitas applies not only to human persons,861 but also to 
every single thing that exists, including nonhuman animals, plants, grains of sand, blades 
of grass, and so on.  One should already begin to see how this metaphysical claim 
grounds a Christian outlook that values the other-than-human aspects of the created order 
in themselves and not according to the conservation of or the possible utilization by 
human beings alone.  Because everything that exists has been intentionally loved into 
existence by a Creator who desires that each particular being exist when it could 
otherwise not, the concept of haecceitas presupposes an intrinsic relationship rooted in 
                                                
 859 Ingham, The Harmony of Goodness, 35. 
 860 Timothy Noone, “Universals and Individuation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 122. 
 861 For more on haecceitas and the human person, see Daniel P. Horan, “Beyond Essentialism and 
Complementarity: Toward a Theological Anthropology Rooted in Haeeceitas,” Theological Studies 75 
(2014): 94-117. Additionally, Mary Beth Ingham writes: “Every single creature possesses a personal haec 
that belongs to no one else.  We see and appreciate this most clearly in the beauty of nature.  As created by 
God, each being is a this, a haec, a unique being incapable of cloning or repetition.  Each tree, each rose, 
each leaf knows no twin.  Haecceitas refers to the ultimate reality of any being, known fully to God alone.  
This would explain, he might say, why no two snowflakes are identical,” in Scotus for Dunces: An 
Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2003), 54. 
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divine intentionality.  “Each being within the created order already possesses an 
immanent dignity whose foundation is relational; it is already gifted by a loving Creator 
with a sanctity beyond our ability to understand.”862   
 This does not mean that the order of creation is entirely flat or without distinction, 
with worms and blades of grass bearing equal value and dignity with human beings.  
Scotus is neither that naïve nor idealistic.  Rather, what the Subtle Doctor argues is that 
worms and blades of grass do not depend or rely upon other created aspects of the world 
(e.g., human beings) for their respective dignity or value.  Whether this or that stone is of 
any use to me is irrelevant when considering its value as such.  Each aspect of creation, 
human and nonhuman alike, bears a unique, unrepeatable, and ineffable haecceitas that 
signals the a priori relationship it has to the Creator, while at the same time 
distinguishing it from the rest of the created order as an individual.  
 Trees, for example, are not to be treated like people just as people are not to be 
treated like trees, but a tree is not worthwhile and deserving of care and conservation only 
because of its potential to provide lumber and firewood or reveal the presence of God in 
nature to a human being (as Thomas Aquinas maintained its singular non-instrumental 
value was).  Instead, each tree is known by God, loved into existence contingently and 
therefore deliberately, and always already remains in a web of relationships with those 
living and nonliving, human and nonhuman created others both near to it within its 
habitat and far away from it elsewhere in the universe.863  Scotus’s principle of 
                                                
 862 Mary Beth Ingham, “The Tradition and the Third Millennium: The Earth Charter,” in Words 
Made Flesh: Essays Honoring Kenan B. Osborne, OFM, ed. Joseph Chinnici (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan 
Institute Publications, 2011), 184. 
 863 In a way, this sense of relationship anticipates the discoveries in the field of quantum 
mechanics in the early and mid-twentieth century, particularly that of “entanglement.”  For a helpful 
exploration of this overlap between theoretical physics and philosophy, see Karen Barad, Meeting the 
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individuation, his concept of haecceitas, offers a radical alternative to the other 
anthropocentric models of creation.  Haecceitas de-centers the human being such that one 
can resituate him or herself among the rest of creation and in relationship to his or her 
Creator. Therefore, Scotus’s approach offers contemporary scholars a different paradigm 
with which to examine our world and all the creatures that inhabit it.   
 Far from a utilitarian system of creational valuation, which adjudicates greater 
and lesser worth based on the usefulness of a particular creature (or species) for human 
beings, Scotus’s proposal of haecceitas as the principle of individuation challenges 
theologians to reconsider widely accepted and unevaluated presuppositions about 
distinction, individuality, and identity previously reserved for human beings alone.  
Imagine if our starting point for ecological ethics did not rely solely on the conservation 
of other-than-human creatures for the sake of the broader human family nor for future 
generations of women and men as Pope Francis has advocated for according to 
“intergenerational solidarity” in Laudato Si (indeed these are worthwhile concerns in 
their own right), but rather what if our starting point was the unquestioned uniqueness of 
all creatures, whether we as individual or a community of humans could decipher such 
distinctiveness?  Perhaps then the questions surrounding the ethics of genetically 
modified organisms, factory farming, or energy production and consumption would 
change in tenor and outcome.  Perhaps then the decisions at the supermarket or even 
stock market might shift to reflect an increasing awareness of the dignity and value all 
aspects of creation bear apart from our personal or collective valuation of other-than-
human creatures.  Regardless of the potential for the allied field of environmental ethics, 
                                                                                                                                            
Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007). 
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a paradigm of creation that took seriously the haecceity of all aspects of creation would 
necessitate a shift in how we human beings did approach the other-than-human world, 
particularly as it concerns this pressing question of how to negotiate the tension between 
the necessarily instrumental dimensions of creation, which are well represented at all 
levels of creaturely consumption and reproduction, and the intrinsic value of creation 
represented by Scotus’s notable contribution to a Franciscan theology of creation. 
 
E. Usus Pauper: Reconceiving the Relationship Between the Intrinsic and 
Instrumental Value of Creation 
 When other-than-human creatures are recognized to have intrinsic worth apart 
from human valuation, there arises a tension between the desire to maintain the inherent 
value of creation while also acknowledging and accounting for the necessary 
instrumental use of various other-than-human creatures.  This tension can be illustrated in 
terms of the three paradigmatic approaches to a theology of creation explored so far in 
this project, highlighting the extremes found on either end of an ethical spectrum.  On the 
one hand, the stewardship model (and, a fortiori, the dominion model) of creation 
reduces all other-than-human dimensions of creation to a place of utility with constant 
reference to the human person for valuation.  On the other hand, an exclusive emphasis 
on all of creation’s inherent value, such as one finds in advancing the kinship or 
community of creation model, runs the risk of flattening the created order and 
establishing a sense of creational equality that renders all dimensions of creation 
indistinguishable from one another in terms of valuation.  What is needed in moving 
beyond this impasse is a framework for concurrently maintaining the dignity and value of 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 333 
all creation while also accounting for the necessary “use” of other living and nonliving 
creatures in the unavoidable cycle of processes that include eating, respiration, 
procreation, sheltering, and so on.   
 Though imperfect in terms of a clear directive that attends to this particular 
tension, I believe that the insight of medieval Franciscan Peter of John Olivi (d. 1298) in 
response to an otherwise esoteric concern about the proper exercise of evangelical 
poverty, what he calls usus pauper (“restricted use” or “poor use”), offers theologians a 
constructive heuristic for addressing this impasse.  Given his relative anonymity, 
especially when compared with the well-known figures of Bonaventure or Scotus, it is 
worth reviewing a little background on Olivi before articulating the contours of his 
argument.  Following this brief chronological sketch, we will take a closer look at what 
Olivi meant by usus pauper and then consider some ways in which it may be 
appropriated for a constructive theology of creation. 
 Peter of John Olivi was born in or shortly before the year 1248 in the southern 
French region of Béziers.864  At around 1260 he entered the Order of Friars Minor at a 
young age and, after initial formation, became a student in Paris.  Records show that he 
never taught at Paris, but was eventually assigned to be a lector at a Franciscan studium 
in Narbonne (although some reports suggest he taught at the studium at Montpellier).  
Despite his early ascension as a lector (a regional theological professor) and promise as a 
theologian and philosopher, he never became a magister.  His writings were first held 
                                                
 864 For a fuller account of Olivi’s chronology, see David Flood, “The Theology of Peter John 
Olivi: A Search for a Theology and Anthropology of the Synoptic Gospels,” in The History of Franciscan 
Theology, ed. Kenan B. Osborne (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1994), 127-184; 
David Burr, Olivi’s Peaceable Kingdom: A Reading of the Apocalypse Commentary (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 63-74; and David Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976). 
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suspect within the Franciscan Order by the General Minister Jerome of Ascoli (ca. 1274-
1279) and then under investigation by the Holy See in subsequent years until his eventual 
acquittal in 1287.  He died in 1298.  The shadow of suspicion cast on his work stemmed 
in part from his disputes with other lectores about the meaning of evangelical poverty.  It 
was his defense of his interpretation of usus pauper in general and its direct relationship 
to the evangelical counsel of poverty in particular that contributed most significantly to 
his being cast in suspicion both during his lifetime and afterward.  There is, of course, no 
shortage of irony here in the claim that the doctrine for which Olivi was considered at 
times controversial and which likely contributed to his largely being forgotten over the 
centuries is also the insight most valuable for our purposes in constructing a 
contemporary theology of creation.  Furthermore, while a substantive review and analysis 
of Olivi’s intended use of the doctrine of usus pauper—that pertaining to the 
interpretation of the evangelical counsel of poverty—far exceeds the scope of this current 
project, perhaps our revisiting the doctrine for application in a non-ecclesiological 
context might offer usus pauper a broader rehabilitation that seems long overdue.865 
 The emergence of what would become the usus pauper controversy is tied to the 
question of whether the Franciscan vow of poverty (literally, to live sine proprio, or 
“without anything of one’s own”) demanded that friars renounce ownership of property 
and goods alone or that it also entail “restricted” or “poor” use of goods in addition to the 
                                                
 865 Much has been written on the history of the usus pauper controversy in general. For example, 
see Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi; David Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); David Burr and David Flood, “Peter Olivi: On Poverty and 
Revenue,” Franciscan Studies 40 (1980): 18-58; David Burr, The Spiritual Franciscans: From Protest to 
Persecution in the Century After Saint Francis (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 
43-66; and Kevin Madigan, Olivi and the Interpretation of Matthew in the High Middle Ages (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 93-140. 
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lack of ownership.866  Olivi and his supporters held the latter position.  They believed that 
true renunciation of ownership meant that any property or goods that the Franciscans had 
access to, practical (if not nominal) ownership over, and ultimate use of were property or 
goods that de jure and de facto belonged to someone else.  As such, from Olivi’s vantage 
point, the friars were obligated to exercise a “restricted” or “poor” use (usus pauper) of 
these goods and use them only insofar as such use was truly necessary.   
 The context within which these questions were debated was shaped by several 
factors including the increasing size of the Franciscan Order in the late thirteenth century 
as well as the increasing number of privileges bestowed upon the friars by the Holy See 
and various European civil authorities.867  As a result of these and other shifting factors, 
the Franciscan Order began to look and act very differently from the earliest days of the 
movement.  Kevin Madigan explains that, “This kind of expansion alone was a 
significant factor in compromising the original rigor of the order.  Perhaps even more 
significant was that popes, kings, and governments all recruited the friars to serve in a 
variety of positions which either encouraged them or forced them to use worldly power 
and enjoy higher living standards.”868  Some members of the Order, including Olivi, 
                                                
 866 It should be noted, if only in passing, that Olivi’s opponents generally agreed that a form of 
usus pauper was indeed integral to the Franciscan charism in that “restricted” or “poor” use of things 
aligned with the general sentiment of Francis of Assisi’s earliest way of life. However, where they departed 
from Olivi and Olivi’s followers is in asserting that usus pauper was not—in fact, could not—be part of the 
Franciscan vow of sine proprio given that they believed usus pauper was too vague a concept and therefore 
result in a dangerous position, spiritually and physically: Spiritually in terms of risking a commitment of 
mortal sin in breaking ones vows inadvertently due to the commitment to usus pauper and physically in 
terms of friars who might scrupulously avoid prudential planning for basic needs (food, shelter, etc.) out of 
fear of violating usus pauper.  Olivi’s opponents maintained that the Rule only bind the friars to renounce 
ownership of property and goods. For more, see the excellent studies Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty; 
and Giacomo Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society, trans. Donatella 
Melucci (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2009). 
 867 For more on the background, see Madigan, Olivi and the Interpretation of Matthew in the High 
Middle Ages, 64-66; Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty, 1-30; and Luigi Pellegrini, Insediamenti 
Francescani nell’Italia del duecento (Rome: Laurentianum Press, 1984), esp. 185 n.58. 
 868 Madigan, Olivi and the Interpretation of Matthew in the High Middle Ages, 64-65. 
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critiqued what they perceived to be a clear violation of the vow of poverty.  Those in 
favor of the more lax, comfortable, and even powerful lifestyle argued that no violation 
of the evangelical counsels was taking place because the friars still, technically, did not 
“own” the property or goods they were using.  This interpretation could also be seen as 
supported by the papal decrees of the late thirteenth century in which the Holy See 
claimed that any properties or goods utilized by the Franciscan friars were, in fact, 
“owned” by the papacy, thereby freeing the friars from the onerous burdens of daily 
precariousness once envisioned and lived by the earliest members of the nascent 
Franciscan movement.869   
 To understand what Olivi meant by usus pauper, we have to remember that Olivi 
was both a theologian and someone well trained in the mercantile economic systems of 
the middle and late thirteenth century, a fact which has often been overlooked.870  Olivi 
was concerned with the seeming disconnect between discernment about what was of 
“actual necessity” and what was, for lack of a better term, merely a “luxury.”  Olivi spells 
out how one could make a distinction between what was necessary and superfluous in 
Question IX of his Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica, which was the first of his two 
major writings on usus pauper; the other was Tractatus de Usu Paupere (both were 
written in the period between 1279-1283).871 
 
                                                
 869 In particular, see the papal constitutions and bulls: Pope Gregory IX, “Quo Elongati,” (1230), 
in FAED 1:570-575; Pope Innocent IV, “Ordinem Vestrum,”(1245), in FAED 2:774-779; Pope Nicholas 
III, “Exiit Qui Seminat” (1279), in FAED 3:737-764; and Pope Martin IV, “Exultantes in Domino,” (1283), 
in FAED 3:764-767. 
 870 See Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 92-95; and Paolo Grossi, Il Dominio e le Cose: Percezioni 
Medievali e Moderne dei Dritti Reali (Milano: Editrice Giuffré, 1992). 
 871 The critical editions of both texts can be found in Petrus Ioannis Olivi, De Usu Paupere: The 
Quaestio and the Tractatus, ed. David Burr (Perth: University of W. Australia Press, 1992).  For the sake of 
simplicity, future references to this edition will simply be cited with the attribution “Olivi” followed by the 
particular treatise and page number unless otherwise noted. 
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We need to evaluate differently the measure of excess in the use of things 
according to the diversity that exists among things that can be used.  As it 
happens, there are some things we regularly and often need in great 
quantity that can be kept and, in fact, usually are.  Such is the case with 
bread and wine.  However, there are other things that we need regularly in 
moderate quantities that cannot be kept in reserve, and one can have them 
only by means of growing them continuously.  Such is the case with 
vegetables.  There are also things we need just occasionally and in small 
numbers.  Such is the case with oil and legumes.  Then there are things 
which, much more so than the others, if kept aside, are associated with 
wealth.  This is seen even by those in the world and in common use.  [This 
practice] conflicts with the deprivation that is characteristic of evangelical 
poverty.  Such is the case with the conservation of wheat in storage and 
wine in cellars, however such is not the case with the conservation of oil 
and wood, unless oil equals wheat and wine in quantity and price.872 
 
Olivi’s position on the nature of usus pauper was misunderstood when people believed 
that he claimed a form of radical asceticism that verged on destitution and offered a clear 
black-and-white depiction of what was appropriate for friars to have or not have, access 
or not access, use or not use.  Olivi was an intelligent student of economy who 
understood the nuances of market exchange.  His understanding of evangelical poverty as 
including usus pauper was tied to a more-subtle appreciation for the relativity of property 
and goods as having value and utility in various circumstances and under diverse 
conditions, a subtlety that was lost on many of his critics.  Giacomo Todeschini explains 
that, according to Olivi, “The relativity of this evaluation, or of the social value, of 
indispensable, useful, or unnecessary goods continuously returns to the concreteness of a 
                                                
 872 Olivi, Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica, 47: “Sciendum etiam quod de excess quantum 
ad usum secundum diversitatem rerum utibilium est diversimode iudicandum. Nam quedam sunt quibus 
frequenter et in magna quantitate indigemus et que communiter conservari possunt et communiter 
conservantur, ut panis et vinum.  Quedam vero sunt quibus frequenter et in competenti quantitate 
indigemus et tamen communiter conservari et haberi non possunt nisis per continuam generationem 
ipsorum, ut sunt herbe ortolane.  Quedam vero quibus raro et tunc in modica quantitate, indigemus, ut 
oleum et legumina.  Quedam etiam sunt quorum conservation plus sapit divitias et plus opponitur defectui 
inopie etiam secundum commune usum et estimationem mundi quam multorum aliorum, ut conservatio 
blade in horreis et vini in cellariis, quam conservation olei vel lignorum, nisi forte oleum in quantitate et 
pretio eis equaretur.” 
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society whose measurement of needs and superfluities varies not only from object to 
object, or from one circumstance to another, but also depending on the number of people 
that use a particular thing.  The usefulness of things, in other words, is directly 
conditioned by the political meaning of those groups who use them.”873 
 There is a certain fluidity or sense of relativity that exists in Olivi’s description of 
usus pauper.  For example, we read in his Tractatus de Usu Paupere: “One can deduce 
what we mean by usus pauper: namely, that usage which, all things considered, is fitting 
for the evangelical poor and mendicant. And there can be diverse grades of it: fitting, 
more fitting, most fitting.”874  Whereas something might have appeared necessary to a 
person at first glance, custom and lifestyle actually dictate judgment or evaluation of that 
thing, which is a perspective that previously may have seemed universal but proves in the 
end to be relative.   
 So by what measure should Franciscans, according to Olivi, judge a thing’s 
usefulness?  The most succinct indication he offers for the meaning of usus pauper 
appears in Question XV of Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica, in which we read that 
the criterion is “that use which, all circumstances considered, is more consonant with the 
poverty and condition of Christ than with the condition of the rich.”875  With ultimate 
reference to the Gospel and the model provided by Christ, Olivi’s invocation of usus 
pauper, particularly as an inextricable dimension of the evangelical counsel of sine 
proprio, actually calls for the mandatory and persistent discernment of the friars in their 
                                                
 873 Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 98. 
 874 Olivi, Tractatus de Usu Paupere VI, 134: “Ex his autem patet quid hic vocatur pauper usus, 
scilicet ille usus qui omnibus hinc inde pensatis decet evangelicum pauperem et mendicum. Et in hoc 
possunt esse diversi gradus, scilicet decens, decentior, decentissimus.” 
 875 Olivi, Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica, q. 15, 98vb (MS Florence, Bibl. Laur. 448): 
“Usus enim pauper censendum est omnis ille usus qui omnibus circumstantiis pensatis potius consonant 
paupertati Christi et statui eius quam statui divitiarum, in quo plures possunt esse grandus puritatis maaioris 
et minoris.” 
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use of any goods or property; one shouldn’t simply presume that because he does not 
own the thing de jure that its use is acceptable as a matter of course.  To relate 
authentically to things according to usus pauper is to view goods or property through the 
lens of what is needed now and in the relative short-term future according to prudential 
and evangelical judgment, and not simply according to the licentious standards of 
worldly wisdom.  
 So what does this medieval concept of usus pauper, enmeshed as it was within the 
intra-ecclesiastical debates of the nascent mendicant religious orders, have to do with a 
contemporary theology of creation? 
 While Olivi almost certainly never imagined this concept being invoked in 
theological reflection on creation and humanity’s place within it, I believe Olivi’s 
understanding of usus pauper offers us at least a heuristic for negotiating the tension that 
exists as a result of the defense of all creation’s intrinsic value apart from human 
utilization while also recognizing the quotidian necessity of humanity’s instrumental use 
of some aspects of the community of creation.  Indeed, all creatures require the “use” of 
other aspects of creation for survival.  Previously living organisms decompose and are 
consumed by other organisms to provide fundamental nutrients for metabolic activity and 
the perpetuation of life.  Sometimes previously living organisms are utilized by other 
organisms, not for nutrients or fuel, but for habitation purposes such as one finds in the 
construction of a beaver’s dam or a human’s home.  If one has eyes to see the intricate 
layers of interdependence and relationship among all aspects of creation, it becomes clear 
that absolutely nothing can survive apart from the necessary instrumentalization of other 
creatures.   
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 Just as Olivi’s opponents accused him of advancing a “dangerous” way of being 
in his strident defense of strict adherence to usus pauper because they believed such a 
vision prohibited prudent concern for basic human needs (e.g., food and shelter), so too 
opponents of the community of creation paradigm might claim that maintaining the 
intrinsic value of all aspects of creation proscribes human use of other creatures in a 
dangerous way.876  However, like Olivi who responded to such critiques with 
acknowledgement of the reality of human existence that necessitates the use of goods and 
property, even among the friars, in advancing a community of creation paradigm we can, 
and must, acknowledge the necessary use of other creatures.  There is simply no way 
around it.  Where Olivi’s insight is especially helpful is in thinking about normative 
attitudes or habits the human species forms around this necessary instrumental utilization 
of other creatures. 
 As the friars are in relationship to goods and property, so also are humans in 
relationship to the rest of creation: we do not “own” other creatures.  Once the dominion 
model of creation is abandoned, the two remaining approaches to the absolute present 
order (stewardship and kinship/community of creation) reject a sense of humanity’s 
sovereign right to do with the rest of creation whatever it pleases.  Instead, both 
remaining models acknowledge what we might call the de jure “ownership” of all 
creation by God the Creator.  However, whereas the stewardship approach then assigns to 
humanity the power of adjudicating alterity and serving as a cosmic mediator between 
God and other-than-human creation, the kinship or community of creation paradigm 
insists on a more strict sense of mutuality and interrelationship.  Even discursively the 
                                                
 876 Here we might imagine religious or philosophical traditions that hold a less-equivocal sense of 
creaturely valuation, such as is typically associated with Jainism. 
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stewardship approach connotes a spirit of conservation of other-than-human creatures for 
the sake of the human species or perhaps even for God.877  However, drawing on the 
familial or interrelational framework of kinship or the community of creation, care for 
creation arises as a mandate for its own sake and for the sake of reciprocity (a conceptual 
landscape that will be explored further in the final section of this chapter on pietas).  
 Presupposing the validity and importance of the kinship or community of creation 
paradigm, an adapted usus pauper principle offers us a general disposition that might aid 
in our discernment about what is or is not necessary in terms of ecological justice and 
care-for-creation praxis.  As a principle, usus pauper in this context always requires the 
individual and community to reflect intentionally on the practices surrounding and 
instrumental usage of other-than-human creatures.  In this way, the Christian community 
might learn a great deal from the ancient wisdom of indigenous peoples around the world 
who have in many cases safeguarded spiritual practices and the importance of active 
discernment when it comes to the taking of other-than-human creaturely life or the 
instrumental usage of other aspects of creation.878  As Christians following the example 
of Jesus Christ in the Gospel, we can imagine a way of being-in-the-world that 
emphasizes our own creatureliness and poverty, which, in its own way, can bolster our 
embrace of a discerning spirit of usus pauper.  Christopher Franks expresses this 
disposition well when he writes: “What becomes evident in the life of Christ…is that 
humanity is called toward a universal love that aims to encompass all things, and that the 
                                                
 877 For example, on the discursive quality of stewardship, see John A. Cuddeback, “Restoring 
Land Stewardship through Household Practice,” in On Earth as it is in Heaven: Cultivating a 
Contemporary Theology of Creation, ed. David Vincent Meconi (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2016), 146-158. 
 878 For a phenomenological engagement with several indigenous traditions, see David Abram, The 
Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1996). 
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universality and trustworthiness of this aim invites us to a defenselessness that refuses 
many of the means of security and barriers we might otherwise have thought appropriate.  
In this way, we learn just how far we can go in ‘allowing ourselves to go on being 
created.”879   
 In sum, one aspect of evangelical poverty that is constitutive of Christian 
discipleship—far and beyond more basic than even the particularities of that communal 
living of religious orders—is a call to recognize, come to terms with, and embrace that 
poverty of human creatureliness that begins with our cosmically communal dependence.  
It is within this context of poverty that Peter of John Olivi’s defense of usus pauper 
provides us with a dynamic and reflective lens through which to frame questions of 
instrumental use while concurrently maintaining each aspect of creation’s intrinsic worth, 
all within in a spirit of discernment. 
 
F. Pietas: Reconceiving the Praxis of Creational Kinship 
 In the final section of this chapter we return to Bonaventure in order to examine 
briefly the way his theological reflection on and use of pietas offers us insight regarding 
theology of creation.  Whereas the insights of Olivi’s conceptualization and defense of 
usus pauper arose within the particular context of interpreting the evangelical counsels 
and debates about the Franciscan expression of poverty, thereby requiring creative 
appropriation and application of the concept for use in a contemporary theology of 
                                                
 879 Christopher A. Franks, “Knowing Our Place: Poverty and Providence,” in On Earth as it is in 
Heaven, 208. 
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creation, Bonaventure’s use of pietas is at times tied directly to creation.880  Bonaventure 
develops a robust theology of the virtue piety (pietas), which does not align with the 
popular connotation in contemporary parlance as that quality of being “religious” or 
“reverent,” especially in a devotional or affective manner.  Instead, the starting point for 
Bonaventure’s explication of pietas is at once etymological and historical.   
 Bonaventure returns to the Roman civil understanding of pietas as a key virtue of 
the citizen.881  In the Roman context, pietas was understood primarily in filial terms 
relating to the care of one’s parents and, secondarily, to other family members, the dead, 
and deities.882  Bonaventure’s use of pietas appears most prominently in chapter three of 
his Collationes de Septem Donis Spiritus Sancti, in which the Seraphic Doctor examines 
each of the classic gifts of the Holy Spirit.883  The recurring theme of exemplarity that 
otherwise appears frequently throughout Bonaventure’s work on Christology can be also 
found operating in his reflection on pietas as a gift of the Spirit.  Bonaventure highlights 
the filial dimension of Christ’s pietas in terms of the motivation for the entirety of the 
Paschal Mystery: 
 
                                                
 880 This is seen most explicitly in his Legenda Maior. For the full text, see Bonaventure, The 
Major Legend of Saint Francis (1260-1263), in FAED 2:525-649 (Opera Omnia VIII:504a-549b).  
Hereafter, Legenda Maior. 
 881 For a detailed overview of the development of pietas within the theological tradition from 
Ancient Rome through the Middle Ages, in particular, see André Méhat, Aimé Solignac, and Irénée Noye, 
“Piété,” Dictionnaire de Spiritualité Ascetique et Mystique, Doctrine et Histoire, 17 vols. (Paris: Editeur 
Beauchesne, 1986), 12:1694-1743.  Often the Latin-Roman concept of pietas is tied in parallel to the 
Classical Greek concept of εὐσέβεια. For more on this ancient connection, see J. Rufus Fears, “The Cult of 
Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology,” in Augstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II, eds. Hildegard 
Temporini-Gräfin Vitzthum and Wolfgang Haase, 37 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 17:827-948. 
 Bonaventure also briefly reviews the etymological development of pietas while citing Augustine’s 
City of God (Bk. 10, ch. 1, n. 3) in his commentary on the Sentences.  See Bonaventure, III sent. D. 35, au., 
q.6, concl. (Opera Omnia III:785b). 
 882 See Stefan Heid, “The Romanness of Roman Christianity,” in A Companion to Roman 
Religion, ed. Jörg Rüpke (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 406-426.  
 883 See Bonaventure, Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, trans. Zachary Hayes (St. 
Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2008), 65-82 (Opera Omnia V:468a-473b). 
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I say that the Son of God incarnate assumed our destitution.  What brought 
this about?  Certainly piety.  “Therefore, he had to become like his 
brothers in all ways, so that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest 
before God to expiate the sins of the people” (Hebrews 2:17).  Because of 
piety he assumed flesh, ascended the cross, rose from the dead, sent the 
Holy Spirit into the world, called the church to himself, freed all fitting 
people from misery – through piety.884 
 
While the eternal sonship of the Incarnate Word accounts for the collective actions of the 
Paschal Mystery, Bonaventure develops this line of thinking further in terms of 
exemplarity and our human vocation to model our actions after that of Christ.  It is here 
that the filial pietas of the Word incarnate becomes the pattern after which we should 
shape the fraternal pietas of our human community. 
 
Most beloved!  See whether your piety is that of brother to brother; of 
brothers from the same womb.  Who is our father?  Certainly God. Who is 
our mother?  She is the church.  She has begotten us in her womb through 
the Holy Spirit, and will give birth to us when we are brought to eternal 
light.  Do you not see that as one member of a body suffers with another 
member, so we ought to have compassion for one another?  We are all 
members of one body.  We are fed with one food.  We are brought forth 
from the same womb…we are one body.  Therefore we should be related 
to each other through piety.885 
 
Bonaventure’s consideration of pietas as a gift of the Spirit moves from specific 
consideration of the perfection of this virtue in Christ to a general consideration of what it 
                                                
 884 Bonaventure, Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, III.12, 76 (Opera Omnia V:471a-
b): “Dico, quod Filius Dei incarnates assumsit inopiam nostrum.  Quid fecit hoc?  Certe pietas.  Unde 
debuit per Omnia fratribus similari, ut misericors fieret et fidelis pontifex ad Deum, ut repropritiaret delicta 
populi [Heb. 2:17].  Per pietatem carnem assumsit, crucem ascendit, resuscitates est a mortuis, Spiritum 
sanctum in terram misit, Ecclesiam ad se vocavit et omnes idoneos a miseria per pietatem liberavit.” 
Emphasis added. 
 885 Bonaventure, Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, III.13, 77 (Opera Omnia 
V:471b): “Carissimi! Videte, si pietas vestra est fratris ad fratrem, et fratris uterine ad fratrem uterinum! 
Quis est pater noster? Certe Deus. Quae mater nostra? Est Ecclesia, quae de utero suo genuit nos per 
Spiritum sanctum et pariet nos, quando praesentati erimus in luce aeterna.  Nonne videtis, quod sicut unum 
membrum compatitur alteri membro, sic et nos debemus nobis invicem campati?  Omnes sumus membra 
unius corporis, uno cibo cibamus, ab eodem utero producimur, ad eandem hereditatem tendimus; et 
magnificabitur hereditas nostra, quanto plures erimus, non angustiabitur.  Sumus unum corpus, pie 
debemus affici ad invicem.” 
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should look like in the rest of humanity.  In a manner that reflects Francis of Assisi’s own 
pattern of highlighting the Incarnation as the model for intra-human relationships,886 
Bonaventure presents Christ as the exemplar of true piety for all of humanity.887  While 
such a transition from the specific to the general is understandable, Bonaventure does not 
simply stop with the human person but elsewhere in his writings broadens the scope of its 
applicability beyond humanity to include other-than-human creatures. 
 In Chapter Eight of his Legenda Maior (“The Major Legend of Saint Francis”), 
Bonaventure explicitly ties the virtue of pietas with other-than-human creatures (what 
Bonaventure calls “irrational creatures”) in discussing Francis’s relationship to the entire 
community of creation.888  Bonaventure attributes Francis’s creational outlook and 
recognition of the inherent kinship of creation to Francis’s pietas.  For example, 
Bonaventure writes: “From a reflection on the primary source of all things, filled with 
even more abundant piety, he would call creatures, no matter how small, by the name of 
‘brother’ or ‘sister,’ because he knew they shared with him the same beginning.”889  In 
this way, Bonaventure explicates Francis’s use of familial language for other-than-human 
creatures such that this seeming idiosyncrasy was in fact a deeply theological practice.  
The naming of other-than-human creatures in fraternal and sororal terms expressed a 
relational reality that was not merely the condescension of a humble human being, but 
rather was a practice that reflected the always already present reality of kinship that bore 
                                                
 886 See Norbert Nguyên-Van-Khanh, The Teacher of His Heart: Jesus Christ in the Thought and 
Writings of St. Francis (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1994). 
 887 Zachary Hayes, The Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. 
Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1992), 138-139. 
 888 Bonaventure, Legenda Maior, VIII:1 in FAED 2:587 (Opera Omnia VIII:526a).  The title of 
Chapter Eight reads: “De pietatis affect, et quomodo ratione carentia videbantur ad ipsum affici.” 
 889 Bonaventure, Legenda Maior, VIII:6 in FAED 2:590 (Opera Omnia VIII:527b): 
“Consideratione quoque primae originis omnium abundantiori pietate repletus, creaturas quantumlibet 
parvas fratris vel sororis appellabat nominibus, pro eo quod sciebat, eas unum secum habere principium.” 
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an inherent reciprocity.  On this note, Bonaventure makes a concerted effort to alert his 
readers to the ways in which other-than-human creatures themselves recognized this 
kinship with Francis and the rest of humanity and, in turn, expressed this recognition in a 
natural manner fitting their respective species.  “Let also the devotion of the faithful 
weigh how the piety in God’s servant [Francis] was of such marvelous power and of such 
abundant sweetness that even the nature of animals acknowledged it in their own way.”890   
 In addition to acknowledging the reciprocity of pietas as a virtue found in both 
Francis and other-than-human creatures the poverello encountered, Bonaventure also 
draws attention to other-than-human creaturely agency in selecting narratives about 
Francis’s encounters with various animals.  A representative illustration of this can be 
found in a brief recounting of Francis’s reception of a sheep.891 
 
Another time at Saint Mary of the Portiuncula the man of God was offered 
a sheep, which he gratefully accepted in his love of that innocence and 
simplicity which the sheep by its nature reflects.  The pious man 
admonished the little sheep to praise God attentively and to avoid giving 
any offense to the brothers.  The sheep carefully observed his instructions, 
as if it recognized the piety of the man of God.  For when it heard the 
brothers chanting in choir, it would enter the church, genuflect without 
instructions from anyone, and bleat before the altar of the Virgin, the 
mother of the Lamb, as if it wished to greet her.  Besides, when the most 
sacred body of Christ was elevated during the solemnity of the Mass, it 
would bow down on its knees as if this reverent animal were reproaching 
the irreverence of those who were not devout and inviting the devout to 
reverence of the Sacrament.892 
                                                
 890 Bonaventure, Legenda Maior, VIII:6 in FAED 2:591 (Opera Omnia VIII:528a): “Perpendat et 
fidelis devotion, quam in servo Dei pietas fuerit admirandae virtutis et copiosae dulcedinis, ut ei 
applauderet suo modo etiam natura brutorum.” 
 891 Again, this is only one of several instances in Chapter Eight of the Legenda Maior in which 
animals relate to Francis and demonstrate agency, rationality, and moral decision-making.  In Chapter Eight 
alone, comparable instances involving animals including lambs, rabbits, wolves, fishes, crickets, and birds 
including pheasants and falcons, as well as natural events such as hailstorms and other kinds of weather. 
 892 Bonaventure, Legenda Maior, VIII:7 in FAED 2:591 (Opera Omnia VIII:528a): “Alio quoque 
tempore apud sanctam Mariam de Portiuncula quaedam viro Dei fuit ovis oblate, quam propter innocentiae 
ac simplicitatis amorem, quas ovis natura praetendit, gratanter suscepit.  Monebat vir pius oviculam, ut et 
laudibus diviniss interenderet et ab omni Fratrum offense caveret; ovis autem, quasi viri Dei pietatem 
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There are several aspects of this passage that are striking with regard to Bonaventure’s 
theological reflection on creation and other-than-human agency.  As it concerns the 
sheep, Bonaventure goes to great lengths recounting the way in which this “irrational 
animal” was, in fact, quite rational by human standards.  The sheep exhibits linguistic 
comprehension and expression; the former when diligently following the instructions of 
Francis, the latter when bleating its prayer before the altar of Mary.  The sheep also 
demonstrates a form of recognizable rational capacity in its ability to distinguish 
independently different times, activities, and locations.  The sheep can pray in an 
unmediated manner and thereby relate to its Creator without the need for human 
intervention (as opposed to what proponents of the stewardship model of creation 
typically maintain).  Finally, the sheep displays moral agency in following the 
admonition of Francis to “avoid giving offense to the brothers,” a line that itself reiterates 
the fraternal relationship the sheep has to the Franciscan friars.  All of these instances of 
other-than-human creaturely agency, rationality, and moral decision-making fall under 
the aegis of Bonaventure’s reflections on the virtue of pietas in general and Francis’s 
exemplary living of pietas in particular. 
 Bonaventure concludes Chapter Eight of the Legenda Maior with a presentation 
of Francis’s model of pietas, not only among other human beings but also with all of 
creation, as an example for other people.  This broadening of applicability helps to 
minimize the appearance of exceptionalism in Francis and train the readers to imagine 
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themselves in the position of not only Francis but also various villagers and others that 
Francis instructed about pietas in word and deed.  In something of an exhortative aside 
that departs from the typically straightforward narrative of the chapter, Bonaventure 
closes with reflection on the centrality of pietas in the establishment and maintenance of 
right relationship among all of creation, noting that pietas is the virtue that “binds all 
creatures together” when all creatures—human and other-than-human alike—embrace it.  
He writes: 
 
The hail kept the pact of God’s servant as did the wolves; nor did they try 
to rage anymore contrary to the law of piety against people converted to 
piety, as long as, according to their agreement, the people did not act 
impiously against God’s most pious laws.  Therefore, we should respond 
piously to the piety of the blessed man [Francis], which had such 
remarkable gentleness and power that it subdued ferocious beasts, tamed 
the wild, trained the tame, and bent to his obedience the beasts that had 
rebelled against fallen humankind.  Truly this is the virtue that binds all 
creatures together, and gives power to all things having the promise of the 
life that now is and is yet to come.893 
 
Given that Bonaventure spends an entire chapter, of fifteen total, of his Legenda Maior 
on the subject of pietas and its place in Francis’s relationship to the entirety of creation, 
especially other-than-human creatures, offers us insight into the importance of the virtue 
in cultivating a particularly “Franciscan” theology of creation.   
 Indeed, Bonaventure was a man of his temporal context and social location, which 
meant that his outlook was shaded by an unavoidable degree of anthropocentrism 
common to his era.  And yet, inspired as he was by his Franciscan foundational 
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worldview, Bonaventure nevertheless articulates a notably non-anthropocentric creational 
praxis.  Rather than talking about humanity’s call to stewardship or benevolent dominion, 
Bonaventure raises up the example of Francis’s exemplary living of the virtue pietas as 
the model for right relationship with the rest of creation.  Acknowledging a fraternal and 
sororal bond that is inextricably present among all creatures by virtue of creation’s single 
origin in God, Bonaventure’s emphasis on pietas is call for care for creation stemming 
not from an external obligation or responsibility, but from an internal or even intrinsic 
familial duty, as one would care for a family member.  The tenor of pietas as the 
operative paradigm in caring for other-than-human creation is one that respects the 
agency and particularity of each creature, regardless of how like or unlike it may be to 
humanity.  The virtue of pietas, as Bonaventure presents it, is exercised in a spirit of 
mutuality and respect that celebrates the diversity of creatures, recognizes each creature’s 
inherent and a priori relationship to the Creator independent of human mediation, and 
directs our action in care for all creatures as fellow members in the one community of 
creation.   
 Bonaventure’s reflection on pietas offers us a heuristic in forming the imaginative 
lens necessary to reconceive Christian praxis in terms of care for creation.  The familial 
language found in titles such as “brother,” “sister,” “mother,” and the like offer us an at 
once simple and yet profound discursive frame that harkens back to what Bonaventure 
describes as the originating mode of relationship found within creation.  In other words, 
God’s intention for how humanity should relate to the rest of creation is seen most clearly 
in the words and deeds of Francis who continually affirmed the kinship of the created 
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order and was able to stand in right relationship with all creatures, living according to 
“God’s most pious laws,” as Bonaventure put it.   
 In the next and final chapter, we will carry these Franciscan insights for a 
theology of creation forward and return to postcolonial theory to articulate in a 
constructive mode how the concept of planetarity can serve as that aegis under which a 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Imagining a Postcolonial Franciscan Theology of Creation 
 
 The preceding chapters have identified and engaged a number of key loci 
pertaining to the development of a contemporary theology of creation, including an 
historical survey and analysis of past and present theological models, scriptural exegesis 
and theological ressourcement, and the identification and explication of critical 
postcolonial theoretical insight and under-examined Franciscan theological resources.  
Each of the previous six chapters could be linked in a series of pairs highlighting 
intellectual and critical complementarity, which builds on the foundational work of 
earlier chapters.  For example, the primary aim of chapter one is to identify the key 
sources for and trace the development of the so-called stewardship model of creation.  
What resulted is a combined historiography of stewardship—as well as its paradigmatic 
forebear, the dominion model—and a general modeling or preliminary typography of its 
some central characteristics.  Chapter one’s complement is found in chapter two, which 
presents a manifold theological and philosophical critique of the stewardship model as 
identified in the first chapter.  Similarly, chapters three and four could be considered a 
related unit, each presenting an in-depth examination of the resources for a community of 
creation paradigm within the canonical scriptural and historical theological tradition, 
respectively.  Finally, in light of the exegetical and historical work of the preceding parts, 
chapters five and six work together to lay the foundation for a constructive theology of 
creation.  The theoretical and theological engagement between and constructive synthesis 
of these last two chapters is the primary focus of this conclusion.   
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 This concluding chapter is organized into four parts: (a) the first section offers an 
overview of what is meant in this project by imagination and its role in a constructive 
theology of creation; (b) it is in the second section, organized into three subsections, that 
the work of engaging the critical postcolonial theory of chapter five with the Franciscan 
theological supplément of chapter six proceeds; (c) the third section continues the project 
of engaging postcolonial theory with particular attention to the ethical heuristic that 
emerges from a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation; (d) and, finally, this chapter 
concludes with a brief recapitulative section. 
 
A. A Hermeneutic of Theological Imagination 
 Gordon Kaufman’s instructive reminder that “theology is human work…done for 
humans for human purposes” is useful to recall as we embark on the constructive work of 
imagining a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation according to planetarity.894  
With this truism in mind, Kaufman further exhorts theologians to recall that, “Theology 
also serves human purposes and needs, and should be judged in terms of the adequacy 
with which it is fulfilling the objectives we humans have set for it.”895  The intention of 
the first two chapters of this project was aimed at precisely this sort of evaluation of 
theology received according to a widely held model, that of stewardship.  Judged here as 
both inadequate and untenable according to several theological and philosophical criteria, 
we are left with a need for a new approach.  Several theologians, including Elizabeth 
Johnson and Denis Edwards, among others, have made promising gestures toward a 
model framed according to kinship or the community of creation.  However, despite the 
                                                
 894 See Gordon D. Kaufman, The Theological Imagination: Constructing the Concept of God 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), 263. 
 895 Kaufman, The Theological Imagination, 264. 
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growing recognition of the need for something new, the task of developing a new 
approach in a substantive way still remains.  In light of this need, I have been arguing that 
a constructive engagement between postcolonial theory and the Franciscan theological 
tradition offers us a way forward.  But such an enterprise requires a great deal of 
imagination.   
 In the wake of the rise of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” when it comes to 
religious faith and theological discourse, theologian Garrett Green has argued for a return 
to “the faithful imagination” in the postmodern world.896  Aware of the ways in which 
that which is associated with imagination has been cast as the opposite of the “real 
world,” especially in the age of modernity, Green is sensitive to the manifold ways the 
language of imagination can be misunderstood.897  Nevertheless, Green makes an 
impassioned argument on behalf of retrieving the category of imagination in 
contemporary theological scholarship. 
 
It is time to acknowledge unapologetically (in both sense of the word) that 
religion—all religion, including the Christian—speaks the language of 
imagination, and that the job of theology is therefore to articulate the 
grammar of Christian imagination.  Theology must become imaginative—
again, in both sense of the word—for it must understand itself to speak the 
language of imagination, and it must pursue its task with imaginative 
creativity: in short, it must articulate the grammar of the Christian 
imagination imaginatively!  Such a theology (you could call it postmodern 
if you insist) will sound oddly orthodox to liberal ears, for doctrinal 
orthodoxy insists on the integrity of the scriptural imagination, testing it 
continually for conformity to the biblical paradigm.  For God has chosen 
to reveal himself to the world in a manner accessible only to the 
imagination.898 
                                                
 896 Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination: The Crisis of Interpretation at the 
End of Modernity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 897 Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination, 187-206. For more on the modern shift 
toward dichotomizing the category of imagination, see John Kaag, Thinking Through the Imagination: 
Aesthetics in Human Cognition (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), esp. 25-56. 
 898 Green, Theology, Hermeneutics, and Imagination, 205-206.  Green is by no means the only 
person to engage the imagination in theological terms.  For example, see Richard Kearney, The Wake of 
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One of the primary reasons this current project has been cast within the framework of a 
theological imaginary, expressed in terms of the imperative to “imagine planetarity,” is 
because the task placed before us is one that cannot rely on a mere tweaking of received 
theological models.  On the one hand, the task of the theologian interested in adhering to 
the scriptural tradition, as Green puts it, requires a commitment to a hermeneutic of 
imagination that operates with creative imagery and metaphoric discourse.  As we saw in 
chapter three, the Hebrew and Christian scriptures are replete with just such resources for 
a non-anthropocentric theology of creation.  And yet, on the other hand, a hermeneutic of 
imagination is required to engage in a constructive project that seeks to engage 
contemporary (or even postmodern) theory, philosophy, and theology in a constructive 
mode.  In other words, not only must we rely upon the imaginative function of human 
cognition to move beyond the confines of hegemonic systems of knowledge, but also the 
very Christian tradition that serves as the foundation for our theological enterprise is 
itself written and expressed according to the discourse of imagination.  On this latter 
point, Green has himself expressed this elsewhere in terms of divine revelation, noting 
that the imaginative function serves as that point whereby God is able to disclose God’s 
self to the finite.  This makes imagination especially “important to theology, since it is 
the matrix in which revelation occurs and the basis for viewing revelation, as a human 
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event, in significant relation to other human phenomena.”899  One of the central 
arguments of this project remains the conviction that the ways we have been articulating 
humanity’s relationship to other-than-human creatures, as well as to the Creator, have 
been misguided.  Rather than attend to the insights found within scripture and tradition 
regarding creation, which requires interpretation through the lens of imagination, we have 
invested heavily in anthropocentric projections about God’s intention for creation in 
general and humanity’s would-be privileged place within it specifically.   
 In addition to the fact that imagination “is the means by which we are able to 
represent anything not directly accessible, including both the world of the imaginary and 
recalcitrant aspects of the real world; it is the medium of fiction as well as of fact,” it is 
also closely tied to the concept of paradigms.900  Green, drawing on the seminal work of 
Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory, observes that, as with scientific fields, the field of 
theology has long operated according to widespread paradigmatic presuppositions.  Kuhn 
famously articulated the long arc of natural science according to “paradigm shifts” across 
the history of scientific and mathematical discovery.901  Simply put, in order to move 
“beyond” that which is considered to be axiomatically true in the natural sciences, it was 
required that someone or, more typically, a small community of individuals would need 
to think “imaginatively.”  What results is not a fictional, counterfactual, or pretend 
hypothesis, though early attempts to articulate such a theory often evokes ridicule or 
dismissal among those committed to the current paradigmatic view.  Instead, the result is 
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recognition of what is and, in fact, has always been true, despite the widespread inability 
of the majority of a given field to recognize it.  According to the well-known history of 
the natural sciences, any educated person could list a series of paradigm shifts that meet 
this description: for example, heliocentrism, gravity, germ theory, special relativity, and 
so on.   
 Green argues that theology works in a comparable manner.902  From among the 
numerous possibilities for illustration, Green suggests the development and adoption of 
the Apostle’s Creed offers a telling example.  In the centuries since the widespread 
appropriation of this paradigmatic framework, “Christians have read the Bible and 
viewed the world according to the pattern internalized by repetition of the creed.  We can 
make the same point, employing the concept of paradigmatic imagination, by saying that 
Christians have imagined the world according to the paradigm exemplified by the 
creed.”903  As we saw in chapter one, first with the development of the dominion model 
of creation and then with the rise of stewardship, the Christian understanding of creation 
was indelibly shaped by these operative paradigms.  Oftentimes, as was demonstrated in 
chapter two, the presuppositions that shaped the Christian creational paradigm did not 
align with what the normative sources for theological reflection—scripture and 
tradition—actually express regarding humanity and the rest of creation, and in some 
cases the guiding impetuses for the formation of the dominion and stewardship models of 
creation were alien to the Christian tradition altogether.  According to Green’s work, we 
can say that the occlusion over centuries of the manifold resources in sacred scripture and 
the theological tradition highlighted in chapters three and four can be accounted for in 
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terms of a widespread bias against recognition of an always already operating 
hermeneutic of theological imagination.  I believe that, as with Copernicus and Salk and 
Einstein and others, there have also always been theological outliers engaging in an 
analogous mode of imaginative thinking with regard to creation; and among these stand 
those highlighted in chapters four and six.  These figures, including those of the medieval 
Franciscan tradition, offer contemporary theologians with useful insights for the 
development of a new paradigm for a Christian theology of creation.  
 To talk about planetarity requires engagement with the theological imagination.  
As discussed in chapter five, planetarity—as a term in itself—is not explicitly 
theological.  Therefore, any theological deployment of the concept necessitates an 
expansion of its meaning in this new context, while also considering its originating 
circumstances in the field of postcolonial theory.  Conversely, a hermeneutic of 
theological imagination is also required in allowing the insights of postcolonial criticism 
to challenge the Christian theological tradition constructively so as to bolster a 
sustainable, non-anthropocentric community of creation paradigm rooted in the 
Franciscan tradition.  Given the current proliferation of the stewardship model of creation 
as the dominant theological and praxis-based paradigm within the Christian tradition, any 
effort to provide an alternative conceptual and discursive theological frame will 
necessarily be imaginative.  In the remainder of this chapter, we will see just how a 
postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation may be imagined according to planetarity. 
 
B. The Theology of Planetarity 
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 With a preliminary appreciation for the original context and development of 
planetarity as outlined in chapter five, we now return to Gayatri Spivak’s neologism to 
engage the concept in an expressly theological mode.  We recall that Spivak’s intention 
in introducing planetarity into discussions of globalization was not merely to provide a 
novel synonym or comparable theory, but rather to propose an explicitly pedagogical 
enterprise that could proceed under the separate heading of planetarity.  The origins of 
planetarity, then, do not rest in an exercise of policy alteration, but instead is found in the 
imaginative process envisioned in the call for a radical paradigm shift.  While the precise 
details of what planetarity contains have remained lacking in the globalization discussion 
and begs to be fleshed out imaginatively, Spivak did highlight at least some dimensions 
of this new way of knowing and thinking, including a redirection of what we identify as 
the source of alterity and the development of a philosophical anthropology that prioritizes 
solidarity with other humans and the whole planet.  Additionally, Spivak’s description of 
the process of bringing planetarity to bear in thought and in action is tied to her 
appropriation of the Freudian notion of the unfamiliar or the “uncanny” (unheimlich), 
which further solicits the imagination. 
 On the one hand, Spivak offers a technical or theoretical argument that helps 
explain what has been at work in earlier modes of thinking and theological reflection 
(i.e., according to dominion or stewardship models), such as the subjugation of 
knowledge and the particularity of creation.  On the other hand, the space left open by 
Spivak’s preliminary descriptions and then sketched out in something of a basic 
philosophical cartography of planetarity provides us with a useful framework with which 
to develop a theology of creation.  Where there are a priori resonances between Spivak’s 
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critical reflection and the Christian tradition’s theological resources, a natural alignment 
can be highlighted to bridge the two distinct spheres of inquiry.  Where there are 
absences or gaps, I posit that the Franciscan theological tradition explored in chapter six 
offers a helpful corrective or supplément.  In what follows, we will respond to Spivak’s 
own invitation for precisely this mode of constructive engagement: “I keep feeling that 
there are connections to be made that I cannot make, that pluralization may allow the 
imaging of a necessary yet impossible planetarity that neither my reader nor I know 
yet.”904  The aim here is to sketch out the theology of planetarity. 
 
1. Particularity and Alterity 
 As has been examined earlier, postcolonial theory is concerned with the erasure of 
individuals under the weight of colonial logic, identifying when such transgressions are 
underway, and naming the mechanisms that serve as the condition of the possibility for 
this kind of oppression.  This critical hermeneutic redirects our attention from the general 
or hegemonic to the particular and individual so as to help deconstruct marginalizing 
dichotomies.  We have seen how the theological metanarratives of creation hitherto 
received within the Christian tradition emphasize a strict distinction between the human 
and the nonhuman other.  Such an outlook is shaped by a misguided conviction that the 
human person is both the center of God’s creation (anthropocentrism) and the exclusive 
object of God’s focus within salvation history (anthropomonism).  A return to the 
scriptural sources and theological tradition has revealed the errancy of these perspectives 
as well as some foundational sources for an alternative approach.  One of the central 
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factors that contribute to anthropocentrism and anthropomonism is the mistaken belief 
that human beings are the source of creational alterity.  In other words, this view holds 
that it is God’s intention for human beings, having been given an exalted status within the 
created world, to be deputized in order to adjudicate who or what is “other,” and in the 
process arrive at the valuation of each aspect of creation.  This is most clearly seen in the 
resultant hierarchical dualism we examined in chapter two.  
 We can see an analog to this problematic emerge in Spivak’s critiques of 
globalization.  One of her primary concerns is the way in which alterity is determined by 
the colonial logic of “the globe” according to which capital interests and those in 
economic, political, and other forms of power establish and reinscribe systems and 
institutions that determine otherness.  In her advocation of a turn to planetarity, Spivak 
suggests that alterity is not something that is derived from us but comes from without 
despite what the machinations of globalized interests in practice claim as evidence to the 
contrary.  Spivak’s call is actually an invitation to return to a paradigm that reflects the 
cosmos as it really is and not as discrete individuals, communities, and institutions of 
power would otherwise have us believe.  Planetarity, then, is the name given to that 
axiomatic reality that has been occluded by globalization and forgotten in the collective 
imaginary of contemporary (Western) societies.  She suggests a placeholder—God, 
mother, etc.—as the true source for alterity according to planetarity, a placeholder that 
the Christian theological tradition confidently identifies as God the Creator. 
 We can also identify one of the goals presupposed in Spivak’s desire to “re-
imagine the planet” as it concerns alterity in this way; namely, she is interested in 
restoring the subjectivity and agency of particular individuals (and, by extension, we 
 D. Horan, OFM | Imagining Planetarity 361 
might add all creatures), which have been subjugated, erased, or otherwise forgotten by 
the self-appointed human adjudicators of alterity within the globalized frame.  Though 
Spivak hints at the restoration of the agency of particulars within a restored sense of 
alterity according to the paradigm of planetarity, she nevertheless falls short of spelling 
out what that might look like, especially within a theological context. 
 In this spirit, the Franciscan theological tradition offers the needed supplément, 
which is, in the case of particularity and alterity, found in the underappreciated work of 
John Duns Scotus on the metaphysical question of individuation.  In a way similar to 
Spivak, Scotus operates from a starting point that presupposes a source of alterity un-
derived from the human person.  Clearly, for Scotus, the source of cosmic alterity is God.  
As Creator, God loves into existence each and every aspect of the created order according 
to its haecceitas, that individuating principle that is absolutely unique, intrinsic, 
inalienable, and a positive quality that is coextensive with each creature’s existence.  The 
dignity and value accorded each aspect of creation, whether human or otherwise, is 
inherent to each respective creature and presupposes an intrinsic relationship to the 
Creator rooted in divine intentionality.  Spivak explains that humanity participates as part 
of and alongside the entirety of creation—what she describes in shorthand as “the 
planet”—and therefore gestures toward the reality that Scotus expressly articulates 
concerning the universal experience of creaturely alterity as individuation.  We are not 
the source of alterity, but the result of that which is not of our making.  In theological 
terms, we are, like the rest of creation, part and parcel of that very same creation.  Our 
particular creatureliness is indicative of the bestowal of value, dignity, identity, and the 
like, from without, from the source of our existence.   
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 Scotus’s philosophical and theological outlook provides the metaphysical flesh 
for the frame of Spivak’s planetarity as it concerns particularity and alterity.  This 
principle of individuation (haecceitas) offers a concrete theology of creational alterity 
that locates the source of all creaturely agency and particularity in the loving freedom of 
God’s intention and therefore provides an answer to the postcolonial request for a 
hermeneutic that seeks to restore the dignity and value of all creation in light of 
generations of oppressive colonial logic.  In other words, when we say theology of 
planetarity, we are referring in part to the axiom of haecceity, which concretely 
articulates the foundation and terminus of a postcolonial logic of alterity: that God is the 
source of alterity and, as a result, each creature bears in its particularity an intrinsic 
dignity and value not assigned by humanity but coextensive with its very existence. 
 Additionally, the recent reconsideration of the meaning and significance of the 
doctrine of Imago Dei by theologians increasingly aware of other-than-human creaturely 
agency offers further theological support to developing planetarity.  The work of David 
Clough, David Cunningham, David Fergusson, Ian McFarland, J. Richard Middleton, 
Leslie Muray, and others explored in chapter four, has encouraged renewal in 
understanding the doctrine of Imago Dei.  In light this theological call and the 
postcolonial opening created by planetarity, we can return to the insights of Bonaventure 
examined in chapter six, which complement Scotus’s contributions in framing the dignity 
and value of all creation.  In particular, Bonaventure’s theology of vestigium, in which all 
particular aspects of creation bear a reflection of the Creator, offers a possible path 
toward a more-capacious understanding of the Imago Dei within the context of a single, 
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divine source for alterity that all creation—human and other-than-human alike—share in 
common.  
 
2. Interrelatedness and Community of Creation 
 It follows that if all creation comes from a singular, common source—namely, 
“God” or “the Creator” according to the Christian tradition—then there is within a 
theological development of the concept of planetarity an implicit claim about the 
interrelatedness of all aspects of the created order, which can be cast as that a priori 
relationship otherwise described in terms of kinship or community.  As was explained in 
chapter six, Bonaventure’s theological reflection on creation develops a robust 
understanding of interrelatedness and community within the created order, which arises 
from consideration of the singular divine source of all that exists.  Furthermore, 
Bonaventure’s Franciscan intellectual heir, John Duns Scotus, articulates a theological 
framework for understanding harmony and mutuality as attributes of creation intended by 
God from the outset of the divine creative act.  What was explicated concerning the 
Franciscan theological tradition regarding the interrelatedness of the community of 
creation provides a substantial supplément for Spivak’s neologism of planetarity as it was 
originally cast.   
 As we saw in chapter five, one of the most promising dimensions of planetarity 
for constructive theological reflection on creation is the sense of inclusivity the term itself 
holds.  As Spivak develops the concept within the context of globalization and 
multiculturalism, it becomes evident that planetarity provides a renewed possibility for 
maintaining unity amid diversity.  Globalization, Spivak and others contend, strips 
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individuals of their inherent identity and particularity by means of the homogenizing and 
marginalizing effects of colonial logic.  The difference affirmed in the previous section in 
both a postcolonial theoretical mode and in terms of a Christian theology of creation is 
experienced as erasure within the framework of globalization.  And yet, to imagine 
planetarity is to recognize a community of real individuals whose uniqueness and 
difference is the very condition for relationship expressed theologically as the community 
of creation.  As noted earlier, planetarity offers the promise of a community of diverse 
subjects rather than the subalternizing erasure of the “other” according to the sameness 
that is constitutive of a colonial logic of universalization.  Imagining planetarity is a 
mode of conceptualization and expression that prioritizes a cosmic vision of the world 
and its inhabitants that presupposes an inherent kinship or community that is constituted 
by all creatures, human and other-than-human alike.   
 Spivak hints in the critical analysis of globalization from which planetarity arises 
that there is a fundamental dimension of human personhood that is, as she puts it, 
“intended toward the other.”  Typically, this call has elicited responses concerning human 
rights.  However, her call for us to “re-imagine the planet” can extend beyond the simple 
recollection of humanity’s intra-relational vocation as part of the human family to include 
recognition of our interrelationship as members of the broader community of creation.  
But what does that look like? 
 Here both Francis of Assisi and Bonaventure’s insights are especially instructive.  
Through an ongoing experience of what some have called nature mysticism, Francis 
understood that all of creation was interrelated and interdependent, not by chance or 
contingent circumstance but by divine volition, by a decision for creation made by the 
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Creator from all eternity.  As can be seen in his Canticle of the Creatures, Francis held 
that human beings do not stand apart from the rest of creation according to some divine 
mandate or ontological distinction, but are themselves creation, part of a cosmic family 
willed into existence by the single divine source.  Francis engages in reflection on 
orthodoxy (in the literal sense of “right worship”) as the primary mode to express this 
understanding of the community of creation.  Whereas the vast majority of God’s other-
than-human creatures, sentient and otherwise, are praising the Creator by being what it is 
they were created to be, human beings—far from being the sole mediators between the 
Creator and creation—are in fact acting in discord with divine intentionality.  Instead of 
living in right relationship with one another and the rest of creation, women and men 
have made themselves rulers over others, which breaks relationship within the 
community of creation.  This pattern is also seen in postcolonial analysis, which critiques 
the strategic deployment of power in discrete ways aimed at bolstering human separatism 
and the maintaining the ecological status quo of exploitation and consumption.  Francis’s 
reflection gestures toward a response that highlights humanity’s need for humility in 
recalling its place alongside other creatures rather than a concretization of a position of 
singular authority and control.  Spivak’s recognition of the human person as “intended 
toward the other” aligns well with Francis’s Christian mystical outlook in calling human 
beings to deeper creational relationship.   
 The postcolonial critique of colonial logic that results in fracturing relationships 
invites the Bonaventurean affirmation of God’s intended harmony and order within 
creation.  Change is elicited, but not change within the spheres of politics or human 
societal constructs.  Rather, change is needed in terms of an attitudinal disposition among 
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humans toward other-than-human creation, which recognizes the communal dimension of 
creation within which humanity is always already finds itself, but nevertheless dismisses 
due to an overwhelming bias arising from unrecognized anthropocentric privilege.  In 
other words, what is needed is a shift in imagination from an anthropocentric and 
anthropomonic outlook toward a worldview that is shaped by recognizing the inherent 
interrelationship and interdependence of all creatures, a truth that continues to be strongly 
supported by research in the natural sciences.  Bonaventure’s own methodology, which as 
we have seen is deeply Trinitarian, further bolsters the assertion that creation is inherently 
interrelated.  That he ties together the singular Trinitarian source of all creation in God 
with the reflection of the Trinity in all creatures in terms of vestigium suggests an a priori 
relational quality and social nature intrinsic to the created order.  Indeed, if the Imago Dei 
can be conceived as present—in some degree or manner—in all human and other-than-
human creatures alike, then the reflections on the life of divine relationship ad intra offer 
potential insights about the divine intention for the community of creation ad extra. 
 Whereas postcolonial critique raises insightful concerns about restoring 
community and unity amid the otherwise occluded particularity of individuals, which 
results from the pervasiveness of colonial logic, it nevertheless falls short of providing 
concrete and substantive illustrations of what a corrective might look like.  However, the 
Franciscan tradition offers a theological response that simultaneously challenges received 
theological models of creation and provides a solid starting point and foundation for a 
new way of imagining humanity’s place within the community of creation.  
 
3. Subjugated Epistemologies and Creation as Subaltern 
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 Among the key elements of postcolonial theory stands a commitment to uncover, 
explain, and contest the complex relationships of knowledge production and power at 
play in multiple contexts, especially as it concerns those at the margins of a system of 
cultural, political, epistemological, or religious hegemony.  Although this phenomenon 
can be articulated in manifold ways, we can describe this iteration of critiquing colonial 
logic as having to do with identification and restoration of subjugated epistemologies, 
which are ways of knowing and being-in-the-world.  Spivak’s most famous work is 
undoubtedly her essay titled, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” which we examined earlier in 
chapter five.  In this seminal essay, Spivak identifies the postcolonial subject of the 
subaltern as that person for whom self-representation and expression is impossible, not 
due to any incapacity on their part for such self-representation or expression, but because 
the subaltern’s mode of self-representation and expression is not recognized—or 
“heard”— by what Spivak calls the “hegemonic discourse” of a given epistemological 
frame or “systems of knowledge production.”  Because the subaltern does not “speak” the 
language of colonial logic or operate according to the system of hegemony, the subaltern 
always recedes into the margins only to appear as something like a specter that haunts the 
imperial and neocolonial contexts.  The subaltern is effectively silenced and erased, 
condemned to invisibility and forgotten.  And although this was not the primary intention 
of Spivak’s work some three decades ago, this critical recognition of the subaltern, whose 
agency and subjectivity is circumscribed by dominant systems of power and knowledge, 
can help to inform a contemporary theology of creation that seeks a non-anthropocentric 
foundation.   
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 As Val Plumwood has keenly observed, given the way that colonial logic has 
operated over the centuries, we can place other-than-human creation in the postcolonial 
category of the subaltern.905  The expansion of this category to include other-than-human 
aspects of creation is a move predicated on the recognition that postcolonial criticism is 
relevant not only for intra-human concerns, but also inter-human relationships within a 
community of creation framework.  Again, as Jea Sophia Oh has explained, “elaborating 
on the Spivakian notion of subaltern, we should rethink postcolonial/colonial 
subalternization of nature as similar to the subaltern woman as the ‘other subject,’ nature 
(nonhuman/more than human) is the ‘othered subject’ in the subalternization of nature as 
objects of discursive management and control.”906  As with the gendered subaltern 
silenced and excluded according to the process of Eurocentric colonialism, other-than-
human creatures have been prohibited from recognized subjectivity due to the pervasive 
presence of anthropocentrism, a form of colonial logic in its own right.   
 Postcolonial theory offers us the critical tools to analyze the colonial logic 
operating within the dominion and stewardship models of creation, but it does not 
provide us with the resources to propose an alternative approach.  This is where the 
undervalued theological insights from the Christian tradition more generally and the 
Franciscan tradition in particular examined in this project offer us constructive resources.  
Additionally, philosophers of science, ethologists, and others working in the natural 
sciences have uncovered further evidence that supports postcolonial theological efforts to 
restore agency and subjectivity to other-than-human creatures. 
                                                
 905 See Val Plumwood, “Decolonizing Relationships with Nature,” in Decolonizing Nature: 
Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era, eds. William M. Adams and Martin Mulligan (London: 
Earthscan Publications, 2003), 51-78. 
 906 Jea Sophia Oh, A Postcolonial Theology of Life: Planetarity East and West (Upland: Sopher 
Press, 2011), 10. 
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 Following Spivak’s call to “unlearn one’s privilege as one’s loss,” those of us 
members of the human species are challenged to recognize the anthropocentric privilege 
that always already operates in our conceptual and discursive operations.  The way we 
think about the world and the way we talk about it reveals a great deal about how we 
believe creation is ordered.  In a way not unlike Eurocentric colonial logic vis-à-vis 
indigenous communities of women and men in the Two-Thirds World, humanity’s 
operative hermeneutic with regard to other-than-human creatures has been one that 
proscribes and erases the agency and subjectivity of the vast majority of God’s creation.  
Categories including language, rationality, capacity for relationship, moral reasoning, and 
others have been used to limit who or what can be “heard” within the community of 
creation in a way analogous to the silenced subaltern.  It is true that many other-than-
human creatures cannot—and likely will not—communicate with human creatures in 
modes familiar to us according to our predominant categories of language and cognition.  
However, it is not true that other-than-human creatures do not have an experience of 
meaning making or exercise modes of expression or negotiate forms of self-
representation.  It is just that these iterations of agency and subjectivity appear absent on 
the horizon of anthropocentric valuation.   
 One might rightly ask: “Can the Earth (or the tree or the squirrel) speak?”  And, 
like the human subaltern in Spivak’s work, the answer is complex.  The answer to the 
question appears to be “no” at first glance, but that is only when the mode of the receiver 
is governed by a type of colonial logic, in this case it is anthropocentrism.  The more 
nuanced answer to the question is, in fact, “yes”: yes, other-than-human aspects of 
creation can “speak” but perhaps not according to the logic of the dominant 
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epistemological framework.  The rest of creation occupies a place of the subaltern 
because the human beings that refuse to engage their imaginative faculties to consider a 
broader horizon of experience, meaning making, and subjectivity cannot hear it.  In other 
words, one of the insights gained from engaging in the critical analysis of postcolonial 
theory is an imperative to increase awareness of the privileged modes of knowing that 
occlude recognizing the reality and experience of the “other.” Furthermore, in addition to 
silencing and erasing the other-than-human subaltern, our earlier models of creation 
within the Christian tradition have sought to “represent” the other-than-human creature.  
Human beings have, by virtue of their self-appointed status as adjudicators of alterity and 
mediators between God and the rest of creation, spoken on behalf of other-than-human 
creatures as we saw earlier in chapter two. 
 Using postcolonial theory through an ecological or creational filter helps uncover 
the subjugating mechanisms at play, but again falls short of proposing an adequate 
response to the problems Plumwood and others raised about humanity’s relationship to 
other-than-human creatures.  In a way not found in many other Christian theological 
resources, the Franciscan tradition presupposes precisely this sense of agency among 
other-than-human creatures.  For this reason among the others already examined, the 
Franciscan tradition presents itself as an ideal dialogue partner for constructing a 
contemporary theology of creation.  Among the concerns postcolonial theory helps to 
identify is the pitfall of “speaking for” the subjugated other.  As was seen in both the 
writings of Francis of Assisi, especially as found in The Canticle of the Creatures, and 
the early sources about his attitude and approach to being in the world, the preliminary 
impetus or starting point for the Franciscan movement began with recognizing, 
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celebrating, and relating to the particularity and agency of other-than-human creatures.  
This disposition follows from the assertion of the a priori relational nature and 
interdependent quality of the community of creation.  As it played out in practice, Francis 
and the theologians that followed him presupposed a kinship with other creatures and 
affirmed their agency according to their particularity (or haecceitas, at least according to 
Scotus).  Unlike the stewardship model of creation that overlooks or even dismisses 
outright the inherent relationship other-than-human creatures have to the Creator and 
calls for human beings to serves as the mediator or cosmic “priests” to go between 
creation and the Creator, Francis and his followers presuppose an egalitarian community 
in which difference is maintained and yet unity is possible.  Bonaventure’s work on the 
virtue of pietas signals an important turning point in the theological development of 
Francis’s nascent awareness of other-than-human creaturely agency.  Recall that in his 
Legenda Maior, Bonaventure recounts numerous occasions and provides several 
examples of the way other-than-human creatures demonstrate meaning-making in ways 
analogous to human experience.   
 Rather than dismiss the ways other creatures relate to one another, to humans, and 
to God as simply “instinct” or mechanical, Bonaventure deploys what I will call a form of 
“strategic anthropomorphism.”  Whereas anthropomorphism is generally seen as either a 
literary device for the creation of fiction or as a naïve projection of human intentions onto 
nonhuman creatures, what I am calling “strategic anthropomorphism” parallels what 
Spivak has proposed in terms of “strategic essentialism.”907  Although Spivak wants in no 
way to support a static essentialism or gender complementarity, she does acknowledge 
                                                
 907 For an overview, see Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffen, eds. “Strategic 
Essentialism,” in Postcolonial Studies: The Key Concepts, 3rd edition (London: Routledge, 2013), 96-98. 
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that there are occasions in which a kind of essentialist discourse, mode, or image could be 
deployed in useful ways.  Likewise, Francis and Bonaventure deploy “anthropomorphic” 
descriptors and narratives in order to provide an imaginative frame for conceiving of 
other-than-human creaturely agency from the limited vantage point of human experience.  
Whether it is in regard to sentient creatures like wolves or birds, or non-sentient elements 
such as hail or fire, the deliberate discursive choice to deploy “strategic 
anthropomorphism” gestures toward a more-foundational reality situated within the 
context of kinship and the community of creation.   
 Theologically, the use of “strategic anthropomorphism” can serve as an intra-
human heuristic for entering into a more-radical space of creational observation and 
imaginative reflection.  The philosopher of biology and one of the major contributors to 
semiotic theory Jakob von Uexküll acknowledged that humans can, within their own 
Umwelt, engage in imagination about what it might be like to experience the world as 
some other creature.908  There is no absolute or direct correlation between that imagined 
experience and the actual experience of, say, a squirrel or tree.  And yet, to propose such 
an activity as a valid source for theological reflection highlights further the manifold way 
in which human beings have, both tacitly and intentionally, subjugated other-than-human 
creatures by circumscribing their respective experiences of reality.  An ethically sound 
theological approach to developing a theology of creation ought to recognize the limits of 
human knowing, while also engaging that cognitive faculty of imagination to help remind 
                                                
 908 For example, see his A Foray into the World of Animals and Humans and A Theory of 
Meaning, trans. Joseph O’Neil (Minnesota: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2010); A Theory of Meaning, trans. 
Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2010); and Theoretical Biology, trans. D. 
L. McKinnon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927). 
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oneself that other creatures also have their own experience of the world and of the 
Creator.   
 Returning to the postcolonial theoretical question about whether the Earth, or any 
other-than-human creature, can “speak,” the answer still remains “yes.”  The real 
question is whether or not we human beings elect to “hear” what the rest of creation says.  
To hear other-than-human creation is to restore a sense of anthropological and 
epistemological humility that our experience is in fact one among many valid 
experiences, and that our place is one located alongside our creaturely kin within the 
cosmic community of creation.909 
 
C. Some Ethical Implications of a Postcolonial Franciscan Theology of Creation 
 This dissertation is a constructive project of systematic theology and not an effort 
to identify or establish ethical norms or practices.  Nevertheless, there are at least three 
key contributions that a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation offers to the field of 
Christian theological ethics that are worth naming here. 
 The first ethical implication comes from Peter John Olivi’s innovative theory of 
usus pauper and the potential that exists for its application in reflection on theology of 
creation.  On the one hand, this principle troubles those attempts to establish normative 
principles that govern decision making from a Christian environmental perspective.  Here 
one might think of a universal proscription banning the consumption of sentient creatures 
or their products.  While certainly well intentioned, this approach does not take into 
                                                
 909 This has only been supported further by recent scientific studies about other-than-human 
creatures.  For example, see Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2016); and Jonathan Balcombe, What a Fish Knows: The Inner Lives of Our 
Underwater Cousins (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2016). 
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consideration the source of this selective alterity and reifies a strict hierarchical 
worldview according to human-based valuation.  On the other hand, this principle 
embraces the need for ongoing discernment about how anything is “used” (versus a 
predetermined set or genus of creatures).  In this way, usus pauper calls individuals and 
communities to embrace a discerning disposition, always interpreting the “signs of the 
times” according to the light of the Gospel as it pertains to our relationship to other 
creatures.  Olivi’s usus pauper as applied to environmental ethics acknowledges the 
necessary “use” of other creatures, an unavoidable and constitutive reality found always 
within the community of creation.  There remains much to be done concerning a 
constructive environmental ethics that takes as its starting point the inevitability of “use” 
within the community of creation.  And this is will remain part of the task of imagining 
planetarity. 
 The second ethical implication comes from Francis’s familial language and 
Bonaventure’s theology of pietas.  Given that postcolonial theory is emerges from and 
relies upon the poststructuralist philosophical tradition, which is deeply concerned about 
language and how language functions, there arises an opportunity for developing an 
environmental ethics that explores deeper the significance of discursive practices tied to 
kinship and the community of creation.  What if instead of talking about other-than-
human creation in ways that rely on a sense of exclusive human-based alterity, 
theologians and ethicists followed the lead of contributors to the Franciscan tradition and 
committed to a discourse centered on inherent interrelatedness and community?  The way 
we talk about ourselves and other creatures has an ethical dimension that should not be 
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lost, but nevertheless remains a task for another time as we continue to imagine 
planetarity. 
 The third ethical implication also comes from Bonaventure’s theology of pietas.  
In addition to the discursive considerations just named, there is also a need to interrogate 
our Christian praxis.  For example, the stewardship-based ethical imperative is typically 
conveyed according to “care for creation.”  While, in principle, this is an important 
mandate, it nevertheless contains numerous problematic presuppositions the likes of what 
we explored in chapter two.  In light of our postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation, 
there is an opportunity to talk about the imperative of “care for (the rest of) creation” as 
arising not from an external mandate or obligation— such as to be stewards, gardeners, 
or caretakers of God’s oikos—but rather, this imperative arises from an internal 
responsibility.  If there is a deontological dimension to what is typically called 
environmental responsibility or ecological justice, it is located within the frame of pietas 
or a duty intrinsic to our familial relationship as co-members of the community of 
creation.  The Franciscan tradition emphasizes the responsibility to care for our creational 
kin just as we would imagine care for members of our human family.  Again, this is an 
opportunity for further ethical reflection replete with possibility and arising from the call 
to imagine planetarity. 
 Both central Franciscan concepts usus pauper and pietas, when viewed from the 
perspective of a theology of creation and engaged in an ethical mode, presume a kinship 
or community of creation paradigm.  The notion of usus pauper as we have engaged it 
within the setting of a theology of creation provides a point of connection between the 
theological reflection on the community of creation and our actions as creatures located 
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within it.  The ethical implications that arise naturally from consideration of how, as both 
free and finite creatures, we must negotiate the truth of all creation’s inherent value with 
the necessity for its occasional instrumental usage, gesture toward a new moral 
hermeneutic.  This way of thinking through Christian ethics departs from the more 
commonplace emphasis on norms in Catholic moral theology and beckons a more 
dynamic process of discernment and conscience formation.    Likewise, the theology of 
pietas as Bonaventure develops it only bolsters what has been explored in scripture, 
tradition, and the natural sciences about what it means to be interrelated and members of 
a cosmic community.  It bridges the more systematic understanding of creation explored 
in this project with the environmental ethics our contemporary context seeks in an age of 
ecological crisis.  While beyond the scope of this current project, there is much to 
consider in the future development of a Christian environmental ethics built on the 




 In this dissertation I have sought to provide a robust account of the emergence of 
the widely appropriated stewardship model of creation, identify key theological 
deficiencies present in its construction and usage, survey the scriptural and theological 
tradition to uncover resources for the development of a community of creation paradigm, 
and systematically engage postcolonial theory and the Franciscan theological tradition to 
construct a contemporary theology of creation according to planetarity.  The primary 
impetus has been to engage the theological imagination to consider anew the created 
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order and humanity’s place within it in a non-anthropocentric register.  While many 
opportunities still remain for further development and clarification, the invitation to 
imagine planetarity provides theologians with the possibility of circumventing, at least to 
a greater degree than has been previously seen, the problematic of anthropocentrism as it 
is found in the stewardship model of creation.  Postcolonial theory sharpens our critical 
lenses to recognize the multifarious ways our previous theological reflection and 
discourse has circumscribed the agency and subjectivity of other-than-human creatures, 
while also supporting a tacit anthropocentricism and anthropomonism.  The Franciscan 
tradition provides an alternative set of theological resources that offer the postcolonial 
insights a theological supplément, which lends not only a theological grammar to 
postcolonial critique but also introduces an orthodox Christian foundation for reflection 
on the order of creation.  What results is a postcolonial Franciscan theology of creation 
that not only allows us to think about other-than-human creatures in a new way, but also 
gives theologians a new starting point for theological anthropology that takes seriously 
our inextricable place as members of and creatures always already situated within the 
cosmic community of creation. 
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